Search results

Seit Beginn der 90er Jahre wird die Vergabe von Entwicklungshilfe an die Beachtung der Menschenrechte gekoppelt, Entwicklungshilfe wird für Positivmaßnahmen und als Druckmittel zur Förderung der Menschenrechte genutzt. Erfahrungen mit politischer Konditionalität westlicher Geberländer am Beispiel Kenias und mit Positivmaßnahmen der Europäischen Kommission werden dargestellt. Die Positivmaßnahmen wurden in einer Evaluierung von 64 Projekten in 6 Entwicklungsländern, darunter drei afrikanischen, untersucht. Die gewonnenen Ergebnisse werden unterteilt nach den Empfängersektoren dargestellt: Legislative, Exekutive und Judikative, Nichtregierungsorganisationen, die im Bereich der Menschenrechte und der Demokratisierung arbeiten, und unabhängiger Journalismus. Die länderübergreifenden Schlußfolgerungen basieren auf einer Unterteilung der Empfängerländer nach verschiedenen Typen politischer Systeme. Danach müssen die zu ergreifenden Maßnahmen von den politischen Strukturen und Machtverhältnissen im jeweiligen Land abhängen. (DÜI-Wgm)

Analyse der spanischen Nahostpolitik und der Entwicklung der bilateralen Beziehungen zu Marokko und den übrigen nordafrikanischen Staaten seit 1976 vor allem im Hinblick auf die Veränderungen gegenüber der Franco-Ära infolge der Demokratisierung Spaniens. Die spanischen Erfolge in der Region bei der Durchsetzung politischer, Sicherheits- und wirtschaftlicher Interessen resultieren wesentlich aus dem nationalen Konsens über die Prioritäten der Außen- und Außenwirtschaftspolitik. (DÜI-Hns)

Over the last few days, there has been a flurry of news reports confirming that U.S. policy regarding Gaza is firmly based on revitalizing the Palestinian Authority (PA). This policy is part of the standard Great Power diplomatic toolkit aimed at empowering a supposed Third Force as a way out of a political and military nightmare. Alas, the record shows that Third Force policies are most often chimeras, not solutions, and that the choice boils down to cutting a deal with the group that is beyond the pale, or else accepting war for the indefinite future.One of the first Third Force policies took place just over a century ago, when the UK, fighting an insurgency in Ireland, looked for a political grouping that would be intermediate between the now-discredited system of direct rule and the demonized Sinn Fein. For several years, Lloyd George pursued a will o' the wisp Gladstoneism, creating and backing a Southern Irish Parliament; but in the end, was forced to abandon this idea and invite Sinn Fein's own Eamon de Valera himself to London to negotiate what became the Free State.Fast forward to Algeria, when French President Charles De Gaulle, having been returned to power by the threat of military revolt and having initially called for FLN rebels to surrender honorably, called for his version of a Third Force: an Algeria "governed by Algerians but in close union with France." This alternative to both the status quo and the "horrifying misery" of secession was, a year-and-a-half later, discarded in favor of negotiations with the FLN and independence.One can tell a similar story for other Great Powers fighting counterinsurgencies, such as the Russians in Afghanistan (or, at least in terms of local military dominance, the Dutch in Indonesia or the Nationalist government in South Africa); but the point is that when the United States chases after a Third Force, as it did in Cuba in 1958 (neither Batista nor Castro) and in Iran in 1978 (neither the Shah nor Khomeini), it is following an oft-trodden path. That path is a dead end, and for a very simple reason: the lengthy fighting (or, in the case of Iran, repression) that leads policy makers to hunt around for a Third Force also makes it impossible for any such Force to have more than a fraction of the legitimacy of the foe that the Great Power, or its client, has been combating.Of course, policy makers may decide, for any number of reasons, that they prefer to continue fighting than to work out a political arrangement with their enemies. In this regard, waving the standard of a Third Force may be less a sign of naivete and more