Search results

Abstract Background This study aimed to examine the longitudinal contributions of four political and socioeconomic factors to the increase in life expectancy in less developed countries (LDCs) between 1970 and 2004. Methods We collected 35 years of annual data for 119 LDCs on life expectancy at birth and on four key socioeconomic indicators: economy, measured by log10 gross domestic product per capita at purchasing power parity; educational environment, measured by the literacy rate of the adult population aged 15 years and over; nutritional status, measured by the proportion of undernourished people in the population; and political regime, measured by the regime score from the Polity IV database. Using linear mixed models, we analyzed the longitudinal effects of these multiple factors on life expectancy at birth with a lag of 0-10 years, adjusting for both time and regional correlations. Results The LDCs' increases in life expectancy over time were associated with all four factors. Political regime had the least influence on increased life expectancy to begin with, but became significant starting in the 3rd year and continued to increase, while the impact of the other socioeconomic factors began strong but continually decreased over time. The combined effects of these four socioeconomic and political determinants contributed 54.74% - 98.16% of the life expectancy gains throughout the lag periods of 0-10 years. Conclusions Though the effect of democratic politics on increasing life expectancy was relatively small in the short term when compared to the effects of the other socioeconomic factors, the long-term impact of democracy should not be underestimated.

Most organizational behavior research in general, and negotiation research in particular,have paid little attention to the role of relative status between social exchange parties. In this paper, we note that while past research and theory on status tends to assume a competitive relationship between parties of different status and a fixed-sum pool of status resources, such assumptions do not apply to exchange between parties of different status in cooperative relationships. Accordingly, we hypothesized an interactive effect between status differential (unequal vs. equal) and relationship (cooperative vs. competitive). The negative impact of status differential on interactions and outcomes between exchange parties of different status would be reduced in cooperative relationships, but not so in competitive relationships. Theoretical implications to research in negotiation, status, and social exchange are discussed.

Previous research has shown that procedural fairness and outcome favorability interactively combine to influence people's reactions to their social exchanges. The tendency for people to respond more positively when outcomes are more favorable is reduced when procedural fairness (how things happen) is relatively high. This paper evaluates whether cultural differences in people's tendencies to view themselves as interdependent or independent (their self-construal) moderate the interactive relationship between procedural fairness and outcome favorability. In three studies, participants indicated their reactions to an exchange with another party as a function of the other party's procedural fairness and the outcome favorability associated with the exchange. In Study 1, participants' national culture was treated as a proxy for their self-construal. In Study 2, people's national culture and self-construal were assessed. In Study 3, participants were classified on the basis of their self-construals. Converging evidence across studies showed that the interactive relationship between procedural fairness and outcome favorability was more pronounced among participants with more interdependent forms of self-construal.

Intergroup relationships can impact on a third party's willingness to punish a violator, but few researchers have explored how intergroup relationships affect third-party compensation tendencies. We recruited 163 participants to observe a dictator game, and then choose either to punish
the dictator or compensate the recipient, each of whom could be from the participant's in-group or out-group. Third parties often chose not to punish in-group dictators and to compensate both in-group victims and out-group victims. When out-group members transgressed against the in-group,
participants punished these out-group members just as often as they compensated the in-group recipients, although they punished out-group dictators more harshly than others overall. However, when both proposer and recipient came from the out-group, participants often did not intervene. We
also found that third-party punishment and compensation were related to individual differences in participants' trait empathy and Machiavellianism. Our findings shed light on the modulating effect of intergroup relationships on third-party altruistic decisions.

BACKGROUND: Primary liver cancer (PLC) is the fifth and second leading cause of death in Japan and Taiwan, respectively. The aim of this study was to compare the economic burden of PLC between the two countries using the cost of illness (COI) method and identify the key factors causing the different trends in the economic burdens of PLC. MATERIALS AND METHODS: We calculated the COI every 3 years using governmental statistics of both countries (1996–2014 data for Japan and 2002–2014 data for Taiwan). The COI was calculated by summing the direct costs, morbidity costs, and mortality costs. We compared the COIs of PLC in both countries at the USD-based cost. The average exchange rate during the targeted years was used to remove the impact of foreign exchange volatility. RESULTS: From 1996 to 2014, the COI exhibited downward and upward trends in Japan and Taiwan, respectively. In Japan, the COI in 2014 was 0.70 times the value in 1996, and in Taiwan, the COI in 2014 was 1.16 times greater than that in 1996. The mortality cost was the greatest contributor in both countries and had the largest contribution ratio to the COI increase in Japan. However, the direct cost in Taiwan had the largest contribution ratio to the COI decrease. CONCLUSIONS: To date, the COI of PLC in Japan has continuously decreased, whereas that in Taiwan has increased. Previous health policies and technological developments are thought to have accelerated the COI decrease in Japan and are expected to change the trend of COI of PLC, even in Taiwan.