After seven decades of regional domination, the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 put the whole continent in a state of political and economic uncertainty. The sudden absence of a strong, yet generally predictable hegemon initiated an intense debate centered on whether or not the rise of China posed a grave threat to the region or whether it would bring stability and cohesion to the region. After 23 years of observation, it is now safe to presume that China does not pose a military threat to the region. Simply because China does not have expansionist or aggressive political or economic aims does not mean that there should be no cause for concern. China does possess persistent political, economic, and security concerns that, despite the nation's best efforts, has not been able to solve. Domestically, examples of these concerns are illegal smuggling, weapons and human trafficking, illegal narcotics, organized crime, Islamic fundamentalism, ethnic nationalism, and Islamic militancy. Internationally, China has had a hard time, not only dealing with the aforementioned list, but also with piracy, ethnic unrest, anti-Chinese sentiment, corruption, and illegal port activities. The reason the solution to these problems remains elusive is the fact that they all share a common element. The element is that they are all transnational in nature; the events themselves, not fully encapsulated within the borders of just one nation-state. This makes them extremely difficult for a single nation-state to be able to effectively deal with them. It happens that Central Asian nations and littoral nations of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore are also afflicted with many of the same issues. This fact is why it will take a comprehensive and coordinated effort in order to effectively deal with the underlying causes which contribute to these problems before any noticeable effect will take place. These efforts, or transnational solutions, are the most effective way to deal with transnational concerns. Research, observations, and the case studies demonstrate that many of the most pressing transnational concerns have similar underlying factors. Income inequality, government repression, and lack of economic opportunity are a few of the most prevalent factors. The obstacles these factors cause are not insurmountable. However each one of these problems require a concentrated and coordinated effort and the cooperation of multiple nation-states. International Organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, are effective mediums in which to accomplish this. What is repeatedly observed is that transnational problems are best solved using transnational solutions. ; 2014-12-01 ; B.A. ; Sciences, Dept. of Political Science ; Bachelors ; This record was generated from author submitted information.
Liberia and Sierra Leone are commonly categorized as fragile and conflict-affected states. They are seen as being particularly vulnerable to organized crime due to deficiencies in their criminal justice systems and having insufficient control of their borders. But they also have emerged from peace processes combining state-building with the transformation of war economies. These were strongly based on the competing control of resources such as diamonds, gold, and timber by armed groups and state agents. A closer look at the illicit economies in both countries today reveals the legacy of these war economies and new dynamics that emerged with West Africa becoming a transit zone for South American cocaine destined for Europe. Although the organization of crime differs between sectors, the way it is tied to state-building and power structures in Liberia and Sierra Leone is quite similar. Surely, porous borders and a lack of regulation and effective law enforcement are real in both countries. But often organized criminal activities are linked to the very state that is supposed to build and defend the (reformed) framework of legality. Furthermore, certain components of illicit economies have important implications for development. Therefore, responses to organized crime need to be carefully crafted and should generally apply selective law enforcement measures combined with broader governance reforms and development-related initiatives addressing livelihood, health, and environmental issues. (Autorenreferat)
El objetivo del presente documento es analizar las actividades comerciales en el territorio de La Guajira colombiana, así como las limitaciones institucionales y naturales a que se vieron sometidos sus comerciantes entre las décadas de 1870 y 1930. El estudio plantea que en La Guajira se desarrolló una economía de frontera, caracterizada por la escasa presencia institucional, prácticas económicas con escasa vigilancia estatal, amplia presencia de población indígena, zonas inhóspitas para la colonización y activo comercio con países vecinos. La falta de Estado permitió que los negociantes adelantaran sus actividades sin mayores controles. Los empresarios y dirigentes regionales vinculados a las actividades extractivas como sal, perlas, palo de tinte, así como al comercio, no pudieron crear las instituciones ni el ambiente empresarial propicio para que en la economía guajira se consolidara un tejido productivo basado en la producción endógena, con empresas competitivas y un mercado de trabajo ajustado a la legislación nacional. ; The main purpose of this article is to analyze the commercial activities in La Guajira, Colombia, as well as the institutional and geographical constraints traders faced between 1870s and 1930s. The result that La Guajira developed a frontier economy, characterized by a weak institutional presence, economic practices with few state surveillance, wide presence of indigenous population, inhospitable zones for colonization and active trade with neighboring countries. The lack of institutions allowed the traders to grow without further controls. The entrepreneurs and regional leaders, linked to extractive activities such as: salt, pearls and logwood, as well as trade, could not create the adequate institutions and business environment to consolidate the departments economy with a production structure based on endogenous production, competitive companies and a job market adjusted to the national legislation.
