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BACKGROUND: In light of worrying public health developments such as declining life expectancy gains and increasing health inequalities, there is a heightened interest in the relationship between politics and health. This scoping review explores the possible welfare policy consequences of populist radical right (PRR) parties in Europe and the implications for population health. The aim is to map the available empirical evidence regarding the influence of PRR parties on welfare policy reforms and to understand how this relationship is mediated by political system characteristics in different countries. METHODS AND ANALYSIS: A scoping review of peer-reviewed empirical literature addressing the relationship between PRR parties, political systems and welfare policy in Europe was performed using the methodology by the Joanna Briggs Institute. Data was charted on main study characteristics, concepts and relevant results, after which a qualitative content analysis was performed. The data was categorised according to the political system characteristics: constitution, political economy, interest representation and partisanship. Five expert interviews were conducted for validation purposes. Early evidence from 15 peer-reviewed articles suggests that exclusionary welfare chauvinistic positions of PRR parties are likely to have negative effects on the access to welfare provisions and health of vulnerable population groups. Differences in implementation of welfare chauvinistic policy reforms are partly explained by mediation of the constitutional order (judicial institutions at national and European Union [EU] level), political economy (healthcare system funding and European single market) and partisanship (vote-seeking strategies by PRR and mainstream parties). No clear evidence was found regarding the influence of interest representation on welfare chauvinistic policies. DISCUSSION: While early evidence suggests that the welfare chauvinistic ideology of PRR parties is harmful for public health, the possible mediating role of political system characteristics on PRR welfare policy influence offers risk and protective factors explaining why the PRR ideology plays out differently across Europe.

Accounts of the management of the recent economic crisis in Spain have been dominated by an emphasis on external constraints. However, this approach leaves unanswered important questions about the role of domestic political factors. Using systematic qualitative primary research and employing elite interviewing and process tracing, this dissertation aims to fill this gap for the period of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) administration. The question it seeks to answer is: what role did domestic political factors play in the PSOE government´s management of the crisis in Spain and in its immediate origins? The dissertation shows that domestic politics played a crucial role in the management of the crisis, most importantly by determining the shape of the measures undertaken. In its three distinct stages – downplaying/inaction, reaction/stimulus and austerity/reform – the PSOE´s response was certainly constrained by external factors, most notably EMU membership and the actions of sovereign-bond investors, the ECB and Germany. Yet while these external constraints forced the government to act, domestic political factors fundamentally shaped the content of key measures: the fiscal stimulus, the labour, financial and pension reforms, the refusal to accept a bailout or the reform of the Constitution. Seven factors were particularly influential: i) electoral and political cost, ii) party and partisanship, iii) organised interests, iv) domestic institutions, v) ideological preferences, vi) ineffective decision-making, and vii) judgement and personal characteristics of decision-makers. In conclusion, domestic politics played a more important role in the management of the crisis than is allowed for by dominant approaches focusing on external constraints and weak domestic policy autonomy. The findings provide empirical evidence to support research agendas that identify significant state discretion in the face of international economic integration and an important role for domestic political factors such as institutions, material interests, partisanship and ideology in shaping economic outcomes.

How much does law matter in election cases where the partisan stakes are high? At first glance, election cases may seem the worst context for studying the influence of law on judicial decision making. Election cases, which decide the applicable rules for a given election, often determine election outcomes and therefore feature the highest political stakes in the balance. There is great temptation for judges to decide these cases in a partisan fashion to help their side. And we have found empirically in earlier work that judges do often appear influenced by partisanship in deciding these cases for their own parties in a way that suggests politics matter more than law.1 But in this Article, we argue that election cases actually offer a unique opportunity to study the role of law in judicial decision making precisely because we can assume partisanship influences judges in these cases. If judges prefer to decide election cases consistent with their partisan interests, then they may decide these cases contrary to partisan interests mainly when the out-party litigant's case has strengths sufficient to overcome this usual, countervailing influence of partisan loyalty. For this reason, we use lower court judges' decisions contrary to their partisan interests (e.g., for a litigant from the opposite party, or against one from their own) as a proxy for underlying case strength. Lower court judges' decisions against their partisan interests buck the normal pattern of partisan loyalty and therefore offer an inference of greater case strength compared to other decisions that are consistent with partisan expectations. Put another way, case strength is assumed to be greater for winning litigants when lower court judges went against their own partisan interests to decide for the winning litigants, than in cases where lower court judges predictably decided in favor of their own party's interests. With this inference of case strength in hand, we then can examine whether case strength is predictive for state supreme court decision ...

