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There is not enough water globally for all the things humans need and want water to do for us. Water supply bubbles are bursting in China, the Middle East and India with potentially serious implications for the global economy and for political stability. Even the United States is depleting groundwater on average 25% faster than it is being replenished. Our thirst for water grows with our population, but the amount of fresh water available on Earth is fixed. If we assume "business as usual" by 2050 about 40% of the projected global population of 9.4 billion is expected to be facing water stress or scarcity. With increasing climate variability being predicted by global climate models, we are likely also to have more people without adequate water more of the time, even in water-rich regions. Irrigation productivity rose dramatically over the past 40 years as a result of the Green Revolution. However, even if we disregard the environmental impacts caused by that revolution, we are no nearer to achieving global food security than we were 40 years ago, as every time we come close to filling the food production gap population growth and ecosystem decline associated with water diversions to human purposes set us back. Our natural and agricultural ecosystems are trying to tell us something. This book pursues these overarching themes connecting to water and food production at global and regional scales. The collection offers a comprehensive discussion of all relevant issues, and offers a wide-ranging discussion with the aim of contributing to the global debate about water and food crises.

"There are growing accounts of innovative, often collaborative institutional approaches to water management that seem to respond better to new challenges in supply and water quality management. While some describe these new institutional designs as a 'third way', as opposed to traditional state-centered or market-based modes, we find that the most salient features of it to characterize even those effective state or market designs. The fundamental ingredient, which is patterned relationships, is one that arises when social networks are built around the formal (state or market) institutions. The necessary plane of description is not on the dimension of structure (state, market, or otherwise) but in the nature and workings of these relational networks. We describe necessary features of these networks. We illustrate these points with a case study: the Environmental Water Account (EWA), a novel market-based program for negotiating water allocations around the San Francisco Bay-Delta (California, U.S.A.). We point out how this institution worked precisely because it was not merely a market-based program but, rather, built in features of an effective social network. In this way, we found a capacity of the EWA to adapt to the dynamic nature of water resources and needs, along with the uncertainties inherent in a complex social-ecological system." (author's abstract)

We argue that the social construction of target populations is an important, albeit overlooked, political phenomenon that should take its place in the study of public policy by political scientists. The theory contends that social constructions influence the policy agenda and the selection of policy tools, as well as the rationales that legitimate policy choices. Constructions become embedded in policy as messages that are absorbed by citizens and affect their orientations and participation. The theory is important because it helps explain why some groups are advantaged more than others independently of traditional notions of political power and how policy designs reinforce or alter such advantages. An understanding of social constructions of target populations augments conventional hypotheses about the dynamics of policy change, the determination of beneficiaries and losers, the reasons for differing levels and types of participation among target groups, and the role of policy in democracy.

Public policy almost always seeks to change the behavior of one or more target populations who are ostensibly linked to the problems the policy is seeking to address. This paper argues that statutory designers and agency officials almost always have a choice from among several potential target groups, and that institutional factors often influence them to make inappropriate choices. Statutory designers, who it is assumed are sensitive to electoral conditions, will tend to oversubscribe some policies by identifying too many targets, including some who are not linked to policy objectives at all. Under other conditions, they will under subscribe, excluding some target groups who would contribute considerably to achievement of policy goals. The institutional conditions and incentives faced by agencies differ from those of elected officials. Therefore, they tend to target policies differently. Under some conditions, agencies will attempt to correct problems introduced by statutory designers, but in other situations, the institutional incentives faced by agencies will only exacerbate the problems. Agencies are most likely to correct problems introduced by statutory designers when agencies have a high degree of professionalism and receive budgets and other rewards on the basis of "value added" evaluations.

ABSTRACTStatutory design is the source of many problems encountered in implementation, yet policy scholars have not made much headway in providing coherent and consistent advice for framing smarter statutes. There is a great deal of disagreement about how much discretion statutes should leave to implementers, and four distinct and conflicting schools of thought have emerged. This article advises that none of the perspectives is always correct and patterns for allocating discretion should take into account the implementation context. Contexts vary from statute to statute and may change for different policy elements within particular policies. The core elements in policy content are identified and linked in a scheme that is more comprehensive and relevant to policy results than previous work. The article also provides a 'value-added' conception of implementation in which the extent of discretion exercised by implementers is measured by changes they make in the core elements of policy.