Konstantinos Katsoudas, "A Dictatorship that is not a Dictatorship". Spanish Nationalists and the 4th of August The Spanish Civil War convulsed the international public opinion and prompted most foreign governments to take measures or even intervene in the conflict. Greek entanglement either in the form of smuggling war materiel or the participation of Greek volunteers in the International Brigades has already been investigated. However, little is known about a second dimension of this internationalization of the war: the peculiar forms that the antagonism between the two belligerent camps in foreign countries took. This paper, based mainly on Spanish archival sources, discusses some aspects of the activity developed in Greece by Franco's nationalists and the way Francoist diplomats and emissaries perceived the nature of an apparently similar regime, such as the dictatorship led by general Metaxas. The main objectives of the Francoist foreign policy were to avoid any escalation of the Spanish civil war into a world conflict, to secure international assistance for the right-wing forces and to undermine the legitimacy of the legal Republican government. In Greece, an informal diplomatic civil war broke out since Francoists occupied the Spanish Legation in Athens and Republicans took over the Consulate in Thessaloniki. The Francoists combined public and undercover activity: they worked hard to achieve an official recognition of their Estado Nuevo, while at the same time created rings of espionage and channels of anticommunist propaganda. The reason of their partial breakthroughs was that, contrary to their Republican enemies, the Nationalists enjoyed support by a significant part of the Greek political world, which was ideologically identified with their struggle. Francoist anti-communism had some interesting implications for Greek politics. An important issue was the Francoist effort to reveal a supposed Moscow-based conspiracy against Spain and Greece, both considered as hotbeds of revolution in the Mediterranean, in order to justify both Franco's extermination campaign and Metaxas' coup. Although this effort was based on fraudulent documents, forged by an anti-Bolshevik international organization, it became the cornerstone of Francoist and Metaxist propaganda. General Metaxas was the only European dictator to invoke the Spanish Civil War as a raison d'etre of his regime and often warned against the repetition of Spanish-like drama on Greek soil. Nevertheless he did not approve of Franco's methods and preferred Dr. Salazar's Portugal as an institutional model closer to his vision. For Spanish nationalist observers this was a sign of weakness. They interpreted events in Greece through the disfiguring mirror of their own historic experience: thus, although they never called in question Metaxas' authoritarian motives, the 4th of August regime was considered too mild and soft compared to Francoism (whose combativeness and fanaticism, as they suggested, the Greek General should have imitated); it reminded them the dictatorship founded in Spain by General Primo de Rivera in 1920s, whose inadequacy paved the way for the advent of the Republic and the emergence of sociopolitical radicalism. Incidents of the following years, as Greece moved towards a civil confrontation, seemed to strengthen their views. ; Konstantinos Katsoudas, "A Dictatorship that is not a Dictatorship". Spanish Nationalists and the 4th of AugustThe Spanish Civil War convulsed the international public opinion and prompted most foreign governments to take measures or even intervene in the conflict. Greek entanglement either in the form of smuggling war materiel or the participation of Greek volunteers in the International Brigades has already been investigated. However, little is known about a second dimension of this internationalization of the war: the peculiar forms that the antagonism between the two belligerent camps in foreign countries took. This paper, based mainly on Spanish archival sources, discusses some aspects of the activity developed in Greece by Franco's nationalists and the way Francoist diplomats and emissaries perceived the nature of an apparently similar regime, such as the dictatorship led by general Metaxas. The main objectives of the Francoist foreign policy were to avoid any escalation of the Spanish civil war into a world conflict, to secure international assistance for the right-wing forces and to undermine the legitimacy of the legal Republican government. In Greece, an informal diplomatic civil war broke out since Francoists occupied the Spanish Legation in Athens and Republicans took over the Consulate in Thessaloniki. The Francoists combined public and undercover activity: they worked hard to achieve an official recognition of their Estado Nuevo, while at the same time created rings of espionage and channels of anticommunist propaganda. The reason of their partial breakthroughs was that, contrary to their Republican enemies, the Nationalists enjoyed support by a significant part of the Greek political world, which was ideologically identified with their struggle. Francoist anti-communism had some interesting implications for Greek politics. An important issue was the Francoist effort to reveal a supposed Moscow-based conspiracy against Spain and Greece, both considered as hotbeds of revolution in the Mediterranean, in order to justify both Franco's extermination campaign and Metaxas' coup. Although this effort was based on fraudulent documents, forged by an anti-Bolshevik international organization, it became the cornerstone of Francoist and Metaxist propaganda. General Metaxas was the only European dictator to invoke the Spanish Civil War as a raison d'etre of his regime and often warned against the repetition of Spanish-like drama on Greek soil. Nevertheless he did not approve of Franco's methods and preferred Dr. Salazar's Portugal as an institutional model closer to his vision. For Spanish nationalist observers this was a sign of weakness. They interpreted events in Greece through the disfiguring mirror of their own historic experience: thus, although they never called in question Metaxas' authoritarian motives, the 4th of August regime was considered too mild and soft compared to Francoism (whose combativeness and fanaticism, as they suggested, the Greek General should have imitated); it reminded them the dictatorship founded in Spain by General Primo de Rivera in 1920s, whose inadequacy paved the way for the advent of the Republic and the emergence of sociopolitical radicalism. Incidents of the following years, as Greece moved towards a civil confrontation, seemed to strengthen their views.
