Search results

Journal of High Energy Physics 2015.11 (2015): 18 reproduced by permission of Scuola Internazionale Superiore di Studi Avanzati (SISSA) ; A search for a charged Higgs boson is performed with a data sample corresponding to an integrated luminosity of 19.7 ± 0.5 fb−1 collected with the CMS detector in proton-proton collisions at √s= 8,TeV. The charged Higgs boson is searched for in top quark decays for mH± mt − mb. The H± → τ±ντ and H± → tb decay modes in the final states τh+jets, μτh, ℓ+jets, and ℓℓ' (ℓ =e, μ) are considered in the search. No signal is observed and 95% confidence level upper limits are set on the charged Higgs boson production. A model-independent upper limit on the product branching fraction B(t → H±b) B(H± → τ±ντ ) =1.2–0.15% is obtained in the mass range mH± = 80–160 GeV, while the upper limit on the cross section times branching fraction σ(pp → t(b)H±) B(H± → τ±ντ ) = 0.38–0.025 pb is set in the mass range mH+ = 180–600 GeV. Here, σ(pp → t(b)H±) stands for the cross section sum σ(pp → t(b)H+) + σ(pp → t(b)H−). Assuming B(H± → tb) = 1, an upper limit on σ(pp → t(b)H±) of 2.0–0.13 pb is set for mH± = 180–600 GeV. The combination of all considered decay modes and final states is used to set exclusion limits in the mH±−tan β parameter space in different MSSM benchmark scenarios ; We congratulate our colleagues in the CERN accelerator departments for the excellent performance of the LHC and thank the technical and administrative staffs at CERN and at other CMS institutes for their contributions to the success of the CMS effort. In addition, we gratefully acknowledge the computing centers and personnel of the Worldwide LHC Computing Grid for delivering so effectively the computing infrastructure essential to our analyses. Finally, we acknowledge the enduring support for the construction and operation of the LHC and the CMS detector provided by the following funding agencies: the Austrian Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economy and the Austrian Science Fund; the Belgian Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique, and Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek; the Brazilian Funding Agencies (CNPq, CAPES, FAPERJ, and FAPESP); the Bulgarian Ministry of Education and Science; CERN; the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Ministry of Science and Technology, and National Natural Science Foundation of China; the Colombian Funding Agency (COLCIENCIAS); the Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sport, and the Croatian Science Foundation; the Research Promotion Foundation, Cyprus; the Ministry of Education and Research, Estonian Research Council via IUT23-4 and IUT23-6 and European Regional Development Fund, Estonia; the Academy of Finland, Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, and Helsinki Institute of Physics; the Institut National de Physique Nucléaire et de Physique des Particules / CNRS, and Commissariat à l'Energie Átomique et aux Energies Alternatives / CEA, France; the Bundesministerium fur Bildung und Forschung, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, and Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft Deutscher Forschungszentren, Germany; the General Secretariat for Research and Technology, Greece; the National Scientific Research Foundation, and National Innovation Office, Hungary; the Department of Atomic Energy and the Department of Science and Technology, India; the Institute for Studies in Theoretical Physics and Mathematics, Iran; the Science Foundation, Ireland; the Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare, Italy; the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning, and National Research Foundation (NRF), Republic of Korea; the Lithuanian Aca We congratulate our colleagues in the CERN accelerator departments for the excellent performance of the LHC and thank the technical and administrative staffs at CERN and at other CMS institutes for their contributions to the success of the CMS effort. In addition, we gratefully acknowledge the computing centres and personnel of the Worldwide LHC Computing Grid for delivering so effectively the computing infrastructure essential to our analyses. Finally, we acknowledge the enduring support for the construction and operation of the LHC and the CMS detector provided by the following funding agencies: the Austrian Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economy and the Austrian Science Fund; the Belgian Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique, and Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek; the Brazilian Funding Agencies (CNPq, CAPES, FAPERJ, and FAPESP); the Bulgarian Ministry of Education and Science; CERN; the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Ministry of Science and Technology, and National Natural Science Foundation of China; the Colombian Funding Agency (COLCIENCIAS); the Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sport, and the Croatian Science Foundation; the Research Promotion Foundation, Cyprus; the Ministry of Education and Research, Estonian Research Council via IUT23-4 and IUT23-6 and European Regional Development Fund, Estonia; the Academy of Finland, Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, and Helsinki Institute of Physics; the Institut National de Physique Nucléaire et de Physique des Particules / CNRS, and Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique et aux Énergies Alternatives / CEA, France; the Bundesministerium fur Bildung und Forschung, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, and Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft Deutscher Forschungszentren, Germany; the General Secretariat for Research and Technology, Greece; the National Scientific Research Foundation, and National Innovation Office, Hungary; the Department of Atomic Energy and the Department of Science and Technology, India; the Institute for Studies in Theoretical Physics and Mathematics, Iran; the Science Foundation, Ireland; the Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare, Italy; the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning, and National Research Foundation (NRF), Republic of Korea; the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences; the Ministry of Education, and University of Malaya (Malaysia); the Mexican Funding Agencies (CINVESTAV, CONACYT, SEP, and UASLP-FAI); the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, New Zealand; the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission; the Ministry of Science and Higher Education and the National Science Centre, Poland; the Fundacao para a Ciencia e a