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In this thesis, I attempt to analyze linkages between international and domestic politics in a hierarchic international system. Theoretically, my purpose is to probe potential opportunities in simultaneously relaxing traditional assumptions about the anarchic nature of the international system and the hierarchic nature of the domestic system. Whereas the late 20th century saw important progress in holding one of these assumptions intact while relaxing the other, systematic theoretical studies attempting to capture the dynamics of a simultaneous change are still missing in the field. I base my work on two prominent theoretical veins in International Relations: the Waltzian dichotomy of anarchic and hierarchic systems and the model of two-level games developed by Robert Putnam in 1988. I propose significant modifications to the first one, fully in line with recent attempts to come to terms with the developments triggered by the contemporary U.S. unipolarity; I only slightly modify Putnam's model to better fit a hierarchic international system. Advancing in a framework of soft rational choice, I propose hypotheses about the interaction of the international and the domestic level. Most importantly, I deduce a theoretical justification for focusing on the political structures and processes within the leading two-level institution, that is, the U.S. Similarly, bargaining between the U.S. government and other actors is asymmetric not only due to straightforward differences in resources but also due to amplifying tendencies to be found in the nature of the contemporary international system. Empirically, I probe my hypotheses in the case of EU­U.S. climate policy. The topic is suitable for my theoretical purposes because the EU is not a minor power the difficulties of which in bargaining vis-à-vis the U.S. could be explained away by a mere lack of power resources. Additionally, recent developments in climate policy show a pattern of competing interests. The EU has, broadly, attempted to further climate protection while the U.S. has been lukewarm at best in considering action to avert a potentially catastrophical imbalance in the climate system. I conclude that the framework of two-level games in a hierarchic system contributes to a better understanding of International Relations. However, I also note that there are many developments in the empirical case that simply do not fit to a rational choice framework, reminding that there are limits to what abstraction can achieve. I also propose future ideas pathways towards a better theory, such as explicit formalization and a better integration to contemporary theories of scientific merit. Asiasanat: Kansainvälinen järjestelmä, kahden tason pelit, ilmastopolitiikka

Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- Part I. A Theory of Democratization and International Organizations -- 2. From Democratization to International Organizations -- 3. From International Organizations to Democratic Consolidation -- Part II. Quantitative Evidence -- 4. Quantitative Evidence on Forming versus Joining -- 5. Quantitative Evidence onDemocratic Consolidation and International Organizations -- Part III. Qualitative Evidence -- 6. The Baltic Experience -- 7. Forming, Remodeling, and Reforming -- 8. Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index

Introduction -- When and how international institutions promote economic reform -- Preferential trading agreements as helpful international institutions -- Design of preferential trading agreements -- Formation of preferential trading agreements -- Economic reform and preferential trading agreements -- Explaining economic reform in Croatia and South Africa -- Agreements and reforms without democratization: Chile and Columbia -- Conclusion.

AbstractHow do disruptions in basic public service delivery shape people's perceptions of politicians? We offer evidence from the July 2012 blackout in India, the largest in human history. Using data from the India Human Development Survey, we compare confidence in politicians between households that were surveyed during the outage and affected by it (treatment) and only days before it (control). Balance statistics show that the treatment and control groups are statistically indistinguishable, and further tests indicate that there was no disturbance to the pattern of surveying. Far from undermining public confidence in politicians, the outage increased it, as citizens reacted to the anxiety created by the crisis. The implications are normatively troubling, as politicians seem to have reaped benefits from disruptions in public service delivery.

AbstractSectoral interests play an important role in distributive politics, but their influence is difficult to measure. We compare the effect of international oil prices on subsidies for domestic gasoline and diesel consumption. Because diesel is used by a smaller number of organized agricultural and transportation interests, they are more capable of collective action than the dispersed beneficiaries of gasoline subsidies. The conventional wisdom holds that sectoral interests could mobilize to stop reform (e.g., price increases, deregulation). Challenging this view, we consider the possibility that sectoral interests promote reform by facilitating the targeted allocation of compensation and exemptions. An empirical analysis of gasoline and diesel prices, 1991–2012, strongly supports the second hypothesis: diesel prices respond to international oil prices more strongly than do gasoline prices. Quantitative tests and case studies allow us to explore causal mechanisms, verify that the gasoline‐diesel difference is related to actual policy reforms, and reject alternative explanations.