The meme of voter fraud is the idea that unworthy voters are attacking the electoral system by voting fraudulently through impersonation or other bad acts. Although scholars of election law aptly demonstrate that the meme is a myth, the meme nonetheless endures as a rationale for the continued passage of heightened voter regulations like voter identification laws. Scholarship critiquing the voter fraud meme relies on partisanship as the prime explanation for voter fraud arguments. This explanation is incomplete in light of the fact that proponents of the myth continue to believe it on an ideological level even when the lack of evidence for voter fraud is demonstrated conclusively. This suggests that the partisanship explanation fails to adequately account for why the voter fraud idea continues to replicate. This Article offers a more complete account of this phenomenon by deploying meme theory to analyze the origins, evolution, and persistence of voter fraud rhetoric. By a "meme," this Article means an idea that spreads from person to person within a culture and replicates along with other ideas to form an ideology or worldview. This meme-based account will demonstrate that the idea of voter fraud is the latest evolutionary product of the ideology of sanctioned exclusion from the franchise. The end objective of this ideology is to exclude from the democracy citizens deemed "unworthy" of the vote by dominant society. This ideology persists throughout the history of the United States and endures separate and apart from partisan motivations. Based on this account, this Article recommends that courts adopt this memetic approach as a heuristic tool to identify and dismiss inchoate claims of election peril and to insist that concerns for the integrity of the electoral system be based on evidence.

Building on interest group and congressional committee literature, the interest group impact theory is created to explicate the role of interest groups in congressional committee hearings. This theory applies not only to the influence interest groups have in congressional hearings, but also to the access given to them to be able to participate. The theory maintains that interest groups are necessary to legislators in this capacity since they provide valuable information relating to politics, elections and policy. Resource rich interest groups with visibility as experts in a policy area are expected to be given more access and influence particularly to committees that are more balanced in terms of partisanship, ideology and leadership experience. Two statistical models test the interest group impact theory, one looks at the access granted to interest groups to participate in congressional hearings and the other at the influence wielded by the testimony they give in those hearings. A unique data set is developed for each model. The access dataset consists of attempts by interest groups to testify before House committees during the 105th, 106th, 107th and 108th sessions of Congress, and consists of data compiled from the Lobbying Disclosure database. A unique dataset of coded congressional hearing testimony submitted by interest groups from six committees and their subcommittees during the 103rd, 106th and 108th Congress was created for the influence model. The research results indicate partial support for the interest group impact theory. Interest group resources increase the likelihood of an interest group access. However, any advantages those resources are in gaining access to congressional hearings, they do not influence the likelihood of the committee adopting the recommendations given in testimony. What do matter are characteristics relating to the committee such as ideology, partisanship and the experience of the chairs. Interest groups do attempt make real recommendations in hearing testimony although they ...

