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Notes - A handwritten draft of a speech given in Lethbridge, AB, written by Ruth Gorman. Note says: Snowed all the way home (14 pages) ; WCC

In recent years, a large number of disputes have arisen in which parties invoke the First Amendment, but the government action they challenge does not directly regulate "speech," as in communication. Instead, the government is restricting the creation of communicative materials that are intended to be disseminated in the future – i.e., they restrict producing speech. Examples of such disputes include bans on recording public officials in public places, Los Angeles County's ban on bareback (condom-less) pornography, restrictions on tattoo parlors, so-called "Ag-Gag" laws forbidding making records of agricultural operations, as well as many others. The question this article address is whether such laws pose serious First Amendment problems.I conclude that they do. First Amendment protection for conduct associated with producing speech is justified for two distinct reasons: first, because such protection is necessary to make protection for communication meaningful; and second, because the Press Clause provides a textual and historical basis for such protection. However, because speech production involves conduct that can have substantial, negative social consequences, it is also true that First Amendment protection for speech production must be limited, and probably less extensive than protection for actual communication.In the balance of this article, I propose a doctrinal framework for how restrictions on speech production might be analyzed. The framework draws on broader free-speech principles such as the content-based/content-neutral dichotomy, and the Supreme Court's repeated statements that the First Amendment accords special importance to speech relevant to the democratic process. However, the framework is distinct from general free-speech analysis, and for the reasons discussed above, generally more tolerant of regulation. I close by applying my proposed doctrinal rules to a number of recent disputes.

The "best interests of the child" standard -- the standard rule applied in custody disputes between two parents -- leaves family court judges ample room to consider a parent's ideology. Parents have had their rights limited or denied partly based on their advocacy of racism, homosexuality, adultery, nonmarital sex, Communism, Nazism, pacifism and disrespect for the flag, fundamentalism, polygamy, or religions that make it hard for children to "fit in the western way of life in this society." Courts have also penalized or enjoined speech that expressly or implicitly criticizes the other parent, even when the speech has a broader ideological dimension. One parent, for instance, was ordered to "make sure that there is nothing in the religious upbringing or teaching that the minor child is exposed to that can be considered homophobic," because the other parent was homosexual. Others have lost rights based partly on telling their children that the other parent was damned to Hell. One mother was stripped of custody partly because she accurately told her 12-year-old daughter that her ex-husband, who had raised the daughter from birth, wasn't in fact the girl's biological father. Courts have also restricted a parent's religious speech when such speech was seen as inconsistent with the religious education that the custodial parent was providing. The cases generally rest on the theory (sometimes pure speculation, sometimes based on some evidence in the record) that the children will become confused and unhappy by the contradictory teachings, and be less likely to take their parents' authority seriously. This article argues these restrictions are generally unconstitutional, except when they're narrowly focused on preventing one parent from undermining the child's relationship with the other. But the observations that lead to this rule are likely, I think, to prove more interesting to readers than the rule itself: (1) The best interests test lets courts engage in viewpoint-based speech restriction. (2) The First Amendment is implicated not only when courts issue orders restricting parents' speech, but also when courts make custody or visitation decisions based on such speech. (3) Even when the cases involve religious speech, the Free Speech Clause is probably more important than the Religion Clauses. (4) If parents in intact families have First Amendment rights to speak to their children, without the government restricting the speech under a "best interests" standard, then parents in broken families generally deserve the same rights. (5) Parents in intact families should indeed be free to speak to their children -- but not primarily because of their self-expression rights, or their children's interests in hearing the parents' views. Rather, the main reason to protect parental speech rights is that today's child listeners will grow up into the next generation's adult speakers. (6) Attempts to limit restrictions to speech that imminently threatens likely psychological harm (or even cause actual psychological harm) to children may seem appealing, but will likely prove unhelpful.

When we talk about what "freedom of speech" means in America, the discussion almost always centers on freedom rather than speech. Taking for granted that speech is an unambiguous and stable category, we move to considering how much freedom speech should enjoy. But, as Randall Bezanson demonstrates in Speech Stories , speech is a much more complicated and dynamic notion than we often assume. In an age of rapidly accelerated changes in discourse combined with new technologies of communication, the boundaries and substance of what we traditionally deem speech are being reconfigured in n

The trail of Warren Hastings ., June 3rd, 6th, 10th, 13th, 1788 / Sheridan -- Reply to Lord Mornington, 1794 / Sheridan -- Roman Catholic emancipation, House of Commons, May 13th, 1805 / Henry Grattan -- On the recognition of the South American Republics, House of Commons, June 15th, 1824 / Canning -- State of Ireland, House of Commons, February 5th, 1883 / Daniel O'Connell -- Resignation of ministers, House of Commons, June 29th, 1846 / Sir Robert Peel -- Free trade, House of Commons, March 13th, 1845 / Richard Cobden -- Address delivered at the dediction of the cementery at Gettysburg, November 19th 1863 / Abraham Lincoln --Berlin treaty, House of Lords, July 18th 1878 / Benjamin Disraeli --Russia : negotiations at Vienna, House of Commons, February 23rd, 1855 / John Bright -- Tax Bills. Pouer of the House of Lords, House of Commons, July 6th, 1860 / John Bright -- Representation of the People bill, House of Commons, May 31st, 1866 / Robert Lowe -- The Eastern question, House of Commons, May 7th, 1877 / Gladstone. ; Speech delivered September 17th, 1656 / Cromwell -- The Peerage bill, House of the Commons, December 8th, 1719 / Sir Robert Walpole -- Reply to Horace Walpole, House of the Commons, 1740 / William Pitt, Earl of Chatham -- Speech in support of Lord Limerick's second motion, House of the Commons, 1742 / William Pitt, Earl of Chatham -- Speech on Sir W. Yonge's motion respecting the Hanoverian troops, House of Commons, 1742 / William Pitt, Earl of Chatham -- On the right to tax America, House of Commons, 1776 / William Pitt, Earl of Chatham -- Conciliation with America, House of Commons, March 22nd, 1775 / Burke -- Abolition of slave trade, House of Commons, April 2nd, 1792 / William Pitt --Roman Catholic emancipation, House of Commons, May 13th, 1805 / Wiliam Pitt -- Peace with France, House of Commons, February 3rd, 1800 / Charles James Fox -- ; Mode of access: Internet.

The concept of "dangerous speech," which I proposed in the early 2010s, illuminates a key fact that is often missed: hate speech (and related categories like toxic and extreme speech) affects people gradually, cumulatively, and by dint of repetition. Dangerous speech is defined based on the specific harm it engenders (inspiring intergroup violence) rather than its content alone or the intent of those who spread it, allowing for a more consistent definition and broader consensus that it should be addressed. In this article, I explain why this concept is useful; describe the five aspects of speech that must be evaluated in order to determine dangerousness; share examples of projects that have been conducted to monitor, evaluate, and counteract dangerous speech; and suggest future avenues for research.

This brief rapid response article considers the French media framing of the Charlie Hebdo attack in terms of 'Republican values' such as free speech, and critiques the post-political and moralistic reduction of debate to 'right and wrong' arguments, as well as the fetishisation of the right to offend and the depoliticisation of the right to be offended.