a way to try and distract audiences from the decision to continue fighting. Such a decision is often accompanied by invocation of the enemy's moral repugnancy; for example, its use of terrorism and its maximalist political program. The fact that those making these arguments may themselves have a history of both negotiating and coordinating with the repugnant enemy does not make the moral condemnation or the search for a Third Force any the less heartfelt. But it does, however, present a way out — if the will is there.A good case in point is U.S. and Israeli policy with regard to the PLO after the latter was expelled from Lebanon. One might have imagined that, after Yassir Arafat and company had decamped to Tunisia, the Third Force — in this case, King Hussein's Jordan — would have been at the center of attempts to find a Palestinian policy. But those attempts ended, predictably, in a dead end; and the Israelis turned to the PLO, negotiating with the group that their own legislation had until then prohibited them from contacting. Of course, the Oslo Accords failed — a point I will return to below — but the issue here is that both the U.S. and Israel made progress precisely because they jettisoned the Third Force fantasy, and de-anathematized the PLO. Indeed, the boycott of the PLO was always shot through with holes, with face being saved by dint of conversations that took place through third parties. Nonetheless, as a political gesture, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's move was symbolically important, not only convulsing Israel but costing him his life, an outcome which could easily have happened to De Gaulle as well.The point is simple: peace is made between enemies, not friends. Negotiations can occur without any implication that one side trusts the other, or considers it morally legitimate, or that future arrangements can never be scrapped (as seems to have happened between Hamas and Israel, and Hamas and the U.S., on multiple occasions over the past decade). Negotiations in this sense are not a reward for good behavior, but a response to vile actions and bad faith.For in the end, the only alternative is to keep fighting, with the goal of a Hamas-free Gaza administered by a revitalized PA receding like Gatsby's green light. The Israelis can fight for weeks, months, or even years more, with the U.S. continuing to provide them cover; they can kill or capture or exile every member of Hamas; and it will not make the PA any stronger or better able to administer Gaza. It is time for those who pride themselves on their sense of realism to face facts and drop the Third Force.

The Chemistry-Aerosol Mediterranean Experiment (ChArMEx; http://charmex.lsce.ipsl.fr) is a collaborative research program federating international activities to investigate Mediterranean regional chemistry-climate interactions. A special observing period (SOP-1a) including intensive airborne measurements was performed in the framework of the Aerosol Direct Radiative Impact on the regional climate in the MEDiterranean region (ADRIMED) project during the Mediterranean dry season over the western and central Mediterranean basins, with a focus on aerosol-radiation measurements and their modeling. The SOP-1a took place from 11 June to 5 July 2013. Airborne measurements were made by both the ATR-42 and F-20 French research aircraft operated from Sardinia (Italy) and instrumented for in situ and remote-sensing measurements, respectively, and by sounding and drifting balloons, launched in Minorca. The experimental setup also involved several ground-based measurement sites on islands including two ground-based reference stations in Corsica and Lampedusa and secondary monitoring sites in Minorca and Sicily. Additional measurements including lidar profiling were also performed on alert during aircraft operations at EARLINET/ACTRIS stations at Granada and Barcelona in Spain, and in southern Italy. Remote-sensing aerosol products from satellites (MSG/SEVIRI, MODIS) and from the AERONET/PHOTONS network were also used. Dedicated meso-scale and regional modeling experiments were performed in relation to this observational