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Abstract.Despite the development of electoral studies in Canada, by-elections have received little attention from researchers. We believe that these are important political events. This research note examines the 121 federal by-elections held between general elections from 1963 to 2008. Our analysis indicates that turnout in by-elections is driven by the larger societal determinants of turnout and not the characteristics of each race. We also find that the support of the government party in a by-election is affected by changes in national opinion towards the government, but only in the third-party system. We find that minor parties and independent candidates perform better in by-elections than in general elections. And we find no difference in the re-election rates of by-election winners and those who enter parliament through general elections.Résumé.Malgré le développement des études électorales au Canada, les élections partielles ont reçu très peu d'attention de la part des chercheurs. Nous croyons qu'il s'agit pourtant d'événements importants dans la vie politique canadienne. Cette note de recherche examine les 121 élections partielles fédérales survenues entre les élections générales de 1963 à 2008. Notre analyse indique que le taux de participation aux élections partielles est davantage influencé par des déterminants sociétaux que par des caractéristiques propres à chacune. Nous constatons aussi que les fluctuations de l'opinion publique canadienne à l'égard du gouvernement influençaient la performance du parti gouvernemental lors des élections partielles avant le réalignement partisan de 1993, mais que ce n'est plus le cas dans le système partisan actuel. Nous observons également que les petits partis et les candidats indépendants enregistrent de meilleures performances lors des élections partielles et qu'il n'y a pas, aux élections générales qui suivent, de différence notable entre le taux de réélection des gagnants aux élections partielles et celui des autres députés sortants.

Abstract. By tying subsidies to vote totals, Bill C-24
substantially changed the way Canadian national parties are financed. This
raises the possibility of increased voter turnout, as parties face greater
incentives to maximize vote totals, and voters face greater incentives to
turn out. We consider this possibility. We show that turnout was not
differently affected by closeness in 2004 than in 2000; that
candidates' efforts were not greater in 2004 in more marginal
ridings; that there were no differences in the likelihood of abstaining or
deserting a preferred third-place party in 2004 and 2000; and that at the
individual level, the decision to turn out was not affected by strategic
considerations in the expected direction. Accordingly, we find little
support for the possibility that C-24 increased turnout.Résumé. En liant les subventions au total des
votes obtenus, la loi C-24 modifie substantiellement le financement des
partis politiques nationaux au Canada. Ce changement pourrait induire une
augmentation de la participation électorale puisque les partis ont
intérêt à maximiser le nombre de votes et les
électeurs sont davantage incités à voter. Nous
examinons cette hypothèse. Nous démontrons que
l'influence de l'intensité de la lutte entre les
candidates sur la participation électorale n'a pas
été différente en 2004 qu'en 2000; que les
efforts des candidats n'ont pas été plus intenses en
2004 dans les circonscriptions perdues à l'avance; que la
probabilité de s'abstenir ou de renoncer à appuyer un
tiers parti n'a pas changé entre 2000 et 2004; et que la
décision individuelle de participer à l'élection
n'a pas été influencée par des
considérations stratégiques allant dans la direction
prévue. En conséquence, nous trouvons peu de preuves
confirmant l'hypothèse selon laquelle la loi C-24 a
favorisé la participation électorale.

AbstractFederal systems can also provide citizens with multiple avenues to obtain service representation. In shared issue areas, citizens are officially represented by two sets of politicians. When politicians are willing to cross jurisdictional boundaries, citizens might also obtain help or information from more than one set of politicians, even in areas of exclusive jurisdiction. We report an experiment designed to examine responses to requests for assistance in different issue areas. Our sample includes 202 Canadian politicians, each of whom received two requests for assistance from fictional constituents. We show that federal arrangements can enhance service representation. On average, politicians are as helpful on issues of shared jurisdiction as issues of exclusive jurisdiction. They are less helpful for issues outside of their jurisdiction. These results suggest that federal arrangements can work to provide citizens with multiple access points to their representative, even in areas that fall outside their representatives' jurisdictional purviews.

AbstractPolitical scientists have long debated whether citizens meet the expectations of a 'folk theory' of democratic representation, in which voters correctly reward and punish politicians for their actions, make choices primarily on the basis of policy preferences and orient their decisions to the future rather than the past. But how do elected politicians themselves theorize voting behaviour? In this paper, we report results from an original survey of more than 2000 elected local politicians in Canada and the United States which allows us to characterize politicians' own democratic theories. We uncover substantial variation in politicians' theories of democracy, and we find examples of a number of well‐known theoretical traditions (democratic realism, partisan retrospection, folk theory) among politicians themselves. We also show that politicians' theoretical perspectives are related to how they undertake representation when in office. We conclude with an outline of a comparative research agenda on the causes and consequences of politicians' democratic theories.

AbstractPoliticians are required to make policy decisions that involve short‐term and long‐term tradeoffs, and existing theory largely expects election‐driven myopic thinking to dominate their reasoning when they do so. Direct evidence on this is surprisingly absent, leaving open questions on whether and when politicians do support future‐oriented policies, and what factors, beyond the shadow of elections, influence such choices. Responding to this gap, we report results of a multi‐year survey of more than 1500 elected politicians who faced an original decision task involving short‐term and long‐term solutions to a local policy problem. First, we show that politicians' theories of voting behavior—specifically, their beliefs about whether voters focus on the short or the long term—strongly predict their decisions when facing inter‐temporal policy tradeoffs. Second, we show that politicians are responsive to changes to short‐run costs associated with long‐term policy investments. Finally, we leverage the panel design of our study and find—in contrast to prevalent assumptions—no evidence that politicians' policy choices are related to their proximity to the next election. In doing so, we expand and refine the theoretical framework on inter‐temporal choice by policymakers, and outline a comparative research agenda for studying how politicians think about the future.