Tecnologia, Portugal; JINR, Dubna; the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, the Federal Agency of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Russian Foundation for Basic Research; the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of Serbia; the Secretaría de Estado de Investigación, Desarrollo e Innovación and Programa Consolider-Ingenio 2010, Spain; the Swiss Funding Agencies (ETH Board, ETH Zurich, PSI, SNF, UniZH, Canton Zurich, and SER); the Ministry of Science and Technology, Taipei; the Thailand Center of Excellence in Physics, the Institute for the Promotion of Teaching Science and Technology of Thailand, Special Task Force for Activating Research and the National Science and Technology Development Agency of Thailand; the Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey, and Turkish Atomic Energy Authority; the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, and State Fund for Fundamental Researches, Ukraine; the Science and Technology Facilities Council, U.K.; the US Department of Energy, and the US National Science Foundation. Individuals have received support from the Marie-Curie programme and the European Research Council and EPLANET (European Union); the Leventis Foundation; the A. P. Sloan Foundation; the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation; the Belgian Federal Science Policy Office; the Fonds pour la Formation à la Recherche dans l'Industrie et dans l'Agriculture (FRIA-Belgium); the Agentschap voor Innovatie door Wetenschap en Technologie (IWT-Belgium); the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS) of the Czech Republic; the Council of Science and Industrial Research, India; the HOMING PLUS programme of the Foundation for Polish Science, cofinanced from European Union, Regional Development Fund; the OPUS programme of the National Science Center (Poland); the Compagnia di San Paolo (Torino); the Consorzio per la Fisica (Trieste); MIUR project 20108T4XTM (Italy); the Thalis and Aristeia programmes cofinanced by EU-ESF and the Greek NSRF; the National Priorities Research Program by Qatar National Research Fund; the Rachadapisek Sompot Fund for Postdoctoral Fellowship, Chulalongkorn University (Thailand); and the Welch Foundation, contract C-1845.demy of Sciences; the Ministry of Education, and University of Malaya (Malaysia); the Mexican Funding Agencies (CINVESTAV, CONACYT, SEP, and UASLP-FAI); the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, New Zealand; the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission; the Ministry of Science and Higher Education and the National Science Centre, Poland; the Fundacao para a Ciencia e a Tecnologia, Portugal; JINR, Dubna; the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, the Federal Agency of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Russian Foundation for Basic Research; the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of Serbia; the Secretaría de Estado de Investigación, Desarrollo e Innovación and Programa Consolider-Ingenio 2010, Spain; the Swiss Funding Agencies (ETH Board, ETH Zurich, PSI, SNF, UniZH, Canton Zurich, and SER); the Ministry of Science and Technology, Taipei; the Thailand Center of Excellence in Physics, the Institute for the Promotion of Teaching Science and Technology of Thailand, Special Task Force for Activating Research and the National Science and Technology Development Agency of Thailand; the Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey, and Turkish Atomic Energy Authority; the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, and State Fund for Fundamental Researches, Ukraine; the Science and Technology Facilities Council, U.K.; the US Department of Energy, and the US National Science Foundation. Individuals have received support from the Marie-Curie programme and the European Research Council and EPLANET (European Union); the Leventis Foundation; the A. P. Sloan Foundation; the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation; the Belgian Federal Science Policy Office; the Fonds pour la Formation à la Recherche dans l'Industrie et dans l'Agriculture (FRIA-Belgium); the Agentschap voor Innovatie door Wetenschap en Technologie (IWT-Belgium); the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS) of the Czech Republic; the Council of Science and Industrial Research, India; the HOMING PLUS programme of the Foundation for Polish Science, cofinanced from European Union, Regional Development Fund; the OPUS programme of the National Science Center (Poland); the Compagnia di San Paolo (Torino); the Consorzio per la Fisica (Trieste); MIUR project 20108T4XTM (Italy); the Thalis and Aristeia programmes cofinanced by EU-ESF and the Greek NSRF; the National Priorities Research Program by Qatar National Research Fund; the Rachadapisek Sompot Fund for Postdoctoral Fellowship, Chulalongkorn University (Thailand); and the Welch Foundation, contract C-1845

The Russian war against Ukraine has had multiple impacts on NATO's deterrence and defence stance vis-à-vis Moscow, which today presents a number of challenges to allies – particularly European ones. The 2022 Madrid summit and the resulting Strategic Concept signalled a substantial departure for the alliance in terms of focus and posture.[1] First, the new Concept represents an unequivocal return to a Russia policy based first and foremost on deterrence and defence, rather than calls for cooperation that had been typical between the end of the Cold War and the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.[2] The 2022 Concept stands in stark contrast with this period of détente and instead explicitly points to Russia as "the most significant and direct threat to Allies' security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area".[3] This new focus on deterrence and defence is accompanied with an enhancement of NATO's military presence along the northern and eastern flanks.[4]The impact on crisis prevention and management and cooperative security
On the contrary, crisis prevention and management and cooperative security, the other two core tasks featured in the 2022 Strategic Concept, are clearly de-prioritised in comparison with the previous 2010 Concept. First, it is explicitly stated that they serve the overarching goal of collective defence. Second, the sections devoted to these two tasks are worded in a cautious, vague and modest way, especially if compared with the ambitious, concrete and robust section referring to Article 5, which enshrines the principle of collective defence. To make just one example, two long-standing NATO partnerships such as the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative are not even explicitly mentioned in the Strategic Concept.