effort. We provide here an overview of the different surface and aircraft observations deployed during the ChArMEx/ADRIMED period and of associated modeling studies together with an analysis of the synoptic conditions that determined the aerosol emission and transport. Meteorological conditions observed during this campaign (moderate temperatures and southern flows) were not favorable to producing high levels of atmospheric pollutants or intense biomass burning events in the region. However, numerous mineral dust plumes were observed during the campaign, with the main sources located in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, leading to aerosol optical depth (AOD) values ranging between 0.2 and 0.6 (at 440 nm) over the western and central Mediterranean basins. One important point of this experiment concerns the direct observations of aerosol extinction onboard the ATR-42, using the CAPS system, showing local maxima reaching up to 150Mm(-1) within the dust plume. Non-negligible aerosol extinction (about 50Mm(-1)) has also been observed within the marine boundary layer (MBL). By combining the ATR- 42 extinction coefficient observations with absorption and scattering measurements, we performed a complete optical closure revealing excellent agreement with estimated optical properties. This additional information on extinction properties has allowed calculation of the dust single scattering albedo (SSA) with a high level of confidence over the western Mediterranean. Our results show a moderate variability from 0.90 to 1.00 (at 530 nm) for all flights studied compared to that reported in the literature on this optical parameter. Our results underline also a relatively low difference in SSA with values derived near dust sources. In parallel, active remote-sensing observations from the surface and onboard the F-20 aircraft suggest a complex vertical structure of particles and distinct aerosol layers with sea spray and pollution located within the MBL, and mineral dust and/or aged North American smoke particles located above (up to 6–7 km in altitude). Aircraft and balloon-borne observations allow one to investigate the vertical structure of the aerosol size distribution showing particles characterized by a large size (> 10 μm in diameter) within dust plumes. In most of cases, a coarse mode characterized by an effective diameter ranging between 5 and 10 μm, has been detected above the MBL. In terms of shortwave (SW) direct forcing, in situ surface and aircraft observations have been merged and used as inputs in 1-D radiative transfer codes for calculating the aerosol direct radiative forcing (DRF). Results show significant surface SW instantaneous forcing (up to (-90)Wm(-2) at noon). Aircraft observations provide also original estimates of the vertical structure of SW and LW radiative heating revealing significant instantaneous values of about 5 K per day in the solar spectrum (for a solar angle of 30 ) within the dust layer. Associated 3-D modeling studies from regional climate (RCM) and chemistry transport (CTM) models indicate a relatively good agreement for simulated AOD compared with observations from the AERONET/PHOTONS network and satellite data, especially for long-range dust transport. Calculations of the 3-D SW (clear-sky) surface DRF indicate an average of about -10 to -20Wm(-2) (for the whole period) over the Mediterranean Sea together with maxima (-50Wm(-2)) over northern Africa. The top of the atmosphere (TOA) DRF is shown to be highly variable within the domain, due to moderate absorbing properties of dust and changes in the surface albedo. Indeed, 3-D simulations indicate negative forcing over the Mediterranean Sea and Europe and positive forcing over northern Africa. Finally, a multiyear simulation, performed for the 2003 to 2009 period and including an ocean–atmosphere (O–A) coupling, underlines the impact of the aerosol direct radiative forcing on the sea surface temperature, O–A fluxes and the hydrological cycle over the Mediterranean. ; French National Research Agency (ANR) ANR-11-BS56-0006 ; ADEME ; French Atomic Energy Commission ; CNRS-INSU and Meteo-France