[ES] This article proposes an analysis of Cuba's role in the defence, safeguarding and valorisation of Cuban and Caribbean cultural heritage. In this way, firstly, the methods used by the Cuban government (cultural policy, laws, population education, etc.) to promote the safeguarding of cultural heritage will be highlighted, as well as the relations established with other countries with the aim of preserving a heritage presented as 'common'. Secondly, the participation and involvement of the Cuban population in preserving the cultural heritage of Cuba and the Caribbean will be highlighted, allowing us to understand the strength of the cultural theme in human, social and inter-state relations. Finally, consideration will be given to the challenges of heritage management for Cuba, which must at the same time preserve one (or more) cultural heritage (s), adapt to tourism, confirm its involvement in sustainability, and constantly invent new economic development strategies. ; International audience This article aims to analyze the role of Cuba in the defense, maintenance and valorization of the Cuban and Caribbean cultural heritage. Firstly, we will explain the methods used by the Cuban government (cultural policy, laws, education of the population, etc.) in order to develop the maintenance of the cultural heritage, as the relationships established with other countries with the aim to preserve an heritage presented as "shared". Secondly, we will throw in relief the participation and implication of the Cuban population in the preservation of the Cuban and Caribbean cultural heritages, so that we can understand the power of the cultural topic in human, social and between states relationships. Lastly, we will consider the challenges that the management of heritage presupposes for Cuba, which must at the same time preserve one or different cultural in heritance(s), adapt itself to the tourism, confirm its implication in the sustainability, and invent constantly new strategies of economic development. ; [ES] This article ...
The analyses of the inter-municipal object tend to confront, in response to the outlying opposition, the attempts to reform the central government and the resilience/neutralisationcapacities of local elected representatives, often leading to the gradual withdrawal of one for the benefit of the others. This article is intended to rethink the role of the State in the political functioning of inter-municipal institutions. Looking at the Camera conurbation over a long period of time and highlighting the socio-political effects of the institution, it can be seen that the inter-municipal structure and the elected representatives who live in it are permanently marked by the decisive direction initially given by the devolved state services. Therefore, intercommunality appears to be a 'creature of the State' which, although escaping the objectives of its designers, functions as a particularly effective mechanism for political integration. ; Literature on municipal cooperation tends to oppose, in accordance with centre/periphery distinction, the urge for reform by the central State and the capacities of resistance of local governments, thus concluding that there has been a loss of power of the French State over the latter. This article contributes to rethink the political role of central State in intermunicipal institutions. Based on a long-term study of the French agglomeration of Chambéry, it focuses on the social and political effects of institutions. In particular, it analyses how State representatives originally played a key role in institutional design, giving local cooperation a decisive and sustainable orientation. In such a perspective, municipal cooperation appears to be a c´reature of the State' which, while escaping its initial purposes, works as a particularly effective mechanism of political integration. ; The analyses of the inter-municipal object tend to confront, in response to the outlying opposition, the attempts to reform the central government and the resilience/neutralisationcapacities of local ...
Two attacks, and one defense, of classical liberal ideas appeared over the weekend. "War and Pandemic Highlight Shortcomings of the Free-Market Consensus" announces Patricia Cohen on p.1 of the New York Times news section. As if the Times had ever been part of such a "consensus." And Deirdre McCloskey reviews Simon Johnson and Daron Acemoglu's "Power and Progress," whose central argument is, per Deirdre, "The state, they argue, can do a better job than the market of selecting technologies and making investments to implement them." (I have not yet read the book. This is a review of the review only.) I'll give away the punchline. The case for free markets never was their perfection. The case for free markets always was centuries of experience with the failures of the only alternative, state control. Free markets are, as the saying goes, the worst system; except for all the others. In this sense