As well as the Shia factor was neglected in the past, today Shiism is not monolithic and triumphant as it could seem. What is Shiism? First, it is a tragic vision of the world; second, an intellectual liberation because there is in Shiism a certain amount of liberty of the commentary; third, the prospect of a separation, for the first time in history of Islam, of state from religion. (Maghreb-Machrek/GIGA)
"While inner Islamic pluralism with regard to the Sunnite schools of law had been regarded as legitimate since classical times, the division between Sunnism and Shiism has proved to be a far more difficult obstacle to Islamic unity. Even in the course of the ecumenical debate in the 20th century, when mutual conversion was encouraged, the issue was exploited by polemicists who considered it to be unlawful proselytization. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the accompanying politicization of Shiism in subsequent decades further aggravated this conflict: on the one hand, a converts' literature - exclusively from Sunnism to Shiism - developed, on the other hand, deliberate attempts at winning over Sunnites to Shiism came became a serious problem with political implications on an international level." (author's abstract)
Jordanian Salafis are often anti-Shiite and employ the religious and conspiratorial arguments against Shiism found among Salafis elsewhere. Yet the specific arguments they use show that they are not merely the Jordanian exponents of a global anti-Shiite Salafi trend, but also have reasons of their own to exploit sectarianism. These reasons have to do with the near absence of Shiite communities in Jordan (meaning that anti-Shiite sentiments will not lead to civil strife in Jordanian society itself), the regime's ecumenical attitude towards Twelver and Fiver Shiites and its highly critical views of 'political Shiism' and 'Shiitizers'. At the same time, the position of Salafis in Jordan, whose beliefs are viewed with scepticism by a regime that supports 'moderate' Islam, also plays a role. Quietist Salafis, who shun political activism, are keen to show the regime their non-violent, obedient and loyalist credentials as allies in the fight against radical Islamism. Political Salafis, who do engage in political activism, also want to show that there is nothing to fear from them and that they can be trusted. Both groups have used Shiism to make these points, showing that Salafi anti-Shiism is not just a global phenomenon, but is also locally shaped.
Intro -- Acknowledgments -- Summary -- A Note On Transliteration, Calendars, And References -- Introduction -- Contents -- 1 What is Political Conservatism? -- 1.1 Political Conservatism: Concept and History -- 1.1.1 Understanding Politics -- 1.1.2 Understanding Conservatism -- 1.2 Conservatism and Religion: A Brief Study of Edmund Burke -- 1.2.1 The Religion and the Politics: Separation and Cooperation -- 1.2.2 The Church and the State in Modern World -- 1.2.3 The Religious Movements and the State -- 1.2.4 The Necessity of Political Consecration -- 1.3 Liberal Conservatism as a Reconciliation of Liberty and Authority -- 2 What is Religious Reformation? -- 2.1 Religious Reformation: Concept and History -- 2.2 Political Theology of Shiism -- 2.2.1 An Introduction to the Political Shiism -- 2.2.2 The Myth of [positive] Innovation in Shiite Ușūlī School: A Case of the "Bad Rationalization" -- 2.2.3 The Myth of Mystical Shiism: The Negligence of Political Shiism from Corbin to Shaygan -- 2.2.4 Young Khomeini and his Kashf al-Asrār, 1944 -- 2.2.5 Shiite Conservatism and Political Shiism: Khomeini Against Clergies -- 3 Constitutionalism, Religion & -- Modernization -- 3.1 Politics and Religion in the Late Qajar Dynasty (1905-1925) -- 3.2 Instrumentalist Approach of Pahlavi Toward Religion -- 3.2.1 Reza Shah and Religion: the Rise of Pahlavi Monarchy -- 3.2.2 Mohammad Reza Shah and Religion: A Paradoxical Monarchy or a Monarchy That Tried to be Secular in a Paradoxical Society -- 3.2.3 The Empress and the Political Meeting with "A Respected Ayatollah" -- 3.2.4 The Inevitability of the Instrumentalist Approach and the Peaceful Religiosity in Pahlavis -- 3.3 From the "Possible" Democratization to the Collapse of Pahlavi -- 3.3.1 The Realpolitik, the Society, and the Constitution -- 3.3.2 The Expeditious Collapse of the Pahlavi System.