It appears somewhat inevitable that the focus on Russia's threat on the eastern flank must be balanced with a de-prioritisation of the southern one.[5] To be sure, terrorism is still formally indicated as a major asymmetric threat to the Alliance; yet, the ruinous NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan and, above all, the war against Ukraine have radically turned NATO's military posture towards the conventional scenario of a peer-to-peer conflict waged by a state actor on the Alliance's eastern border stretching from Scandinavia to the Black Sea. As a result, the crisis prevention and management core task may be relegated to a background role, at least in the short to medium term.[6] This new reality will affect some European allies on the Mediterranean shores as they seek to keep NATO engaged in North Africa and the Middle East.A membership postponed sine die
The war in Ukraine has ushered in a number of unexpected developments with regard to NATO's enlargement, with Finland joining the alliance and Sweden currently in the process of doing so. At the same time, the issue of Ukraine's membership has remained controversial, as it has been since the 2008 Bucharest Summit.[7]
At the 2023 Vilnius summit, allies reiterated that Ukraine might not enter NATO while the conflict with Russia is ongoing, closing the door to such an outcome for the mid-to-long term.[8] On the same occasion, G7 countries gathered in Vilnius pledged long-term military support to Kyiv both as a group and via bilateral agreements, in primis between Washington and Kyiv.[9]
As a result, for the foreseeable future, Article 5 will apply to the current NATO limes and will not include Ukraine as a third country: allies will continue to provide military assistance to Kyiv while refraining from a direct conflict with Russia on Ukrainian territory.The challenges of the new NATO Force Model
The Alliance took several steps in order to meet the collective deterrence and defence goals set up by the new Strategic Concept. Among these, a new NATO Force Model stands out as a particularly ambitious undertaking. Among the initiatives under this model, perhaps the most advertised was the increase of the Rapid Reaction Force to 300,000 troops from the current 40,000 to be deployed within one month.[10] Indeed, NATO is aiming at a force model in which allied troops are divided into three tiers based on their respective readiness level: tier 1 forces (over 100,000) are to be deployable in up to ten days; tier 2 (200,000) in around 10-to-30 days; tier 3 (500,000) in between 30 and 180 days.[11]
This move will, in all likelihood, prove to be as difficult to implement in the short and medium term as it is ambitious. The task is particularly arduous considering the magnitude of the leap required in sheer numbers and, above all, the fact that most NATO countries outside of the US are already under pressure to maintain high readiness across domains as they concurrently make huge investments in the modernisation of their forces and re-stocking of ammunition.[12] Notably, these numbers entail a level of enablers and logistics not seen as necessary during the post-Cold War era marked by crisis management and stability operations. Even at the peak of its military engagement in Afghanistan in 2011, NATO deployed a maximum of 130,000 troops from 51 allied and partner countries,[13] though they did not necessitate the air and naval components, as well as the land heavy equipment, necessary to cope with a peer adversary.
For sure, from an operational point of view, it is much easier to plan and implement a major defence posture in Europe than in Central Asia. Still, military mobility remains a priority issue for NATO, to the point that even non-EU allies such as US, UK, Canada and Norway have joined the PESCO Military Mobility project to improve the related infrastructure and legal framework in Europe.Forward defence in practice
At the same time, the 2022 Summit led to the commitment by NATO to strengthen its Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) – first established in 2017 with four multi-national battalion-sized battle groups in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Poland[14] – both in size and scope. Indeed, they are going to be upgraded to brigade-sized forces.[15] Moreover, under the enhanced Vigilance Activity (eVA) label, four other multinational battlegroups have been deployed in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia, led respectively by France, Italy, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
Again, framework nations and other contributing allies are, in many cases, encountering serious hurdles as they attempt to keep a battle-ready force in theatre, given the shortages in troops and equipment that appear to affect all Allies except the US.[16] These land forces are integrated within a broader deterrence and defence posture which includes air policing of the whole European allies' airspace, standing maritime groups activities in the seas adjacent to Europe, and integrated air and missile defence (IAMD).[17] Moreover, the Strategic Concept recognises space and cyber as operational domains where Article 5 may be invoked should an attack against allied assets occur, and sets the goal to integrate space capabilities within the Alliance's deterrence and defence posture by laying the ground for multi-domain operations. Meanwhile, the underwater environment is gaining more attention also within NATO.