the classic teaching of economics does a disservice. We start with the theorem that free competitive markets can equal -- only equal -- the allocation of an omniscient benevolent planner. But then from week 2 on we study market imperfections -- externalities, increasing returns, asymmetric information -- under which markets are imperfect, and the hypothetical planner can do better. Regulate, it follows. Except econ 101 spends zero time on our extensive experience with just how well -- how badly -- actual planners and regulators do. That messy experience underlies our prosperity, and prospects for its continuance. Starting with Ms. Cohen at the Times, The economic conventions that policymakers had relied on since the Berlin Wall fell more than 30 years ago — the unfailing superiority of open markets, liberalized trade and maximum efficiency — look to be running off the rails.During the Covid-19 pandemic, the ceaseless drive to integrate the global economy and reduce costs left health care workers without face masks and medical gloves, carmakers without semiconductors, sawmills without lumber and sneaker buyers without Nikes.That there ever was a "consensus" in favor of "the unfailing superiority of open markets, liberalized trade and maximum efficiency" seems a mighty strange memory. But if the Times wants to think now that's what they thought then, I'm happy to rewrite a little history. Face masks? The face mask snafu in the pandemic is now, in the Times' rather hilarious memory, the prime example of how a free and unfettered market fails. It was a result of "the ceaseless drive to integrate the global economy and reduce costs?" (Here, I have a second complaint -- the ceaseless drive to remove subjects from sentences. Who is doing this "ceaseless drive?" Where is the great conspiracy, the secret meeting of old white men "driving" the economy? Nowhere. That's the point of free markets.)The free market has a plan, imperfect as it might be, for masks in a pandemic. Prices rise. People who really want and need masks -- doctors, nurses, police -- pay what it takes to get them. People who don't really need them -- nursery schools -- look at the price, think about the benefit, and say, "maybe not," or take other measures. People reuse masks. Producers, seeing high prices, work day and night to produce more masks. Others, knowing that every 10 years there is a spike in prices, pay the costs of storing masks to make great profits when the time comes. The actual story of masks in the pandemic is the exact opposite. Price controls, of course. Instantly, governments started prosecuting businesses for "price gouging" who dared to raise the price of toilet paper. Governments redistribute income; markets allocate resources efficiently. As usual, the desire to redistribute tiny amounts of income to those willing to stand in line to get toilet paper won out. An entrepreneur tried to start producing masks. The FDA shut him down. (I hope I recall that story right, send comments if not.) China wanted to ship us masks. Yes, China the new villain of globalization gone mad. But their masks were certified and labeled by EU rules, not US rules, so like baby formula they couldn't be imported and sold. More deeply, even I, devoted free-marketer; even at the late night beer sessions at the CATO institute, nobody puts mask distribution in a pandemic as the first job of free markets. There is supposed to be a public health function of government; infectuous diseases are something of an externality; safety protocols in government labs doing government funded research are not a free-market function. As we look at the covid catastrophe, do we not see failures of government all over the place, not failures of some hypothetical free market? California even had mobile hospitals after H1N1. Governor Brown shut them down to save money for his high speed train. We might as well blame free markets for the lines at the DMV. The idea that trade and shared economic interests would prevent military conflicts was trampled last year under the boots of Russian soldiers in Ukraine.Does anyone think a prime function of free market economics is to stops wars, usually prosecuted by, eh, governments? The standard history of WWI is enough. We do allege that free markets, and free markets alone, make a country wealthy enough to fight and win wars, if the country has the will and desire to do so. The US and NATO military budget vs. Russia's, larger by a factor of 10 at least, seems to bear that out, along with the much greater quality of our weapons. Heaven help us militarily once the protectionists lead us to state-directed penury. inflation, thought to be safely stored away with disco album collections, returned with a vengeance.Did anyone every vaguely hint that inflation control is a function of free markets? Inflation comes from government monetary and fiscal policy. And increasing bouts of extreme weather that destroyed crops, forced migrations and halted