Search results

Introduction By obtaining the right to parliamentary enfranchisement in 1915, women in Denmark strengthened their political citizenship. On Constitution Day, June 5 th 1915, the Danish suffragettes dressed in white, marched through the streets of Copenhagen to the royal palaces and to the King to mark the occasion of the parliamentary vote. The march completed the struggle for the enfranchisement, which women obtained some 66 years after the 1849 Danish Constitution, the latter granting the vote to men with their own household who had not received public poor people's relief or could not dispose of their own estate. It did not include "women, poor people, criminals and fools" and as a result only about a quarter of the male population was enabled to vote. The parliamentary vote symbolized women's new societal status and initiated a range of structural changes to gender relations throughout the 20 th century. Women's suffrage formed a central part of the struggle for democracy between the different strata of society: between the Right and the Left and between the urban and rural political forces. The struggle went on in several arenas: in the Parliamentary debates, where the male parliamentarians debated women's political citizenship (Bach 2003), in the suffragette organisations among the female members (Dahlerup 1977; Hansen 1992; Højgaard 1977) and throughout the country where local citizens - especially women - organised in networks contributing to political empowerment and social capital (Rambusch 1990). It was never a mass movement and never as militant as it was the case in Great Britain (Dahlerup 1978). From a historical and comparative perspective it is important to differentiate between suffrage for the parliament and for the local municipality and between different types of rights: civil, political and social rights (Marshall 1950). In a gender perspective, the Danish debate on suffrage has changed across the 20 th century. Around 1900, the debate focused on questions related to gender and class as it dealt with an extension of citizenship to women and the poor. Today, the debate deals with the intersection of gender and ethnicity. The Danish political culture and political system gradually came to include the farmers' and worker's movements. After a severe constitutional fight between the Conservatives and the democratic forces from the Liberal Left and the Social Democratic Party, the political institutions opened up for demands from the farmers' and working class movements. The struggle for women's vote was based upon a democratic alliance and it was part of the general political transformation after the take over of government by the Liberal Left in 1901. Compared to Western democratic countries like France and Britain there was a relatively short period between women and men's general and equal right to vote. Nordic women obtained relatively early political rights compared to other western European countries with strong republican traditions like France, and the process was relatively non-dramatic compared to the English Suffragettes fight for the vote (Siim 2000). The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the history of female suffrage in Denmark by examining some of the main actors and organisations from a historical as well as from a comparative Nordic perspective.

Current debates on conscientious objection to military service reveal a conflict between conscription and individual freedom of conscience; they question the scope of human rights and liberties as well as raise an issue of their extension. The majority of member states of UN and CoE officially recognize a right to conscientious objection. However, the flow of complaints to international human rights monitoring bodies demonstrates absence of a general consensus on the concept, origin and legal status of this human right. The paper aims to examine, whether and how the right to conscientious objection to military service has a link with fundamental human rights in the main international human rights instruments. Human rights documents of UN and CoE – two international organizations, most relevant for the development of human rights standards – were chosen as the object of research. The scope of analysis is limited to recommendatory documents of UN CHR, PACE and Committee of Ministers of the CoE, the case-law of ECtHR under ECHR as well as the case-law of UN HRC under ICCPR. Results of research show that in the recommendatory documents of UN and CoE institutions the right to conscientious objection to military service is derived from the fundamental right – the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, embedded in Article 18 of ICCPR and Article 9 of ECHR respectively. However, the case-law of UN and CoE institutions is ambivalent in these terms. After a long-term disavowal of the considered right with regard to ICCPR, in 1993 UN HRC explicated that this right can be derived from the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (General Comment No. 22: Article 18 of the ICCPR). Meanwhile, ECtHR (The Commission) does not recognize the right to conscientious objection to military service under ECHR. However, both UN HRC and ECtHR (The Commission) recognize legal consideration of complaints on the violation of the right to such conscientious objection in terms of discrimination. Till January 2007, Article 4 ECHR and Article 8 of ICCPR respectively were regarded to be the only obstacle to originate the right to conscientious objection in the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in the case-law of UN HRC and ECtHR. According to these institutions, recognition of the right of conscientious objection fell within the jurisdiction of the contracting State Party under these articles. Nevertheless, the January 2007 Communication of UN HRC disavowed the significance of Article 8 of ICCPR and, on the grounds of Article 18, set a task to contracting State Parties to justify non-recognition or restrictions of the right to conscientious objection as well as prove the damage done to the State by the implementation of the right under consideration. A ground-breaking position of UN HRC can be explained by recommendatory character of the decisions, and legal obligatory nature of ECtHR decisions determines a more conservative stance of the latter institution. Notwithstanding, the lately practice of UN HRC demonstrates that this institution claims to embody a driver of international legal recognition of the right to conscientious objection.

Current debates on conscientious objection to military service reveal a conflict between conscription and individual freedom of conscience; they question the scope of human rights and liberties as well as raise an issue of their extension. The majority of member states of UN and CoE officially recognize a right to conscientious objection. However, the flow of complaints to international human rights monitoring bodies demonstrates absence of a general consensus on the concept, origin and legal status of this human right. The paper aims to examine, whether and how the right to conscientious objection to military service has a link with fundamental human rights in the main international human rights instruments. Human rights documents of UN and CoE – two international organizations, most relevant for the development of human rights standards – were chosen as the object of research. The scope of analysis is limited to recommendatory documents of UN CHR, PACE and Committee of Ministers of the CoE, the case-law of ECtHR under ECHR as well as the case-law of UN HRC under ICCPR. Results of research show that in the recommendatory documents of UN and CoE institutions the right to conscientious objection to military service is derived from the fundamental right – the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, embedded in Article 18 of ICCPR and Article 9 of ECHR respectively. However, the case-law of UN and CoE institutions is ambivalent in these terms. After a long-term disavowal of the considered right with regard to ICCPR, in 1993 UN HRC explicated that this right can be derived from the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (General Comment No. 22: Article 18 of the ICCPR). Meanwhile, ECtHR (The Commission) does not recognize the right to conscientious objection to military service under ECHR. However, both UN HRC and ECtHR (The Commission) recognize legal consideration of complaints on the violation of the right to such conscientious objection in terms of discrimination. Till January 2007, Article 4 ECHR and Article 8 of ICCPR respectively were regarded to be the only obstacle to originate the right to conscientious objection in the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in the case-law of UN HRC and ECtHR. According to these institutions, recognition of the right of conscientious objection fell within the jurisdiction of the contracting State Party under these articles. Nevertheless, the January 2007 Communication of UN HRC disavowed the significance of Article 8 of ICCPR and, on the grounds of Article 18, set a task to contracting State Parties to justify non-recognition or restrictions of the right to conscientious objection as well as prove the damage done to the State by the implementation of the right under consideration. A ground-breaking position of UN HRC can be explained by recommendatory character of the decisions, and legal obligatory nature of ECtHR decisions determines a more conservative stance of the latter institution. Notwithstanding, the lately practice of UN HRC demonstrates that this institution claims to embody a driver of international legal recognition of the right to conscientious objection.

