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Why do states make disingenuous treaty commitments? Under what conditions will countries refrain from entering cooperative agreements with which they do not expect to comply? This article addresses these questions by analyzing how states that are pursuing nuclear weapons treat the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The authors develop a distinction between two types of noncooperative behavior. The first is cheating while part of the NPT (predation) and the second is pursuing nuclear weapons outside of the treaty (abstention). The authors' argument is that democratic proliferators are more likely to abstain because executives in democracies are domestically constrained to a greater degree than authoritarian leaders. Statistical tests in a sample of all countries with active nuclear weapons programs from 1968 to 2004 provide evidence in favor of our argument. Controlling for confounding variables and the factors that motivate states to pursue nuclear weapons, the results show that states with greater constraints on executive authority are less likely to choose predation. Yet, electoral mandates do not appear to dissuade governments from making disingenuous treaty commitments. These findings have important implications for nuclear proliferation, the credibility of international commitments, and efforts to link domestic political institutions with international outcomes.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT or Treaty) faces either extinction or extension in 1995, when the NPT signatories will meet to decide its fate. Given the rapid changes in today's nuclear technology and political environment, many states have expressed reservations about extending the Treaty. This Note considers the implications of those reservations as well as arguments favoring extension. This Note reviews the birth of the atomic age and the terms of the NPT and examines the Treaty's strengths and weaknesses. The author concludes that the Treaty should remain in force and suggests strategies for maintaining the support of member states and attracting other states as the 1995 extension conference draws near.

In recent debate on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT), William Walker (2007) views the NPT as a "child of a grand enlightenment project," which created an international order of cooperation & commitment among states. He contends that the Bush administration has devised a counter-enlightenment strategy that has led to the normative decline of the nuclear order, leading to accusations & recriminations. This paper attempts to cool the debate. It considers the question of whether the number of nuclear states would instantly & dramatically increase if the NPT collapsed. It then discusses the relationship between nuclear disarmament & the NPT. The conclusion highlights some rarely considered aspects favoring the NPT & notes that the world might not miss the treaty until it is gone. Adapted from the source document.

Lottaz, Iwama, and their contributors investigate the role of neutral and nonaligned European states during the negotiations for the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Focusing on the years from the Irish Resolution of 1958 until the treaty's opening for signatures ten years later, the nine chapters written by area experts highlight the processes and reasons for the political and diplomatic actions the neutrals took, and how those impacted the multilateral treaty negotiations. The book reveals new aspects of the dynamics that lead to this most consequential multilateral breakthrough of the Cold War. In part one, three chapters analyze the international system from a bird's eye perspective, discussing neutrality, nonalignment, and the nuclear order. The second part features six detailed case studies on the politics and diplomacy of Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Austria, and Yugoslavia. Overall, this study suggests that despite the volatile and dangerous nature of the early Cold War, the balance of the strategic environment enabled actors that were not part of one or the other alliance system to play a role in the interlocking global politics that finally created the nuclear regime that defines international relations until today. A valuable resource for scholars of nonproliferation, the Cold War, neutrality, nonalignment, and area studies.

Lottaz, Iwama, and their contributors investigate the role of neutral and nonaligned European states during the negotiations for the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Focusing on the years from the Irish Resolution of 1958 until the treaty's opening for signatures ten years later, the nine chapters written by area experts highlight the processes and reasons for the political and diplomatic actions the neutrals took, and how those impacted the multilateral treaty negotiations. The book reveals new aspects of the dynamics that lead to this most consequential multilateral breakthrough of the Cold War. In part one, three chapters analyze the international system from a bird's eye perspective, discussing neutrality, nonalignment, and the nuclear order. The second part features six detailed case studies on the politics and diplomacy of Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Austria, and Yugoslavia. Overall, this study suggests that despite the volatile and dangerous nature of the early Cold War, the balance of the strategic environment enabled actors that were not part of one or the other alliance system to play a role in the interlocking global politics that finally created the nuclear regime that defines international relations until today. A valuable resource for scholars of nonproliferation, the Cold War, neutrality, nonalignment, and area studies.

Intro -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Author biography -- Peter Pella -- Chapter 1 Introduction -- Chapter 2 Scientific background -- 2.1 Fundamental forces -- 2.2 Model of the atom -- 2.3 Isotopes -- 2.4 Stability -- 2.5 Half-life -- 2.6 Fission and fusion -- Chapter 3 Technology -- 3.1 Reactor physics -- 3.2 Nuclear reactors -- 3.3 Reactor designs -- 3.4 The nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear proliferation -- 3.5 Uranium enrichment -- 3.6 Reactor wastes -- 3.7 Reprocessing -- 3.8 Fission weapons -- 3.9 Gun-barrel device -- 3.10 Implosion device -- 3.11 Proliferation concerns -- References -- Chapter 4 The nuclear nonproliferation treaty -- 4.1 Why proliferation is a concern -- 4.2 NPT early history -- 4.3 Conference on Disarmament -- 4.4 The NPT -- 4.5 Recent history of the NPT -- 4.6 The IAEA, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee -- 4.6.1 The IAEA -- 4.6.2 The NSG -- 4.6.3 Zangger Committee -- 4.7 Successes of the NPT -- 4.8 Difficulties faced by the NPT -- 4.8.1 Iraq -- 4.8.2 Libya -- 4.8.3 Syria -- 4.8.4 DPRK -- 4.8.5 Iran -- 4.9 Lessons learned -- References -- Chapter 5 The NPT in crisis -- 5.1 Safeguards -- 5.2 Technical cooperation -- 5.3 Disarmament -- 5.4 Middle East -- 5.5 Security assurances -- References -- Chapter 6 Conclusion -- Reference -- Chapter -- Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons -- Article I -- Article II -- Article III -- Article IV -- Article V -- Article VI -- Article VII -- Article VIII -- Article IX -- Article X -- Article XI -- Reference.

"Lottaz, Iwama, and their contributors investigate the role of neutral and nonaligned European states during the negotiations for the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Focusing on the years from the Irish Resolution of 1958 until the treaty's opening for signatures ten years later, the nine chapters written by area experts highlight the processes and reasons for the political and diplomatic actions the neutrals took, and how those impacted the multilateral treaty negotiations. The book reveals new aspects of the dynamics that lead to this most consequential multilateral breakthrough of the Cold War. In part one, three chapters analyze the international system from a bird's eye perspective, discussing neutrality, nonalignment, and the nuclear order. The second part features six detailed case studies on the politics and diplomacy of Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Austria, and Yugoslavia. Overall, this study suggests that despite the volatile and dangerous nature of the early Cold War, the balance of the strategic environment enabled actors that were not part of one or the other alliance system to play a role in the interlocking global politics that finally created the nuclear regime that defines international relations until today. A valuable resource for scholars of nonproliferation, the cold war, neutrality, nonalignment, and area studies"--