power plants has illustrated that the market's invisible hand was not protecting the planet.Doe the Times even vaguely think of news as fact not narrative? There have been a lot of migrations. "Forced?" Many due to violence, poverty, ill government. None due to temperature. Halted power plants (more passive voice)? Yes, it was that pesky unfettered free market that shut down power plants... The favored economic road map helped produce fabulous wealth, lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty and spur wondrous technological advances.Well, a peek of sunlight, an actual correct fact! But there were stunning failures as well. Globalization hastened climate change and deepened inequalities. More fact free narrative spinning. How are "inequalities" plural? Globalization brought the sharpest decline in global inequality in the history of our species. Perhaps it "hastened climate change" in that if China had stayed desperately poor they wouldn't be building a new coal fired power plant a week. US emissions went down because of... choose 1: enlightened policy 2: fracking, a shift to natural gas made only possible by the curious US property rights system absent in Europe, and pretty much over the dead body of the entire energy regulatory apparatus. ***Meanwhile over at WSJ, Deirdre is in classic form. (Again, I have not read the book, so this is Deirdre coverage.) The paragraph that caught my attention and demanded a blog post: We need [according to Acemoglu and Johnson] ... the legislation currently being pushed by left and right to try again the policies of antitrust, trade protection, minimum wage and, above all, subsidy for certain technologies. Messrs. Acemoglu and Johnson are especially eager to regulate digital technologies such as artificial intelligence. "Technology should be steered in a direction that best uses a workforce's skills," they write, "and education should . . . adapt to new skill requirements." How the administrators of the Economic Development Administration at the Department of Commerce would know the new direction to steer, or the new skills required, remains a sacred mystery."Technology should be steered." There it is, the full glory of the regulatory passive voice. Steered by who? Deirdre answers the question with that gem of rhetoric, specificity. "Administrators of the Economic Development Administration at the Department of Commerce" for example. The theme uniting the two essays: If there is one lesson of the last 20 years it is this: The catastrophic failure of our government institutions. From bungled wars, a snafu of financial regulation in 2008 just now repeated in FTX, SVB, and inflation the evident collapse of the FDA CDC and plain commonsense in the pandemic, the free market is bravely forestalling a collapse of government (and associated, i.e. universities) institutions. we need the state to use its powers "to induce the private sector to move away from excessive automation and surveillance, and toward more worker-friendly technologies." Fear of surveillance is a major theme of the book; therefore "antitrust should be considered as a complementary tool to the more fundamental aim of redirecting technology away from automation, surveillance, data collection, and digital advertising."The question what institution has the technical competence to do this seems to be begging. "Government subsidies for developing more socially beneficial technologies," the authors declare, "are one of the most powerful means of redirecting technology in a market economy." Well, interpreting the sentence literally, you have to give it to them. Government subsidies are powerful means of "redirecting technology." Usually to ratholes. Messrs. Acemoglu and Johnson warmly admire the U.S. Progressive Movement of the late 19th century as a model for their statism: experts taking child-citizens in hand.Their chapters then skip briskly through history...seeking to show how at each turn new innovations tended to empower certain sections of society at the expense of others. The "power" that concerns them, in other words, is private power.This is, in fact, the central question dividing free-marketers and others. Private power being subject to competition, we worry more about state power. The essence of state power is monopoly, and a monopoly of coercion, fundamentally violence. The heart of the book is that technological gains create winners and losers, and Acemoglu and Johnson want that directed by a nebulous bureaucracy. Which will somehow never be infected by, oh, Republicans, or turn in to the endless stagnation of most of the last millennium which actually did pursue policies that forbade technological improvement in order to sustain the incomes of incumbents. Deirdre, who coined the lovely phrase "trade tested betterment" takes it on. During the past two centuries, the world has become radically better off, by fully 3,000% inflation adjusted. Even over the past two decades the lives of the poor