Current debates on conscientious objection to military service reveal a conflict between conscription and individual freedom of conscience; they question the scope of human rights and liberties as well as raise an issue of their extension. The majority of member states of UN and CoE officially recognize a right to conscientious objection. However, the flow of complaints to international human rights monitoring bodies demonstrates absence of a general consensus on the concept, origin and legal status of this human right. The paper aims to examine, whether and how the right to conscientious objection to military service has a link with fundamental human rights in the main international human rights instruments. Human rights documents of UN and CoE – two international organizations, most relevant for the development of human rights standards – were chosen as the object of research. The scope of analysis is limited to recommendatory documents of UN CHR, PACE and Committee of Ministers of the CoE, the case-law of ECtHR under ECHR as well as the case-law of UN HRC under ICCPR. Results of research show that in the recommendatory documents of UN and CoE institutions the right to conscientious objection to military service is derived from the fundamental right – the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, embedded in Article 18 of ICCPR and Article 9 of ECHR respectively. However, the case-law of UN and CoE institutions is ambivalent in these terms. After a long-term disavowal of the considered right with regard to ICCPR, in 1993 UN HRC explicated that this right can be derived from the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (General Comment No. 22: Article 18 of the ICCPR). Meanwhile, ECtHR (The Commission) does not recognize the right to conscientious objection to military service under ECHR. However, both UN HRC and ECtHR (The Commission) recognize legal consideration of complaints on the violation of the right to such conscientious objection in terms of discrimination. Till January 2007, Article 4 ECHR and Article 8 of ICCPR respectively were regarded to be the only obstacle to originate the right to conscientious objection in the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in the case-law of UN HRC and ECtHR. According to these institutions, recognition of the right of conscientious objection fell within the jurisdiction of the contracting State Party under these articles. Nevertheless, the January 2007 Communication of UN HRC disavowed the significance of Article 8 of ICCPR and, on the grounds of Article 18, set a task to contracting State Parties to justify non-recognition or restrictions of the right to conscientious objection as well as prove the damage done to the State by the implementation of the right under consideration. A ground-breaking position of UN HRC can be explained by recommendatory character of the decisions, and legal obligatory nature of ECtHR decisions determines a more conservative stance of the latter institution. Notwithstanding, the lately practice of UN HRC demonstrates that this institution claims to embody a driver of international legal recognition of the right to conscientious objection.

No Brasil, em períodos recentes, novas tendências, estruturas e estratégias políticas envolvendo novas formas de parcerias entre o governo e segmentos da sociedade têm contribuído para a transformação dos padrões tradicionais de planejamento e gestão urbanos, como políticas públicas. Esses novos processos e dinâmicas tem tido profundas implicações político-institucionais e legais que se baseiam no questionamento da divisão tradicional entre as esferas pública e societal. Qual a importância desses novos arranjos nos processos decisórios municipais e na definição do futuro das cidades? Este artigo analisa essas questões no caso da administração municipal de Maceió, capital de Alagoas, entre 1997 e 2001, liderada pelo Partido Socialista Brasileiro, e argumenta que as avaliações otimistas baseadas no poder de mobilização e envolvimento das forças populares nesses processos como uma contrapartida ao tradicional predomínio das elites, em contextos conservadores, necessita ainda de melhor investigação. PALVARAS-CHAVE: democracia, governo local, participação social, orçamento participativo, conselhos. SOCIAL PARTICIPATION AND MUNICIPAL DECISION PROCESS IN BRAZILIAN DURING BRAZILIAN SOCIALIST PARTY'S TENURE IN MACEIÓ, ALAGOAS In recent decades, in Brazil, novel structures, new tendencies and new partnership strategies between the public and private sectors have contributed to the transformation of the traditional patterns of planning and urban management as public policies. These new processes and dynamics have had profound politico institutional and legal implications, based on questioning the traditional division between the private and public spheres. What is the importance of these new arrangements in the process of municipal decision-making and in determining the direction which the city takes? This articles analyses these issues in the case of the municipal administration of Maceió, Alagoas led by the Brazilian Socialist Party, from 1997 to 2001 and argues that the optimistic evaluation based on the power of mobilisation, and of involving popular forces in the process, as a counterpoint to the traditional predomination of the elites, in conservative places, needs to be better investigated. KEY WORD: democracy, local government, social participation, participatory budgeting, councils. PARTICIPATION SOCIALE ET PROCESSUS DE DECISION MUNICIPAL SOUS LA GESTION DU PARTI SOCIALISTE BRÉSILIEN A MACEIÓ, ALAGOAS Récemment au Brésil, de nouvelles tendances, structures et stratégies politiques impliquant de nouvelles formes de partenariat entre le gouvernement et des segments de la société ont contribué à la transformation des modèles traditionnels de planification et de gestion urbaines, en tant que politiques publiques. Ces nouveaux processus et dynamiques ont eu des implications politiques, institutionnelles et légales basées sur la question de la division traditionnelle entre les sphères publiques et sociétales. Quelle est l'importance de ces nouvelles dispositions pour les processus de décision municipaux et pour définir l'avenir de ces villes? L'article analyse ces questions dans le cas de l'administration municipale de Maceió, capitale de l'Etat d'Alagoas, entre 1997 et 2001, gouvernée par le Parti Socialiste Brésilien, et soutient que les évaluations optimistes basées sur le pouvoir de mobilisation et d'engagement des forces populaires dans ce processus en tant que contrepartie à la traditionnelle prédominance des élites, dans un contexte conservateur, a besoin d'être encore approfondi. MOTS-CLES: démocratie, gouvernement local, participation sociale, budget participatif, conseils. Publicação Online do Caderno CRH: http://www.cadernocrh.ufba.br