through the multidisciplinary programme MISTRALS (Mediterranean Integrated Studies aT Regional And Local Scales) ; CORSiCA project - Collectivite Territoriale de Corse through Fonds Europeen de Developpement Regional of the European Operational Program ; Contrat de Plan Etat-Region ; European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program 654169 ; Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitivity TEC2012-34575 ; Science and Innovation UNPC10-4E-442 ; European Union (EU) ; Department of Economy and Knowledge of the Catalan Autonomous Government SGR 583 ; Andalusian Regional Government P12-RNM-2409 ; Spanish Government CGL2013-45410-R 262254

PubMed ID: 24186907 ; Background. Interleukin 12Rß1 (IL-12Rß1)-deficient patients are prone to clinical disease caused by mycobacteria, Salmonella, and other intramacrophagic pathogens, probably because of impaired interleukin 12-dependent interferon production. About 25% of patients also display mucocutaneous candidiasis, probably owing to impaired interleukin 23-dependent interleukin 17 immunity. The clinical features and outcome of candidiasis in these patients have not been described before, to our knowledge. We report here the clinical signs of candidiasis in 35 patients with IL-12Rß1 deficiency.Results. Most (n = 71) of the 76 episodes of candidiasis were mucocutaneous. Isolated oropharyngeal candidiasis (OPC) was the most common presentation (59 episodes, 34 patients) and was recurrent or persistent in 26 patients. Esophageal candidiasis (n = 7) was associated with proven OPC in 2 episodes, and cutaneous candidiasis (n = 2) with OPC in 1 patient, whereas isolated vulvovaginal candidiasis (VVC; n = 3) was not. Five episodes of proven invasive candidiasis were documented in 4 patients; 1 of these episodes was community acquired in the absence of any other comorbid condition. The first episode of candidiasis occurred earlier in life (median age±standard deviation, 1.5 ± 7.87 years) than infections with environmental mycobacteria (4.29 ± 11.9 years), Mycobacterium tuberculosis (4 ± 3.12 years), or Salmonella species (4.58 ± 4.17 years) or other rare infections (3 ± 11.67 years). Candidiasis was the first documented infection in 19 of the 35 patients, despite the vaccination of 10 of these 19 patients with live bacille Calmette-Guérin.Conclusions. Patients who are deficient in IL-12Rß1 may have candidiasis, usually mucocutaneous, which is frequently recurrent or persistent. Candidiasis may be the first clinical manifestation in these patients. © The Author 2013. ; University of Chicago Tehran University of Medical Sciences and Health Services Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale Rockefeller University Ege Üniversitesi University College London Istanbul Üniversitesi City, University of London, City Comer Children's Hospital, University of Chicago Medicine St. Giles Foundation Université Paris Descartes Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad: PI10/01718, PI06/ 1031 National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences: 8UL1TR000043 Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale Fundación Canaria de Investigación y Salud, FUNCIS Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, MICYT: 182817, 69992 European Social Fund, ESF Agence Nationale de la Recherche: GENCMCD 11-BSV3-005-01 Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria Rockefeller University ANR-10-LABX-62-IBEID National Center for Research Resources European Research Council European Regional Development Fund INREDCAN 05/06 ; 1Pediatric Hematology-Immunology Unit, National Bone Marrow Transplantation Center, Tunis, 2Faculty of Medicine, University of Tunis El Manar, 3Laboratory of Cytoimmunology, Pasteur Institut of Tunis, and 4Department of Cardiology, Ariana Hospital, Tunis, Tunisia; 5Department of Pediatric Immunology and Allergy, Ankara University School of Medicine, 6Immunology Division, Hacettepe University Children's Hospital, 7Department of Pediatric Infectious Diseases, Dr Sami Ulus Maternity and Children's Health and Diseases Training and Research Center, and 8Department of Pediatric Immunology, Dr