have improved. The "great enrichment" after 1800 and its resulting superabundance has brought us out of misery. Even the poor workers who did not benefit in the short run have done so enormously in the long run. In 1960, 4 billion of the 5 billion people on the planet lived on $2 a day. Now it's fallen to 1 billion out of 8, and the income average is $50 a day. The state didn't do it, and forcing short-run egalitarianism or handing power to the Office of Economic Development can kill it, as it regularly has. Messrs. Acemoglu and Johnson see great imperfections in the overwhelmingly private sources of the enrichment. With such imperfections, who needs perfection?Another way to see the problem is to remember the common sense, refined in Economics 101 and Biology 101, of entry at the smell of profit. ...The great fortunes they deprecate have the economic function of encouraging entry into the economy by other entrepreneurs who want to get rich. This competition cheapens goods and services, which then accrues to the poor as immense increases in real income.Many fortunes, for instance, were made by the invention of the downtown department store. The profit attracted suburban competitors, and at the mall the department-store model began to fail. Jeff Bezos reinvented the mail-order catalog. He is imitated, and the fortunes are dissipated in enormous benefit to consumers called workers. .... It's what happened and happens in a liberal economy.The book uses a lot of history, surveyed by McCloskey. As before, it's criticized a bit as history lite. The history Deirdre covers has the usual imperfections of the free market. I wonder if the book has any history of success of this plan, of governments successfully guiding technological transformations to protect the rights and incomes of incumbents, without in the process killing technical change. Governments habitually screw up basics like rent control. Figuring out what new technology will do is pretty much beyond the capacity of private investors and book-writing economists. The idea that bureaucracy has the capacity to figure out not just what new technology will work, but to guide its social and distributional consequences seems... far beyond the historical record of bureaucratic accomplishment. But I am straying beyond my promise to review the review, not the book, before reading the latter. ****I recognize the desire on both sides. Partisan politics needs "new" ideas and a "new" propaganda. In particular, the right is aching for something shiny and new that it can sell to voters, which it regards with the same sort of noblesse-oblige intellectual disdain as the left does. Mind the store, mend the institutions, freedom, rights, opportunity and make your own prosperity are, apparently, not sexy enough. So both sides need new initiatives, expanded governments, to excite the rabble. But we're not here to supply that demand, merely to meditate on actual cause-and-effect truth of what works. Beware the temptation. Update: In retrospect, perhaps the issue is much simpler. The bulk of economic regulation serves exactly the purpose McCloskey basically alleges of Acemoglu and Johnson: Preserve rents of incumbents against the threats of technological improvements. From medieval guilds to trade protection to taxis vs. Ubers, that is really its main function. So we have an extensive bureaucracy that is very good at it, and extensive experience of just how well it works. Which is, very well, at protecting rents and stifling growth.
the point is to show how tourism administration can help anticipate or resolve conflicts between public policy actors. Initially, the institutional framework in place reveals an 'apparently peaceful space', based on cooperation between the State and local and regional authorities, and a fluidity of management methods allowing for the use of associations. Structures and tools for the prevention of conflicts are brought together (departmental and regional tourism committees, mechanisms for coordinating public or private initiatives). However, a number of potential conflict factors can be seen when looking at the standards in force brought together in the Tourism Code (risks of competition between public actors, multiplicity of operators with horizontal competence, resistance of tourist municipalities to the increase in 'intercommunalisation'). Litigation risks arise, in particular due to the lack of a conformity link or compatibility between planning documents and the lack of mandatory alignment between public contracts. In addition, there is a risk of unfair competition complaints from tourism professionals against certain forms of public interventionism. Despite the regional coordination power, the regional ambition is hampered by the endogenous design of tourism development shown by many coastal tourist municipalities. ; le propos est de montrer comment l'administration du tourisme peut contribuer à anticiper ou à résoudre des conflits entre les acteurs des politiques publiques. Au départ, le cadre institutionnel en place révèle un "espace apparemment pacifié", reposant sur une coopération entre l'Etat et les collectivités territoriales, ainsi qu'une fluidité des modes de gestion admettant le recours aux associations. Sont assemblées des structures et outils de régulation préventive des conflits (comités départementaux et régionaux du tourisme, dispositifs de coordination des initiatives publiques ou privées). Néanmoins plusieurs facteurs de conflits potentiels sont perceptibles à l'examen des normes en vigueur ...