This article is an investigation sample about the protest that happened in many places of the national territory during the conservative governments at early XX century, exactly between the end of the Thousand days War, in 1902 and the power promotion of the Liberal Party through the candidature of Doctor Enrique Olaya Herrera. It is about the social history work the covers a short period of our history. The main goal of this study is analyze the causes and characteristics of a series of social nonconformity that had mainly, a local a regional develop- ment and range to put in evidence some administrative anomaly or ask the immediate intervention of the provincial or national authorities the get the satisfaction of any political or economical need of the community. The causes of the civic protest were the lack of water in popular neighbor- hoods, the very bad electricity service of a private company, the distress for the high life cost, etc. The knowledge of these an other social events are those that are going to facilitate us a detailed and complete view and the historical dynamics plus, of course the analysis of the causes and characteris- tics of the agriculture and union protest which there is a very good intellectual production. For these reasons the article is another piece of the puzzle less know of the social national history that is available to the readers. ; El presente artículo es una muestra de la investigación adelantada acerca de la protesta cívica acaecida en diferentes puntos del territorio nacional durante los gobiernos conservadores de principios del siglo XX. Exactamente, entre la finalización de la Guerra de los Mil Días en 1902 y el ascenso al poder del liberal mediante la candidatura del doctor Enrique Olaya Herrera. Se trata, entonces, de un trabajo de historia social que cubre un corto período de nuestra historia. El objetivo principal del estudio fue analizar las causas y las características de una serie de expresiones de inconformismo social que tuvieron, fundamental- mente, un desarrollo y alcance local o regional, dispuestas para poner en evidencia alguna anomalía administrativa y social o demandar la inmediata intervención de las autoridades provinciales o nacionales en procura de la satisfacción de alguna necesidad política o económica de la comunidad. Entre las causas de las protestas cívicas estuvieron asuntos relacionados con la falta del servicio de agua en los barrios populares, el pésimo servicio de energía eléctrica prestado por la empresa privada de un municipio, la angustia por el alto costo de la vida, etc. El conocimiento de estos y otros acontecimientos sociales son los que van a facilitar una visión más detallada y completa del panorama histórico sumados, por supuesto, al análisis de las causas y características de la protesta sindical y agraria, de lo cual existe una producción intelectual bastante prolífica. Por eso este artículo es otra pieza del rompecabezas menos conocido de la historia social nacional.

Book reviewed in this article:POLITICS, LANGUAGE and TIME: Essays on Political Thought and History. By J. G. A. Pocock.INDIRECT RULE AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE: Essays in East African Legal History. By H. F. Morris and James S. Read.HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE.THE HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE, 1460–1559. By Eugene F. Rice jr.THE AGE OF RELIGIOUS WARS, 1559–1689. By Richard S. Dunn.KINGS AND PHILOSOPHERS, 1689–1789. By L. Krieger.THE AGE OF REVOLUTION AND REACTION, 1789–1850. By C. Breunig.THE AGE OF NATIONALISM AND REFORM, 1850–1890. By N. Rich.THE END OF THE EUROPEAN ERA, 1890 to the present. By F. Gilbert.THE COUNTER‐REVOLUTION: Doctrine and action, 1789–1804. By J. Godechot, translated by S. Attanasio.HITLER? HORTHY? AND HUNGARY: Germ; in‐Hungarian Relations, 1941–1944. By Mario D. Fenyo.THE REVOLUTION OF 1688 IN ENGLAND. By J. R. Jones.THE BRITISH EMPIRE‐COMMONWEALTH, 1897–1931. By John Kendle.THE DURHAM REPORT AND BRITISH POLICY: A Critical Essay. By Ged Martin.INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CONTEMPORARY COMMONWEALTH ISSUES. By Robert R. Wilson.THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS. By S. R. Mehrotra.INDIA'S DEMOCRACY. By A. H. Hanson and Janet Douglas.THE DYNAMICS OF INDIAN POLITICAL FACTIONS: A Study of District Councils in the State of Maharashtra. By M. C. Carras.THE WAGES OF WAR 1816–1965: A Statistical Handbook. By J. David Singer and Melvin Small.ECONOMIC GROWTH IN HISTORY: Survey and Analysis. By J. D. Gould.EMILE DURKHEIM: Selected Writings. Edited and translated by A. Giddens.HISTORISM: The Rise of a new Historical Outlook. By F. Meinecke; translated by J. E. Anderson.TOWARDS THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF HISTORY: Selected Essays. By Lee Benson.POLITICS AND SOCIAL INSIGHT. By Francis G. Castles.CAPITALISM AND MODERN SOCIAL THEORY: An analysis of the writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber. By A. Giddens.LEGAL CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT: Administrative Law in Britain and the United States. By Bernard Schwartz and H. W. R. Wade.THE COUNTRY PARTY IN NEW SOUTH WALES: A Study of Organisation and Survival. By D. Aitkin.A FINE COUNTRY TO STARVE IN. By G. C. Bolton.ADELAIDE AND THE COUNTRY 1870–1917: Their Social and Political Relationship. By J. B. Hirst. THE MAKING OF AN AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER. By Laurie Oakes and David Solomon.PROTESTANTISM AND SOCIAL REFORM IN NEW SOUTH WALES, 1890–1910. By J. D. Bollen.CONSCRIPTION: Necessity and Justice: the Case for an All Volunteer Army. By Glenn Withers.EDWARD GIBBON WAKEFIELD IN NEW ZEALAND: His Political Career, 18534. By Peter Stuart.SILENT POLITICS: Polls and the Awareness of Public Opinion. By Leo Bogart.THE POLITICS OF UNREASON: Right‐Wing Extremism in America 1790–1970. By S. M. Lipset and E. Raab.RADICALS OR CONSERVATIVES? The Contemporary American Right. By J. McEvoy III.THE BROKEN REBEL: A Study in Culture, Politics and the Authoritarian Character. By Rupert Wilkinson.PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS. Edited by G. Parry.CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY: Sociological Illusion or Reality? By J. Scherer.COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE: Propositional Inventory, Tests and Theory. By C. W. Gilbert.GOVERNING WITHOUT CONSENSUS: An Irish Perspective. By Richard Rose.ULSTER: A Case Study in Conflict Theory. By R. S. P. Elliot and John Hickie.IRELAND'S ENGLISH QUESTION: Anglo‐Irish Relations 1534–1970. By Patrick O'Farrell.