Inevitably, NATO's ability to properly bolster its forward defence capabilities represents a crucial element in the credibility of its standing forces along the eastern flank as a conventional deterrent. At the same time, the Alliance is developing new regional plans that aim to blend with those of front-line nations, and testing them via large scale exercises such as Steadfast Defender 24. Still, these plans will require that the new Force Model effectively raises the number of high-readiness troops.[18]Mass and credible deterrence
The Ukraine war has exposed substantial gaps throughout European militaries in terms of capacity: ammunition stocks, number of available weapon systems and the defence industries' ability to quickly ramp up production without clear international coordination and procurement commitments by governments. Ammunition stocks have rarely been a priority among NATO allies and should be brought to a level befitting a protracted, high-intensity conflict such as the one taking place in Ukraine. At the same time, the wide-ranging modernisation drive already underway in many allies' armed forces must deliver exquisite capabilities to the armed forces at scale, especially considering that the technological edge long given for granted by NATO forces has gradually been eroded in key areas, including emerging and disruptive technologies.
The war in Ukraine showed how mass is still a necessary precondition for victory in drawn-out conflicts between peer or near-peer forces. Mass, however, is not simply achieved by a number of troops, but by the amounts and quality of available equipment, large ammunition stocks, the ability to quickly move forces as needed and adequate training beyond élite, front-line troops to bear high levels of attrition. Achieving adequate mass thus requires a concerted effort that transcends the purely numerical dimension, but combines crucial industrial, budgetary and readiness elements.
First, Western and especially European armed forces must be backed by solid industrial capacity. The European Defence and Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB) needs to be able to scale up production of low- and high-end equipment and ammunition in order to avoid the ammunition shortages that were widespread even before Russia's full-scale invasion. The fragmentation of the defence market in Europe, with countries pursuing separate national programmes for systems often answering similar requirements, is an obstacle to the achievement of true economies of scale making European products less competitive.[19] This also means that the scarce funds available for research and development separately at a national level cannot be combined and leveraged together, at a time when much of the military spending is directed to filling post-Cold War gaps.
Second, defence budgets are increasing throughout NATO, though critical gaps accumulated over decades of prioritising stability, peacekeeping and crisis management operations are set to absorb large part of these efforts in the short and medium terms. Many militaries will likely face an arduous task as they seek to prepare for large-scale, protracted and high-intensity conflict against peer- or near-peer level forces while at the same time bringing ammunition and equipment stocks to adequate levels.
Third, while the war in Ukraine presents many traditional features of 20th-century wars, such as attrition and the central role of artillery, it is also witnessing a number of revolutionary developments such as the massive use of uncrewed air vehicles (UAVs). NATO allies must put warfighting readiness back at the top of national priorities, with particular attention to morale and motivation but also training and education of personnel, in a way that favours a flexible and adaptable approach to military operations that transcends domains and requires an increasingly integrated use of wide-ranging technologies.
In conclusion, NATO has taken a number of meaningful steps to maintain a credible deterrent for its members in the face of Russia's war in Ukraine. Still, to prevent an attack to eastern allies by a risk-prone adversary, it must demonstrate to be on the whole capable of effectively responding to full-scale conventional war, and to do so for as long as it takes. This is probably the greatest challenge for the new NATO posture caused by two years of a large-scale, high-intensity war fought by Moscow at its borders.Elio Calcagno is Researcher in the Defence Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Alessandro Marrone is Head of the Defence Programme at IAI. This commentary is a revised and updated version of a chapter written by the same authors for the study Russia-Ukraine War's Strategic Implications, edited by Alessandro Marrone, Rome, IAI, February 2024.[1] NATO, 2022 Strategic Concept, July 2022, https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept.[2] Elio Calcagno, "Dove punta la bussola Nato", in AffarInternazionali, 1 July 2022, https://www.affarinternazionali.it/?p=4236.[3] NATO, 2022 Strategic Concept, cit., point 8.[4] Ibid., point 21.[5] Alessandro Marrone, "NATO's New Strategic Concept: Novelties and Priorities", in IAI Commentaries, No. 22|30 (July 2022), https://www.iai.it/en/node/15667.[6] Enrico Casini and Andrea Manciulli (eds), La guerra tiepida. Il conflitto ucraino e il futuro dei rapporti tra Russia e Occidente, Rome, Luiss University Press, 2023.[7] Andrew Gray, "Bucharest Declaration: NATO's Ukraine Debate Still Haunted by 2008 Summit", in Reuters, 10 July 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/natos-ukraine-debate-still-haunted-by-bucharest-pledge-2023-07-10.[8] Sean Monaghan et al., "What Happened at NATO's Vilnius Summit?", in CSIS Critical Questions, 14 July 2023, https://www.csis.org/node/106347.