Does the partisan character of governing parties play a role in the formation of fiscal policy? The conventional view is that the left tends toward excessive deficits while the right practices a more prudent and restrictive fiscal policy. However, there is little evidence that would sustain such a view. At the same time, some strong arguments have been advanced which hold that whatever room existed previously for partisanship in fiscal policy making has been sharply reduced if not eliminated by developments such as greater international financial interdependence in recent decades. These issues are examined with a series of models that have been estimated using data from 14 OECD countries for the period from 1961 through 1991. The evidence produced in this paper suggests that the relationship between partisanship and fiscal policy is contingent on macroeconomic conditions. The left has tended to treat fiscal policy as a counter-cyclical tool, tightening fiscal policy when aggregate demand is high and loosening it to stimulate the economy when demand is low. On the other hand, the right has either refrained from such activism or actually conducted procyclical fiscal policies. The evidence also suggests that these partisan-based differences have been reduced over the recent decades. ; Bestimmendie parteipolitischen Konzeption der an der Regierung befindlichen Parteien deren Fiskalpolitik? Üblicherweise wird davon ausgegangen, daß die Linke eher zu exzessiven Defiziten neigt während die Rechte eine eher vorsichtige und restriktive Fiskalpolitik betreibt. Dieser Einschätzung fehlt allerdings die empirische Basis. Gleichzeitig sind gewichtige Argumente dafür vorgebracht worden, daß die in den letzten Jahrzehnten gewachsene Abhängigkeit von den internationalen Finanzmärkten den fiskalpolitischen Handlungsspielraum drastisch eingeschränkt, wenn nicht sogar beseitigt hat. Diese Fragen werden anhand einer Reihe von Modellen überprüft, die mit Daten von 14 OECD-Ländern von 1991-1991 geschätzt wurden. Die Tests zeigen, daß die makroökonomischen Rahmenbedingungen ganz wesentlich die Beziehung zwischen parteipolitischer Orientierung und Fiskalpolitik bestimmen. Die Linke neigte dazu, Fiskalpolitik antizyklisch einzusetzen, indem sie eine restriktivere Politik verfolgt, wenn die Gesamtnachfrage hoch war, und bei geringer Nachfrage eine liberalere Politik bevorzugte, um die Wirtschaft zu stimulieren. Die Rechte dagegen hat sich eines solchen Aktivismus enthalten oder tatsächlich eine prozyklische Fiskalpolitik verfolgt. Die empirischen Resultate zeigen darüber hinaus, daß diese parteipolitischen Unterschiede im Verlaufe der letzten Jahrzehnte geringer geworden sind.

The Australia in World Affairs series commenced in 1950 and provides a continuous, researched scholarly account of Australia's foreign policy. The eleventh volume, Australia in World Affairs 2006-2010: Middle Power Dreaming, outlines the transition from Liberal-National Party Coalition to Labor government and shows the extent to which partisanship made a difference in Australian foreign policy. Shifting power relativities meant that Australian governments faced one of the most demanding and important tasks in their future management of foreign policy. Great attention continued to be paid to the US alliance, and new efforts were devoted to furthering security ties with US allies Japan and South Korea, as well as to enhancing Australia's military capabilities, all the while ensuring that the US remained engaged with whatever architecture emerged.

Inhaltsverzeichnis: Introduction: Democratic Norms, Group Perceptions, and the 2020 Election (Daniel E. Bergan) -- 1. Democratic Norms, Social Projection, and False Consensus in the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election (Aaron C. Weinschenk, Costas Panagopoulos and Sander van der Linden) -- 2. Out-Party Cues and Factual Beliefs in an Era of Negative Partisanship (Suhwoo Ahn, Daniel E. Bergan, Dustin Carnahan, Rachel Barry and Ezgi Ulusoy) -- 3. Getting out the Black Vote in Washington DC: A Field Experiment (Jamil S. Scott, Melissa R. Michelson and Stephanie L. DeMora) -- 4. Sleepy Joe? Recalling and Considering Donald Trump's Strategic Use of Nicknames (Tyler Johnson) -- 5. Disclosures of Character: Formal Aspects of Presidential Campaign Announcement Speeches (Michael Cornfield) -- Conclusion: Reflections on Democratic and Social Norms after the 2020 Election (Daniel E. Bergan and Bruce I. Newman).

"Americans today don't trust each other and their institutions as much as they used to. The collapse of social and political trust arguably has fuelled our increasingly ferocious ideological conflicts and hardened partisanship. But is the decline in trust inevitable? Are we caught in a downward spiral that must end in war-like politics, institutional decay, and possibly even civil war? In A Liberal Democratic Peace, Kevin Vallier argues that American political and economic institutions are capable of creating and maintaining trust, even through polarized times. Combining philosophical arguments and empirical data, Vallier shows that liberal democracy, markets, and social welfare programs all play a vital role in producing social and political trust. Even more, these institutions can promote trust justly, by recognizing and respecting our basic human rights"--

"This book introduces a unique, new dataset on welfare state reforms in the UK, Denmark, Finland, France and Germany from 1974 to 2014. Using a variety of welfare state types in Europe, the authors have systematically investigated core questions that have preoccupied the welfare state literature at least since the 1990s. These include, the extent of path dependency in mature welfare states, the usage of so-called "invisible" policy instruments for hiding cutbacks, and the role of partisanship - on whether the ideological color of the incumbent affects policy - which have been analysed in depth by examining the new dataset presented in this book. This text will be of key interest scholars, students and practitioners studying, and working in, welfare and the welfare state, and more broadly to political science, sociology and social policy."