Ponencia presentada en el XI Symposium celebrado en Donostia-San Sebastián en el mes de noviembre de 2012, dedicado al tránsito del autogobierno foral a la autonomía constitucional entre 1876 y 1936. ; Los Fueros de Álava, Gipuzkoa y Bizkaia persistieron entre 1844 y 1876. El liberalismo español utilizó una hipotética vinculación entre las instituciones forales vascas y la insurrección carlista para extender la unidad constitucional, acometiendo una reforma drástica del servicio militar, de la fiscalidad, y la reducción de los poderes de las Juntas Generales y Diputaciones. En la reforma, el Presidente del Gobierno Cánovas pretendió atenerse al procedimiento previsto en la Ley de Fueros de 1839 convocando a los comisionados de las Provincias vascas, sin ningún resultado. El proyecto de nueva ley suscitó una fuerte división en el seno del liberalismo español, entre la minoría constitucionalista partidaria de la abolición total los Fueros, y la mayoría del partido liberal-conservador de Cánovas que pretendía mantener, tras una negociación, algunas pecualiaridades en el orden fiscal y administrativo. El proyecto del Gobierno fue retocado en el paso por el Senado. Se produjo un intenso debate en el Congreso entre los diputados vascos, los constitucionalistas y el partido del Gobierno. La Ley de 21 de julio de 1876 terminó con un ciclo multisecular de autogobierno vasco. ; Araba, Gipuzkoa eta Bizkaiko foruek 1844 eta 1876 bitartean jarraitu zuten. Liberalismo espainiarrak euskal foru-erakundeen arteko lotura hipotetikoa eta matxinada karlista erabili zituen batasun konstituzionala hedatzeko; horretarako zerga-sistemaren, soldadutzaren, eta Batzar Nagusien eta Aldundien botereen murriztapenaren erreforma drastikoari ekin zion. Erreforman, Cánovas, Gobernuaren Lehendakariak, 1839ko Foru Legean zetorren prozedurari eustea nahi izan zuen, Euskal probientzietako batzordekideak deitzen, emaitzarik gabe. Lege berriko proiektuak zatiketa sendoa sortu zuen liberalismo espainiarraren barruan, alde batetik, Foruak erabateko indargabetzearen alde zegoen gutxiengo konstituzionalistak, eta, bestetik, gehiengoa zen Cánovas-eko alderdi liberal-kontserbadorea. Azken hauek, negoziazio baten ondorioz, ogasun eta administratibo arloetako berezitasun batzuk mantendu nahi zituzten. Gobernuaren proiektua Senatutik igarotzean aldaketa batzuk izan zituen. Eztabaida bizia gertatu zen euskal diputatuen, diputatu konstituzionalisten eta Gobernuako alderdiaren diputatuen artean. 1876ko uztailaren 21eko Legea euskal autogobernuko mendetako zikloarekin amaitu zen. ; The Fueros of Alava, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa persisted between 1844 and 1876. The Spanish Liberalism used a hypothetical link between the Basque foral institutions and the Carlist insurrection to extend constitutional unity, undertaking drastic reform of military service, taxation, and reducing the powers of the General Councils and Councils. In the reform, the Prime Minister Cánovas sought to follow the procedure laid down in the 1839 Foral law by summoning the commissioners of the Basque Provinces, without any result. The new law's draft provoked a strong division in the Spanish liberalism between constitutionalist minority which was for Jurisdictions' total abolition and the Canovas' party's liberal-conservative mayority who pursued to maintain, after a negotiation, some singularities in fiscal and administrative order. The Government's project was altered in the Senate. There was an intense debate in Congress between the Basque deputies, the Constitutionalists, and the ruling party. The Law of July 21, 1876 ended with a centuried Basque self-government.

