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This paper uses the case of Sino-Southeast Asian relations to gain insights on China's ability to muster support for its global agenda. The analysis focuses on the regional-global nexus of interstate relations and explores the extent to which the quality of two states' regional relations influences the likelihood of behavioral alignment in global politics. To this end, we consider a range of potentially influential aspects of Sino-Southeast Asian relations (the quality of bilateral relations based on recent event data, alliance policy, regime similarity, development level, and economic ties) and employ a statistical model to search for correlations with observed trends of voting coincidence in the United Nations General Assembly during the period 1979-2010. We find a strong correlation between the quality of regional bilateral relations and global policy alignment, which indicates that patterns of regional cooperation and conflict also impact the trajectory of China's rise in world affairs.

Taiwan's landscape of think tanks, despite having emerged during a time of Leninist one-party governance and state-led economic development not unlike that in Mainland China, is today marked by a substantial agency in conducting both research and advocacy. This sets them apart from their counterparts on the mainland. We ask how this development was shaped by Taiwan's evolution as a political entity, especially its experience of gradual political liberalization and eventual full democratization by the mid-1990s. In its wake, multiparty competition, factionalism, the emergence of a vigorous civil society, and individual interest groups created an environment in which think-tank services were sought by many competing actors, offering a wide array of funding opportunities for policy research. Additionally, a political culture that stresses expertise and the need to conduct unofficial diplomacy often gave think tanks a privileged position within the system, and they served as key agents in conducting the kind of informal diplomacy made necessary by Taiwan's loss of diplomatic recognition from the 1970s onwards. We further offer an overview of Taiwan's think-tank landscape, describing major groups (or types) of institutes and briefly portraying especially prominent cases within them. Finally, we provide two detailed case studies to show how these institutes operate in practice, and how the need for unofficial diplomacy and a recent government change have shaped their activities.(Pac Aff/GIGA)

Many new think tanks have emerged in East Asia in recent decades. The region is home to highly diverse and in some cases very vibrant environments for think-tank development. While there are some commonalities among think tanks in East Asia in terms of the models used at the time of their establishment, there is no uniform pattern of think-tank development in the region that can be traced back to the operations of developmental states. This Special Issue explores the driving forces of and the challenges to think-thank development in three specific East Asian settings: Mainland China, Taiwan, and Japan. In particular, the experience with think-tank development in Mainland China raises the necessity of reconsidering prevailing conceptions that think tanks can only prosper in democracies and when they are independent of the government. Two broad conclusions emerge from this Special Issue. First, the contributions emphasize that context matters for think-tank development and, more specifically, that national think-tank sectors are greatly influenced by the particular political context in which they exist. Second, the contributions show not only that the specific political context factors that impact the trajectories and traits of East Asian think-tank sectors vary between countries, but also that they operate at different interactive levels: (a) at the level of the inter- and transnational context within which think-tank sectors develop; (b) at the level of domestic governmental systems and their openness to external policy advice and other think-tank services; and (c) at the level of individual political leaders interested in engaging with think tanks. (Pac Aff/GIGA)

Pakistan occupies an elevated role in China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and hosts its 'flagship' project, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It has attracted the largest volume of investments under the BRI and opened itself comprehensively to its transformative potential. This book provides a comprehensive analysis of CPEC's impact on Pakistan's economy, politics, and society, covering its developmental benefits as well as resulting controversies. Interdisciplinary and international experts capture the complexity of CPEC, presenting new empirical data in the form of interviews, archival materials, and documentary evidence. Covering topics ranging from agriculture to the environment, gender to security, they focus on local outcomes challenging prevalent narratives about the BRI as a strategic, China-driven vehicle to transform other countries in its image. They argue that examples like CPEC should be understood as interactive processes between China and its international partners, which produce interdependent relations between them. Beyond the case of CPEC, these findings contribute to the burgeoning field of "Global China", through a comprehensive yet granular assessment of the first 10 years of the BRI's flagship project.

On 21st February 2023, the Chinese Foreign Ministry released its concept for a "Global Security Initiative", a white paper outlining the country's proposed solution to challenges across traditional and non-traditional security issues. While the content mostly amounts to a restatement of long-standing principles and pooling of existing activities under a new label, its packaging as a "global initiative" should be seen as a statement of intent, claiming a much greater role in international politics. The sketched Chinese security agenda differs significantly from that of Western powers in both its principles and practices, making this field a new arena of competition between both sides.

The security dimension has long been the most contentious aspect of US-China relations, marked by strategic mistrust, great-power competition and several flashpoints in East Asia. Until recently, these tensions were moderated by much warmer and closer economic ties, civil society exchanges in business, education, academia, culture and tourism, as well as shared interests in globalization and trade. However, recent moves by the US and Chinese governments to "securitize" the previously cooperative aspects of their relationship have fundamentally altered this dynamic and greatly increased the likelihood of a permanent confrontation between the two great powers.

As the military standoff over Ukraine continues, both sides have attempted to mobilize international support for their respective positions. While Kiev has received in­creasingly robust NATO backing, Russia has turned to its "strategic partner" China. A recently published joint Sino-Russian statement has fueled speculation that Beijing could weigh in on Moscow's side and perhaps even lead to the resurgence of competition between ideo­logical blocs in world politics. However, diverging interests on Ukraine limit such co­operation in the short term. A long-term align­ment between both sides is a more serious possibility, but can still be influenced by Western policy choices.

The recent military coup in Myanmar reversed a decade-long experiment towards incremental political liberalization. At the same time, it also brought China's engagement there back into the spotlight, and initial Chinese reactions led to suspicions that Beijing had welcomed or even aided the return to military rule. However, the reality of China's role in Myanmar's democratic transition and simultaneous peace process is far more complicated, and instructive for its overall engagement in conflict societies.

Ever since its announcement in 2013, China's "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI) has attracted significant attention from international observers, covering its impact on fields ranging from economic integration to geopolitics. However, the peace and security implications of the BRI have seen comparatively little interest, despite the heavy concentration of BRI-related investments in highly fragile and conflict-prone environments. This report focuses on BRI projects and their transformative impact on conflict dynamics in four of these countries: Pakistan, Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan and Uganda. It also provides some practical suggestions for improving local outcomes and strengthening international cooperation.

Ever since its announce­ment in 2013, China's "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI) has attracted significant attention from inter­national observers, covering its impact on fields ranging from economic integration to geo­politics. However, the peace and security impli­cations of the BRI have seen comparatively little interest, despite the heavy concentra­tion of BRI-related invest­ments in highly fragile and conflict-­prone environ­ments. This report focuses on BRI projects and their trans­formative impact on conflict dynamics in four of these countries: Pakistan, Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan and Uganda. It also provides some practical suggestions for improving local outcomes and strengthen­ing inter­national co­operation.

Ever since its announce­ment in 2013, China's "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI) has attracted significant attention from inter­national observers, covering its impact on fields ranging from economic integration to geo­politics. However, the peace and security impli­cations of the BRI have seen comparatively little interest, despite the heavy concentra­tion of BRI-related invest­ments in highly fragile and conflict-­prone environ­ments. This report focuses on BRI projects and their trans­formative impact on conflict dynamics in four of these countries: Pakistan, Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan and Uganda. It also provides some practical suggestions for improving local outcomes and strengthen­ing inter­national co­operation.