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We characterize the optimal extraction path when a concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. Under asymmetricinformation, a `virtual Hotelling rule' describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costsalong an optimal extraction path. In sharp contrast with the case of complete information, elds which are heterogeneous in terms of their initial stocks follow dierent extraction paths. Some resource might be left unexploited in the long-run as a way to foster incentives. The optimal contract may sometimes be implemented through royalties and license fees. With a market of concessionaires, asymmetric information leads to a `virtual Herndahl principle' and to a new form of heterogeneity across active concessionaires. Under asymmetric information, the market price converges faster to its long-run limit, exhibiting more stability.

We characterize the optimal extraction path when a concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. Under asymmetricinformation, a `virtual Hotelling rule' describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costsalong an optimal extraction path. In sharp contrast with the case of complete information, elds which are heterogeneous in terms of their initial stocks follow dierent extraction paths. Some resource might be left unexploited in the long-run as a way to foster incentives. The optimal contract may sometimes be implemented through royalties and license fees. With a market of concessionaires, asymmetric information leads to a `virtual Herndahl principle' and to a new form of heterogeneity across active concessionaires. Under asymmetric information, the market price converges faster to its long-run limit, exhibiting more stability.

We characterize the optimal extraction path when a concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. Under asymmetricinformation, a `virtual Hotelling rule' describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costsalong an optimal extraction path. In sharp contrast with the case of complete information, elds which are heterogeneous in terms of their initial stocks follow dierent extraction paths. Some resource might be left unexploited in the long-run as a way to foster incentives. The optimal contract may sometimes be implemented through royalties and license fees. With a market of concessionaires, asymmetric information leads to a `virtual Herndahl principle' and to a new form of heterogeneity across active concessionaires. Under asymmetric information, the market price converges faster to its long-run limit, exhibiting more stability.

We characterize the optimal extraction path when a concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. Under asymmetricinformation, a `virtual Hotelling rule' describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costsalong an optimal extraction path. In sharp contrast with the case of complete information, elds which are heterogeneous in terms of their initial stocks follow dierent extraction paths. Some resource might be left unexploited in the long-run as a way to foster incentives. The optimal contract may sometimes be implemented through royalties and license fees. With a market of concessionaires, asymmetric information leads to a `virtual Herndahl principle' and to a new form of heterogeneity across active concessionaires. Under asymmetric information, the market price converges faster to its long-run limit, exhibiting more stability.

We characterize the optimal extraction path when a concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. Under asymmetricinformation, a `virtual Hotelling rule' describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costsalong an optimal extraction path. In sharp contrast with the case of complete information, elds which are heterogeneous in terms of their initial stocks follow dierent extraction paths. Some resource might be left unexploited in the long-run as a way to foster incentives. The optimal contract may sometimes be implemented through royalties and license fees. With a market of concessionaires, asymmetric information leads to a `virtual Herndahl principle' and to a new form of heterogeneity across active concessionaires. Under asymmetric information, the market price converges faster to its long-run limit, exhibiting more stability.

We characterize the optimal extraction path when a concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. Under asymmetricinformation, a `virtual Hotelling rule' describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costsalong an optimal extraction path. In sharp contrast with the case of complete information, elds which are heterogeneous in terms of their initial stocks follow dierent extraction paths. Some resource might be left unexploited in the long-run as a way to foster incentives. The optimal contract may sometimes be implemented through royalties and license fees. With a market of concessionaires, asymmetric information leads to a `virtual Herndahl principle' and to a new form of heterogeneity across active concessionaires. Under asymmetric information, the market price converges faster to its long-run limit, exhibiting more stability.

We characterize the optimal extraction path when a concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. Under asymmetricinformation, a `virtual Hotelling rule' describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costsalong an optimal extraction path. In sharp contrast with the case of complete information, elds which are heterogeneous in terms of their initial stocks follow dierent extraction paths. Some resource might be left unexploited in the long-run as a way to foster incentives. The optimal contract may sometimes be implemented through royalties and license fees. With a market of concessionaires, asymmetric information leads to a `virtual Herndahl principle' and to a new form of heterogeneity across active concessionaires. Under asymmetric information, the market price converges faster to its long-run limit, exhibiting more stability.

We characterize the optimal extraction path when a concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. Under asymmetricinformation, a `virtual Hotelling rule' describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costsalong an optimal extraction path. In sharp contrast with the case of complete information, elds which are heterogeneous in terms of their initial stocks follow dierent extraction paths. Some resource might be left unexploited in the long-run as a way to foster incentives. The optimal contract may sometimes be implemented through royalties and license fees. With a market of concessionaires, asymmetric information leads to a `virtual Herndahl principle' and to a new form of heterogeneity across active concessionaires. Under asymmetric information, the market price converges faster to its long-run limit, exhibiting more stability.