The topic of this research needs to be investigated because at that time there were many events related to the description of the struggle of many Islamic figures in advancing Islam, especially Mahmud Ghazni. During the reign of Mahmud Ghazni Islamic civilization experienced rapid progress and during the reign of Mahmud Ghazni much progress in the fields of education and the economy. Mahmud Ghazni was a man who controlled Islam and had a lot of influence and power during wars and often won over his enemies until the caliph Al-Qadir Billah gave him the title Yamin addaulah which means people who are trusted by the government and Amin Addaulah which means trusted by the government. Mahmud Ghazni is known as a pious person and has a strong promise in the field of science and development. The problems discussed in this study are as follows. First, what is the general picture of the Ghaznavid dynasty in Islamic history? Second, how was the development of the Ghaznawiyah dynasty during the reign of Mahmud Ghazni? Third, what is the strategy used by Mahmud Ghazni in advancing Islamic civilization? In this study, the type of research used is qualitative research that relies on library materials that are relevant to the research theme, while the method used is historical research, which seeks to find out and make a systematic and objective reconstruction of past history related to the role of Mahmud Ghazni on the development of Islamic civilization (388-421 H / 998-1030 AD), by collecting, evaluating strong evidence to establish facts and get strong conclusions. The results of the research in this study are first, Alpataqin was the pioneer of the founding of the Ghaznawiyah Dynasty, while Sabuktaqin was able to form an established dynasty power and a wide area so that it was later recognized by Baghdad. Second, the government of the Ghaznawiyah dynasty experienced glory during the reign of Mahmud Ghazni who ruled for approximately 34 years. Its power can be used to expand its territory to reach the territory of India, to successfully conquer Peshawar, Kashmir, and Bathinda in 391-394 H/1001-1004 AD. Punjab was controlled in 1006 AD, Kangra in 1009, Baluchistan in 402-403 H. /1011-1012 AD, then Delhi in 405-406 H/1014-1015 AD. The vast territory and abundant sources of wealth make this country's economy very strong, so that it can be used for the prosperity of the country. First, Alpataqin was the pioneer of the founding of the Ghaznawiyah dynasty, while Sabuktaqin was able to form an established dynasty and a large area that was later recognized by Baghdad. Third, Mahmud Ghazni in advancing Islamic civilization in India, carried out several strategies to be able to achieve the heyday and progress of Islam. Mahmud Ghazni's strategy is to advance Islamic civilization in India by carrying out policies in the fields of politics and government, in the military field, carrying out several policies in the economic field as well as policies in the socio-cultural and religious fields. ; Topik penelitian ini perlu diteliti karena pada masa itu banyak peristiwa yang terkait dengan gambaran perjuangan banyak tokoh Islam dalam memajukan Islam terutama Mahmud Ghazni. Pada masa pemerintahan Mahmud Ghazni peradaban Islam mengalami kemajuan yang pesat serta pada masa pemerintahan Mahmud Ghazni banyak kemajuan di bidang pendidikan dan perekonomian. Mahmud Ghazni adalah seorang yang menguasai Islam dan sangat memiliki pengaruh serta kekuatannya saat peperangan dan kerap menang atas musuhnya hingga khalifah Al-Qadir Billah memberi gelar Yamin addaulah yang artinya orang yang diandalkan pemerintah serta Amin Addaulah yang artinya yang dipercaya pemerintah. Mahmud Ghazni diketahui selaku umat sholeh serta memiliki janji yang kuat dalam bidang keilmuan serta perkembangan. Masalah yang dibahas dalam penelitian ini sebagai berikut. Pertama, bagaimana gambaran umum Dinasti Ghaznawiyah dalam sejarah Islam? Kedua, bagaimana perkembangan Dinasti Ghaznawiyah pada masa Pemerintahan Mahmud Ghazni? Ketiga, bagaimana strategi yang dilakukan oleh Mahmud Ghazni dalam memajukan peradaban Islam? Dalam penelitian ini jenis penelitian yang digunakan adalah penelitian kualitatif yang bertumpuh pada bahan-bahan pustaka yang relevan dengan tema penelitian sedangkan, metode yang digunakan ialah penelitian sejarah (historical research), yaitu berupaya mengetahui serta membuat rekontruksi sejarah