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This article illustrates how organizational learning can explain the shift in United Nations' peacekeeping exit strategies from the election-based approach of the 1990s to peacebuilding. Conceptualizing learning as an ideal-type, three-step process, of knowledge acquisition, interpretation and institutionalization, the analysis reveals the impact of new knowledge on institutional change. It demonstrates how knowledge acquisition became systematized within the United Nations' Secretariat especially after 2000, with the active promotion of boundary-spanning activities. The analysis then shows how a shared understanding of the role of peacebuilding for exit strategies was developed by the organization's bureaucracy and intergovernmental bodies in the interpretation step. Finally, it highlights how the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission institutionalized the transition to peacebuilding as the new exit strategy and how new learning capacities were created. By conceiving the interaction between international organizations and their external environment as a dynamic relationship, the analysis confirms the potential of organizational learning theories for explaining institutional change in international relations.

How do international organisations (IOs) balance norms that have conflicting prescriptions? In this article, we build on the literature on norm contestation and norm conflict to identify four ways in which IOs might respond to norm conflicts: (1) consistent norm prioritisation; (2) ad hoc norm prioritisation; (3) balanced norm reconciliation and (4) imbalanced norm reconciliation. How IOs are more likely to respond, we argue, depends on the salience of the norm conflict and the relative strength of the conflicting norms. We illustrate our argument by investigating the norm conflicts that the United Nations (UN) encountered between traditional UN peacekeeping norms and the norm of international criminal accountability in the context of assistance by UN peace operations to the International Criminal Court. Distinguishing between behaviour and discourse as well as headquarters and field levels, we argue that the UN's response strategies have been largely successful at reducing the tensions generated by the norm conflicts, but that in the longer term they run the risk of both undermining the international criminal accountability norm and damaging the acceptance and credibility of UN peace operations.

How do international organisations (IOs) balance norms that have conflicting prescriptions? In this article, we build on the literature on norm contestation and norm conflict to identify four ways in which IOs might respond to norm conflicts: (1) consistent norm prioritisation; (2) ad hoc norm prioritisation; (3) balanced norm reconciliation and (4) imbalanced norm reconciliation. How IOs are more likely to respond, we argue, depends on the salience of the norm conflict and the relative strength of the conflicting norms. We illustrate our argument by investigating the norm conflicts that the United Nations (UN) encountered between traditional UN peacekeeping norms and the norm of international criminal accountability in the context of assistance by UN peace operations to the International Criminal Court. Distinguishing between behaviour and discourse as well as headquarters and field levels, we argue that the UN's response strategies have been largely successful at reducing the tensions generated by the norm conflicts, but that in the longer term they run the risk of both undermining the international criminal accountability norm and damaging the acceptance and credibility of UN peace operations.

Die schwindende Unterstützung multilateraler Zusammenarbeit durch wichtige weltpolitische Akteure bedroht auch die Handlungsfähigkeit internationaler Organisationen. Verschiedene Initiativen zum 75. Jubiläum der Vereinten Nationen (UN) im Jahr 2020 zielen darauf, diese Handlungsfähigkeit wiederherzustellen. Ansatzpunkte dafür sehen Gisela Hirschmann und Cornelia Ulbert im Global Governance Spotlight 5|2019 erstens in der flexiblen Bildung von Koalitionen, auch unter Einbezug nichtstaatlicher Akteure, zweitens in institutionellen Reformen zur effektiveren Problembearbeitung und drittens in der Vermittlung der Notwendigkeit multilateraler Problemlösung in die Gesellschaften hinein.

Human rights violations by international organisations (IOs) are a possible side effect of their growing authority. Recent examples are the cases of sexual exploitation by UN peacekeepers and violations caused by IMF austerity measures. In response, IOs increasingly develop safeguards to protect human rights from being violated through their policies to regain legitimacy. We argue that this development can be accounted for by a mechanism we call 'authority-legitimation mechanism'. We test this theoretical expectation against ten case studies on UN and EU sanctions policies, UN and NATO peacekeeping and World Bank and IMF lending. Next, we demonstrate inductively that the authority-legitimation mechanism can evolve through different pathways, depending on which actors get engaged. We label these pathways legislative institution-building if parliaments in member states put pressure on their governments to campaign for human rights safeguards in IOs, judicial institution-building if courts demand human rights safeguards, like-minded institution-building if civil society organisations, middle powers and IO bodies with little formal power push for human rights safeguards, or anticipatory institution-building if IOs adopt such safeguards from other IOs without having violated human rights themselves. Finally, we argue that which of these pathways are activated and how effective they are depends on specific conditions. ; Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG-geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz frei zugänglich / This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.

Human rights violations by international organisations (IOs) are a possible side effect of their growing authority. Recent examples are the cases of sexual exploitation by UN peacekeepers and violations caused by IMF austerity measures. In response, IOs increasingly develop safeguards to protect human rights from being violated through their policies to regain legitimacy. We argue that this development can be accounted for by a mechanism we call 'authority-legitimation mechanism'. We test this theoretical expectation against ten case studies on UN and EU sanctions policies, UN and NATO peacekeeping and World Bank and IMF lending. Next, we demonstrate inductively that the authority-legitimation mechanism can evolve through different pathways, depending on which actors get engaged. We label these pathways legislative institution-building if parliaments in member states put pressure on their governments to campaign for human rights safeguards in IOs, judicial institution-building if courts demand human rights safeguards, like-minded institution-building if civil society organisations, middle powers and IO bodies with little formal power push for human rights safeguards, or anticipatory institution-building if IOs adopt such safeguards from other IOs without having violated human rights themselves. Finally, we argue that which of these pathways are activated and how effective they are depends on specific conditions.

AbstractHuman rights violations by international organisations (IOs) are a possible side effect of their growing authority. Recent examples are the cases of sexual exploitation by UN peacekeepers and violations caused by IMF austerity measures. In response, IOs increasingly develop safeguards to protect human rights from being violated through their policies to regain legitimacy. We argue that this development can be accounted for by a mechanism we call 'authority-legitimation mechanism'. We test this theoretical expectation against ten case studies on UN and EU sanctions policies, UN and NATO peacekeeping and World Bank and IMF lending. Next, we demonstrate inductively that the authority-legitimation mechanism can evolve through different pathways, depending on which actors get engaged. We label these pathwayslegislative institution-buildingif parliaments in member states put pressure on their governments to campaign for human rights safeguards in IOs,judicial institution-buildingif courts demand human rights safeguards,like-minded institution-buildingif civil society organisations, middle powers and IO bodies with little formal power push for human rights safeguards, oranticipatory institution-buildingif IOs adopt such safeguards from other IOs without having violated human rights themselves. Finally, we argue that which of these pathways are activated and how effective they are depends on specific conditions.