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AbstractWe analyze the differences in the socioeconomic profiles between suicide terrorists and 'regular' militants using a dataset of 1596 militants (including 209 suicide terrorists) from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). We find that suicide terrorists are better educated, younger, less likely to be married or have children, and less likely to live in the Gaza strip than their non-suicide counterparts. Moreover, although the profiles of Hamas and PIJ militants are distinctively different, the suicide terrorists are very similar to one another.

Does globalization lead to environmental degradation? What is the role of democracy for environmental performance and do left-wing governments really care more about the environment? Using a comprehensive measure of environmental performance, we test these three hypotheses for a panel of 134 countries for the period 2007-2016. Our findings show that globalization leads to better environmental performances. Interestingly, this result is predominantly driven by social, not by economic or political globalization. Although we find evidence that left-wing governments perform better than right-wing governments, it is centrist governments that have the highest environmental performance. The political system, i.e. democracy, turns out insignificant in all specifications.

This paper argues that corruption in Russia is systemic in nature. Low wage levels of public officials provide strong incentives to engage in corruption. As corruption is illegal, corrupt officials can be exposed any time, which enforces loyalty towards the powers that be; thus corruption is a method of governance. We trace the systemic corruption back to the Mongolian empire and demonstrate its persistence to the current regime. We show the geographic distribution of contemporary corruption within Russia, survey the literature on the causes, consequences, and cures of corruption in Russia, and discuss entry points to fighting it.

We analyze the determinants of Islamophobia using the only nation-wide anti-Islam referendum ever, which was held in Switzerland in 2009 and led to the prohibition of minarets. We find economic, environmental, and cultural factors as well as the presence of Muslims to determine voting behavior. Approval rates for the bill rise with unemployment and decrease with education, income, and the attractiveness of the location. Approval is higher in rural areas, in municipalities with a higher share of men, and in the Italian and German speaking parts of Switzerland. It is higher in municipalities with a higher share of Muslims, which strongly supports the "religious threat" hypothesis. We compare the voting behavior in the minaret referendum with the referendum "for democratic naturalizations", held in 2008, in order to disentangle determinants of Islamophobia from those of xenophobia. We show that our results are robust to the estimation with ecological inference.

We analyze the determinants of Islamophobia using the only nation-wide anti-Islam referendum ever, which was held in Switzerland in 2009 and led to the prohibition of minarets. We find economic, environmental, and cultural factors as well as the presence of Muslims to determine voting behavior. Approval rates for the bill rise with unemployment and decrease with education, income, and the attractiveness of the location. Approval is higher in rural areas, in municipalities with a higher share of men, and in the Italian and German speaking parts of Switzerland. It is higher in municipalities with a higher share of Muslims, which strongly supports the 'religious threat' hypothesis. We compare the voting behavior in the minaret referendum with the referendum "for democratic naturalizations", held in 2008, in order to disentangle determinants of Islamophobia from those of xenophobia. We show that our results are robust to the estimation with ecological inference.

We analyze the formation of environmental policy to regulate transboundary pollution if governments are self-interested. In a common agency framework, we portray the environmental policy calculus of two political supportmaximizing governments that are in a situation of strategic interaction with respect to their environmental policies, but too small to affect world market prices. We show how governments systematically deviate from socially optimal environmental policies. Taxes may be too high if environmental interests and pollution-intensity of production are very strong; under different constellations they may be too low. Governments may actually subsidize the production of a polluting good. Politically motivated environmental policy thus may be more harmful to the environment as compared to the benevolent dictators' solution. In other cases it may enhance environmental quality and welfare beyond what a benevolent government would achieve.

We analyze the formation of environmental policy to regulate transboundary pollution if governments are self-interested. In a common agency framework, we portray the environmental policy calculus of two political supportmaximizing governments that are in a situation of strategic interaction with respect to their environmental policies, but too small to affect world market prices. We show how governments systematically deviate from socially optimal environmental policies. Taxes may be too high if environmental interests and pollution-intensity of production are very strong; under different constellations they may be too low. Governments may actually subsidize the production of a polluting good. Politically motivated environmental policy thus may be more harmful to the environment as compared to the benevolent dictators' solution. In other cases it may enhance environmental quality and welfare beyond what a benevolent government would achieve.

Contrary to the wide-held perception that increased international competition will lead to the erosion of environmental standards we show that economic integration, such as NAFTA, may instead lead to tighter environmental control. In maximizing political support the administration will trade off some of the gains from trade liberalization accruing to both the export sector and labor for increasing support by the environmentalists and the losers of protection (i.e. the import sector). This is effected through tightened environmental control - NAFTA will result in higher environmental standards in the US.

What are the correlates of environmental performance? In particular, does globalization lead to environmental degradation? What is the role of democracy for environmental performance and do left-wing governments really care more about the environment? Using a novel and comprehensive measure of environmental performance, we test these three hypotheses for a panel of 134 countries for the period 2007–2016. Our results are surprising—we find no evidence that democracies are cleaner, left-wing governments perform better than right-wing governments, but centrist governments clearly have the highest environmental performance, and globalization is good for the environment. The positive impact of globalization, however, is driven by social globalization—economic and political globalization do not play a role.