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According to empirical studies, the life cycle of labor supply volatility exhibits a U-shaped pattern. This may lead to the conclusion that demographic change induces a drop in output volatility. We present an overlapping generations model that replicates the empirically observed pattern and study the impact of demographic transition on output volatility. We find that the change in age-composition itself has only a marginal influence on output volatility as the mitigating effect of lower labor supply volatility is compensated by higher labor supply. Instead, the driving force behind the Great Moderation in our model is the downward shift of the age-specific labor supply volatility curve.

In this article, we provide new, novel evidence for a more recent structural break (in 2010) indicating a greater moderation of output volatility compared to the well-known break during the mid-1980s. The period of analysis runs from 1962Q2 to 2018Q3. It covers 26 OECD countries. In terms of methodology, it has mainly been used as the measures of conditional and unconditional volatility and procedures of structural break detection (Inclan–Tiao test and autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity model). As a result, it has been found that output greatly stabilized following the structural break at 2010Q1 in the post-era of 2008/09 global financial crisis. Moreover, output stabilization is robustly evident for 24 (out of 26) OECD countries. From a political standpoint, it is implied that the Keynesian view may be influential in this moderation. Government expenditures and fiscal programs, regulations of financial markets against the sub-prime lending and limitations to trade of mortgage-backed securities might have been the main driver of stability. Rapid improvement of digitalization and technical productivity may be regarded as another relevant reason that might have contributed to the stabilization process. © 2019, The Author(s).

This paper investigates the factors explaining exchange market pressures (EMP) and the hoarding and use of international reserves (IR) by emerging markets during the 2000s, as the Great Moderation turned to the 2008-9 global crisis and great recession. According to our results, both financial and trade factors played important roles, yet the relative magnitude of financial considerations dominated, both during the Great Moderation and during the crisis. The coefficient of gross short-term external debt quintuples during the onset of the crisis, and then gradually declines as we let the crisis window roll forward. Capital outflow (induced by global deleveraging) was the force behind the emerging markets EMP rise during the global financial crisis, with the emerging markets' stock markets themselves only playing a secondary role. In addition, emerging markets were greatly affected by the fall in commodity prices during the initial phase of the crisis, although the relative impact of trade factors remained virtually the same in magnitude during the financial crisis and the Great Moderation period that preceded it. We also study the association between several country-level indicators, as of 2007, and the EMP measure during the height of the crisis in 2008:Q4 in a cross sectional regression. We found that that richer EMs experienced greater EMP during the crisis. Greater FDI inflows prior to the crisis were associated with a lower crisis EMP, while greater portfolio debt inflows with a higher crisis EMP, and this effect is much larger than the mitigation effect associated with greater FDI inflows. We conclude with an analysis of the factors that account for the trade and financial exposure of emerging markets during the crisis, finding that pre-crisis financial and trade openness are significant predictors of the financial and trade shock during the crisis. The severity of the financial shock was further exacerbated by financial ties to the U.S., while the trade shock was more severe in EMs with a larger commodity export share.

This paper investigates the factors explaining exchange market pressures (EMP) and the hoarding and use of international reserves (IR) by emerging markets during the 2000s, as the Great Moderation turned to the 2008-9 global crisis and great recession. According to our results, both financial and trade factors played important roles, yet the relative magnitude of financial considerations dominated, both during the Great Moderation and during the crisis. The coefficient of gross short-term external debt quintuples during the onset of the crisis, and then gradually declines as we let the crisis window roll forward. Capital outflow (induced by global deleveraging) was the force behind the emerging markets EMP rise during the global financial crisis, with the emerging markets' stock markets themselves only playing a secondary role. In addition, emerging markets were greatly affected by the fall in commodity prices during the initial phase of the crisis, although the relative impact of trade factors remained virtually the same in magnitude during the financial crisis and the Great Moderation period that preceded it. We also study the association between several country-level indicators, as of 2007, and the EMP measure during the height of the crisis in 2008:Q4 in a cross sectional regression. We found that that richer EMs experienced greater EMP during the crisis. Greater FDI inflows prior to the crisis were associated with a lower crisis EMP, while greater portfolio debt inflows with a higher crisis EMP, and this effect is much larger than the mitigation effect associated with greater FDI inflows. We conclude with an analysis of the factors that account for the trade and financial exposure of emerging markets during the crisis, finding that pre-crisis financial and trade openness are significant predictors of the financial and trade shock during the crisis. The severity of the financial shock was further exacerbated by financial ties to the U.S., while the trade shock was more severe in EMs with a larger commodity export share.