Part 1: Recent Developments in Trade Theory and Empirics -- Chapter 1. The "New-New" Trade Theory: A review of the literature -- Chapter 2. Time Zones and FDI with Heterogeneous Firms -- Chapter 3. Firm Heterogeneity and Decision to Export: An exploration with India's Capital Goods Sector -- Chapter 4. IPR Regulatory Policy, Commercial Piracy and Entry modes of MNC: A Theoretical Analysis -- Part 2: International trade and institutions -- Chapter 5. International Trade and Size of the Government -- Chapter 6. Heterogenous Effect of Corruption on Bilateral Trade: Sectoral Gravity Analysis with Panel Data -- Chapter 7. Enlargement Decisions of Regional Trading Blocs -- Chapter 8. The Deal Breaker or the Protector of Interests of Developing Countries: India's Changing Negotiating Stance in WTO -- Part 3: Issues in Trade, Trade Policy and Development -- Chapter 9. Export Performance in Textile and Garments with China as a Competitor: An analysis of India's situation from the perspective of Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm -- Chapter 10. Impact of Trade Liberalization on Indian Textile Firms: A Panel Analysis -- Chapter 11. Trade, Infrastructure and Income Inequality in Selected Asian Countries: An empirical analysis -- Chapter 12. A Theoretical Model of Trade, Quality of Health Services and Signalling -- Chapter 13. Smuggling and Trafficking of Workers: A brief review and analysis of the Economics of Illegal Migration -- Chapter 14. Impact of Trade vs Non-Trade Policies on the Incidence of Child Labour: A Two Sector General Equilibrium Framework -- Chapter 15. FDI and Child Labour in a Developing Economy: A General Equilibrium Analysis -- Part 4: Issues related to foreign investment flows -- Chapter 16. The Role of Institutions in Attracting US FDI -- Chapter 17. Does foreign direct investment promote capital accumulation? -- Chapter 18. Do macroeconomic indicators influence foreign direct investment in India? A Causality Analysis -- Chapter 19. The Nature of trading by Domestic and Foreign Institutional Investors: A Cross Country Analysis -- Part 5: Issues relating to Globalization, financial markets and financial instruments -- Chapter 20. Exploratory study of select commodity and equity index around 2008 -- Chapter 21. An empirical estimation of volatility clustering, volatility spillover and persistence in terms of half-life from a developed country USA to two emerging economy India and China -- Chapter 22. Post Crisis Global Financial Architecture and India -- Part 6: Issues related to foreign exchange market -- Chapter 23. Survey and benchmarking of Indian FX markets and types of intervention -- Chapter 24. The global foreign exchange market: crisis and beyond -- Chapter 25. 'The Impossible Trinity': Where does India stand? -- Part 7: Issues related to financial institutions -- Chapter 26. Insuring the Insurer: a game theoretic approach to regulatory design -- Chapter 27. Does skill matter in Mutual funds? How emerging markets differ from more developed markets/Mutual fund performance: An International Perspective -- Chapter 28. Determinants of foreign bank entry into emerging market economies -- Chapter 29. Banks, financial derivatives, and crises: a fourth generation model.
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The illicit wildlife trade (IWT) is the fourth most lucrative form of organised crime globally (Donnenfeld & Aucoin, 2017:1). The Global Financial Integrity (GFI) reports that IWT is one of the most profitable and illicit economies with a profit margin of US$ 23 billion annually (May, 2017:np). It has developed into one of the most expensive security challenges. Affecting a broad range of plants and animals, the illegal trade in wildlife deprives nations of their biodiversity, income opportunities, natural heritage and capital (Nowak, 2016:1). Although governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and locals have sought to protect wildlife in the past, entire species of animals and plants are still in danger. To complicate matters, wildlife crime is no longer nationally bound and has moved to a highly sophisticated and a transnational problem (Steyn, 2017:np). Wildlife criminal syndicates exploit weaknesses in neighbouring countries criminal justice systems and porous borders amongst other elements making it easier for the crime to be transboundary in nature (Pienaar, 2014:2; Steyn, 2017:np), through loopholes derived from inconsistent neighbouring countries' wildlife laws. This is due to each country listing country-relevant species and developing legislation suitable to their needs. However, the dynamics of wildlife crime being transnational and perpetrated by organised criminal networks cannot only be dealt with at a national level, as this may aid in the exploitation of wildlife crime laws and the above-mentioned loopholes (Warchol & Harrington, 2016:25). IWT has become a serious and global problem and has developed into a well organised criminal activity, involving multiple TCN's. Its clandestine nature, coupled with it being deemed as a low risk crime has allowed it to extend into other forms of TOC's in the SADC region. South Africa's abalone crisis has moved from a national wildlife crime to that of a regional one. This is as a result of the TCN's being involved in the poaching and smuggling of the marine mollusc at a rapid rate. Furthermore, East Asian criminal groups in collaboration with local Cape Flats gangs have successively used the illicit abalone trade to facilitate the drug trade in Cape Town. Although great efforts have gone into the protection of wild fauna and flora there the low risk of detection and weak deterrence due to low penalties in neighbouring SADC countries aid in the illicit trade. International regulatory frameworks such as CITES have undoubtedly been a key factor both in terms of raising awareness and developing collective responses and strategies to control the wildlife trade. However, like that of CITES, most international and regional treaties are only regulatory and require domestic laws to regulate the regional trade in endangered species. Ultimately, what is required is a domestic consensus in neighbouring countries laws to stop IWT.
