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A description of how the still-continuing negotiations for the elimination of chemical-warfare weapons by international treaty proceeded from 1968 to 1979. Drawing mainly from the proces-verbal & working papers of the negotiations, the description is analytical rather than narrative, the substantive matters under negotiation being categorized into those of nonarmament & disarmament, & into those of the scope of the treaty sought & its verification. Possible guidelines for the future of the negotiations are derived, including use of "confidence-building measures" to ease verification demands & other intragovernmental constraints. Attention is paid to the consequences of the intergovernmental talks being conducted both within a bilateral US-USSR working group & within the multilateral Committee on Disarmament. The role, since 1973, of the Pugwash Chemical Warfare Study Group is also described. Prospects for a Chemical Weapons Convention are not good, basically because the negotiations appear to be promoting that process of military & political assimilation of chemical weapons which the Convention must ultimately reverse. AA.

Emphasis on U.S.-Soviet arms control. Decision making structures adopted by the participants, and communication modes used to convey information, offers, and responses.

Arms control efforts tend to proceed through highly formalized and very visible direct negotiations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. There is evidence, however, that even when political and technological conditions might otherwise produce agreements, this formal process itself tends to impede the flexibility necessary for compromise and successful negotiations. The examination of the role of process in negotiation is based on the analysis of the particular structures of decision making adopted by the participants, and of the modes of communication they use to convey information, offers, and responses. Given the number of bureaucratic actors generally involved in arms control, full participation by all in a decentralized decision-making process can be expected to lead to slow and inflexible negotiating positions. Similarly, direct communication is likely to highlight concerns for status and bargaining reputation which impede concessions and agreement. In analyzing the Test Ban and Salt I negotiations from this perspective, centrally controlled decision- making, combined with informal and closely held communication, is shown to have contributed to the eventual success of the negotiations. While the formal negotiations of the Test Ban and SALT process frequently became blocked, the informal back-channels, from which most bureaucratic actors were excluded, led to concessions and progress. Centralized decision making and the informal 'off the record' communica tion of proposals and responses, in these cases, facilitated agreements. While these procedures are not cost free, particularly for pluralistic and open societies, they suggest that formal processes of negotiation should not automatically be sought in the context of arms control efforts.