Sami Ulus Children's Health and Diseases Training and Research Center, Ankara, 9Department of Pediatric Infectious Diseases and Clinical Immunology, Istanbul University and Istanbul Medical Faculty, 10Department of Pediatric Immunology, Ege University Faculty of Medicine, Izmir, and 11Department of Pediatric Immunology, Necmettin Erbakan University Meram Medical Faculty, Konya, Turkey; 12Department of Immunology, Gran Canaria Dr Negrín University Hospital, 13Department of Pediatrics and 14Department of Internal Medicine, Complejo Hospitalario Universitario Insular Materno Infantil, and 15Department of Medical and Surgical Sciences, School of Medicine, University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Spain; 16Unit of Biochemistry and 17Laboratory of Microbiology, National Institute of Medical Sciences and Nutrition Salvador Zubirán (INCMNSZ), and 18Department of Pediatric Pulmonology, Laboratory of Pulmonary Physiology, Hospital Infantil de México Federico Gómez, Mexico City; 19Department of Internal Medicine, University Hospital, Maastricht, Netherlands; 20Department of Clinical Biochemistry and Immunology, Addenbrookes Hospital, Cambridge, and 21Department of Medicine, University College London, United Kingdom; 22Pediatric Department, Soroka Medical Center, Faculty of Health Sciences, Ben Gurion University, Beer Sheva, Israel; 23Department of Pediatric Infectious Diseases, Comer Children's Hospital, University of Chicago Medicine, and 24Department of Pediatrics, University of Chicago Medical Center, Illinois; 25St Giles Laboratory of Human Genetics of Infectious Diseases, Rockefeller Branch, Rockefeller University, New York, New York; 26Department of Pediatrics, UFRJ–Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; 27Group of Primary Immunodeficiencies, University of Antioquia, Medellin, Colombia; 28Department of Pediatrics, Pediatric Infectious Diseases Research Center, Tehran University of Medical Sciences, Iran; 29Department of Pediatrics, Hospital Puerto Montt, Chile; 30Department of ?linical Immunology, Center for Pediatric Hematology, Oncology, Immunology, Moscow, Russia; 31Laboratory of Human Genetics of Infectious Diseases, Necker Branch, Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale, 32University Paris Descartes, Imagine Institute, 33Study Center for Primary Immunodeficiencies, Necker Hospital, AP-HP, and 34Pediatric Hematology-Immunology Unit, Necker-Enfants Malades Hospital, AP-HP, Paris, France -- Financial support. This work was supported by Fondo de Investiga-ciones Sanitarias, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (grants PI06/ 1031 and PI10/01718), the European Regional Development Fund–European Social Fund (FEDER-FSE), Fundación Canaria de Investigación y Salud (Canarian government; INREDCAN 05/06), Foundation Caja Rural de Cana-rias-Chil y Naranjo (research prize 2004), Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (fellowship to E. H. R), INSERM, University Paris Descartes, Rockefeller University, National Center for Research Resources and the National Center for Advancing Sciences of the National Institutes of Health (grant 8UL1TR000043), Laboratoire d'Excellence "Integrative Biology of Emerging Infectious Diseases" (grant ANR-10-LABX-62-IBEID), the European Research Council, Agence Nationale de la Recherche (grant GENCMCD 11-BSV3-005-01), the St Giles Foundation, the Candidoser Association, and Consejo Nacio-nal de Ciencia y Tecnología de Mexico (grants 69992 and 182817). Potential conflicts of interest. All authors: No reported conflicts. --