İnsanlığın varlığından günümüze kadar birçok sorun ve problem yaratıldı ve bunların çok büyük bir kısmının temelinde insanoğlunun hatası yatmaktadır. Terörizm bu sorunlardan biridir ve belki de en önemlisidir. İnsanları göç etmeye zorlayan ve devletleri değişik politikalar yaratmaya iten bir güçtür. Terörizmle mücadele de sınır güvenliği çok önemli bir yere sahiptir. Ülkeler sınırlarını güvenli hale getirerek terörizmden ve onun yarattığı tehlikelerden korunduklarını düşünürler. Bunun için birçok fiziki güvenlik yöntemlerine başvururlar sınır duvarı, tel örgü, hendek ve insansız hava araçları gibi. Fakat bu tip tedbirler terörizmi önlemez sadece etkilerini kısa bir süreliğine azaltır. Bununla beraber insan hakları ihlallerine de sebebiyet verilir. Fiziki sınır güvenlik tedbirleri kaçakçılık ve yasa dışı geçişleri önlemek adına fayda sağlar. Terörizmle mücadele etmek için sınır güvenliği gerekli ve bu sınır güvenliği devlet tarafından sadece fiziki tedbirler ile değil aynı zamanda doğal yollar ile almak gereklidir. Yani sınır komşuları ile iyi ilişkiler kurarak terörizmin ülke içine sızmasına mâni olmak ve sınır bölgelerinde yaşayan insanları terörizme karşı cephe almalarını sağlayarak. Türkiye Fırat Kalkanı Harekâtı ile sınır bölgesinde böyle bir tedbir alma yoluna gitmiştir. Terör unsurları (YPG, PKK, IŞID) ile sınır hattı arasında güvenli bölge oluşturmaya çalışmıştır. Oluşturulan bu güvenli bölgelere Türkiye'ye dost olan gruplar yerleştirilerek terör örgütlerinin ülke içine sızması engellenmiş olacaktır. Entegre fiziki sınır güvenlik yöntemleri ve doğru politikalar ile terörizmle mücadele daha etkili olacaktır. Sınır güvenliği konusu farklı boyutlarda tartışılmaya başlanacaktır ; A lot of problems were created by people since the existence of humanity and majority of them depend on the failure of mankind. Terrorism is one of these problems and maybe it is the most important. Terrorism is a kind of power which force people to move and change of goverments' policy.Border security has a crucial place about counter terrorism. Countries think that they are avoiding from terrrorism and its dangers by making safe their borders. Because of that, they use many methods such as border wall, wire mesh, ditch and unmanned aerial vehicle. These type protection methods can't obviate, only it reduces effects for a short time. Physical protection methods can be useful to prevent illegal migration and smuggling. Counter terrorism depend on border security and not only physical measure but also natural methods should be used by goverments. İn other words each goverment had better create good relations with their border countries thus they are able to prevent terrorism action on the way to homeland. Also people who live in the border region, should be organised against terror foundations. By starting Fırat Kalkanı Harekatı, Turkey goverment took this type precaution on the border line. Turkey would like to create safe zone between terror organizations (PKK, IŞIS, YPG,) and border line. Harmless groups will be inserted in to the safe zone so terror organizations can't enter Turkey. In briefly, integrated border security methods and true political relations are able to apply more effective counter-terrorism. Border security issue will be discussed on different dimensions.
