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AbstractGovernment agencies have a certain freedom to choose among different possible courses of action. This article studies agency decision making on priorities in a principal–agent framework with multiple tasks. Agency leadership has discretion over part of the agency's budget to incentivize staff in the pickup of cases. The head is concerned not only with society's benefits from the agency's overall performance, but also with the organization's public image. Based on their talent and the contracts offered by the head, staff officials choose which type of task to pursue: complex major cases with an uncertain outcome or basic minor and simple cases with a higher probability of success. We show how the size of the agency's discretionary budget influences both the scale and type of tasks it will engage in. Small changes in the budget can cause extensive restructuring from major to minor tasks, or vice versa, causing social welfare jumps. The mechanism provides overhead authorities with some control over the priorities of supposedly independent agencies. It applies generally to government bureaus with the formal and informal discretion to choose their tasks. Antitrust authorities serve as one illustration of implications for institutional design.

A case study of the development of a mediation program within a state environmental agency. A number of concerns arose, including the neutrality of mediators, the types of cases mediated, the voluntary participation of parties, & acceptance of the mediated agreement. These issues are examined via an analysis of a conflict mediated by the agency. Based on issues in the case, criteria are suggested to help guard against the problems that arise when government agencies serve a mediating role. These criteria may be useful to any organization that contemplates using mediation to help resolve conflict. 3 Tables, 1 Appendix, 48 References. Adapted from the source document.

Period covered by report ends June 30. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Much research following Kaufman's classic study Are Government Organizations Immortal? has investigated the claim that government agencies enjoy great security and long life. Less attention has been paid to Kaufman's thesis that government agencies facing a termination threat have strong incentives to react. In a study of the on-going Norwegian local government amalgamation reform, we demonstrate that this type of government agency reacts by hoarding (i.e., a last-minute flurry of spending) when faced with a termination threat. This finding shows that agencies facing termination threats are active players in the termination game. We discuss implications for research on agency termination and design implications for reformers of the public sector.

Master i styring og ledelse ; This thesis is based on explorative empirical research on the use of strategic management and performance management in central-administrative governmental agencies in Norway. Employing document analysis, the whole population of 61 central administrative agencies in Norway (the year 2017) – including directorates, inspectorates and oversight bodies, was examined. These are organizationally independent units but are exposed to politically based ministerial governance, including performance budgeting and performance management. Strategic management and performance management are therefore not inherently integrated processes in Norwegian government agencies. Key questions were how performance management interacts with strategic management in governmental agencies, do ministries' various use of performance management affect whether agencies develop strategies or how they design their strategy, and are (long term) strategies dormant documents or actively used as steering instruments in agencies alongside (short term) performance management? Both quantitative and qualitative data were gathered from our source documents. Poister et al.'s (2010) strategic management framework was used as an integrative perspective. The relationship between agency and parent ministry was interpreted as defining important contextual determinants described by Ferlie and Ongaro (2015). Strategies were analysed with various approaches such as strategic stance (Boyne and Walker 2004) and institutional "administrative values" and vision (Bozeman 2007, Hood 1991). The quantitative data were analysed with Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM) (Hair et al. 2017). Key findings: In a supposedly low-NPM affected tier of government, two-thirds of agencies had agency-wide strategies. Strategic management seems to have a stronger identity forming function, while performance management dominates aim-setting in agencies. Depending on variables like size, organisation structure, policy area and ministry-affiliation, the interaction between performance management and strategic management showed non-linear variations suggesting they function as separate, but interconnected steering-instruments in government agencies in Norway. ; Denne masteroppgaven er en utforskende studie av bruk av strategisk styring og mål- og resultatstyring i sentral-administrative statlige virksomheter i Norge. Jeg brukte dokumentanalyse av tre dokumentkilder: tildelingsbrev, virksomhetenes strategidokumenter og virksomhetens årsmeldinger. Jeg studerte hele populasjonen av 61 sentraladministrative enheter, deriblant direktorater og tilsyn. Disse virksomhetene er autonome enheter, men er underlagt ytre styring gjennom tildelingsbrevenes mål- og resultatstyring og budsjettstyring. Strategisk styring og mål- og resultatstyring er derfor i disse virksomhetene strukturelt løsrevet fra hverandre. Nøkkelspørsmål har vært hvordan mål- og resultatstyringen og den strategiske styringen interagerer, hvorfor noen statlige virksomheter utvikler strategier og hvordan styrken og detaljorienteringen i tildelingsbrev påvirker utviklingen og bruken av strategier. Jeg innhentet både kvantitative og kvalitative data fra våre kilder. Ved hjelp av det strategiske rammeverket til Poister et al. (2010) tolket jeg bruk av tildelingsbrev som kontekstuelle determinanter som beskrevet av Ferlie og Ongaro (2015). Tildelingsbrev ble analysert med henblikk på kvantitativ måling av ulike styringsvirkemidler. Strategier ble analysert fra flere perspektiver, bl.a. strategisk ståsted (Boyne and Walker 2004) og verdier og visjoner (Bozeman 2007, Hood 1991). De kvantitative dataene ble analysert med Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM) (Hair et al. 2017). Nøkkelfunn: I statlige virksomheter på sentral-administativt nivå hadde 41 av 61 virksomheter utviklet strategier. Et stort flertall (78%) refererte til sin strategi i sine årsrapporter, men kun et mindretall (37%) refererte til konkrete strategiske mål. Dette bidrar til et bilde av at strategier hos mange ikke er sovende dokumenter. Strategier ser ut til å ha en mer identitets-markerende funksjon i styringen av virksomheter, mens mål- og resultatstyringen i tildelingsbrev dominerer den kortsiktige målsettingsfunksjonen. Når strategier blir for detaljerte i sine mål, ser det ut til at de raskere blir irrellevante for virksomheten. Avhengig av variabler som virksomhetens størrelse, organisasjonsstruktur, politikkområde og tilhørighet til departement, viste virksomhetene store variasjoner i strategisk styring og mål- og resultatstyring. Dette tolkes i denne oppgaven som at mål- og resultatstyring og strategisk styring synes å brukes som separate, men likevel sammenvevde redskaper i styringen av statlige virksomheter i Norge. ; publishedVersion

The phenomenon of corruption cases continues to increase from year to year, both from the number of cases that occur and the amount of state financial losses incurred. The criminal acts of corruption committed are also increasingly systematic and massive in all aspects of society's lives. To respond to this phenomenon, the Government, in this case the Ministry of Finance, issued a "breakthrough" in the system of government expenditure transactions, by issuing cashless government system with modern payment instruments. The cashless payment system is expected to close the potential gaps of corruption arising from conventional payment systems using physical money. Transactions carried out with non-cash payment systems can be traced in full and in detail, starting from who the user is, when and where the transaction is conducted, what is the purpose of using the transaction, and what is the nominal value. The use of cashless payment instruments is also expected to be able to fulfill the principles of (1) flexibility, (2) safety in transactions and fraud avoidance, (3) effectiveness, and (4) accountability while paying attention to the precautionary principles in the use of state budget. The cashless government system is expected to be a solution to the acceleration of government performance and public services within the framework of presenting clean, transparent and accountable governance. In the end, improving the working system of government organizations is expected to be able to encourage economic growth and provide benefits for improving the welfare of the community.