The recent political events in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Tunisia (2011) have confirmed the key role of social networks (SNSs), as well as online political news in supporting citizens with their self-determination. Furthermore, "changes in the media landscape present new challenges for scholars interested in the relationship between the media and civil society. Additionally, the explosion of the Internet that started in advanced democracies and has spread through much of the globe provides new and unexplored pathways for communication. Moreover, the inclusion of the Internet in the media environment raises new questions for citizens, politicians, researchers, journalists, and government" (Oates, Owen & Gibson, 2006, p. 1). This study looks at the relationships between young people's exposure to political news on the Internet and their political awareness. It develops and applies an index for political participation composed of several variables measuring political interest, discussion, knowledge, and participation. The survey among students in both countries was administered in Arabic and German, while the master questionnaire was developed in English. The survey was conducted between April and June 2010 in Egypt at Minia University and in Germany at Technical university of Dresden. The sample size was 1000 (500 in each country) students from several departments representing different academic fields: three departments of Engineering, three departments of Humanities and Social Science, and finally three departments of Natural Science. The study's main research question was: "What is the impact of students' exposure to political news on the Internet on their political awareness and civic activities?" The researcher started from the hypothesis that heavy use of political news on the Internet is positively related to political awareness. A further research question aimed at gauging the role of intervening variables such as gender and field of study for the relationship between the use of political news on the Internet and the level of political awareness. Results show that there is a positive relationship between using political online news and political awareness. German students' political awareness for German students was higher than Egypt student's political awareness (M=63.02, SD=15.65, comparing to M=45.72, SD= 17.65 for Egyptians).:Table of Contents: ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS II ABSTRACT III TABLE OF CONTENTS IV INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1 POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN THE LIFE OF YOUNG PEOPLE…………………………………………………………………………….8 1.1 INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 8 1.2. POLITICAL MEDIA USES AND EFFECTS IN THE LIFE OF YOUNG PEOPLE 10 1.3. THE ROLE OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 12 1.4. THE LITERATURE UP TO NOW IN THIS AREA 14 1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 18 1.5.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 18 1.5.2 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 18 CHAPTER 2: CHANGING COMMUNICATION ENVIRONMENT THROUGH THE INTERNET AGE …………….20 2.1 INTRODUCTION 20 2.2 INTERNET HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT 20 2.3 STRUCTURE, FEATURES AND PHENOMENA OF THE INTERNET 23 2.3.1 MANY TO MANY COMMUNICATION 23 2.3.2 INTERACTIVITY 34 2.3.3 CREDIBILITY 28 2.4 SOCIAL NETWORK (SNSS) 30 2.4.1 SOCIAL NETWORK; DEFINITION, HISTORY, AND DEVELOPMENT 30 2.4.2 SOCIAL NETWORK (SNSS); USERS, CHARACTERISTICS AND FEATURES 32 2.4. 3 BLOGS 35 2.5 INTERNET USE 38 2.5.1 GENERAL TRENDS 38 2.5.2. SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES AND –INTERNET USE 40 2.6. SOCIAL NETWORK AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION IN EGYPT 44 2.7 CONCLUSION 47 CHAPTER 3 POLITICAL AWARENESS AND RELATED CONSTRUCTS………. 49 3.1 INTRODUCTION 49 3.2 POLITICAL COGNITIONS 50 3.3 POLITICAL INTEREST 51 3.4 POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE 52 3.4.1. MEASURING OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE 53 3.4.2 MEDIA USE AND POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE 54 3.5. POLITICAL EFFICACY 56 3.5.1 DEFINITION 56 3.5.2. MEASURINGOF POLITICAL EFFICACY 58 3.6. