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The idea of non-alignment has remained a central component of Indian identity in global politics that is manifest in continuities: since independence in 1947 India has been in pursuit of strategic autonomy, a quest that in practice has led to semi-alliances fashioned under the cover of non-alignment and shaped by regional dynamics. In this setting, the rise of China now raises an interesting conundrum for Indian policy-makers as New Delhi seeks to balance the benefits and risks of an increasingly assertive neighbour and a network of alliances with like-minded countries. This article approaches this enigma by delineating continuities of non-alignment from the early roots of the policy, through the Cold War-era and into the modern-day international system. Though domestic factors have had a significant influence on the trajectory of Indian foreign policy, the continuities of non-alignment have prevailed through changes in leadership and domestic vicissitudes. By exploring the foundation of non-alignment and how India has operationalized the policy, this article maintains that to some extent continuity will persist: India will likely continue its rhetoric in favour of strategic autonomy while moving closer to the West and its allies in practice. Yet in order to effectively balance China's growing influence, India will need to be more assertive in building these alliances, as the success of its modern-day pursuit of strategic autonomy may well rest on a strong foundation of strategic partnerships. The coming to office in May 2014 of the National Democratic Alliance government led by Narendra Modi has signalled a move away from even the rhetoric of non-alignment, with significant implications for the future of Indian foreign policy. (International Affairs (Oxford) / SWP)

The question of whether Australia should change government policy to permit the export of uranium to India has divided Australians, arms control advocates and scholars. This article does not take a position for or against Australia's export of uranium to India. Instead, it argues that the concept of 'the national interest' is misleading as the analytical framework for assessing this important foreign policy decision, and leads to a distorted analysis and policy prescription. It is not all that difficult for the government to justify a decision to sell uranium to India as being in the national interest. But a more nuanced and complicated analysis results when the issue is discussed using a novel analytical framework of 'a balance of interests'. 'The national interest' is erroneous as a description of the empirical reality, substitutes tautology for explanation and is unhelpful as a guide to policy. 'A balance of interests' is superior on all three counts of description, explanation and prescription. In addition, it captures human agency and allows for human error and multiple balances as weighed by different people reflecting their personal predilections, professional backgrounds, life and career experiences, party philosophy, and institutional interests and perspectives. (International Affairs (Oxford) / SWP)