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While radical right parties championing anti-immigrant platforms have made electoral gains throughout Europe, anti-immigrant sentiment—a key indicator of radical right support—has not dramatically increased during this same period. In this article, we seek to help make sense of this paradox by incorporating a contextual factor missing from previous studies: levels of anti-immigrant violence. Our key argument is that higher levels of collective violence targeting immigrants raise the salience of the immigrant/native boundary, which activates both positive and negative views of immigrants and makes these attitudes more cognitively accessible and politically relevant. This argument implies that exposure to violence against immigrants should strengthen existing prejudice (or empathy) toward immigrants and engender feelings of affinity (or antipathy) for radical right parties. Analyses of the German portion of the European Social Survey (ESS 2014 − 2019) and the Anti-Refugee Violence in Germany (ARVIG 2014 − 2017) datasets reveal a powerful interaction effect: exposure to higher levels of collective violence increased the probability of feeling closest to radical right parties among those who held neutral, negative, and extremely negative views of immigrants. However, these events were not associated with radical right sympathies among those holding pro-immigrant attitudes. We conclude that when violence against immigrants resonates with public opinion on immigrants, it opens new political opportunities for radical right parties. These findings should inform future research on the politicization of international migration, especially studies investigating how anti-immigrant attitudes translate into political outcomes.

Protest raises the visibility of a social movement, and this affects all organizations affiliated with the movement's group identity. Although the mutually beneficial relationship between protest and social movement organizations is well documented, we argue that protest does not necessarily aid other, more mundane types of affiliated organizations in the same manner. Specifically, we expect that increases in protest participation will favor the viability of organizations targeting an audience close to the group identity but not of organizations with an audience in which some members share that identity and others do not. We evaluate these claims using a data set of pro-lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) protest events and local organizations in U.S. cities using a fixed-effects panel design with instrumental variables. Findings show that increases in protest participation decrease the presence of organizations that engage LGBTQ and non-LGBTQ audiences, especially local businesses that simultaneously bridge multiple groups of owners, customers, and clients.

Since Gamson's (1975) landmark study of social movement organizations, scholars have debated whether it is more advantageous to concentrate on a narrow or diverse set of issues. This paper recasts this debate in terms of organizational survival. Drawing on ideas from theories of category spanning and social movements, we argue that an organization that occupies a distinct niche conveys its purpose more effectively, which increases its chances of survival when compared to more diverse SMOs. Using a longitudinal dataset on environmental social movement organizations (ESMOs), we find organizations that span multiple and distant issue categories are significantly more likely to disband, compared to those with a more specialized focus. Other characteristics of ESMOs affect their survival rate in ways that are strikingly similar to for-profits and other types of nonprofits. Larger and more complex ESMOs benefit from economies of scale, while younger, less established organizations are more likely to perish.

This article uses data on prisoners incarcerated for misdemeanors in late-nineteenth-century U.S. cities to assess a three-part argument that asserts that threats to white dominance prompted efforts of social control directed against African Americans and foreign-born whites: (1) For African Americans, competition with whites for jobs instigated efforts by whites to enforce the racial barrier. (2) For the foreign-born, upward mobility became associated with white identity, which allowed those who "became white" to be seen as less threatening. We thus expect the threat from foreign-born whites to be highest where their concentration in poverty was greatest. (3) We suggest that violence against a given boundary raises the salience of group threat, so a positive relationship should exist between prior violence against a group and its level of incarceration for misdemeanors. Using panel analyses of cities from 1890 through 1910, we find supporting evidence for the first two arguments and partial support for the third.

African American Studies, Ethnic Studies, and Women's Studies programs in higher education have received wide support from faculty members and students, yet few programs offer a major or have tenure-line faculty positions. Our analysis used sociological theories to generate testable implications about the chances that an institution will offer these majors. We found that the relevant size of students' and faculty's demographic profiles reflect the chances that these majors will be offered. Moreover, institutions that offer Women's Studies programs are significantly more likely also to offer majors in Ethnic Studies and African American Studies, but this effect is asymmetric.

Data on the state-level ERA ratification process are used here to address leading theoretical debates about the role of social movements, public opinion, and political climate on policy outcomes, the goal being to test the claim that these factors depend on each other. Social movement organizations, public opinion, and political party support all influenced the ratification process. But the effects are modified when the interactive nature of public opinion and electoral competition, and political party support and movement organizational strength, are tested. In particular, the effect of social movement organizations on ratification was amplified in the presence of elite allies, and legislators responded most to favorable public opinion under conditions of low electoral competition. These findings are used to suggest a more integrated theory of policy outcomes that considers interactive and contingent effects of movements, public opinion, and political climate.

Two major waves of US immigration -- 1869-1924 & 1965-1993 -- are compared in terms of the ethnic diversification they produced & the racial conflicts that resulted in the major immigrant-receiving cities, drawing primarily on daily microfilm accounts from the New York Times of racial/ethnic collective action, both violent & nonviolent, in 76 large urban areas. It is theorized that the surge in immigration created collective mobilization among whites against people of color, spurred by increased competition for scarce resources (especially economic opportunities), which often resulted in racial violence. During the first wave, immigrants reshaped the country's ethnic national identity & reinforced the long-standing white/nonwhite racial dichotomy. During the second wave, it is contended that immigration itself, particularly the size of the immigration population, was no longer the primary cause of ethnic conflict; rather, racial diversity caused "white ethnic" immigrants to band together & seek assimilation into the native white population against immigrants of color, further cementing white/nonwhite boundaries. This is demonstrated by the increase in acts of violence against blacks & decrease in those directed at Asians during this second period. Characteristics of racial/ethnic conflicts across both periods are examined, including the size of events, level of violence, degree of organization, & participant groups; the impact of ethnic diversity on racial conflict remained positive & significant, supporting competition theory. Implications for contemporary racial relations are discussed, suggesting that, since racial/ethnic boundaries are maintained by social constructs, based largely on status & power hierarchies, there is the possibility that they can be changed. 5 Tables, 2 Figures, 81 References. K. Hyatt Stewart

Many countries seem to be confronting challenges from ethnic movements. This study extends arguments from existing theories to consider an explanation of ethnic mobilization at the world system level. The analysis uses structural equation models to compare data on ethnic mobilization in 130 countries from 1965 to 1990. The authors examine hypotheses concerning the impact of peripheral status and integration into the world system on the magnitude of ethnic violence and nonviolence. Results provide evidence that peripheral countries with more ties to international governmental organizations have significantly lower levels of ethnic violence than peripheral countries without these ties. Moreover, peripheral countries with more memberships in international organizations experience a significantly higher magnitude of ethnic nonviolent protest. Finally, we present some speculative results regarding the impact of income inequality on the magnitude of ethnic violence.

Examines the relationship of ethnic violence to national ties with international governmental organizations and to income inequality; based on data from 130 countries, 1965-90. Some focus on ethnic nonviolent protest.