In January 1875, the Buenos Aires municipal council legalized female sexual commerce within authorized bordellos. A decade of rapid urbanization and population growth, characterized by a high proportion of unmarried males, had created problems of social control and public health that had to be addressed by city authorities. Assisted in their task by doctors specializing in public health who were aware of European legislation on the issue, councilmen enacted a law purportedly intended to improve public health. Instead, the desire to create revenues from exorbitant license fees meant that municipally regulated prostitution served principally to keep prostitutes off the streets and enlarge city coffers. It was not until 1888 that the Dispensario de Salubridad (or Prostitutes' Registry) was established along with the Sifilicomio (the venereal disease hospital) to periodically examine and treat women in licensed houses of prostitution.

Bill introduced by the Texas House of Representatives relating to the continuation and functions of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission, including the consolidation, repeal, and creation of certain licenses and permits; changing fees.

Cover -- Content -- Abstract -- I. Introduction -- II. Economics of the Telecommunications Sector -- A. Network Externalities -- B. Contribution to Economic Growth -- C. Demand Elasticity -- D. Technology, Industry Structure, and Market Power -- E. Regulation -- III. Tax Policy -- A. General Considerations -- B. Spectrum License Fees -- C. Rent Taxes -- D. Corporate Income Tax -- E. Excises -- F. Value-added Tax -- G. Input Taxes and User Fees -- H. Tax Incentives -- IV. Conclusion: A Pecking-Order Approach to Taxing Telecoms -- References -- Tables -- 1. Telecommunications-specific Tax Provisions -- 2. Empirical Studies of Telecommunication Price Elasticities -- Figures -- 1. Worldwide Market and Revenue Growth, and Average Price per Minute -- 2. General and Sector-Specific Taxes in the Telecoms Industry -- 3. Global Cell Phone Penetration Rates -- 4. Number of Mobile Operators per Country -- 5. Malawi Telecommunications Telecommunications Revenues -- 6. Jamaica Telecommunications Revenues -- 7. Impact of A New Excise: The Case of Guinea -- 8. Specific vs. Ad Valorem Excise -- Boxes -- 1. Rent Taxation Options -- 2. International Call Termination Process -- 3. VAT Pre-Payment and Calling Cards -- 4. Prepaid cards, and international calls: who pays the VAT?.

In 1841, North Carolina passed a law requiring free black people to acquire firearm licenses from their county court. This essay argues that the license requirement forced free black people to rely on their families' support to access firearms, which sits contrary to the "individual right" framework that firearms are often viewed through. Family members helped free black people to construct racial identities, highlight trustworthiness, connect individuals to patrons and professional networks, and manage legal fees, all in pursuit of firearm access. This essay contributes to our understanding of antebellum black families and their connections to their broader interracial communities.

Although the relationship between natural resources and civil war has received much attention, little is known about the underlying mechanisms. Controversies and contradictions in the stylized facts persist because resource extraction is treated as exogenous while in reality fighting affects extraction. We study endogenous fighting, armament, and extraction method, speed and investment. Rapacious resource exploitation has economic costs, but can nevertheless be preferred to balanced depletion due to lowered incentives for future rebel attacks. With private exploitation, rebels fight more than the government if they can renege on the contract with the mining company, and hence government turnover is larger in this case. Incentive-compatible license fees paid by private companies and mining investment are lower in unstable countries, and increase with the quality of the government army and office rents. This implies that privatised resource exploitation is more attractive for governments who have incentives to fight hard, i.e., in the presence of large office rents and a strong army. With endogenous weapon investments, the government invests more under balanced than under rapacious or private extraction. If the government can commit before mining licenses are auctioned, it will invest more in weapons under private extraction than under balanced and rapacious nationalized extraction.

Bill introduced by the Texas House of Representatives relating to the amount of the fees paid by certain peace officers, correctional officers, members of the state military forces, and veterans of the armed forces for a license to carry a concealed handgun and to the issuance of such a license to certain peace officers and members of the state military forces; authorizing a fee.

This relatively short case gives students a comprehensive overview of the steps required to prepare consolidated financial statements under U.S. GAAP when a subsidiary prepares its accounts under a foreign GAAP—in this case, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). While the case is closely based on an actual Australasian company seeking listing in the United States, the product and the exact financial details are disguised. Specifically, the case exposes students to the following: accounting for foreign currency transactions; adjustments to convert foreign GAAP to U.S. GAAP (accounting for license fees); translation of financial statements; change of functional currency; remeasurement of financial statements; and foreign consolidation and statement of cash flows with foreign operations. The case has been field-tested in an advanced accounting course and is also suitable for use in international accounting courses. Both undergraduate and graduate students have profited from the case.