masa lampau secara sistematis dan obyektif berkaitan peran Mahmud Ghazni terhadap perkembangan peradaban Islam (388-421 H/ 998-1030 M), dengan cara mengumpulkan, mengevaluasi bukti-bukti kuat untuk menegakkan fakta dan mendapatkan kesimpulan yang kuat. Hasil penelitian pada penelitian ini adalah pertama, Alpataqin adalah sebagai perintis berdirinya Dinasti Ghaznawiyah, sementara Sabuktaqin mampu membentuk kekuatan Dinasti yang mapan dan wilayah yang luas sehingga kemudian diakui keberadaannya oleh Baghdad. Kedua, Pemerintahan Dinasti Ghaznawiyah mengalami kejayaan pada masa pemerintahan Mahmud Ghazni yang berkuasa selama lebih kurang 34 tahun. Kekuatan yang dimilikinya dapat dipergunakan untuk memperluas wilayah kekuasaan hingga mencapai wilayah India, hingga berhasil menaklukan Peshawar, Kashmir, dan Bathinda pada 391-394 H/1001-1004 M. Punjab dikuasai pada 1006 M, Kangra pada 1009, Baluchistan pada 402-403 H/1011-1012 M, kemudian Delhi pada 405-406 H/1014-1015 M. Wilayah yang luas dan sumber kekayaan yang melimpah, membuat ekonomi negeri ini sangat kuat, sehingga dapat dimanfaatkan untuk kemakmuran negeri. Pertama, Alpataqin adalah sebagai perintis berdirinya Dinasti Ghaznawiyah, sementara Sabuktaqin mampu membentuk kekuatan Dinasti yang mapan dan wilayah yang luas sehingga kemudian diakui keberadaannya oleh Baghdad. Ketiga, Mahmud Ghazni dalam memajukan peradaban Islam di India, melakukan beberapa strategi untuk dapat mencapai masa kejayaan serta kemajuan Islam. Adapun strategi yang dilakukan Mahmud Ghazni untuk memajukan peradaban Islam di India dengan melakukan kebijakan dalam bidang politik dan pemerintahan, dalam bidang militer, melakukan beberapa kebijakan dalam bidang ekonomi serta kebijakan dalam bidang sosial budaya dan keagamaan.
The article analyses the impact of present-day Russian internal structural factors, searching national ideology and shaping "Russian conservatism" line formation marked the links between this ideology and Russian foreign policy. The main focus is designated to Russia's politics after the Russia-Georgia conflict in 2008, highlighting the response of Vladimir Putin's regime to several domestic policy tensions related with: 1) the structure of the Russian regime and the domination of siloviki group in the power structures; 2) the etno-federalist structure of Russia and the growing nationalism; and 3) the competition of several ideologies, which increasingly turns to the support of Eurasianist ideology line and its transformation into "Russian conservatism". Theoretically, this analysis is based on the internal and external factors that have an impact on the state's policies (e.g. Walter Carlsnaes concepts), as well as on the theories analysing Russian etno-federalism and informal networks/relations. This article argues that Russian internal structural factors strongly support the Russian Eurasianist direction as the dominant policy doctrine, and this doctrine defines the Russian foreign policy, limits its balancing and influences the dynamics of foreign policy. It shows how, during the recent years, Russia's assertive foreign policy has become influenced by neo-imperialist vision of a strong, conservative, and alternative Russia, which actively uses the "Russian conservatism" as an ideological justification, supports active protection of Russia's interest in the post-Soviet region (e.g., war with Ukraine) increasing the use of foreign policy in the post-Soviet region (e.g., war with Ukraine) or raising the question about the multipolar world order. Other competing ideological lines (pro-Western liberalism and Slavic nationalisms) are still included in the balancing if there is demand, however, it remains non-typical forms of current Russia's ideological framework. Since the Russia-Georgia war in 2008, the aggressive Russian foreign policy depends not only on the external factors, but it also increasingly reacts to internal factors, especially to Putin's interest to maintain the vertical power and ensure further legitimacy of the regime. Russia's "electoral authoritarianism", which actively used the concept of "sovereign democracy" last decade, faced serious challenges in 2011– 2012. After public protests for electoral fraud, Putin's circles have perceived that Russia's ruling elites need to initiate a new turn for the country, either to a wider democracy development or to find other resources to mobilise society. By reacting to the interest of siloviki group and seeing the confrontation between Russian ethnic and minorities' nationalism manifestations, Putin's regime strengthened its orientation towards the new Eurasianism, which emphasized the special path of Russia's civilization: being alternative to the Western world, adjusting only "appropriate for Russia" democracy standards, opposing human rights development, and seeing it as a harmful foreign influence. State patriotism was framed under the new "Russian conservatism" line, which emphasized strong authority of central