[9] Laura Kayali, "G7 Countries Pledge Long-Term Support for Ukraine", in Politico, 12 July 2023, https://www.politico.eu/?p=3333672.[10] "NATO to Boost Troops on High Alert to over 300,000 - Stoltenberg", in Reuters, 27 June 2022, https://www.reuters.com/article/instant-article/idUKKBN2O80R0.[11] NATO, New NATO Force Model, June 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220629-infographic-new-nato-force-model.pdf.[12] IAI interview, 6 September 2023.[13] "Blood and Billions of Dollars: NATO's Long War in Afghanistan", in Reuters, 15 August 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/india/blood-billions-dollars-natos-long-war-afghanistan-2021-08-13.[14] Each Battlegroup is led by a framework nation, respectively US (Poland), Germany (Lithuania), UK (Estonia) and Canada (Latvia).[15] "NATO Reaffirms Plan to Have 'Combat-Ready' Brigades in the Baltic States", in LRT, 11 July 2023, https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/2032611/nato-reaffirms-plan-to-have-combat-ready-brigades-in-the-baltic-states.[16] Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsh, "All Unquiet on NATO's Eastern Flank", in Foreign Policy, 13 April 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/13/nato-eastern-flank-battle-group-russia-poland-latvia-lithuania-estonia.[17] On NATO IAMD see, among others, Alessandro Marrone and Karolina Muti (eds), "Europe's Missile Defence and Italy: Capabilities and Cooperation", in Documenti IAI, No. 21|05 (April 2021), https://www.iai.it/en/node/13072.[18] Ben Barry et al., "The Future of NATO's European Land Forces: Plans, Challenges, Prospects", in IISS Research Papers, June 2023, https://www.iiss.org/en/research-paper/2023/06/the-future-of-natos-european-land-forces.[19] See in this regard Michelangelo Freyrie and Michele Nones, "The Implications for the European Defence Industry", in Alessandro Marrone (ed.), Russia-Ukraine War's Strategic Implications, cit., p. 107-116.

On 22 November 2023, the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, and the Italian Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, signed a German-Italian Action Plan.[1] The Plan promises greater collaboration between the two countries on the biggest challenges currently facing Europe. Among these priorities is environmentally sustainable economic growth and the acceleration of climate protection. While the Action Plan is relatively terse, focusing on the establishment of fora for greater cooperation rather than providing a detailed roadmap, its energy and climate section does highlight a specific project as an example of closer cooperation: the acceleration of the completion of the so-called South-Central Corridor for the transport of hydrogen throughout Europe. This Corridor has the primary function of enabling the import of hydrogen produced in North Africa into the very core of Europe and thus to the high-demand areas of Germany and Northern Italy. One especially important part is the so-called SouthH2 Corridor, which includes a pipeline running the entire length of the Italian peninsula before connecting to Southern Germany via Austria.
There are strong political and strategic arguments for a deeper energy cooperation between Italy and Germany, despite some differences.[2] Hydrogen and gas infrastructure is a key area where intensified cooperation is crucial.[3] Through the SouthH2 Corridor, the two countries have indeed expressed their willingness to collaborate precisely on hydrogen infrastructure, notably the SoutH2 Corridor. However, such cooperation cannot be limited to the infrastructural part; it must extend to a series of related issues in which both countries should seek to align their political and legal initiatives, starting from overcoming uncertainties regarding the development of hydrogen demand and the use of other net-zero technologies in both countries. In short, cooperation on infrastructure can be used as a jumping off point for a deeper collaboration on and exchange of information about their broader transition strategies. Such bilateral coordination would also contribute to the achievement of EU Green Deal objectives more broadly.The hydrogen pipelines: The SoutH2 Corridor and the rest
The construction of a hydrogen pipeline connecting the Mediterranean to the German industrial heartland is motivated by economic and political reasons. Economically, the EU would be able to import cheap, clean molecules; politically, it would contribute to building a new energy and sustainable partnership between the EU and the North African countries. Within this scheme, Italy can (and has the ambition to) be the joining link between North African exporters and European importers.
As pointed out by the Action Plan, the SoutH2 Corridor is the flagship infrastructure project embodying the new wave of energy cooperation between Italy and Germany. It consists of a 3,300 km pipeline that would transport 4 million tons of (green) hydrogen from North Africa to Germany via Italy and Austria. Behind the project are the major gas grid owners and operators in Italy, Austria and Bavaria and it is composed of four different sections.[4] Besides the Action Plan, the SoutH2 Corridor was included in the most recent list of EU projects of Common and Mutual Interest that, for the first time, included hydrogen projects as a result of the revision of the TEN-E Regulation.
However, the growing cooperation on hydrogen-ready infrastructure is not limited to the SoutH2 Corridor. Indeed, there are two other hydrogen pipelines under consideration. The first is through Switzerland, which is also part of the SoutH2, while the second is the SunsHyne Project crossing Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.[5] The latter project can transport hydrogen via unused natural gas pipelines in the Czech Republic and Slovakia replacing Russian gas.