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Este artículo analiza los proyectos políticos frente a la modernidad occidental de dos de los pensadores musulmanes más prominentes en la segunda mitad del siglo XX en Irán. La Revolución Islámica de 1979 es habitualmente presentada por los medios de comunicación occidentales y algunos comentaristas mal informados como una revolución unicolor, orquestada y culminada por el ayatolá Jomeini y sus seguidores. Esta narrativa elude y niega la diversidad de ideas, proyectos y pensamientos que caracterizan el Irán prerrevolucionario. A modo de demostración, presentaremos de manera comparada los pensamientos y proyectos políticos de Ali Shariati y Ruholá Jomeini, que se pueden considerar como los más significativos de la intelligentsia religiosa de la época. El primero se distingue como proponente de una modernidad alternativa basada en la revolución del chiismo. Por su parte, defenderemos que el proyecto presentado por Jomeini es teórica y analíticamente mejor definido como un populismo pragmático de base islámica que como un proyecto fundamentalista chií. ; This article discusses the political projects of two of the most prominent Islamic thinkers in the second half of the twentieth century in Iran. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 is usually portrayed by Western mainstream media and some ill-informed commentators as a uniform revolution, orchestrated and carried out by ayatollah Khomeini and his followers. This narrative eludes and denies the diversity of ideas and projects that characterised pre-revolutionary Iran. To illustrate this line of thought, we compare the political views and projects of Ali Shariati and Ruhollah Khomeini, who can be considered the most significant figures of the religious intelligentsia at the time. The former is known as a proponent of an alternative modernity based on Shi"i revolution. The latter"s project is theoretically and analytically better understood as a pragmatic populism with Islamic roots, more than Shi"i fundamentalism.
In: This paper is due to be presented at the "Regulating Religion" Conference sponsored by the Centre for Asian Studies at the National University in Singapore in December, 2015
Este artículo analiza los proyectos políticos frente a la modernidad occidental de dos de los pensadores islámicos más prominentes en la segunda mitad del siglo XX en Irán. La Revolución Islámica de 1979 es habitualmente presentada como una revolución unicolor, orquestada y culminada por el Ayatolá Jomeini y sus seguidores. Esta narrativa elude y niega la diversidad de ideas, proyectos y pensamientos que caracterizan el Irán prerrevolucionario. A modo de demostración, presentaremos de manera comparada los pensamientos y proyectos políticos de 'Ali Shari'ati y Ruholá Jomeini, que se pueden considerar como los más significativos de la intelligentsia religiosa de la época. El primero se distingue como proponente de una modernidad alternativa basada en la revolución del chiismo. Por su parte, defenderemos que el proyecto presentado por Jomeini es teórica y analíticamente mejor definido como un populismo pragmático de base islámica que como un proyecto fundamentalista chií. ; This article will analyse the political projects facing Western modernity of two of the most prominent Islamic thinkers in the second half of the twentieth century in Iran. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 is usually portrayed as a uniform revolution, orchestrated, and culminated by Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers. This narrative eludes and denies the diversity of ideas, projects and thoughts that characterised pre-revolutionary Iran. In order to demonstrate this line of thought, we will present in a comparative way the political thoughts and projects of 'Ali Shari'ati and Ruhollah Khomeini, who can be considered as the most significant figures of the religious intelligentsia at the time. The former is distinguished as a proponent of an alternative modernity based on the revolution of Shiism. The latter presents a project that we will defend is theoretically and analytically better understood as a pragmatic populism of Islamic roots than as a Shi'i fundamentalist project.
