Search results

At first sight, modern economics and justice seem not to fit together. Whereas the former primarily deals with individual self-interest and extrinsic incentives, the latter deals with other-regardingness and intrinsic social motives. However, recent findings, mainly from the field of experimental economics, reintroduce aspects of justice into economic modeling. Other theories, evolutionary models for instance, take up the key findings and apply the economic rationale in order to find out why human traits which apparently run counter to individual self-interest may have survived. In this introductory note we date this discussion back to the days of Adam Smith and argue that he already set the basis for such a discussion. Apparently, Smith was well aware that principles of justice and the market may, at times, be contradictory. However, he also found that both served a common purpose, or so we will argue. We further aim at bringing together Smith's classical position with recent ideas, for instance Binmore's theory of justice, and see whether the one can be fruitful for the other. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]

This paper examines a recent debate in the literature on power indices in which classical measures such as the Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik, & Public Good indices have been criticized on the grounds that they do not take into account player preferences. It has been argued that an index that is blind to preferences misses a vital component of power, namely strategic interaction. In this vein, there has been an attempt to develop so-called strategic power indices on the basis of non-cooperative game theory. We argue that the criticism is unfounded & that a preference-based power index is incompatible with the definition of power as a generic ability: "the ability to affect outcomes". We claim that power resides in, & only in, a game form & not in a game itself. 1 Figure, 52 References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2005.]