Search results

Statutory construction and interpretation, important in every field of law, is vital in a field containing a large number of legislative acts and a considerable body of appellate court decisions construing them. For this reason alone, statutory construction problems are particularly significant in criminal law. Many American jurisdictions punish no activity other than that expressly declared criminal by statute.' The Federal Government, which of course punishes no crimes except those defined by Congress, has contributed to this growth of the criminal law through the imposition of many duties and the proscription of various activities relating to the collection of revenue, national defense, regulation of interstate and foreign commerce and the several other fields into which Federal Government activity is continually expanding. Without the reinforcement of statutory specifications, several states punish conduct which was punishable under common law principles. Even in these jurisdictions, the complexities of our present civilization have required definition of additional conduct the community feels departs from its presently accepted standards. The expansion of state government, also, into fields not previously regulated, and the emergence of many types of conduct unknown to the common law, have made statutory crimes of the first importance.

The existence of criminal law is to protect and maintain central values insociety. As an independent nation, the applicable criminal law should be in accordancewith the noble values that live and develop in Indonesian society. KUHP (WvS) is aproduct of western colonial law, of course it carries the spirit of colonialism,individalism, and liberalism that is not in accordance with the noble values of anindependent Indonesian nation. The development of Indonesian criminal law must bebased on Indonesian philosophy, spirit, and values, in terms of ideology (Pancasila),religious/religious, social, political, economic, and cultural aspects that live anddevelop in society (customary law). Nor should it ignore international developments,because the Indonesian state is part of a civilized international community. Colonialinheritance criminal law that adheres to the teachings of positivist legal law, must beintegrated with the teaching of legal historism which is a legal understanding that isconsidered appropriate and adhered to by the people of Indonesia, so that in Indonesiathere is an unwritten criminal law (customary criminal law).

This book offers a phenomenological perspective on the criminal law debate on robots. Today, robots are protected in some form by criminal law. This book presents the different rationale for protecting robots beyond the property justification based on the phenomenology of human-robot interactions.

Current article takes a closer look at the dialogue between the Strasbourg and the Luxembourg courts on the interpretation of the ne bis in idem principle and analyses how it influenced the (non)acceptance of the possibility to conduct both, criminal and administrative penal proceedings, against the same person for the same acts. It starts with the pre-Zolotukhin jurisprudence of the European Court for Human Rights and analyses how the Luxembourg interpretation of Article 54 CISA had a major influence on the change in the way the Strasbourg court perceived the possibility to conduct both, criminal and administrative penal proceedings, against the same person for the same acts. It further explores how the Luxembourg court followed the way indicated by Zolotukhin and accepted the stance of the Strasbourg court on the possibility of duplication of criminal and administrative penal proceedings against the same person for the same acts under the ne bis in idem protection afforded to individuals by Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Finally, it analyses whether the recent shift in the Strasbourg court's jurisprudence, which was also followed by the Luxembourg court, means that the ne bis in idem principle in European criminal law has, on the question of the duplication of criminal and administrative penal proceedings, basically come to the positions which were dominant in the pre-Zolotukhin jurisprudence.

The author examines discretion in law as an inter-sectoral phenomenon that manifests itself in all sectors of law without exception, yet with a consideration of the sectoral specifics. Discretion is legally permitted juridical freedom of participants of legal relations to execute their subjective rights, duties and prohibitions at their discretion, based on the autonomy of will of the latter entities and strictly within the legal limits. The attributive features of discretion include legal grounds, alternativeness and multivariate behavior, freedom of will, initiative of the participants of legal relations, and restrictions by the law and a number of extralegal factors.

»Proceedings ›in absentia‹ in comparative and international criminal law« finds a normative approach to the question whether trial ›in absentia‹ is suitable for International Criminal Tribunals by applying classical sources of international criminal law and combining institutional aspects of the procedural theory, specifically the goals of the international criminal trial, with the individual frameworks of fundamental rights, namely the right to be present. Through a critical analysis of concepts presented as models for trial ›in absentia‹ it introduces a new concept for trials ›in absentia‹ which considers both the defendant's right and duty to be present. The book thereby establishes a connection between legal theory, international criminal procedural law, international human rights law and comparative law on the one hand and – considering the high number of accused of International Criminal Tribunals at large – a highly relevant procedural question on the other hand. / »Proceedings ›in absentia‹ in comparative and international criminal law« finds a normative approach to the question whether trial ›in absentia‹ is suitable for International Criminal Tribunals by applying classical sources of international criminal law and combining institutional aspects of the procedural theory, specifically the goals of the international criminal trial, with the individual frameworks of fundamental rights, namely the right to be present. Through a critical analysis of concepts presented as models for trial ›in absentia‹ it introduces a new concept for trials ›in absentia‹ which considers both the defendant's right and duty to be present. The book thereby establishes a connection between legal theory, international criminal procedural law, international human rights law and comparative law on the one hand and – considering the high number of accused of International Criminal Tribunals at large – a highly relevant procedural question on the other hand.

Article 83(2) TFEU, introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, confers a power on the EU to harmonise Member States' legislation to define criminal offences and criminal sanctions. Nonetheless, uncertainty persists as to whether this provision exhaustively determines the EU's power to adopt criminal law to enforce its policies. The article outlines the core case for viewing art.83(2) TFEU as a lex specialis. It argues that the post-Lisbon constitutional design, alongside principled and teleological considerations, support a Member State centred approach for criminal law competence. This is particularly the case with regard to the adoption of harmonisation measures.

Philip Pettit has made central to modern republican theory a distinctive account of freedom—republican freedom. On this account, I am not free solely because I can make choices without interference. I am truly free, only if that non-interference does not itself depend on another's forbearance (what Pettit calls 'formal' freedom). Pettit believes that the principal justification for the traditional focus of the criminal law is that it constitutes a bulwark against domination. I will, in part, be considering the merits of this claim. Is the importance of the orthodox realm of the criminal law solely or mainly explained by the wish to protect people from domination? In short, the answer is that it is not. Across the board, the criminal law rightly protects us equally from threats to what Pettit calls 'effective,' as opposed to formal, republican freedom. I will develop my critique of Pettit's account of criminal law, in part to raise questions about the role of 'domination' in political theory, and about whether it poses a significant challenge to liberal accounts of criminal law.