In spite of all the good news about the economy and the swift confirmation of Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court, the headlines this stormy week have been dominated by town hall brawls. As congressional representatives went home to their districts for their August recess, they were greeted by a volatile mixture of high temperatures, monsoon-like storms and furious mobs who stormed town hall meetings to protest against health reform. Several politicians, terrorized by the voters, suspended the meetings and ran past the mobs and into their getaway cars. They later announced they would take phone calls or meet voters individually in scheduled appointments. Journalists and TV talk show personalities were left wondering as to the origin of this new movement of storm troopers: were they real people, from the grassroots, fed up with the way Washington is dealing with health care reform, or was this manufactured, "Astroturf" mobilization, organized by the health insurance and drug companies, scared of losing a large share of their profits if a government-run plan is included on the final bill? Most likely it is a mixture of both. But whether fabricated or not, the tone of the debate and the images of scuffles and fist fights shocked the nation and left many asking what happened to American civility. More importantly, where was the President's leadership?Granted, it is difficult to defend a bill that is not even ready, and Obama has avoided giving bottom lines that may come back to haunt him: his larger political purpose is to pass some kind of health care reform, even if serious compromises have to be made. Having taken the 1994 Clinton-care defeat lesson to heart, President Obama decided from the beginning that he could not dictate to Congress and therefore stated the general principles of health care reform (universal coverage and cost control) and then gave Congress leeway in writing the detailed legislation. But from the beginning, there was a deep chasm between progressives, who insist that a public-plan option is the best way to meet both goals, and conservatives, who adamantly oppose the government-run plan claiming it would bankrupt private insurance companies, and see this and the mandate of universal coverage as "socialized medicine". The Blue Dog Democrats, fiscally conservative, have joined ranks with the opposition and effectively killed the public option in some versions of the bill, replacing it with a vague alternative of co-ops (mutual care).The result so far has been a confusion of bills and versions that no regular voter can understand. Indeed, not even those that are following the debate closely can tell with clarity what each version entails. But because health care is close and personal, it is easy to whip up a frenzy over it just by letting out a few misleading judgments, half truths and exaggerations, and hammering at them until they have the ring of truth. Corporate interest groups from the health insurance and pharmaceutical industries are fiercely organizing fringe elements on the right, mainly instructing them to be disruptive of town hall meetings and to interrupt any serious discourse. And most of the average, less-educated voters use "easy" sources of information such as radio talk commentators (read: Rush Limbaugh) or TV news shows which are anything but "fair and balanced", instead of hard sources (newspaper editorials, op-ed and factual news articles). In the end, when topics are complex and conflicting information saturates the media, people believe what they want to believe, what confirms their feelings and their ideological bent, what reassures them they are correct in their assumptions and emotions.It is this state of confusion that has allowed the crazy mobs, aided and abetted by the likes of Rush Limbaugh and Sarah Palin, to make the most outlandish claims, from accusing the government of Socialism and Nazism in one voice, to vociferously asserting the Democrats' plan includes euthanasia (of course it does not; it includes a voluntary option for terminal patients to get "counseling on end-of-life options"). But these are the same kind of people that kill abortion-clinic doctors and nurses in their crusade to "save innocent lives". And exactly of the same kind as the "birthers", those who do not believe President Obama was born in the United States, a fact very easily verifiable, since the White House has made his birth certificate available!The point is, extremists are taking over that national scene and are attacking a bill that is not yet ready, based on false claims and preposterous characterizations. The left is now mobilizing union representatives to counteract the right wing crazies. Perhaps it would be better to cancel all town hall meetings, since it is expected that a bill will be passed by the end of the month. It will be most likely be a watered down version of what Obama initially wanted, but it will allow him to claim yet another victory, another check mark on his campaign promises.The debate over health care has accomplished something that seemed unfathomable only a month ago: it has united Republicans. Economic conservatives, libertarians and extreme right social conservatives are all against the public plan option. However, even if they were successful in defeating this bill, as long as they continue on this course of adamant opposition, they will not be well-positioned for the 2010 elections. They will have no other policy initiatives or legislative accomplishments to boast of and they will still be easily characterized as the "party of no." Their political calculations made them oppose a highly qualified Supreme Court nominee in a futile exercise that has put them on the wrong side of history and set them back at least for a decade in getting electoral support from the Latino community, the largest and fastest- growing minority group in the country. The void of Republican political leadership has been filled by extremist groups and irresponsible radio talk commentators, reducing the party's appeal to moderates and independents.This dramatic realization is one incentive to get Republicans to work harder in passing health care reform in some bipartisan shape or form. But this is not likely, since their preference so far has been to deny Obama any chance of bipartisanship. Another motivation to bring them to the table should be the awareness that, if the rising cost curve of health care is not brought under control, the economic recovery that is starting to show will only be temporary, the deficit will continue to grow and other countries will not be so accommodating in holding US debt. But political expedience on their part may overtake even this fundamental concern about the future economic stability of the country.On his part, Obama will have the problem of dealing with the liberal wing of his party: the left will be furious if, with a majority in both Houses, their version of health care reform does not pass, and the President settles for a weaker, watered down version. Indeed, in general terms, the biggest and most immediate test for Obama will be how far he allows the left in Congress to go before he decides to rein them in. In order to regain control of the health care debate, the President held his own town hall meeting in New Hampshire this past Tuesday. His message was clearer and more focused as he answered genuine concerns and questions from the audience. But to what extent he was able to calm down