Проводится анализ изменений, внесённых законодателем в Главу 22 Уголовного кодекса Российской Федерации в июле -декабре 2014 г., а также в марте 2015 г. На основании указанного анализа автор определяет направления дальнейшего совершенствования норм, составляющих обозначенную Главу. ; Chapter 22 of the Criminal Code of the RF protecting social relations in the sphere of economic activity within the second half-year of 2014 and March 2015 has been considerably amended by the legislator. Under the Federal Law of 21 July 2014 No. 218-FZ, the indicated Chapter has been supplemented with Article 172.1 that establishes the responsibility for ''falsification in fiscal accounting and finance organization accountability''. According to the Federal Law of 21 July 2014 No. 277-FZ, Chapter 22 of the Criminal Code of the RF has been amended by introducing Article 191.1 that establishes the responsibility for "illegally obtained, stored, transported, processed timber for the distribution purpose". In compliance with Federal Laws of 22 December 2014 No. 430-FZ, 31 December 2014 No. 530-FZ, 8 March 2015 No. 45-FZ, 30 March 2015 No. 67-FZ, significant changes were made into the disposition of Articles 171.1, 171.2, 173.1, 173.2, 178, 180 and 194 of the CC of the RF. By the Federal Law of 31 December 2014, Article 200.2 was introduced in the Chapter which establishes responsibility for ''smuggling alcoholic and tobacco goods'' and it was decriminalized in December 2011. Despite the amendments, Chapter 22 of the Criminal Code of the RF still has serious gaps, for example, the lack of a regulation aimed at establishing criminal responsibility for ''financial pyramid schemes''. The necessity of the criminal responsibility for such acts is pointed out by both jurists and legal practitioners. Simultaneously, following the indicated legislative amendments, some problems concerning the development of other regulations in Chapter 22 of the CC of the RF appeared to be unsolved. In particular, there were no changes either introduced in the disposition of ''anti-laundering'' legal norms (Articles 174-174.1 of the CC of the RF) and in the disposition of Article 193.1 of the CC of the RF in spite of their complexity in practice application. There also exist problems arising in the practical application of Articles 185, 185.1, 189-190 of the CC of the RF. To solve the problems of further development of Chapter 22 of the CC of the RF, the optimal ratio both for criminalization and decriminalization of acts in the sphere provided by the Chapter can be presented. In jurists'' and legal practitioners'' views, within new, social and economic conditions decriminalization of some acts must prevail where the responsibility for them is fixed by the regulations included into this Chapter. At the same time, under the following conditions it is important to revise punishment imposed for the crimes in the sphere of economic activity. For more effective measures to combat those crimes, the legislator must stipulate punishment that can serve an alternative to imprisonment.
Данная статья продолжает серию исследований, посвященных дальнейшему совершенствованию норм, составляющих главу 22 Уголовного кодекса Российской Федерации. Автор проводит анализ исследований учёных, посвящённых проблемам, возникающим при практическом применении указанных норм. На основании проведённых исследований автор обоснованно формулирует собственные выводы о концепции дальнейшего реформирования данной главы УК РФ. ; The development of criminal law of the Russian Federation protecting social relations in the economic sphere is impossible without the scientific conception base. The conception involves a definite balance between criminalization of new acts and decriminalization of the acts for which the criminal responsibility is established by the law in Chapter 22 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. This balance was not practically followed in the Criminal Code by the legislator. In fact, there was an imbalance towards criminalization of new acts. During this period only four acts were decriminalized: pseudo-entrepreneurship (Art. 173 of the CC of the RF); misleading advertisement (Art.182 of the CC of the RF); smuggling (Art.188 of the CC of the RF); consumer fraud (Art. 200 of the CC of the RF). At the same time Chapter 22 was supplemented by more than ten novels. On the one hand, it should be noted that criminalization may eliminate gaps in current criminal law that protects social relations in the economic sphere. On the other hand, in the result of criminalization there is a danger of rising a law, which establishes criminal responsibility for the commission of acts, that is neither socially dangerous nor ''abortive''. The latter is referred to the novels that establish criminal responsibility for hostile takeover, illegal gambling, as well as ''fly-by-night companies'' and were introduced into Chapter 22 of the CC of RF in 2010-2011. Many other laws comprising Chapter 22 can be similarly characterized. In this case decriminalization of the relevant laws is under consideration. Decriminalization of acts in the economic sphere is appropriate not only by means of making them in torts. Due to the law analysis it becomes clear that some laws are special to those laws which establish criminal responsibility for crimes where social relations in the economic sphere cannot be the subject. Article 176 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, as an example, sets forth responsibility for illegal lending. This act is considered to be fraud with infringement on property. Article 176 of the CC of the RF is virtually aimed at protection of social relations in the economic sphere. In connection with the introduction of Article 159.1 into Chapter 21 of the CC of the RF, which establishes responsibility for lending fraud, decriminalization of illegal lending is a major aspect (Art.180 of the CC of the RF). The conception of development of criminal law protecting social relations in the economic sphere cannot be either only criminalization or only decriminal-ization of acts. However, in present-day social and economic conditions decriminalization of acts is certain to be an important feature of the conception.