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 59 3.6.1. THE INFLUENCE OF MEDIA ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 61 3.6.2. MEASURING OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 62 3.6.3 VOTING 63 3.7. POLITICAL DISCOURSE 66 3.8. POLITICAL AWARENESS 67 3.8.1. CONCLUSION ON THE OPERATIONALIZATION 68 3.8.2. MASS MEDIA AND POLITICAL AWARENESS 70 CHAPTER4: THE POLITICAL AND MEDIA SYSTEMS IN GERMANY AND EGYPT 71 4.1. EGYPTIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 71 4.2. EGYPTIAN MEDIA SYSTEM 72 4.2.1 HISTORY AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORK 72 4.2.2 THE EGYPTIAN PRESS 75 4.2.3. RADIO AND TV UNION 77 4.2.4 OTHER MEDIA OUTLETS 97 4.3. GERMANY MEDIA SYSTEM AND POLITICAL SYSTEM 81 4.4. GERMANY MEDIA SYSTEM 82 4.4.1 HISTORY AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORK 82 4.4.2 THE GERMANY PRESS 83 4.4.3. RADIO AND TV UNION 84 4.4.4. OTHER MEDIA OUTLETS 85 5.1. CONCLUSION 85 CHAPTER 5: METHODS ………87 5.1. SAMPLE 87 5.2. QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT 88 5.3. FIELDWORK AND DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE 89 5.3.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 89 5.3.2. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE (IV'S) 91 5.4. DATA ANALYSIS …92 5.5. VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF MEASURES. 93 5.5.1 VALIDITY 93 5.5.2 RELIABILITY 94 CHAPTER 6: RESULTS COMPARING EGYPTIAN AND GERMANY UNIVERSITY STUDENT'S ….95 6.1 POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS OF MEDIA USE 95 6.1.1 POLITICAL FREEDOM 95 6.1.2 TECHNICAL ACCESS TO INTERNET 98 6.1.3 THE DIGITAL DIVIDE 98 6.2. GENERAL MEDIA EXPOSURE 101 6.2.1 TRADITIONAL OR NEW MEDIA PLATFORM? 102 6.2.2 WHERE AND WHEN DO YOUNG PEOPLE USE THE INTERNET? 104 6.3 EXPOSURES TO POLITICAL MEDIA CONTENT 106 6.3.1 ACCESSING POLITICAL INFORMATION ONLINE 107 6.3.2. THE AMOUNT OF ONLINE COVERAGE OF POLITICAL NEWS 109 6.3.3 CONFIDENCE AND ACCURATE PICTURE OF ONLINE POLITICAL NEWS 110 6.4 POLITICAL AWARENESS 111 6.4.1 POLITICAL INTEREST 111 6.4.2 POLITICAL DISCUSSION 113 6.4.3. POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE 113 6.4.4 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 116 6.5. INTERNET USE AND POLITICAL AWARENESS 119 CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION IN LIGHT OF THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 126 8. RECOMMENDATIONS 129 9. REFERENCES 130 APPENDICES. 145 A/QUESTIONNAIRE IN ENGLISH LANGUAGE 145 B/QUESTIONNAIRE IN GERMAN LANGUAGE 155 C/QUESTIONNAIRE IN ARABIC LANGUAGE 166 APPENDIX. D. AGREEMENT LETTER TO APPLY QUESTIONNAIRE IN EGYPT FROM CENTRAL AGENCY FOR PUBLIC MOBILIZATION AND STATISTICS 175 APPENDIX. E. LIST OF TABLES 176

'In der westlichen Öffentlichkeit gelten islamistische Parteien als Hindernis für eine Demokratisierung im arabischen Raum. Diese Sichtweise wird jedoch durch eine Analyse der Entwicklung jener arabischen Staaten relativiert, die islamistischen Parteien Gelegenheit zur politischen Teilhabe geben. Diese Studie vergleicht staatliche Strategien der Einbindung und Unterdrückung von Islamisten in Algerien, Marokko und Tunesien. Dabei stehen zwei Fragen im Vordergrund: Wie haben sich diese Strategien auf die islamistischen Akteure und deren Agenden ausgewirkt und was bedeuten sie für die von der EU im Rahmen des Barcelonaprozesses und der Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik verfolgte Stabilitäts- und Reformpolitik? Die Bilanz der unterschiedlichen Strategien legt nahe, dass die Unterdrückung von Islamisten, wie sie in Tunesien praktiziert wird, den Weg zu profunden politischen Reformen verbaut. Umgekehrt hat die Einbindung von Islamisten, die sich demokratischen Regeln unterwerfen, in Algerien und Marokko in der zweiten Hälfte der 1990er Jahre zu pluralistischeren, repräsentativeren und kompetitiveren Systemen geführt. Zudem sind die Islamisten durch ihre Einbindung kompromissbereiter und pragmatischer geworden. In Algerien hat diese Einbindung stabilisierend, in Marokko nicht merklich destabilisierend gewirkt. Paradoxerweise decken sich die Interessen der EU in wichtigen Politikfeldern - etwa Verfassungs-, Wahlrechts- und Wirtschaftsreformen oder Korruptionsbekämpfung - heute stärker mit denen der Islamisten als mit denen von Teilen der herrschenden Eliten. Eine breite Partizipation von Islamisten, die sich demokratischen Regeln unterwerfen, ist folglich - hinsichtlich der im Barcelonaprozess und in der europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik verankerte Reformagenda für die Region - im europäischen Interesse.' (Autorenreferat)