This chapter analyzes the role that mahdism plays in Shiism. The author argues that the originally politically neutral mahdist belief is increasingly taking root in politics of the Shiite world. He assesses the implications of this development discussing three specific cases.
This chapter analyzes the role that mahdism plays in Shiism. The author argues that the originally politically neutral mahdist belief is increasingly taking root in politics of the Shiite world. He assesses the implications of this development discussing three specific cases.
"This book is a historical and sociological reading of the relation between Sunnis and Shias from the inception of the dispute for Mohammed's succession until today. It is divided in two parts. The first part offers a comprehensive history of the divide. It shows how Shiism was, during much of the Middle Ages, the main contestation ideology of the caliphate, but also how Sunnism and Shiism converged as Shiism progressively ceased to be an esoteric and politically radical doctrine to espouse a number of tenets of mainstream Islam. It shows the political dynamics that runs beneath theological debates and, in particular, how the Sunni/Shia conflict was revived when the Safavids made Shiism an official state religion on the model of Sunnism. On the contrary, when faced with the colonial challenge, Sunni and Shia reformists closed ranks and collaborated. The second part of the book offers a socio-historical account of some national contexts in which the Sunni/Shia divide shapes the society and the politics: Iraq, Bahrain, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Yemen and Lebanon. It shows that in each of these countries the sectarian divide is shaped by very specific historical and social circumstances. Sunni and Shia identities are associated with ethnic, regional, statutory and economic identities. In most cases the relations between Sunnis and Shias are shaped by typical majority/minority dynamics. They can lead to conflict but dynamics of emulation often emerges from conflicts, which are particularly obvious when Sunni and Shia Islamic movements compete"--
The rise of the Islamic State, and its antisemitic ideology, has led to violence against Jews in Europe and a genocide of Shia Muslims in Iraq. This thesis investigates the causes and origins of Islamist antisemitic violence from a social identity perspective. It is the first systematic study of Islamist antisemitism and anti-Shiism that accounts for its trajectory from its inception in the 1930s until 2018. The material consists of primary sources of Islamist literature. First, it studies antisemitic perpetrators of Islamist attacks in Europe. Second, it analyses antisemitism in Islamic State propaganda. Third, it studies Sayyid Qutb's antisemitism. Lastly, it studies the anti-Shiite legacy of the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Sahwa movement. The study does not situate the problem of Islamist violence within the religion itself or the Sunni or Shia branch of Islam but rather within how political actors use religion for political purposes. This thesis challenges the conventional view of the Islamic State's violence as originating from the theological interpretations of Salafism and argues that rather, it originates from the political ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, it centers antisemitism and its interconnected anti-Shiism at the core of Islamist ideology and use of violence. The findings demonstrate that mainly two concepts are central to Islamist antisemitic violence: the war against Islam conspiracy and the imaginary victimized ummah. Additionally, it shows that antisemitism and anti-Shiism are interconnected since the Sahwa movement and ISIS transferred antisemitic notions onto Shiites. The study also shows that the war against Islam conspiracy is the main feature of ISIS antisemitism and that it was developed by Sayyid Qutb, who inspired the Sahwa movement. It also demonstrates that the Sahwa movement inspired ISIS in their politicized genocidal anti- Shiism. The findings can be divided into seven categories: 1) the war against Islam conspiracy; 2) a politicization of religious identities; 3) Muslim identity as either victimized or martial; 4) the imaginary victimized ummah; 5) violence in defense of the imaginary victimized ummah; 6) a transfer of antisemitic notions onto Shiites; and 7) antisemitic Islamist excommunication of Muslims. This thesis argues that antisemitic and anti-Shiite violence is the result of the politicization of religious identities within a war narrative. In addition, this thesis demonstrates how the Muslim Brotherhood combined Nazi antisemitism with politicized interpretations of Islamic scripture, inspiring the Islamic State's Islamist antisemitism and violence.
