Search results

(Originally published in Review of Politics, 1991, 53, 4.) An examination of Joseph Raz's unique brand of liberalism highlights his rejection of antiperfectionist "neutrality" as neither possible nor desirable & his claim that political action is intended to encourage the pursuit of what is good & discourage the pursuit of what is morally inferior. Raz places great value on both individual liberty & autonomy; however, he rejects the value of autonomy used to make morally evil decisions. He also points out that certain social forms, such as the relationship between parents & their children, need not provide opportunities for choice. Raz's distinctly liberal position is apparent in his advocacy of a modified version of J.S. Mill's "harm principle" that disallows government use of coercive means to discourage individuals from committing "victimless" immoralities. Although Raz opposes victimless immoralities as a matter of moral principle, he emphasizes that the use of criminal law to combat them is morally wrong. Arguments used by Raz to reject paternalistic coercion & conditions that justify it are addressed. J. Lindroth

InThe Morality of Freedom, Joseph Raz has challenged the anti-perfectionism of orthodox liberal political theory and proposed an alternative form of liberalism based on perfectionist moral premises. Raz maintain that his theory of political morality qualifies as a "liberal" theory in view of the pride of place it gives "autonomy" considered as an intrinsic human good. Nevertheless, autonomy, according to Raz, is valuable only when exercised in the pursuit of morally upright ends. The principal point of contact between Raz's theory and leading antiperfectionist versions of liberalism is his endorsement of a qualified version of J. S. Mill's "harm principle." Raz argues that, though the law can and should discourage "victimless immortalities" by noncoercive means, it should not criminalize victimless wrongdoing. The article argues that Raz's claims are strongest where his substantive position is weakest. Perfectionist conservatives and antiperfectionist liberals are correct to maintain that Razian perfectionism cannot supply a ground for rejecting coercive legislation to uphold public morality as a matter of principle.

This collection provides an intellectually rigorous and accessible overview of key topics in contemporary natural law jurisprudence, an influential yet frequently misunderstood branch of legal philosophy. It fills a gap in the existing literature by bringing together leading international experts on natural law theory to provide perspectives on some of the most pressing issues pertaining to the nature and moral foundations of law. Themes covered include the history of the natural law tradition, the natural law account of practical reason, normativity and ethics, natural law approaches to legal obligation and authority and constitutional law. Creating a dialogue between leading figures in natural law thought, the Companion is an ideal introduction to the main commitments of natural law jurisprudence, whilst also offering a concise summary of developments in current scholarship for more advanced readers

This book defends the conjugal view of marriage. Patrick Lee and Robert P. George argue that marriage is a distinctive type of community: the union of a man and a woman who have committed to sharing their lives on every level of their beings (bodily, emotionally, and spiritually) in the kind of union that would be fulfilled by conceiving and rearing children together. The comprehensive nature of this union, and its intrinsic orientation to procreation as its natural fulfillment, distinguishes marriage from other types of community and provides the basis for the norms of marital exclusivity and permanence. Lee and George detail how the basic moral norms regarding sexual acts follow from the ethical requirement to respect the good of marriage and explain how the law should treat marriage, given its conjugal nature, examining both the same-sex-marriage issue and civil divorce