The use of physical force is, unfortunately, one of the key elements in the repertoire of human behaviour. Given the persistence and prominence of the intentional use of force, or violence, for human interactions, group behaviour and state actions, it is surprising how limited the degree of understanding of this topic still is. Many of the policies dealing with potential or actual group-based violence therefore remain imperfect. For example, not one of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which have shaped the development aid discourse since 2000, refers to peace or security. This silence on security, conflict and peace is overdue to be remedied. The SIPRI Yearbook aims to fill existing knowledge gaps: it provides information on and endeavours to enhance understanding of conflict, peace and security, thereby enabling better policies to be made in the pursuit of a more peaceful, secure and equitable world. Social science has identified at least four further significant fields that exhibit knowledge gaps concerning the strategic use of force by groups in areas with weakened state institutions, including in undemocratic states. These four fields are the drivers of insecurity, conflict and fragility; trends in security, conflict and peace; the consequences of violent conflict and insecurity; and interventions and institutions for security and peace. Taken as a whole, these gaps imply the absence of a comprehensive system of security data tying together the different strands of peace research, which may be the most fundamental and systematic knowledge gap presented thus far. This lack of understanding greatly complicates peacebuilding and conflict prevention. It makes interventions in conflicts much more ideological, much less an issue of actual common interests and ultimately less successful -- leading to self-fulfilling prophecies or 'narratives' of failed interventions, seemingly demonstrating the limitations of such actions. If so many other issues in an individual's life or in society can be measured, it should be possible to develop metrics for peace and security, both at the individual and the aggregate, national levels. However, measuring perceptions of insecurity, counting the war dead, tallying incidents of weapon smuggling, developing proxies for peace and estimating security indicators is not sufficient. Despite these and many other developments referenced in the SIPRI Yearbook over the years, at least two important challenges remain. The first challenge is to define the remaining data needs to advance the study of security, conflict and peace. The second will be to develop a 'global system of security accounts', which brings together in a consistent framework the many variables measuring flows of security and peace. The SIPRI Yearbook has for almost five decades provided a narrative on global security developments, building on SIPRI's unique ability to gather, collate and interpret relevant trends. The time may be right to ask how this narrative can be formalized to further develop knowledge on and policies for security and peace. Adapted from the source document.
The Bedouin of South Sinai have been significantly affected by the politics of external powers for a long time. However, never had the interest of external powers in Sinai been so strong as since the Israeli-Egyptian wars in the second half of the 20th century when Bedouin interests started to collide with Egypt's plans for a development of luxury tourism in South Sinai. rnrnThe tourism boom that has started in the 1980s has brought economic and infrastructure development to the Bedouin and tourism has become the most important source of income for the Bedouin. However, while the absolute increase of tourists to Sinai has trickled down to the Bedouin to some extent, the participation of Bedouin in the overall tourism development is under-proportionate. Moreover, the Bedouin have become increasingly dependent on monetary income and consequently from tourism as the only significant source of income while at the same time they have lost much of their land as well as their self-determination.rnrnIn this context, the Bedouin livelihoods have become very vulnerable due to repeated depressions in the tourism industry as well as marginalization. Major marginalization processes the Bedouin are facing are the loss of land, barriers to market entry, especially increasingly strict rules and regulations in the tourism industry, as well as discrimination by the authorities. Social differentiation and Bedouin preferences are identified as further factors in Bedouin marginalization.rnrnThe strategies Bedouin have developed in response to all these problems are coping strategies, which try to deal with the present problem at the individual level. Basically no strategies have been developed at the collective level that would aim to actively shape the Bedouin's present and future. Collective action has been hampered by a variety of factors, such as the speed of the developments, the distribution of power or the decay of tribal structures.rnWhile some Bedouin might be able to continue their tourism activities, a large number of informal jobs will not be feasible anymore. The majority of the previously mostly self-employed Bedouin will probably be forced to work as day-laborers who will have lost much of their pride, dignity, sovereignty and freedom. Moreover, with a return to subsistence being impossible for the majority of the Bedouin, it is likely that an increasing number of marginalized Bedouin will turn to illegal income generating activities such as smuggling or drug cultivation. This in turn will lead to further repression and discrimination and could escalate in a serious violent conflict between the Bedouin and the government.rnrnDevelopment plans and projects should address the general lack of civil rights, local participation and protection of minorities in Egypt and promote Bedouin community development and the consideration of Bedouin interests in tourism development.rnrnWether the political upheavals and the resignation of president Mubarak at the beginning of 2011 will have a positive effect on the situation of the Bedouin remains to be seen.rn
Focusing on the Ming (1368-1644) and (especially) the Qing (1364-1912) eras, this book analyzes crucial moments in the formation of cultural, regional, and religious identities. The contributors examine the role of the state in a variety of environments on China's "peripheries," paying attention to shifts in law, trade, social stratification, and cultural dialogue. They find that local communities were critical participants in the shaping of their own identities and consciousness as well as the character and behavior of the state. At certain times the state was institutionally definitive, but it could also be symbolic and contingent. They demonstrate how the imperial discourse is many-faceted, rather than a monolithic agent of cultural assimilation
