Two of the four macroeconomic adjustment programmes, Portugal and Ireland's, can be considered a success in the sense that the initial expectations in terms of adjustment, both fiscal and external, were broadly fulfilled. A rebound based on exports has taken hold in these two countries, but a full recovery will take years. In Greece the initial plans were insufficient. While the strong impact of the fiscal adjustment on demand could have been partially anticipated at the time, the resistance to structural reforms was more surprising and remains difficult to cure. The fiscal adjustment is now almost completed, but the external adjustment has not proceeded well. Exports are stagnating despite impressive falls in wage costs. In Cyprus, the outcome has so far been less severe than initially feared. It is still too early to find robust evidence in any country that the programmes have increased the long-term growth potential. Survey-based evidence suggests that structural reforms have not yet taken hold. The EU-led macroeconomic adjustment programmes outside the euro area (e.g. Latvia) seem to have been much stricter, but the adjustment was quicker and followed by a stronger rebound.
Two of the four macroeconomic adjustment programmes, Portugal and Ireland's, can be considered a success in the sense that the initial expectations in terms of adjustment, both fiscal and external, were broadly fulfilled. A rebound based on exports has taken hold in these two countries, but a full recovery will take years. In Greece the initial plans were insufficient. While the strong impact of the fiscal adjustment on demand could have been partially anticipated at the time, the resistance to structural reforms was more surprising and remains difficult to cure. The fiscal adjustment is now almost completed, but the external adjustment has not proceeded well. Exports are stagnating despite impressive falls in wage costs. In Cyprus, the outcome has so far been less severe than initially feared. It is still too early to find robust evidence in any country that the programmes have increased the long-term growth potential. Survey-based evidence suggests that structural reforms have not yet taken hold. The EU-led macroeconomic adjustment programmes outside the euro area (e.g. Latvia) seem to have been much stricter, but the adjustment was quicker and followed by a stronger rebound. ; Das Europa-Parlament unterzog soeben das Wirken der Troika im Hinblick auf Rechenschaftslegung, Demokratieprinzip und Transparenz einer kritischen Prüfung. Dieser Beitrag fasst die Kernaussagen einer vom Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) des Europäischen Parlaments in Auftrag gegebenen ausführlichen Studie zusammen. Zwei der vier makroökonomischen Anpassungsprogramme, dasjenige für Portugal und das für Irland, können in dem Sinne als erfolgreich angesehen werden, dass die ursprünglichen Erwartungen bezüglich der fiskalpolitischen und der außenwirtschaftlichen Anpassung weitestgehend erfüllt wurden. Eine auf Exporten basierende Wende ist in beiden Ländern bereits eingetreten. Eine vollständige Erholung wird aber noch viele Jahre benötigen. In Griechenland waren schon die ursprünglichen Pläne unzureichend. Während der starke Einfluss der fiskalpolitischen Anpassung auf die gesamtwirtschaftliche Nachfrage im Prinzip hätte beizeiten antizipiert werden können, war der Widerstand gegen Strukturreformen überraschender und bleibt nur schwer zu überwinden. Die fiskalpolitische Anpassung ist nunmehr fast vollendet. Die außenwirtschaftliche Anpassung ist jedoch nur wenig vorangekommen. Die Exporte stagnieren trotz eindrucksvoller Senkung der Lohnkosten. Anders als Irland und Portugal hat Griechenland nach wie vor Probleme, die Ziele seines Anpassungsprogramms zu erfüllen, seine Wirtschaft schrumpft wieder und die Regierung steht in scheinbar endlosen Verhandlungen über ein neuerliches multilaterales Finanzierungspaket. Warum? Das Problem lässt sich mit einem Wort zusammenfassen: Exporte (oder vielmehr: Mangel an Exportwachstum). Zwei Zahlen zeigen das Dilemma des Landes. Die Regierung hat in 2013 einen primären Haushaltsüberschuss (Haushaltssaldo minus Schuldendienst) erzielt, und Griechenland hat 2013 weniger exportiert als 2012. Dass der griechische Staat erstmals seit Jahrzehnten in der Lage ist, seine Ausgaben mit seinen eigenen Einnahmen zu bezahlen, ist zwar in der Tat ein Meilenstein. Doch wir glauben, dass die zweite Nachricht (der Mangel an Exportwachstum) langfristig die bedeutsamere ist. Für Zypern war das Ergebnis weniger einschneidend als ursprünglich befürchtet. Es ist jedoch noch für alle Programmländer zu früh, robuste Evidenz fuer eine Erhöhung des langfristigen Produktionspotenzials durch die Anpassungsprogramme zu finden. Survey-basierte Evidenz legt nahe, dass Strukturreformen bisher kaum gewirkt haben. Die von der EU geführten makroökonomischen Anpassungsprogramme außerhalb der Eurozone (z.B. Lettland) waren noch viel strikter. Trotzdem erfolgte die Anpassung schneller und mündete in eine schnellere Wende und Erholung.
Two of the four macroeconomic adjustment programmes, Portugal and Ireland s, can be considered a success in the sense that the initial expectations in terms of adjustment, both fiscal and external, were broadly fulfilled. A rebound based on exports has taken hold in these two countries, but a full recovery will take years. In Greece the initial plans were insufficient. While the strong impact of the fiscal adjustment on demand could have been partially anticipated at the time, the resistance to structural reforms was more surprising and remains difficult to cure. The fiscal adjustment is now almost completed, but the external adjustment has not proceeded well. Exports are stagnating despite impressive falls in wage costs. In Cyprus, the outcome has so far been less severe than initially feared. It is still too early to find robust evidence in any country that the programmes have increased the long-term growth potential. Survey-based evidence suggests that structural reforms have not yet taken hold. The EU-led macroeconomic adjustment programmes outside the euro area (e.g. Latvia) seem to have been much stricter, but the adjustment was quicker and followed by a stronger rebound.
Vigorous debate over the effectiveness of the fiscal adjustment programmes for the crisis-stricken countries in the eurozone has grown quite polarised. In this Forum, several experts use analytical, evidence-based approaches to gauge the effectiveness of these programmes. The role played by the estimates of the fi scal multipliers that the Commission, IMF and ECB used to structure the adjustment programmes is crucial to this debate. If these multipliers were underestimated, as the IMF itself claims, then the negative impact of the fiscal restructuring on already fragile economies would also have been underestimated. Several authors examine the available evidence to determine whether the adjustments programmes were flawed from the outset. Another contribution analyses the effectiveness of structural reforms when monetary policy rates are near the zero lower bound. A final paper uses a case study of Ireland's recovery thus far to examine the actual effects that the programmes have had on the crisis-stricken countries' economies.