All these three projects benefit from the same route from North Africa to Northern Italy, then splitting towards either Switzerland or Austria, with an additional split near Vienna towards Munich (SouthH2) or via Slovakia and the Czech Republic to Bavaria (SunsHyne). Italy and Germany would therefore need to cooperate on all these three projects, which will contribute to reaching the hydrogen import targets set by the REPowerEU Plan.The challenges of creating an integrated hydrogen market
Despite the positive infrastructural developments, German-Italian hydrogen cooperation must overcome several barriers. First, it needs to address the almost absence of a market. The conundrum is to build up quickly a solid market (in terms of both supply and demand) while ensuring the respect of competition and fairness of the market. Hydrogen is frequently compared to natural gas; however, natural gas markets were built at the time of vertically integrated (and often state-owned) companies. In the 1980s and 1990s, EU legislation started to focus on liberalisation through the directives. To fully build a liberalised, sustainable and well-functioning market takes time. Achieving the desired outcome will require a substantial effort and cooperation between policymakers, regulators and the industry.[6]
Additionally, hydrogen has been seen as a holy grail for decarbonisation because of its potential versatility. However, in reality, there is still much uncertainty about the future sectors supplied by clean hydrogen. Despite its multiple potential uses, policymakers should promote efficiently the use of hydrogen in those sectors where other more competitive and advanced technologies are not an option. In this sense, policymakers need to address demand uncertainty along the transition to encourage investment decisions. Indeed, the energy transition entails the need to transform not only the supply, but also the demand side. Therefore, Italian and German policymakers should work together to promote the ramp-up of hydrogen demand, thus reducing market uncertainty which can undermine investment decisions and slow the pace of the energy transition. While Germany has released (and updated) its hydrogen strategy, Italy has only issued preliminary guidelines. As of today, hydrogen consumption corresponds to 55 TWh in Germany[7] and 16 TWh in Italy.[8] The new Italian National Energy and Climate Plan foresees around 0.25 million tonnes (around 8.3 TWh) of hydrogen by 2030 to meet RED III targets, while Germany's updated hydrogen strategy foresees 95–130 TWh by 2030.Hydrogen vis-à-vis other key technologies
Connected to the question of future demand for hydrogen are also national plans and projections for the deployment of other net-zero technologies. This is especially true for the development and deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies. Through CCS, the CO2 emissions of an industrial process or power generation can be collected and redirected to underground storage facilities, thus preventing their release into the atmosphere and their contribution to the greenhouse effect. CCS is intimately connected to the future of the hydrogen market, since it is a part of the production of so-called "blue" hydrogen, which refers to the production of hydrogen from natural gas with subsequent capture and storage of the resulting carbon emissions. CCS is also included as a strategic net-zero technology in the proposed Net-Zero Industry Act, making projects associated with it eligible for accelerated planning permission and priority status for investment.
Italy and Germany have both engaged with the question of CCS, with Germany expected to publish a Carbon Management Strategy in the near future, which will detail the sectors in which it expects to leverage the technology.[9] Germany, and particularly the Green Party, have also recently pushed for a European Carbon Management Plan to increase EU cooperation on this issue.[10] In early 2023, Germany and Norway pledged closer cooperation on CCS and blue hydrogen value chains.[11] In Italy, meanwhile, Eni and Snam are working on developing a CCS project in Ravenna, which has recently been recognised as one of the EU's Projects of Common Interest (PCIs)[12] and would become one of the world's largest CCS facilities, with an estimated storage capacity of over 500 million tonnes.[13] The EU, for its part, is expected to publish a Communication on an industrial carbon management strategy in the first quarter of 2024.[14] Governments will also need to decide whether to use clean hydrogen or CCS to decarbonise the industry sector depending on geographical and geological features, existing and future infrastructure and technological availability.
Whether or how this will affect the SoutH2 Corridor is still unclear. According to the European Hydrogen Backbone initiative, a group of European infrastructure operators seeking to sketch out and advocate a common position on the future of Europe's hydrogen infrastructure, virtually the entirety of the capacity of the South-Central Corridor will be used for the transport of green hydrogen.[15] However, there exists uncertainties as to whether and when all the hydrogen imported from North Africa via the Corridor can really be green, which will depend on the development of electrolysis capacity in this region. As mentioned above, there is also uncertainty associated with how the CCS and related blue hydrogen capacities in Italy and Germany[16] will interact with the project: that is, how will blue hydrogen produced in either country affect demand, and how will such hydrogen be transported and distributed if not through the Corridor. Coordination on hydrogen must therefore also go hand-in-hand with closer examination of where and how CCS will be used in the two countries and in North Africa.Looking ahead
The Italian-German Action Plan's emphasis on the SoutH2 Corridor is a welcome development as it puts forward a tangible, infrastructural flagship project, which in addition to enhancing interconnection, also has symbolic value for the partnership between the two countries. It is clear, however, that cooperation cannot end at the construction of pipelines or other interconnectors, nor does it suffice as an initial step in isolation. Rather, the completion of the SoutH2 Corridor must go hand-in-hand with an intensification of dialogue between German and Italian policymakers and regulators, which must be based on common, realistic assumptions for the role of, and thus the demand for, hydrogen in the decarbonisation of industry as well as a common vision for the deployment of CCS in hydrogen production. By leveraging infrastructural connection to achieve greater policy and regulatory coordination, Italy and Germany should then make their common vision heard in Brussels to integrate their bilateral efforts into the broader challenge of creating a European hydrogen market.Pier Paolo Raimondi is a Researcher in the Energy, Climate and Resources Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and a PhD Candidate at the Catholic University of Milan. Max Münchmeyer is a Researcher in the Energy, Climate and Resources Programme of IAI.