the prevailing anxiety in the country at large still remains to be seen. Outside the town hall, two groups of irate citizens on the opposite ends of the political spectrum confronted each other, yelled and shook their fists, but the police were able to restrain them without much effort.In spite of the turbulent TV images that have inundated the airways this week, the majority of the electorate in this country is still moderate, rational and centrist. They want health care reform and they want it to include a government-run option, which they may or may not buy into, but which they see as an important way to spur competition, in the understanding that it is competition and not monopolies that help control costs. They also want reform of the way private insurance companies ration care, for example, by denying coverage to those with pre-existing conditions. They are appalled at the crazies on the right, with their false claims about a bill they have not read, and their outrageous claims of Socialism and Nazism, which they merge into one demonic ideology. They are tired of their pseudo-religious zeal and self-righteousness, their insistence on rejecting Darwin's theory of evolution along with global warming, climate change and stem cell research, their violent outbursts, and their tendency to speak in terms of Good (themselves) and Evil (the rest). And they are embarrassed at the subtext of racism that underlies most of the extremists' demented claims, and which becomes crystal clear in their assertion that President Obama is not an American citizen.On the other hand, most citizens are also wary of ultra-liberals on the left, who want to use the Democrats' prevalence to entrench new vast social programs, over-regulate the financial system and corporate pay, and raise taxes to levels that would choke growth and productivity; they are afraid they will forever bankrupt the government and the country.Six months into his presidency, Obama faces sinking approval numbers and the possibility of a major defeat. After a string of solid successes that included, among others, passing an 800 billion dollar economic stimulus plan, expanding children's health insurance, and rescuing the banking system, his agenda may get bogged down in the politics- as- usual Washington culture he promised to change. It will take all his will power and discipline to stay focused, get back on message and resist the blows. His ambition will have to be tempered by patience, caution and political skill. As his aura wears off, the coming battles will be the final test of his courage and determination to succeed. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 사회학과, 2012. 2. 장덕진. ; 경제적 세계화와 국내 정치가 조세정책에 미치는 영향 연구 : 1981년 - 2008년 OECD 18개국을 대상으로 서울대학교 대학원 사회학과 박 기 웅 본 논문은 한 사회의 균열을 반영하는 국내 정치가 경제적 세계화의 흐름 속에서 자율적인 정책 형성 능력을 유지하는지 밝히고자 한다. 세계화의 논리는 국가공동체 및 민주주의의 논리와 갈등을 일으키고, 이러한 갈등은 국내의 다양한 경제·사회정책 영역의 투쟁으로 드러난다. 특히 국가의 물질적 기반과 직결되는 조세정책은 경제적 세계화의 영향력을 받는 동시에 국가의 재분배 정책 의지를 반영한다는 점에서 중요한 지표이다. 본 연구는 경제적 세계화와 국내 정치의 경쟁적 관계에 대한 실마리를 찾고자 조세정책의 주요 세목인 법인세를 연구 대상으로 삼았다. 지난 30년 간 사회과학계는 신자유주의적 세계화의 효과에 대해 수렴 가설과 다양성 가설로 대표되는 논쟁을 지속해왔다. 먼저 수렴 가설은 자본을 유치하기 위한 조세경쟁이 정부의 조세정책 능력을 구조적으로 제약하고 국내 정책 결정에 대한 주권을 약화시켜, 각 국의 정책을 하향 수렴(race to the bottom)시킨다고 주장한다. 반면 다양성 가설은 국내적 요인(정당정치, 노조 등)에 의해 세계화의 영향력이 매개되어 개별 국가가 세계화의 파괴적인 영향력을 막아낼 수 있다고 본다. 뿐만 아니라 다양성 가설은 국가 별, 레짐(regime) 별로 세계화 양상이 유의한 차이를 보인다는 점에 주목한다. 두 입장의 이론적인 대립과 비교할 때, 그간의 경험 연구들은 대부분 다양성 가설 혹은 정치 중심(Politics Matter)의 주장들을 뒷받침해왔다. 본 논문은 기존의 경험 연구가 지닌 한계를 극복하고 레짐 별 차이를 확인하기 위해, 1981년부터 2008년까지 선진 산업국가의 법인세 정책 변화를 패널교정표준오차(Panel-Corrected Standard Error) 회귀모델로 분석하였다. 분석 결과 첫째, 법정법인세율은 경제적 세계화 변수(금융자유화, 무역의존도)와 강한 부(-)의 관계를 보였다. 이 결과는 경제적 세계화가 진행될수록 조세경쟁이 심화되고 법정법인세율이 낮아진다는 점에서 수렴 가설을 지지하는 근거가 된다. 하지만 여전히 정당과 노조를 비롯한 국내 정치적 변수도 부분적으로 영향을 미치고 있다는 점에서 국내 정치의 영향력이 무의미해졌다고 해석하기는 어렵다. 둘째, 개인소득세 최고세율과 법정 법인세율의 차이를 나타내는 세율 격차는 경제적 세계화 변수와 정(+)의 관계를 보였다. 즉 경제적 세계화가 진행될수록 세율 격차는 점점 더 커지고, 그에 따라 세입 증대 억제와 소득세의 누진성 약화와 같은 조세경쟁의 간접적 효과가 나타나는 것이다. 국내 정치 요소 중 정당 정치 변수의 영향력은 사라졌지만 노조의 영향력은 여전히 유효하였다. 셋째, Esping-Anderson이 제시한 복지국가 레짐 분류가 세계화에 대한 대응에서 어떤 차이점과 공통점을 보이는지 확인하기 위해 법정법인세율에 대한 레짐 별 분석을 시도하였다. 그 결과 경제적 세계화 변수는 레짐과 무관하게 부(-)의 관계를 나타내면서 효율성(수렴) 가설을 강하게 뒷받침하고, 국내 정치 변수는 부분적으로만 다양성 가설을 지지한다는 사실을 확인했다. 세부적으로 경제적 세계화 변수는 사민주의 레짐의 법인세 정책에 가장 강한 영향력을 나타냈고, 정당 정치 변수는 자유주의 레짐에서, 노조 변수는 보수주의 레짐에서 유의하게 나타났다. 본 연구의 결과를 종합하면, OECD 국가들의 법인세 정책에는 조세경쟁으로 인한 '강한 수렴'과 국내 정치의 매개를 통한 '약한 다양성' 경향이 드러난다고 할 수 있다. 즉, 자본의 영향력 증대와 정치의 퇴각으로 인한 정책 자율성의 축소는 세계 경쟁의 틀에 구속되어 있는 선진 산업 국가에서 보편적으로 관찰되는 현상인 것이다. 또한 연구 결과는 신자유주의적 세계화가 진행된 이래 정치사회학적 의미의 민주주의 기반이 흔들리고 있으며 동시에 민주주의의 왜소화가 빠르게 진행되고 있음을 암시한다. 이는 선진 복지국가만의 문제가 아니라, 전 세계적인 신자유주의적 재편 과정의 일부이며 또한 '미국의 길'을 걷고 있는 한국의 문제이기도 하다. 따라서 향후 한국에서 전개될 복지국가 논쟁은 국내 정치를 제약하는 경제적 세계화의 영향력에 대해 심화된 고민을 필요로 한다. ; Effects of Economic Globalization and Domestic Politics on Tax Policy - Focused on 18 OECD Countries, 1981-2008 - Park, Kiwoong Department of Sociology Graduate School Seoul National University The purpose of this study is to find out whether domestic politics, which reflect social cleavage, still preserves its autonomy which enables policy making in the era of economic globalization. The logic of globalization confronts with the logic of nation community and democracy, and this conflict comes out as a struggle within various domestic economic/social policy areas. Especially, tax policy, directly connected with the country's material base, is important because it not only is influenced by economic globalization but also reflects the state's redistribution policy will. Main target of this research is the corporate tax, major item of tax policy, to inquire about the competitive relationship between economic globalization and domestic politics. There has been an acute debate about the effect of neoliberal globalization between convergence hypothesis and diversity hypothesis. First, convergence hypothesis insists that tax competition to attract capital structurally constrains the state's tax policy capacity and weakens its sovereignty in internal policy decision. As a result, each country's policy enters the race to the bottom. Diversity hypothesis, however, maintains that an individual nation can protect itself from globalization's destructive influence by domestic factors (party politics, institution, etc.). Also, this stance focuses on the differentiated effect of globalization by country and regime. Based on such debate, most previous empirical researches have backed up the diversity hypothesis or the 'Politics Matter' argument. This paper has analyzed the corporate tax change of the advanced industrial states between 1981 and 2008 by OLS-PCSE(Panel-Corrected Standard Error) model to overcome the limits of previous empirical researches and to verify the characteristics by regime. The analysis result is as follow. First, statutory corporate tax rate shows a strong negative relation with economic globalization variables (financial liberalization, trade openness). This result supports convergence hypothesis by showing off that the tax competition deepens and statutory corporate tax rate decreases as economic globalization proceeds. But it cannot be interpreted that the influence of domestic politics has become meaningless since internal politics variables, such as party and labor union, still keeps their influence. Second, tax rate difference between the highest individual income tax rate and statutory corporate tax rate is positively related with economic globalization