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Mexico's 2024 elections are important for Mexico and for the United States too.In a year filled with elections around the world, we should pay close attention to Mexico's 2024 electoral contests. Mexico's incumbent President, Manuel Andrés López Obrador or AMLO as he is known, seeks to preserve his legacy by supporting the election of his chosen successor, Claudia Sheinbaum. AMLO wants to assure the continuation of Mexico's "fourth transformation," as AMLO calls the reform process that he initiated. A determined opposition seeks to reverse many of AMLO's actions and policies and warns that AMLO seeks to weaken Mexico's democracy.The outcomes of Mexico's elections are very important for the United States. No other country in the world has more impact on the daily lives of Americans than does the US's southern neighbor. Mexico is the US's largest trading partner and production partner. It is also the entry way for massive amounts deadly, illegal drugs and huge flows of migrants.Managing these key issues will be debated sharply during both the US and Mexican election campaigns, as will be the strength of democratic practices in both countries. Mexico's June 2024 elections will be large and complex. 98.6 million Mexicans are eligible to cast their ballots on June 2 for some 20,375 positions at the local, state, and national levels.Rightly, most attention will be focused on the choice of a new president and the election of an entirely new national congress (500 deputies and 128 senators) next June. Although Mexico's constitution does not allow incumbent president López Obrador to run again, AMLO remains high in the polls, with approval ratings circling 60% depending on the poll, and he is throwing strong support to his chosen successor, Claudia Sheinbaum. Polls show Sheinbaum with a roughly 20% lead over the candidate of the opposition center-right coalition, Xóchitl Gálvez, at present.Importantly, AMLO has indicated that if Sheinbaum's coalition (named "Let's Continue Making History") wins a large enough majority in the new Congress, he will recommend constitutional reforms that would have the effect of weakening independent checks and balances in Mexico and centralizing more power in the hands of the president. AMLO has been very critical of the Supreme Court, the National Elections Institute and other autonomous institutions that were created over the years as Mexico was building its democracy. However, AMLO has not had the two thirds majority in both houses of Congress needed to approve the constitutional reforms he would like to see. His attempted reforms have sparked very large counter demonstrations and been rebuffed by Mexico's courts, but he has persisted in his calls for constitutional change. During AMLO's tenure the independent global indexes on democracy and related issues, including corruption and rule of law, have reported deterioration and backsliding in the quality of Mexico's democracy. The 2023 World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index, for example, tracks a decline in Mexico's rule of law score during AMLO's term and currently ranks Mexico at 116 out of the 142 countries measured. Thus, the outcome of the Mexico's elections could be very important for the strength of Mexico's democratic institutions. Not surprisingly, many in Mexico see the 2024 elections as a test for maintaining the strength of its democracy – echoing themes being heard in the US election campaign. In Mexico, the formal national campaigns have not yet begun, but there has already been a good deal of campaign activity. Currently, AMLO's candidate, Sheinbaum, and the coalition led by AMLO's Morena party have a substantial lead over the three party opposition coalition know as the "Broad Front for Mexico" and their candidate, Gálvez. Many observers believe the gap can be narrowed before the vote in June. The question is how much, for both the presidential vote and to impact the eventual congressional majorities. AMLO and his coalition have some clear weak spots on which the opposition will focus. One of the most evident is public unhappiness with the government's handling of Mexico's serious and persistent public security problems. In a recent poll by the respected Reforma newspaper, for example, 52% rated AMLO's handling of organized crime as "bad", and only 23% gave the President a good rating.The widespread crime and poorly working justice system brings much violence to Mexican communities (with over 30,000 homicides annually in recent years and over 169,000 homicides since AMLO took office). This situation results in over 90% of impunity for most crimes. This situation also has severely negative effects for the US. It facilitates massive smuggling of deadly drugs, such as fentanyl. The latest data suggests that drug overdose rates in the US hit a new high of some 112,000 in 2023. The seizures of lethal synthetic fentanyl at the US-Mexico border almost doubled from FY 22 to FY 23, and the fentanyl seized between FY 21 and FY 23 rose 241%. US-Mexico anti-crime cooperation has improved recently but remains far less effective than is needed. Thus, both Mexicans and Americans have a serious interest in the kind of crime and drug policies that Mexico's new government will pursue. Several Republican politicians and candidates have already proposed using the US military to go after drug cartels in Mexico, which could easily spark a crisis with a Mexican government seeking to defend its sovereignty.Given the large flows of migrants crossing Mexico over the last year, the US also has a very important interest in how good and willing a partner a new Mexican government will be in trying to tackle the very challenging cluster of issues involving the hundreds of thousands of migrants trying to enter the US through Mexico. Both governments are struggling with how to manage migration, and polling shows that more Americans see this as a priority.Of course, if a Trump administration were to emerge from the US elections, we would likely see a much different and less cooperative US approach to dealing with Mexico on migration as well as drug smuggling. Crucially important is that across the same border, US-Mexico trade averages $1.5 million a minute supporting millions of US jobs, and trade has grown significantly since 2020.. We cannot forget that despite all the problems Mexico has become the US's largest trading partner, with some 5 million US jobs supported by that commerce.US-Mexico relations are so important to both countries that the governments will need to find a way to manage even very serious disagreements. The results of the elections, however, will make a big difference for good or for bad in managing the challenges.
