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Citizens are generally opposed to politicians receiving a high pay. We investigate the degree to which this aversion is moderated by citizens' individual-level trust in politicians and whether institutional delegation can moderate the reactions to proposed changes in politicians' pay. Using a survey experiment, we confirm that trust in politicians is a key predictor of attitudes regarding their pay. Distrust toward politicians seems to matter much more than general attitudes on income inequality when citizens form opinions on politicians' pay. Furthermore, citizens' aversion to high pay for politicians is affected by institutional delegation, but such delegation only lessen the opposition to pay raises modestly, leaving most citizens firmly against pay raises for politicians. Finally, while citizens' trust in politicians matters greatly for their attitudes regarding politicians pay, proposed changes in politicians' pay do not conversely affect citizen's perceptions of the politicians.

Bureaucracy and rules have been subject to criticism for years. The concept "self-imposed bureaucracy" emphasizes the rules that municipalities themselves have decided and implemented and at the same time plays on the negative images that are typically associated with bureaucracy. The article examines what drives the growth of internal rules in two municipalities and how managers and employees perceive the local rules. The emergence of internal rules is influenced by local conditions such as political attention and the wish to ensure equal treatment of both citizens and employees, but national conditions such as regulation also appear to be important. Contrary to common assumptions about rules in public organizatoins, managers and employees perceive that most rules make a positive contribution to the quality of service.

Bureaukrati og regler har været udsat for kritik i årevis. Med begrebet om "selvpåført bureaukrati" er der sat fokus på de regler, som kommunerne selv vedtager, og det spiller samtidig videre på de negative billeder, som typisk forbindes med bureaukrati. Artiklen undersøger, hvad der driver fremvæksten af interne regler i to kommuner, og hvordan ledere og ansatte opfatter de lokale regler. Fremvæksten af interne regler er påvirket af lokale forhold som politisk opmærksomhed og sikring af ligebehandling af såvel borgere som ansatte, men nationale forhold som regulering også ser ud til at have betydning. I modsætning til de gængse fordomme over for regler opfatter ledere og medarbejdere, at de fleste regler leverer et positivt bidrag til kvaliteten i servicen.

Bureaucracy and rules have been subject to criticism for years. The concept "self-imposed bureaucracy" emphasizes the rules that municipalities themselves have decided and implemented and at the same time plays on the negative images that are typically associated with bureaucracy. The article examines what drives the growth of internal rules in two municipalities and how managers and employees perceive the local rules. The emergence of internal rules is influenced by local conditions such as political attention and the wish to ensure equal treatment of both citizens and employees, but national conditions such as regulation also appear to be important. Contrary to common assumptions about rules in public organizatoins, managers and employees perceive that most rules make a positive contribution to the quality of service.

There is a great need for innovation in the public sector and for improved understanding of how innovation can be turned into evidence‐based public policy. This article discusses potential contributions from 30 years of experience in the Nordic countries with a reform programme called 'Free Commune Experiments' (FCEs). Here, local authorities are granted waivers from legislation to experiment with normally 'illegal' practices. The article asks if the FCEs have managed to synthesise local governments' potential to generate novel practices with central government's potential to evaluate, verify and disseminate effective innovations. The conclusion is that the FCEs have been effective generators of policy ideas, but that limited knowledge has been produced about the effects of innovative practices and whether or not new policies should be replicated beyond 'test sites'. With some changes, it is argued that the programme could nonetheless be a strategy worth emulating beyond the Nordic countries.

This article contributes insight into the working conditions of political leaders based on rarely accessible high‐quality data that include unique surveys of Danish ministers, mayors, and permanent secretaries supplemented by in‐depth interviews. The results show that the classical metaphor of the leader as a puppet master being pulled by an endless number of strings also fits the ministers. Their work life is fragmented in time and space, and their time is in great demand when compared to mayors and permanent secretaries. They experience high work pressure, which comes at a cost to their personal lives. They are exposed in public life and harassed, especially on social media. The implications for the balance between the minister and permanent bureaucracy, descriptive representation as well as policy innovation and quality of decision‐making are discussed. It is concluded that stressful working conditions are likely to affect the way our democracies work.

The concept sense of community responsibility (SOC-R) provides useful insights into public service motivation (PSM) research because SOC-R is act-relevant and connected to an identifiable community. A survey sent to 2,463 Danish councilors in multipurpose local governments illustrates how PSM and SOC-R as constructs are highly correlated, but not totally overlapping. SOC-R relates negatively to voluntary retirement but positively to visionary leadership and political influence, indicating that SOC-R is a supplementary motivation to take on responsibility and exercise leadership. The key contribution is thus a better understanding of motivation in public service provision.