Why did 62 million Americans vote for Donald Trump? Trump and Us offers a fresh perspective on this question, taking seriously the depth and breadth of Trump's support. An expert in political language, Roderick P. Hart turns to Trump's words, voters' remarks, and media commentary for insight. The book offers the first systematic rhetorical analysis of Trump's 2016 campaign and early presidency, using text analysis and archives of earlier presidential campaigns to uncover deep emotional undercurrents in the country and provide historical comparison. Trump and Us pays close attention to the emotional dimensions of politics, above and beyond cognition and ideology. Hart argues it was not partisanship, policy, or economic factors that landed Trump in the Oval Office but rather how Trump made people feel.

Why did 62 million Americans vote for Donald Trump? Trump and Us offers a fresh perspective on this question, taking seriously the depth and breadth of Trump's support. An expert in political language, Roderick P. Hart turns to Trump's words, voters' remarks, and media commentary for insight. The book offers the first systematic rhetorical analysis of Trump's 2016 campaign and early presidency, using text analysis and archives of earlier presidential campaigns to uncover deep emotional undercurrents in the country and provide historical comparison. Trump and Us pays close attention to the emotional dimensions of politics, above and beyond cognition and ideology. Hart argues it was not partisanship, policy, or economic factors that landed Trump in the Oval Office but rather how Trump made people feel.

Part I. What should the role of citizens be in a democratic society? -- Public opinion in a democracy -- Appendix. Studying public opinion empirically -- Part II. Are citizens pliable? -- Political socialization -- Mass media -- Attitude stability and attitude change -- Part III. Do citizens organize their political thinking? -- Ideology, partisanship, and polarization -- Roots of public opinion: personality, self-interest, values and history -- Roots of public opinion: the central role of groups -- Part IV. Do citizens endorse and demonstrate democratic basics? -- Knowledge, interest, and attention to politics -- Support for civil liberties -- Support for civil rights -- Part V. What is the relationship between citizens and their government? -- Trust in government, support for institutions, and social capital -- Impact of public opinion on policy -- Part VI. What do we make of public opinion in a democracy? -- Conclusion.

The 2016 election and aftermath: did Donald Trump break the mold? -- Voting and elections in theory: do we consent to a system that limits our say in government? -- Give us the ballot: why has the right to vote been so contentious? -- Turning out to vote, or not: is the youth apathy rap justified? -- Partisanship, 21st century style: can we break from the shelter of our tribe? -- Realignment redux: is there a "unifying theory" for today's electoral alignment? -- The nomination process: are party nomination contests too democratic? -- Minor parties: can a third party save our democracy? -- Campaign finance: can anything be done about big money in elections? -- New media and Russian interference: are objective assessments possible in the 21st century? (with Carlo Macomber) -- Conclusion: are there pathways for renewal?

Polarization in US politics and policy / William Crotty -- Ideology as a polarizing force / William Crotty -- Voter turnout and the path to plutocracy / Walter Dean Burnham -- From umbrella parties to polarized parties / Arthur C. Paulson -- Big money, mass media, and the polarization of Congress / Thomas Ferguson -- Structural sources of political polarization / Gerald M. Pomper and Marc D. Weiner -- Religious groups as a polarizing force / Lyman A. Kellstedt and James L. Guth -- Women's political leadership roles / Barbara C. Burrell -- African Americans and party politics / William Crotty -- Latinos, partisanship, and electoral engagement / John A. Garcia -- Gay rights and the party divide / Paul R. Brewer and Shawn C. Fettig -- Aging policy: a partisan paradox / Christine L. Day -- The debate over health care / Thomas R. Marshall -- Representation in a dysfunctional democracy / William Crotty.