variable. It means that the tax rate difference becomes larger and the indirect effect of the tax competition, for example, control on tax revenue increase and weakened income tax's progressivity, as the economic globalization progresses. Though the influence of party politics variable among internal politics factors has faded away, labor union's influence is still effective. Third, statutory corporate tax rate analysis, according to regime, is performed to verify how Esping-Anderson's welfare state regime classification applies to response to globalization. As a result, regardless of regime, economic globalization variable shows negative relationship. This result strongly supports effective convergence hypothesis, and confirms that the internal politics variable support the diversity hypothesis in part only. Specifically, economic globalization variable presents the strongest influence on social democratic regime's tax policy, while party politics variable is significant in liberal regime. Labor union variable is significant in conservative regime. Putting together the result of this study, OECD countries' corporate tax policy reveals a 'strong convergence' due to tax competition and a 'weak diversity' carried by domestic politics. That is, reduction of domestic policy's autonomy due to augmented influence of capital and retreat of politics is a universal phenomenon in advanced industrial states which are confined in the framework of global competition. It can be referred that the base of democracy - in the way of political sociology - is waving and trivialization of democracy is proceeding. This is not only the problem of the advanced welfare state, but also a phase of global neoliberal reorganization and Korea, which is on the way of 'The Road to USA.' Thus, the influence of economic globalization which can constrain internal politics should be concerned in the welfare state debate in Korea. ; Master

En 2016, el gobierno Colombiano del presidente Juan Manuel Santos alcanzó un acuerdo de paz con el mayor grupo guerrillero del país, las FARC-EP. Una parte importante de las negociaciones, que duraron cuatro años (2012-2016), fue la creación de un mecanismo de Justicia Transicional para investigar y juzgar a los miembros de las FARC-EP, así como a los miembros de la Fuerza Pública y a terceros que participaron en el conflicto armado. El nombre de esta jurisdicción es Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP). Desde su entrada en vigor en 2017, ha habido mucho discurso público sobre esta institución, incluyendo el debate en los medios de comunicación colombianos. Los medios de comunicación en línea e impresos colombianos, en particular, pueden tener un impacto en la población, enmarcar y dar forma a ciertos discursos a través de su información. Esto, a su vez, significa que ciertos tipos de reportajes pueden tener un impacto en la percepción de ciertos temas – como instituciones específicas – y pueden alimentar y mitigar un conflicto. Por ello, el sociólogo noruego Johan Galtung creó el concepto de Periodismo de Paz, con el que los periodistas pueden contribuir positivamente al desarrollo de cualquier conflicto o guerra. Por lo tanto, en esta tesis se determinará en qué medida cuatro de los periódicos en línea colombianos más significativos logran incorporar el concepto de Periodismo de Paz en sus informaciones y así contribuir a la paz en el país. Además, el objetivo de la investigación que aquí se presenta es responder cómo estos periódicos representan y enmarcan la JEP a lo largo del año 2019. Para responder a estas preguntas se utiliza el análisis de contenido de orientación cualitativa según Philipp Mayring. Se analizan 47 artículos de los cuatro periódicos El Colombiano, El Espectador, El País Cali y El Tiempo en cuatro periodos diferentes del año 2019 con respecto a los encuadres que se utilizaron en el cubrimiento mediático específico. Además, en un segundo paso del análisis, se utilizaron las características del Periodismo de Paz establecidas por Galtung como categorías formadas deductivamente dentro de la investigación. En general, puede decirse que los periódicos con un trasfondo político más liberal retratan con más fuerza al PJ como una institución pacificadora, imparcial y que cumple la ley. Los medios online, más bien conservadores, utilizan marcos con connotaciones negativas con más frecuencia que sus competidores, pero citan cada vez más a terceros, como el partido gobernante Centro Democrático. Por otra parte, en cuanto a las características del Periodismo de Paz, se observa que los periódicos más liberales consiguen incorporar este criterio más que los conservadores, aunque hay que señalar que también cumplen parcialmente los requisitos de Galtung. ; In 2016, the Colombian government under President Juan Manuel Santos reached a peace agreement with the country's largest guerrilla group, the FARC-EP. A big part of the negotiations, which lasted about four years (2012-2016), was the creation of a Transitional Justice mechanism to investigate and judge members of the FARC-EP as well as members of the Public Forces and third parties who participated in the armed conflict. The name of this jurisdiction is Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP). Since its entry into force in 2017, there has been much public discourse about this institution, including the debate in the Colombian media. The Colombian online and print media in particular can have an impact on the population and frame and shape certain discourses through their reporting. This, in turn, means that certain types of reporting can have an impact on the perception of certain issues – such as specific institutions – and can fuel and mitigate a conflict. This is why the Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung created the concept of Peace Journalism, which journalists can use to contribute positively to the development of any conflict or war. Therefore, it will be determined in this thesis to what extent four of the most significant Colombian online newspapers manage to incorporate the concept of Peace Journalism into their reporting and thus contribute to peace in the country. Moreover, the aim of the research presented here is to answer how these newspapers represent and frame the JEP throughout the year of 2019. To answer these questions the qualitative oriented content analysis according to Philipp Mayring is used. 47 articles of the four newspapers El Colombiano, El Espectador, El País Cali and El Tiempo are analyzed in four different periods of the year 2019 with regard to the frames that were used in the specific media coverage. In addition, in a second step of the analysis, the characteristics of Peace Journalism established by Galtung were used as deductively formed categories within the investigation. Overall, it can be said that the newspapers with the more politically liberal background portray JEP more strongly as a peace-bringing institution that is impartial and follows the law. The rather conservative online media outlets utilize frames with negative connotations more often than their competitors, but they increasingly cite third parties, such as the ruling party Centro Democrático. Furthermore, with regard to the characteristics of Peace Journalism, it can be seen that the more liberal newspapers manage to incorporate this criteria more than the conservative ones, although it must be noted that they also only partially meet Galtung's requirements.

