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We investigate why states provide a voluntary contribution to war crimes tribunals despite the fact that these tribunals are located in states that offer few economic and strategic advantages. We view tribunal financing as a form of foreign assistance and place the funding of tribunals within the broader foreign assistance literature to explain the motivations of donor states. We examine voluntary contributions to four tribunals, and our analysis shows that there are differences between the gatekeeper stage and the secondary decision to allocate assistance. However, donors generally make no distinction among tribunals for purposes of foreign assistance. As a consequence, purely voluntarily funded tribunals are at a disadvantage, since they are not seen by states as unique and requiring special consideration. Ultimately, the lack of funding calls into question the ability of these tribunals to provide justice to victims as well as serve as a mechanism for national reconciliation.

We investigate why states provide a voluntary contribution to war crimes tribunals despite the fact that these tribunals are located in states that offer few economic and strategic advantages. We view tribunal financing as a form of foreign assistance and place the funding of tribunals within the broader foreign assistance literature to explain the motivations of donor states. We examine voluntary contributions to four tribunals, and our analysis shows that there are differences between the gatekeeper stage and the secondary decision to allocate assistance. However, donors generally make no distinction among tribunals for purposes of foreign assistance. As a consequence, purely voluntarily funded tribunals are at a disadvantage, since they are not seen by states as unique and requiring special consideration. Ultimately, the lack of funding calls into question the ability of these tribunals to provide justice to victims as well as serve as a mechanism for national reconciliation. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2007.]

The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) & the Extraordinary Chambers for Cambodia (ECC) represent a departure from the model established by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) & the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The SCSL & the ECC have often been referred to as "mixed" or "hybrid" tribunals in which there are significant domestic & international components. The tribunals include a combination of domestic & international judges, utilize domestic & international laws & are administered by a prosecutorial team composed of domestic & international lawyers. Many of these institutional changes have been brought about because of criticisms of the ICTY & the ICTR. The fundamental question of this article is whether these mixed tribunals are a more effective mechanism for providing justice & reconciliation than purely international solutions. This is an important question because both the international community & states are moving in the direction of mixed tribunals. References. Adapted from the source document.

A commonly found feature in many parliamentary democracies is the power of the government to call elections before the completion of a full term of office. Based on an examination of British and Canadian general elections during the 1940 to 2000 period, we find that it is not a good decision for the governing parties to wait the full term allowable between elections. The general pattern is that the longer the government waits to call an election, the worse its chances for gaining seats. This is a parliamentary effect similar to the honeymoon period commonly associated with presidential regimes.

A commonly found feature in many parliamentary democracies is the power of the government to call elections before the completion of a full term of office. Based on an examination of British & Canadian general elections during the 1940 to 2000 period, we find that it is not a good decision for the governing parties to wait the full term allowable between elections. The general pattern is that the longer the government waits to call an election, the worse its chances for gaining seats. This is a parliamentary effect similar to the honeymoon period commonly associated with presidential regimes. 8 Tables, 18 References. Adapted from the source document.