This commentary presents some of the key issues discussed during a workshop organised by IAI, which brought together energy industry experts from both Germany and Italy. The event is part of a broader IAI project, "An Italian-German Dialogue on Energy Security and Transition amid Russia's War on Ukraine", supported by the German Federal Foreign Office.[1] Germany and Italy, Piano di Azione italo-tedesco per la cooperazione strategica bilaterale e nell'Unione europea [Action Plan to strengthen cooperation at both bilateral and European level], 22 November 2023, https://www.governo.it/en/node/24362; Deutsch-italienischer Aktionsplan für strategische Zusammenarbeit auf bilateraler und EU-Ebene, https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/975228/2244468/dc5441c1b7497c5855a723c87ffbf3a8/2023-11-22-dtitaktionsplan-data.pdf.[2] Max Münchmeyer and Pier Paolo Raimondi, "Between Security and Transition: Prospects for German-Italian Energy Cooperation", in IAI Commentaries, No. 23|66 (December 2023), https://www.iai.it/en/node/17912.[3] Ibid.[4] These are the "Italian H2 Backbone" promoted by Italy's TSO, Snam; "H2 Readiness of the TAG pipeline system" promoted by Trans Austria Gasleitung; "H2 Backbone WAG + Penta-West" promoted by Gas Connect Austria; and "HyPipe Bavaria – The Hydrogen Hub" promoted by bayernets. See SoutH2 Corridor website: The Initative, https://www.south2corridor.net/south2.[5] A project based in collaboration between SNAM, TAG, EUstream, Net4Gas and OGE.[6] Alexander Scheibe and Rahmatallah Poudineh, "Regulating the Future European Hydrogen Supply Industry: A Balancing Act between Liberalization, Sustainability, and Security of Supply?", in OIES Papers, No. ET26 (October 2023), https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?p=46606.[7] Hydrogen Europe, Germany Updates National Strategy, 27 July 2023, https://hydrogeneurope.eu/germany-updates-national-strategy.[8] Confindustria, Piano d'azione per l'idrogeno, September 2020, p. 16, https://www.confindustria.it/home/policy/position-paper/dettaglio/piano-azione-idrogeno.[9] Julian Wettengel, "Green Parliamentary Group Calls for Carbon Capture for Germany's Unavoidable Industry Emissions", in Clean Energy Wire, 22 December 2023, https://www.cleanenergywire.org/node/12898.[10] Nikolaus J. Kurmayer, "German Greens Make Way for European Carbon Management Plan", in Euractiv, 27 November 2023, https://www.euractiv.com/?p=2019904.[11] Norway's Government, Closer Cooperation between Norway and Germany to Develop Green Industry, 5 January 2023, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/id2958102.[12] Eni, Eni: Ravenna CCS Project Joins European List of Projects of Common Interest, 28 November 2023, https://www.eni.com/en-IT/media/press-release/2023/11/eni-ravenna-ccs-project.html.[13] Ibid.[14] Website of the European Commission DG Energy: Carbon Capture, Storage and Utilisation, https://energy.ec.europa.eu/node/5094_en.[15] European Hydrogen Backbone (EHB), Five Hydrogen Supply Corridors for Europe in 2030, May 2022, p. 25, https://ehb.eu/files/downloads/EHB-Supply-corridor-presentation-Full-version.pdf.[16] EHB website: Country Narratives: Italy (Snam), https://ehb.eu/page/country-specific-developments#italy-snam; and Germany (OTRAS, OGE and GASCADE), https://ehb.eu/page/country-specific-developments#germany-ontras-oge-and-gascade.

This book offers a comprehensive and accessible overview of international labour migration and the ILO's efforts to protect migrant workers through a rights-based approach. It gives new insights into the factors that motivate people to seek work outside their country of origin and the significant development effects on both origin and destination countries. Exposing the often limited access of migrant workers to their fundamental rights at work, it describes in detail the international norms that have evolved to protect migrant workers and ensure decent work for all. It reflects on existing an.