Mexico's 2024 elections are important for Mexico and for the United States too.In a year filled with elections around the world, we should pay close attention to Mexico's 2024 electoral contests. Mexico's incumbent President, Manuel Andrés López Obrador or AMLO as he is known, seeks to preserve his legacy by supporting the election of his chosen successor, Claudia Sheinbaum. AMLO wants to assure the continuation of Mexico's "fourth transformation," as AMLO calls the reform process that he initiated. A determined opposition seeks to reverse many of AMLO's actions and policies and warns that AMLO seeks to weaken Mexico's democracy.The outcomes of Mexico's elections are very important for the United States. No other country in the world has more impact on the daily lives of Americans than does the US's southern neighbor. Mexico is the US's largest trading partner and production partner. It is also the entry way for massive amounts deadly, illegal drugs and huge flows of migrants.Managing these key issues will be debated sharply during both the US and Mexican election campaigns, as will be the strength of democratic practices in both countries. Mexico's June 2024 elections will be large and complex. 98.6 million Mexicans are eligible to cast their ballots on June 2 for some 20,375 positions at the local, state, and national levels.Rightly, most attention will be focused on the choice of a new president and the election of an entirely new national congress (500 deputies and 128 senators) next June. Although Mexico's constitution does not allow incumbent president López Obrador to run again, AMLO remains high in the polls, with approval ratings circling 60% depending on the poll, and he is throwing strong support to his chosen successor, Claudia Sheinbaum. Polls show Sheinbaum with a roughly 20% lead over the candidate of the opposition center-right coalition, Xóchitl Gálvez, at present.Importantly, AMLO has indicated that if Sheinbaum's coalition (named "Let's Continue Making History") wins a large enough majority in the new Congress, he will recommend constitutional reforms that would have the effect of weakening independent checks and balances in Mexico and centralizing more power in the hands of the president. AMLO has been very critical of the Supreme Court, the National Elections Institute and other autonomous institutions that were created over the years as Mexico was building its democracy. However, AMLO has not had the two thirds majority in both houses of Congress needed to approve the constitutional reforms he would like to see. His attempted reforms have sparked very large counter demonstrations and been rebuffed by Mexico's courts, but he has persisted in his calls for constitutional change. During AMLO's tenure the independent global indexes on democracy and related issues, including corruption and rule of law, have reported deterioration and backsliding in the quality of Mexico's democracy. The 2023 World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index, for example, tracks a decline in Mexico's rule of law score during AMLO's term and currently ranks Mexico at 116 out of the 142 countries measured. Thus, the outcome of the Mexico's elections could be very important for the strength of Mexico's democratic institutions. Not surprisingly, many in Mexico see the 2024 elections as a test for maintaining the strength of its democracy – echoing themes being heard in the US election campaign. In Mexico, the formal national campaigns have not yet begun, but there has already been a good deal of campaign activity. Currently, AMLO's candidate, Sheinbaum, and the coalition led by AMLO's Morena party have a substantial lead over the three party opposition coalition know as the "Broad Front for Mexico" and their candidate, Gálvez. Many observers believe the gap can be narrowed before the vote in June. The question is how much, for both the presidential vote and to impact the eventual congressional majorities. AMLO and his coalition have some clear weak spots on which the opposition will focus. One of the most evident is public unhappiness with the government's handling of Mexico's serious and persistent public security problems. In a recent poll by the respected Reforma newspaper, for example, 52% rated AMLO's handling of organized crime as "bad", and only 23% gave the President a good rating.The widespread crime and poorly working justice system brings much violence to Mexican communities (with over 30,000 homicides annually in recent years and over 169,000 homicides since AMLO took office). This situation results in over 90% of impunity for most crimes. This situation also has severely negative effects for the US. It facilitates massive smuggling of deadly drugs, such as fentanyl. The latest data suggests that drug overdose rates in the US hit a new high of some 112,000 in 2023. The seizures of lethal synthetic fentanyl at the US-Mexico border almost doubled from FY 22 to FY 23, and the fentanyl seized between FY 21 and FY 23 rose 241%. US-Mexico anti-crime cooperation has improved recently but remains far less effective than is needed. Thus, both Mexicans and Americans have a serious interest in the kind of crime and drug policies that Mexico's new government will pursue. Several Republican politicians and candidates have already proposed using the US military to go after drug cartels in Mexico, which could easily spark a crisis with a Mexican government seeking to defend its sovereignty.Given the large flows of migrants crossing Mexico over the last year, the US also has a very important interest in how good and willing a partner a new Mexican government will be in trying to tackle the very challenging cluster of issues involving the hundreds of thousands of migrants trying to enter the US through Mexico. Both governments are struggling with how to manage migration, and polling shows that more Americans see this as a priority.Of course, if a Trump administration were to emerge from the US elections, we would likely see a much different and less cooperative US approach to dealing with Mexico on migration as well as drug smuggling. Crucially important is that across the same border, US-Mexico trade averages $1.5 million a minute supporting millions of US jobs, and trade has grown significantly since 2020.. We cannot forget that despite all the problems Mexico has become the US's largest trading partner, with some 5 million US jobs supported by that commerce.US-Mexico relations are so important to both countries that the governments will need to find a way to manage even very serious disagreements. The results of the elections, however, will make a big difference for good or for bad in managing the challenges.
