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Cosmopolitan approaches to global justice & resource distribution have been subjected to criticism by those who argue that such approaches ignore the diversity of cultures & values in the world. This essay considers & rejects three of these arguments. (1) In the case of the "cultural relativism argument," if all truth & values are relative, then cosmopolitan approaches are not feasible, at best, & amount to little more than Western cultural imperialism, at worst. This argument ignores the fact that cosmopolitanism does not necessarily assume the presence of universal truth. Moreover, the relativist approach actually sanctions cosmopolitanism (at least by those who hold cosmopolitan values). (2) The "cultural respect" argument, which contends that one group should not try to impose its values on another group, fails to recognize the possibility of consensus even among differing cultures. In addition, the concept of respect for other cultures is, in & of itself, rooted in the Western tradition. Moreover, redistribution of resources constitutes one of the highest forms of respect for others. (3) The "diverse cultural values" argument, asserting that resource distribution is difficult, if not impossible, because different cultures & peoples place different values on resources, ignores the possibility of achieving consensus on at least some issues. Moreover, the argument is challenged by the argument that placing different values on different things is part of the natural "costs" of the beliefs of a particular culture. K. W. Larsen

This article examines Terry Nardin's account of the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. Nardin argues that states ought to adopt a presumption against intervention in the affairs of another state but he claims that, under certain circumstances, this presumption may be overridden to further human rights. This article calls into question both his defence of the norm of nonintervention and his account of when humanitarian intervention is legitimate. It argues that his proposals do not go far enough and that a cosmopolitan theory of intervention is more plausible.

This article examines the justifications of anti-perfectionism given by John Rawls in his recent work Political Liberalism. Rawls, I argue, gives one major argument in defence of anti-perfectionism (what I shall call the 'reasonableness among free and equal persons' argument) and two subsidiary arguments (what I shall call the 'social unity' argument and the 'stability' argument). None of these arguments, I claim, are persuasive. Rawls's most recent justification of anti-perfectionism is therefore unsuccessful.

In 'Liberalism and communitarianism: a misconceived debate' I argued that communitarians advance plausible descriptive and normative claims but that these are compatible with liberalism.1 I also argued that some communitarians affirm an implausible meta-ethical thesis which liberals disavow. Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift make seven criticisms of my analysis.2 Their first three criticisms focus on my treatment of the descriptive communitarian thesis that individuals 'conceive their identity … as defined to some extent by the community of which they are a part'.3

This article considers the criticisms made of liberal political thought by communitarians in the 1980s. It aims to clarify the communitarian critique and evaluate the force of communitarian criticisms of liberalism. It argues that communitarians advance three different types of claim: descriptive claims which stress that people are social beings; normative claims which celebrate the value of community and solidarity, and a meta-ethical claim emphasizing that political principles should mirror 'shared understandings'. This article argues that the descriptive and normative claims espoused by communitarians are judged to be plausible but are accepted by liberals, and that the meta-ethical thesis is untenable and liberals are right to eschew it.