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We argue that political parties in the US have consciously opted to employ political consultants for their candidates' needs in order to help cultivate competitive national elections. Thus, consultant use by political parties does not signal party decline, but party adaptation. Further, the use of political consultants by the political parties is so complete that consultants can be considered employees of the political parties; not in the traditional sense of individuals on the payroll, but in the modern corporate sense of independent contractors who are hired to complete a defined project. We investigate how national political party committees spend the money they have allocated for individual candidates in congressional races using data from the 1998 and 2000 election cycles. We examine Federal Election Commission (FEC) records of payments political parties make via coordinated expenditures.

In this chapter of Life after Reform: When Bipartisan Campaign Reform Meets Politics, the authors reject the assumption that national political parties are strong in the US due to soft money, & argue that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) will create broader competition by changing spending & fundraising strategies at the national level of political parties. The changes in use of resources of soft & hard money are contextualized in the light of the new limits & the new incentives to garner hard money donations. The changes in hard money requirements under BCRA as related to party choice of coordinated or independent spending with their chosen candidate is discussed in the case of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC). Findings indicate an increased use of political party consultants as a campaign expenditure. In conclusion, the authors predict significant change in the way federal campaigns are financed by a shifting of money away from national party committees to state & local parties, PACs & NGO's. 1 Table, 2 Figures. J. Harwell

For the past three years, the Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies at American University has hosted short courses at the American Political Science Association's Annual Meeting on the topic of teaching about campaigns and elections. These efforts are part of the "Improving Campaign Conduct" project funded by The Pew Charitable Trusts. Our experience shows that professors teaching American politics have an interest in keeping their classroom materials relevant and timely, while also preserving a strong analytical framework. Here, we hope to offer some advice and guidance to professors teaching courses that cover campaigns and elections in whole or in part.

Recent efforts by the congressional campaign committees (CCCs), the party organizations charged with electing candidates to the US House of Representatives, have been unusually proactive in pursuing House majorities. The CCCs convinced other party-related actors, such as the national committees, political action committees (PACs) and members of Congress, to help achieve majorities in the House. These party-orchestrated activities are notable for their focus on the legislative party's goals, rather than on the party's presidential candidate. The cooperative efforts of the CCCs with their respective national committees, their attempts to induce cooperation from the PAC community, and their outreach for assistance from their own office-holders are explored. These initiatives in the 1990s reflect a significant shift in tactics. They are a reaction to changes in the level of electoral competition, concurrent with the presence of party entrepreneurs who convinced other political actors to view the party's House electoral success as consistent with their own goals.

Political consultants are seen as influential actors in American politics who may effect policy long after their service on an election has concluded. Many observers of the consulting industry (see, for example, Shea 1996; Sabato 1981) have suggested that the use of political consultants has been especially bad for political parties, contributing to their decline. Proponents of the party decline thesis maintain that consultants weaken parties by giving candidates independent support bases for conducting their campaigns, creating a campaign climate where individual candidates take the voting public's focus away from party platforms. But consultants have become prominent because the parties cannot always offer up-to-date technical services and close attention to local situations. Some political scientists suggest that political consultants can assist parties in attaining their goals by providing the highly professional and technical services to party candidates that party organizations themselves cannot (Luntz 1988). Further, political consultants tend to work in concert with political parties because they depend on the parties for a supply of clients (Sabato 1981; Luntz 1988). Here we explore another dimension of the consultant-political party relationship: the role political parties play in training political consultants. We hypothesize that contemporary political consultants are likely to have had close links (such as prior employment) with a political party since the 1970s, when parties began adopting new technologies and training their employees to use them.Consultant background vis-a-vis political parties can lead to two very different notions of the effect of consultant activity on our politics.

Debates about campaign finance often point to television advertising as a major reason for the high cost of campaigning, but the debates are too rarely informed by systematic data on advertising costs. A leading source tracking campaign ads, the Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG), offers data about both the volume and the estimated cost of advertising being purchased. Here, we test the accuracy of CMAG cost data by comparing CMAG estimates to records we gathered directly from television stations for five competitive campaigns in the Philadelphia area in 2006. Our findings show that while CMAG is highly accurate in gauging the incidence of advertising, CMAG estimates of the cost were much higher than the actual cost. We counsel caution then in judging the cost of television advertising based on CMAG estimates.

Debates about campaign finance often point to television advertising as a major reason for the high cost of campaigning, but the debates are too rarely informed by systematic data on advertising costs. A leading source tracking campaign ads, the Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG), offers data about both the volume and the estimated cost of advertising being purchased. Here, we test the accuracy of CMAG cost data by comparing CMAG estimates to records we gathered directly from television stations for five competitive campaigns in the Philadelphia area in 2006. Our findings show that while CMAG is highly accurate in gauging the incidence of advertising, CMAG estimates of the cost were much higher than the actual cost. We counsel caution then in judging the cost of television advertising based on CMAG estimates. Adapted from the source document.