power, Russian imperial identity, Russia's interest in Eurasian regions, support for multipolar world, and the spread of conservative values as opposition to Western cosmopolitism. It helped to mobilise Russian society, integrate the great old and the new military victories of Russia's state and received a new support and greater legitimacy for Putin's regime. This ideology leaves room for integration of separate narratives from various ideological lines (from the Soviet nostalgia and technocratic modernisation to "old Russia" traditionalism). Military actions in Ukraine in 2014–2015 have illustrated that imperial approach effectively mobilises not only the Russian society but a certain part of the other post- Soviet societies (e.g., the idea of the Russian world). This "Russian conservatism" also attempts to respond to other internal tensions, such as ethnic conflicts, by promoting a more intensive Russian state identity instead of an ethnic identity. The situation, when various ethnic minorities and their leaders (e.g., R. Kadyrov) actively supported Russia's actions in Ukraine and the new Putin's activism, revealed that under this ideological umbrella, such local actors as in Putin's circle, leaders of ethnic regions, Orthodox church, and media authorities find themselves in the state's ongoing narratives. Under this situation, Putin's regime effectively marginalises their opponents. Non-systemic liberal-democrats are presented as acting against Russia's interests. The discourse for keeping the relationship with Western partners, which emphasizes the modernisation or stresses the importance of economic developments, is still valid, and it is still used for balancing, but current ideological trend has clearly prioritised the imperial identity over democracy development. ; Straipsnyje analizuojamas šiandienės Rusijos vidaus struktūrinių veiksnių ir vidaus veikėjų poveikis nacionalinės ideologijos paieškai ir "rusiškojo konservatizmo" linijos formavimui, nužymint ir šios ideologijos sąsajas su Rusijos užsienio politika. Pagrindinį dėmesį skiriant Rusijos politikai nuo Gruzijos ir Rusijos karo 2008 m. iki 2016 m. yra išryškinama, kaip Vladimiro Putino režimas, atsakydamas į vidaus politikoje kylančias įtampas, susijusias su: 1) Rusijos režimo struktūros specifika, silovikų dominavimu; 2) etnofederalizmo struktūra ir stiprėjančiu nacionalizmu bei 3) ideologijų konkurencija, vis aktyviau imasi eurazianistinę kryptį transformuoti į valstybine doktrina tampantį "rusiškąjį konservatizmą". Šiai analizei yra naudojamos vidaus ir išorės struktūrinių veiksnių poveikio politikai (pvz., Walterio Carlsnaeso konceptai), etnofederalizmo tyrimų bei neformalių ryšių teorinės priegos. Straipsnyje tvirtinama, kad Rusijos vidaus struktūriniai veiksniai formuoja Rusijos eurazianistinę kryptį kaip dominuojančią politikos doktriną, kuri apibrėžia (riboja) Rusijos užsienio politikos balansavimą ir padeda paaiškinti jos dinamiką. Parodoma, kaip pastarųjų metų Rusijos agresyvėjanti užsienio politika tampa persmelkta valdžioje neoimperialistų vizijos apie "stiprią, konservatyvią ir alternatyvią Rusiją", kuri lemia "rusiškojo konservatizmo" plėtojimą ir didėjantį naudojimą užsienio politikos kontekste, pagrindžiant Rusijos aktyvumą (agresyvumą) posovietiniame regione (pvz., kare su Ukraina), keliant daugiapolio pasaulio tvarkos klausimą. Kitos konkuruojančios idėjinės linijos (provakarietiškas liberalizmas ir slavofiliškas nacionalizmas) yra įtraukiamos į balansavimą pagal poreikį, tačiau išlieka netipinėmis formomis, tam tikrais ideologiniais kraštutinumais.
Uscito a pezzi dalla pesante crisi finanziaria e industriale del 1907, che aveva messo a nudo i limiti della struttura economica del Paese, il capitalismo industriale italiano elaborò un programma, portato avanti fino al primo dopoguerra, che prevedeva l'instaurazione di un governo di tecnocrati. Questo avrebbe dovuto trainare il Paese fuori dalla crisi, pianificarne l'economia e trasformarlo in una grande potenza industriale, con forti connotazioni imperialistiche. Segnali in tale direzione si erano registrati anche nei decenni precedenti, tra fine Ottocento e inizi Novecento, quando ebbe inizio un processo di concentrazione nel settore siderurgico e meccanico. Un percorso peraltro stimolato dalle commesse statali sempre più consistenti (Galli Della Loggia, 1970; Battilossi, 1999; Amatori e Colli, 1999; Bolchini, 2002). La crisi industriale e finanziaria del 1907 e la recessione a livello mondiale che ne seguì, accelerarono la soluzione tecnocratica, che prevedeva un'alleanza, più o meno stretta, con una parte della classe politica e l'entrata in guerra. Negli anni immediatamente seguenti il conflitto, il potere dei tecnocrati sulla scena politica italiana sembrò accrescersi notevolmente, soprattutto quando il governo progettò un programma di espansione economica nelle regioni del Caucaso, nei Balcani e nel Levante ex ottomano, territori in grado di fornire materie prime e di assorbire