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In this work we simulate the effects of tax autonomy of the Austrian states on the levels of public employment in each state. We show that depending on the strength of the public sector lobby, tax autonomy would require reduction of employment in the public sector between 25% and 35% of the current level. We also show that tax autonomy increases welfare levels by 1% to 1.5%, that is that the positive change in the disposable income of the workers more than offsets the welfare loss resulting from lower public goods' provision. Finally, we show that reduction of public employment is welfare-superior to an alternative scenario, in which employment levels are held constant but the wage levels in the public sector need to be adjusted.

This research agenda contribution starts from the observation that an increasing number of interest group studies have been addressing questions about framing. Although this emerging literature has made great progress towards being able to study interest group framing in large-n designs owing to advances in data-gathering techniques, many analytical and conceptual challenges still lie ahead. One important question that remains is how framing can serve as a political strategy and, more precisely, which frames are most effective. This article gives an overview of the recent work on interest group framing. It highlights some key issues that interest group scholars face when they undertake research on framing. Various studies on interest group framing are contrasted in terms of the types of frames studied, the level of analysis employed and how influence is determined. I conclude by developing an agenda with some concrete recommendations for interest group scholars that deal with questions about framing.

We propose a forensic approach to investigate the politico-economic forces that influence narrow vote outcomes in legislative assemblies. Applying nonparametric estimation techniques to a data set covering all roll call votes between 1990 and 2014, we can identify the existence of precise control over legislative vote outcomes in the U.S. House of Representatives. Several pieces of evidence indicate that this control seems to be, at least partly, driven by campaign finance donations. Moreover, control seems to be most prevalent in times of higher electoral competition, i.e. during election years. Our contribution sheds new light on the role of money in politics and, more generally, opens a novel perspective to empirical research on legislative voting.

[Abstract] This paper argues that an interest group's networking skills in micro-states may be as important, if not more important than other variables discussed in the interest group influence literature. This argument is based on the recent literature on democratisation in micro-states which shows that politics in these states is personalistic in nature. The argument is supported by expert interviews undertaken in the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.