How have Scotland's first post-devolution decades been felt across the political landscape?Features analysis of the key political institutions and parties in ScotlandProvides a detailed chronology of the devolution eraIncludes perspectives from civil servants, campaigners and politicians including Jim Gallagher, Joyce McMillan, Johann Lamont, Murdo Fraser and Marco BiagiIf you want a taster ahead of publication on 1st August you can download the introduction from the resources tab, below.Marking the first twenty years of the Scottish Parliament, this collection of essays assesses its impact on Scotland, the UK and Europe and compares progress against pre-devolution hopes and expectations. It brings together the voices of ministers and advisers, leading political scientists and historians, commentators, journalists and former civil servants – building an authoritative account of what the Scottish Parliament has made of devolution.The Story of the Scottish Parliament is an essential guide to the powers Holyrood may need for Scotland to flourish in an increasingly uncertain world.Contributors to The Story of the Scottish ParliamentMargaret Arnott is professor of public policy at the University of the West of Scotland.Lynn Bennie is reader in politics at the University of Aberdeen. Marco G. Biagi was MSP for Edinburgh from 2011 to 2016, latterly serving as Minister for Local Government and Community Empowerment. Alan Convery is lecturer in politics at the University of Edinburgh. Torcuil Crichton is the Daily Record's Westminster editor and a journalistic veteran of six UK general election campaigns and five Scottish elections. Sir John Curtice is professor of politics at Strathclyde University and senior research fellow, NatCen/ScotCen Social Research. Zoe Ferguson is an associate with the Carnegie UK Trust and has been developing their work on kindness. Murdo Fraser is MSP for Mid Scotland and Fife and was deputy leader of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party from 2005 to 2011.Jim Gallagher's 35-year civil service career included heading the Scottish Justice department, being private secretary to two Secretaries of State for Scotland, and twice serving in the No 10 Policy Unit under different Prime Ministers. Ewan Gibbs lectures in sociology and social policy at the University of the West of Scotland and sits on the committee of the Scottish Labour History Society. Ambrose Gillick is a designer and lecturer in architecture at Kent School of Architecture. David Gow is now editor of Social Europe and of sceptical.scot. Gerry Hassan is research fellow in contemporary history at Dundee University. Ailsa Henderson is professor of political science at the University of Edinburgh where she conducts research on comparative sub-state political behaviour and political culture.Kirsty Hughes is director of the Scottish Centre on European Relations. Lee Ivett is an award-winning architect, designer and founding director of Baxendale Studio. Richard Kerley is Emeritus Professor of Management at Queen Margaret University, Edinburgh, and co-chair of the Centre for Scottish Public Policy. Colin Kidd is Wardlaw Professor of Modern History at the University of St Andrews. Johann Lamont is Labour MSP for Glasgow and was previously leader of the Scottish Labour Party.Craig McAngus is a lecturer in politics at the University of the West of Scotland. Neil McGarvey is a senior teaching fellow in the School of Government and Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. Joyce McMillan is a freelance

Within the climate countermovement, neoliberal think tanks have played a predominant role in both the United States and Europe. There are links between climate obstructionism and ideologies such as conservatism and the extreme right; androcentrism, patriarchal worldviews and industrial masculinities, and whiteness and xenosceptic ideologies. This research takes as a case study the Dutch think tank CLINTEL, which, despite having been founded in 2019, has managed to get a declaration against the climate emergency to members of the European Parliament, which has been signed by climate action contrarians from all over the world. This paper analyses the contrarian framings present in this declaration based on the typology established by Almiron et al. (2020). In addition, this research makes a gendered discursive analysis of the discussion about this statement in a forum of the European Parliament, where CLINTEL met with members of the far-right Dutch party Forum van Democratie (FvD), part of the European Conservatives and Reformists group. The study on CLINTEL's statement shows that the think tank uses similar frames as other European denialist think tanks. Its climate declaration has a significant gender bias, with an overwhelming over-representation of men among the signatories. This, together with the discursive analysis of its discussion with members of the European Parliament, is a contribution to the emerging line of research on industrial masculinities and climate change obstructionism. This paper provides information on the think tank CLINTEL, helping to fill a knowledge gap on the climate change countermovement in the Netherlands. ; Dentro del contramovimiento climático, los think tanks neoliberales han desempeñado un papel predominante tanto en Estados Unidos como en Europa. Existen vínculos entre el obstruccionismo climático e ideologías como el conservadurismo y la extrema derecha; el androcentrismo, las cosmovisiones patriarcales y las masculinidades industriales, y las ideologías blanca y xenoescéptica. Esta investigación toma como caso de estudio el think tank neerlandés CLINTEL, que, a pesar de haber sido fundado en 2019, ha conseguido hacer llegar a los miembros del Parlamento Europeo una declaración contra la emergencia climática, que ha sido firmada por contrarios a la acción climática de todo el mundo. Este trabajo analiza los encuadres contrarios presentes en esta declaración a partir de la tipología establecida por Almiron et al. (2020). Además, esta investigación realiza un análisis discursivo de género del debate sobre esta declaración en un foro del Parlamento Europeo, donde CLINTEL se reunió con miembros del partido holandés de extrema derecha Forum van Democratie (FvD), que forma parte del grupo de Conservadores y Reformistas Europeos. El estudio sobre la declaración de CLINTEL muestra que el think tank utiliza marcos similares a los de otros think tanks negacionistas europeos. Su declaración sobre el clima tiene un importante sesgo de género, con una abrumadora sobrerrepresentación de hombres entre los firmantes. Esto, junto con el análisis discursivo de su debate con los miembros del Parlamento Europeo, es una contribución a la línea de investigación emergente sobre las masculinidades industriales y el obstruccionismo del cambio climático. Este artículo proporciona información sobre el think tank CLINTEL, contribuyendo a llenar un vacío de conocimiento sobre el contramovimiento del cambio climático en los Países Bajos