Статья посвящена изучению отношений между иранским обществом и духовенством: в частности, их религиозных основ, специфики и эволюции в период с начала Исламской революции до настоящего времени. Поскольку иранский исламизм не возник стихийно в ходе Исламской революции, а уже был достаточно сильно укоренен в народной культуре и негласных социальных правилах, необходимо проанализировать основы и специфику исламской философии и, в особенности, те её аспекты, на которые опираются иранские клерикальные круги при создании иранской политической системы. Влияние представителей духовенства на малообразованные и традиционалистские слои населения позволило им после революции быстро перейти в разряд государственных деятелей.Рассмотрены основы иранской клерикальной идеологии и её пункты: безоговорочное принятие исламских норм в интерпретации Велаяте Факиха и ведение жизни в полном соответствии с шариатом; наличие строго ограниченных рамок для общественной, политической, научной и художественной свободы; контроль духовенства за источниками дохода и накоплением богатства; воздержание от творческого саморазвития, самовыражения и восприятия, а также от проявления интереса к большей части традиционной персидской культуры и мировым культурным достижениям и наследию через самоцензуру или правительственную цензуру; полное принятие клерикальной культуры и закрепление за искусством и наукой роли государственных инструментов; продвижение и укрепление исламской (шиитской) идеологии через отказ от всех существующих в мире политических, экономических и социальных моделей (как западных, так и восточных). Хотя иранское духовенство сделало попытку полностью притворить все эти пункты в жизнь, факторы внешнего и внутреннего порядка заставили его пойти на определенные уступки, однако не изменили их концепцию исламского общества и исламского человека. Сделаны выводы о состоянии клерикального режима в ИРИ на сегодняшний день и его перспективы ; This article is devoted to studying the relationship between Iranian society and the clergy: in particular their religious foundations, specificity and evolution since the beginning of the Islamic Revolution until the present. Since the Iranian Islamism did not arise spontaneously in the course of the Islamic Revolution, and was already quite strongly rooted in the national culture and unwritten social rules, it is necessary to analyze the fundamentals and specifics of Islamic philosophy, and in particular those of its aspects that underpin the Iranian clerical circles to create Iran's political system. The influence of the clergy on poorly educated and traditionalist sectors of the population after the revolution allowed them to quickly move into the category of public figures. In the present article the basics of the Iranian clerical ideology and its items will be studied, such as: unconditional acceptance of Islamic norms in the interpretation of Velayat-e Faqih and maintenance of life in full compliance with the Shariah; presence of a strictly limited framework for social, political, scientific and artistic freedom; control by the clergy of the sources of income and wealth; refraining from creative self-development, self-expression and perception, as well as the manifestation of interest in most of the traditional Persian culture and world cultural achievements and heritage through self-censorship or government censorship; full acceptance of the clerical culture and the consolidation of the role of art and science as political instruments; promotion and strengthening of Islamic (Shiite) ideology through the rejection of all the world's political, economic and social models (both Western and Eastern). Although the Iranian clergy has made an attempt to introduce all these points, external and internal factors forced it to make concessions, but did not change their concept of an Islamic society and Islamic rights. In this article conclusions will be drawn about the state of the clerical regime in Iran today and its prospects
The reemergence of Iraq as a Shiite religious center requires a reevaluation of the Iran-Iraq relationship. In the coming years, Iranian authorities may be forced to devote their attention to counteracting Iraqi religious influence inside their country. The pilgrimage is a major avenue for this influence, which makes control of the pilgrimage a vital interest for the government in Tehran. Alternatively, the rebirth of Najaf as a world center of Shiism may deprive Iran's present rulers of their religious pretensions, paving the way for the end to the regime's Islamist system. But with close to two million Iranian pilgrims visiting Iraq each year, an amicable divorce between these two rival interpretations of Shiism seems unlikely. Until one side or the other prevails, the religious dimension will play an important role in Iranian-Iraqi relations. Observers of these affairs should pay close attention to the pilgrimage, which may in fact be the single most important bilateral tie between the two countries. Adapted from the source document.