Die ohnehin chronischen Sicherheitsdefizite im nichtnuklearen Bereich haben sich in Rußland in den letzten Jahren wegen der zunehmenden Überalterung des Kapitalstocks noch verschärft. Zu den störanfälligsten Sektoren gehört die Erdöl- und Erdgasindustrie. Nur wenig ist bislang dafür getan worden, um die bei der Deponierung toxischer Abfälle enstehenden Umweltrisiken zu vermindern. Eine gefährliche Folge der Vernachlässigung der Sicherheitsstandards in der Produktion und bei der Giftmülldeponierung ist die Kontaminierung zahlreicher Grundwasservorkommen. Die Studie basiert auf der umfassenden Auswertung russischer Quellen. (BIOst-Mrk)

Asia's historical development is at a crossroads. Twenty months into the coronavirus pandemic, the cumulative economic and financial impacts are estimated to be much worse than those of the 1997 Asian economic crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis. Governments across ASEAN and East Asia have deployed a significant amount of emergency capital in their response to the pandemic, with an initial focus on protecting livelihoods. As countries move towards long-term deep decarbonisation and a circular Net Zero economy, recovery from the pandemic has offered a rare opportunity to realign energy, innovation, trade, and fiscal policies into macroeconomic planning and national budgets towards a new sustainable development paradigm. This book reviews and assesses the low-carbon green growth policies, practices, and economic recovery packages and identifies implementation gaps and new opportunities. The detailed analyses embedded in the chapters cover a wide range of impact strategies at sectoral level and identify immediate economywide actions required to realise the Net Zero future. Based on a review of countries' experiences, this volume concludes that past climate actions have entailed progressive bottom-up, sectoral, low-carbon, green growth initiatives that are relatively fast and easy to implement and that provided incremental co-benefits. Realising the Net Zero Future by 2050 will require much higher levels of technology absorption, crowding in finance, and strong institution building. It urges public and private actors to harness the potentials of regional cooperation based on market principles, which will reduce the cost of transformation to the Net Zero economy.

In hospitals, nutrition care is a set of actions that allows for the identification of patient nutritional needs and the provision of care to address those needs. Optimal nutrition for inpatients has a critical role in the prevention and treatment of diseases: It helps boost the body's immune system, reduces the risk of disease and infection, and aids in the recovery from illness. In Philippine public hospitals, nutrition care is provided by the Nutrition and Dietetics Service. In this work, we give a case study on the one of the hospital processes—the quality of hospital nutrition. Processes refer to the way care is delivered and whether it is aligned to evidenced-based practice or standards. We looked at whether Philippine public hospitals deliver high-quality, nutritionally appropriate meals to inpatients, adhere to the minimum meal allowance budget, and follow the minimal NDS inputs and process standards. Apart from the issue of unmet minimum meal allowance budget and nutritional content, we were able to unpack concerns related to human resources, equipment, management functions, and other NDS processes that could have an impact on the quality of nutrition care delivered. The general insight in enhancing the nutritional care offered in hospitals is to look at Nutrition and Dietetics Service as a whole, rather than just increasing the minimum meal allowance budget. The Department of Health must also guarantee that the value of high-quality nutrition care is recognized in hospitals, as it is often overlooked that it has an impact on total patient care quality.

This paper estimates the impact of group purchasing on medicine prices in French hospitals, taking advantage of the entry of hospitals into regional purchasing groups between 2009 and 2014. This paper uses a new database providing the average annual prices paid for all innovative and costly medicines in public hospitals. Using a fixed effects model that controls for hospitals' medicine-specific bargaining abilities and medicine-specific price trends, I find that group purchasing reduces prices of medicines in oligopoly markets, but has no impact on the prices of medicines with no competitors.

This paper estimates the impact of group purchasing on medicine prices in French hospitals, taking advantage of the entry of hospitals into regional purchasing groups between 2009 and 2014. This paper uses a new database providing the average annual prices paid for all innovative and costly medicines in public hospitals. Using a fixed effects model that controls for hospitals' medicine-specific bargaining abilities and medicine-specific price trends, I find that group purchasing reduces prices of medicines in oligopoly markets, but has no impact on the prices of medicines with no competitors.

This paper estimates the impact of group purchasing on medicine prices in French hospitals, taking advantage of the entry of hospitals into regional purchasing groups between 2009 and 2014. This paper uses a new database providing the average annual prices paid for all innovative and costly medicines in public hospitals. Using a fixed effects model that controls for hospitals' medicine-specific bargaining abilities and medicine-specific price trends, I find that group purchasing reduces prices of medicines in oligopoly markets, but has no impact on the prices of medicines with no competitors.

This paper estimates the impact of group purchasing on medicine prices in French hospitals, taking advantage of the entry of hospitals into regional purchasing groups between 2009 and 2014. This paper uses a new database providing the average annual prices paid for all innovative and costly medicines in public hospitals. Using a fixed effects model that controls for hospitals' medicine-specific bargaining abilities and medicine-specific price trends, I find that group purchasing reduces prices of medicines in oligopoly markets, but has no impact on the prices of medicines with no competitors.