"Handelt es sich bei der aktuellen Krise in der Euro-Zone um eine strukturelle Krise oder nur um eine Häufung von 'Krisenereignissen'? Noch ist unklar, wer letztlich die Gewinner sein werden - und wie diese die Krise darstellen werden." (Autorenreferat)
"This chapter traces how rapidly evolving mechanisms of EU governance have affected German economic policy since the Treaty of Maastricht was agreed in 1991. Its central theme is the transition of Germany from 'pace-setter' in the constitutive politics of designing EMU to 'beleaguered player' in the regulative politics of its implementation, from Germany as policy model to Germany as the main problem. Europeanization has both reinforced traditional policy beliefs in 'sound' finance and acted as a catalyst for domestic policy reforms by strengthening the domestic discourse of competitiveness. It has also led to significant pressures for institutional reconfiguration, notably within the federal executive, federal-state relations, and the Bundesbank. The chapter questions the traditional assumption of a goodness of 'fit' between German and EU economic policies, in part because of unintended effects from EMU and in part because, despite emphasis on a consensus about the 'social market' economy, Germany lacks a unitary economic policy model. 'Ordo-liberal' and 'managed' economy elements co-exist in tension and react very differently to Europeanization. The nature of the domestic governing style, with its stress on consensus and the complementing of majoritarian by 'negotiation' democracy, creates an important institutional bias to 'managed' capitalism. But the reinforcing effects of the European Single Market, EMU, and globalization raise questions about the loyalty of key German firms to 'managed' capitalism and whether at some point its defences might be overwhelmed by a process of market liberalization that escapes its confines. In that case the polity and political effects of Europeanization will prove much greater than is currently seen." (author's abstract)
This article examines the complex effects - cognitive and material, direct and indirect - of the European Union on German economic policies, with particular reference to the government of Gerhard Schröder (1998-2002) and to Economic and Monetary Union. Particular attention is paid to the questions of institutional fit and misfit, of changing domestic opportunity structures, and of whether Europeanisation has been important in reshaping domestic preferences or in altering the context of domestic action. The changing context of domestic action raises in turn the question of whether Europeanisation is displacing the German model of 'managed' capitalism. Two variables are identified as central in answering this question: the nature of domestic governing style and the extent of commitment to 'negotiation' democracy over majoritarian democracy and the continuing loyalty of German firms to this model.