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Intro -- Endorsements -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1. The skeptical paradox -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Skepticism -- Pyrrhonian skepticism -- The skeptical paradox -- 1.3 The Cartesian skeptical paradox -- Underdetermination-based Cartesian skepticism -- 1.4 Humean skepticism and epistemic circularity -- 1.5 Agrippa's trilemma -- Further reading -- 2. Content and epistemic externalism -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Content externalism -- Putnam's content externalism and the BIV skeptical hypothesis -- Davidson's holistic content externalism -- Chalmers: The Matrix as metaphysics -- 2.3 Epistemic externalism -- Further reading -- 3. The denial of the Closure principle and contextualism -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The denial of the Closure principle -- Closure and Transmission -- Abominable conjunctions -- 3.3 The contextualist response: Cohen and DeRose -- The contextual sensitivity of 'know' -- The problem of disagreement, retraction and MacFarlane's epistemic relativism -- Contextualism and philosophy -- Further reading -- Notes -- 4. Hinge epistemology and Closure-based Cartesian skepticism -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Hinge epistemology in outline -- 4.3 Hinge commitments and radical skepticism -- Epistemic vertigo -- Further reading -- 5. Epistemological disjunctivism -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Epistemological disjunctivism in outline -- 5.3 Defending epistemological disjunctivism -- 5.4 The 'biscopic' response to radical skepticism -- Further reading -- 6. Moore, liberals, and conservatives -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 G. E. Moore's proof of the external world -- 6.3 Pryor and the liberal account of perceptual justification -- 6.4 Wright's conservative account of perceptual justification and entitlements.

This volume brings together new research on the topic of epistemic closure from both leading philosophers and emerging voices in epistemology. It connects epistemic closure principles to related themes in epistemology such as scepticism, dogmatism, evidentialism, epistemic logic, and modal epistemology. Epistemic closure is of central importance to contemporary epistemology, so much so that no epistemology is complete without an answer to the question of where it stands on the issue. The chapters in this book touch on the central themes of closure and transmission and argue for and against different closure and transmission principles. The contributors address issues such as whether knowledge and justification are closed under deductive entailment; whether scepticism can be properly contained by restricting closure principles; whether justification for a set of premises can fail to transmit across inference to a conclusion; Moore's Paradox; and which theories of knowledge--contextualism, contrastivism, or relevant alternatives epistemology--emerge from denying closure. New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in epistemology.

"Skepticism is one of the perennial problems of philosophy: from antiquity, to the early modern period of Descartes and Hume, and right through to the present day. It remains a fundamental and widely studied topic and, as Annalisa Coliva and Duncan Pritchard show in this book, it presents us with a paradox with important ramifications not only for epistemology but also for many other core areas of philosophy. In this book they provide a thorough grounding in contemporary debates about skepticism, exploring the following key topics: the core skeptical arguments, with a particular focus on Cartesian and Humean radical skepticism. the epistemic principles that are held to underlie skeptical arguments, such as the closure and underdetermination principles. the content externalism of Putnam, Davidson and Chalmers, and how it might help us respond to radical skepticism. the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction and how it relates to the skeptical problematic. contextualism in epistemology and its anti-skeptical import. the various interpretations of a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology. the viability of epistemological disjunctivism, including whether it can be combined with hinge epistemology as part of a dual response to radical skepticism. liberal and conservative responses to the Humean skeptical paradox. Both authors are themselves prominent figures who work on skepticism, and so one novelty of the book is that it provides an insight into their own contrasting responses to this philosophical difficulty. With the addition of annotated further reading and a glossary this is an ideal starting point for anyone studying the philosophy of skepticism, along with students of epistemology, metaphysics and contemporary analytic philosophy"--