la produzione italiana in eccesso rispetto alle richieste di un mercato interno asfittico. La collaborazione tra mondo imprenditoriale, bancario e politico non produsse il risultato sperato. La caduta del governo Nitti e il ruolo destabilizzante e filotedesco della Banca Commerciale Italiana nell'Est europeo e nel Caucaso furono tra le cause principali che impedirono il decollo del progetto tecnocratico, provocando una dura reazione da parte dei fratelli Perrone alla guida del gruppo Ansaldo.Heavily Weakened by the financial and industrial crisis of 1907, which showed all the limits of the economic structure of Italy, the Italian industrial capitalism developed a program that continued until the early after World War, which was taking into account the establishment of a government of technocrats. This should had to take the country out of crisis, establish an economical plan and turn it into a major industrial power, with strong imperialist characteristics. Signals in this direction were also recorded in the previous decades, from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when a process of concentration of the main groups of entrepreneurs and capitalists began in the steel and mechanical industry. A path anyway enhanced by more and more orders from the government (Galli Della Loggia, 1970; Battilossi, 1999; Amatori and Colli, 1999; Boldrini, 2002). The industrial and financial crisis of 1907 and the global recession that followed, accelerated the technocratic solution, which were looking for a more or less closer alliance, with a part of the political class and going into war. Soon after the war, the political power of the technocrats in Italy seemed to grow significantly, especially when the Government developed a program of economic expansion in the regions of the Caucasus, Balkans and on the countries of the ex East Ottoman, these territories could provide raw materials and, with respect of an internal market completely saturated, to absorb the exceeding Italian production. The collaboration within the world of business, banking and politics did not produce the desired result. The fall of the Nitti´s Government and the pro German and destabilizing role of the Italian Commercial Bank in Eastern Europe and on the Caucasus were the major drivers against the launch of the technocratic project, inducing a though reaction by the Perrone brothers leading the group Ansaldo. ; L'obiettivo del saggio è di accertare se l'intervento dello Stato fascista nell'economia del paese sia stato effettuato, oltre che dai ministeri deputati a tale funzione e dai vertici del partito fascista, in primis da Mussolini, anche dalle strutture centrali e periferiche del sistema corporativistico.Il potere contrattuale della classe operaia, già del tutto esautorato dalla riforma sindacale del fascismo, dalla creazione cioè di un unico sindacato, fu eliminato definitivamente in seguito all'autonomia della Confindustria nei confronti del Consiglio Nazionale delle Corporazioni e delle Corporazioni, ad eccezione della breve e timida parentesi collaborazionistica avviata dopo il 1936. Tra i motivi di questo cambiamento nell'atteggiamento degli industriali bisogna ricordare che nella seconda metà degli anni Trenta l'economia italiana registrava un deciso orientamento bellico per cui si avvertì l'esigenza di un maggiore impegno della classe operaia per rispondere alle esigenze di una parziale riconversione degli impianti e di una maggiore produttività. Si trattava comunque di aperture molto timide. Nella sostanza, la Confindustria restò arroccata sulle sue posizioni. Del resto era impensabile che tecnocrati e industriali potessero chiedere una partecipazione molto allargata delle Corporazioni al piano industriale varato dal governo.The objective of the test is to determine whether the intervention of the fascist state in the economy of the country has been made, not only by prosecutors appointed to this function and the heads of the fascist party, first by Mussolini, also from the central and peripheral structures corporatist system.The contractual power of the working class, already completely ousted from the union reform of fascism, namely the creation of a single trade union, was permanently deleted after the autonomy of the Confederation against the National Council of Corporations and the Corporations, except for short and timid brackets started after 1936. Among the reasons for this change in the attitude of the industrialists have to remember that in the second half of the thirties the Italian economy registered a strong orientation war that came the need for greater commitment working class to meet the needs of a partial conversion of the plants and increased productivity. It was still very timid openings. In essence, the Confederation remained entrenched in their positions. Moreover it was unthinkable that technocrats and industrial might ask a very enlarged participation of the guilds to plan launched by the government
