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First Online: 15 December 2018 ; This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) ; Under what conditions do international governmental organizations (IGOs) cease to exist? Surprisingly, leading theories of international organization rarely address this question. Across the theoretical spectrum scholars assume that international organizations have a high degree of "staying power". Yet reality looks different. More than one-third of IGOs created since 1815 have since died. This article addresses the puzzle of why IGOs cease to exist. Using a combination of cross-sectional and survival analysis, I seek to identify factors associated with IGO termination. My analysis is based on a novel dataset coding detailed information on all IGO created since 1815, including their function, membership, and geographic span. Against prevailing theoretical expectations, my analysis demonstrates i) that overall mortality is high among IGOs, ii) that states often prefer to create new IGOs as opposed reforming existing ones, and iii) that having a large and heterogeneous membership is associated with greater organizational survivability. These findings indicate a need for refinement of existing theories of 'institutional robustness'.

The balance of power is one of the oldest and most venerable concepts in the study of International Relations. Few concepts have had a comparable influence on both scholarship and statesmanship, and few have been so fiercely contested. In a recent article, `Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History' ( EJIR, June 2007), Wohlforth et al. set out to test balance-of-power theory against 2000 years of world history. Although their article has considerable merits, I highlight three main weaknesses in their approach. First, I argue that they misstate balance-of-power theory. Second, the competing theoretical hypotheses they offer are (a) not novel, (b) too vague to enable productive empirical testing. Third, the historical evidence they present, based on the study of ancient international systems, is too scant and impressionistic to be probative for the causal mechanisms they seek to evaluate. As a result, balance-of-power theory is neither refuted nor significantly refined.

A growing literature touts the prominence of international cooperation among substate officials through so-called transgovernmental networks (TGNs). These networks are allegedly faster, cheaper and more flexible than conventional international treaty organizations (ITOs) (e.g. Slaughter, 2004). Yet, TGNs are not evenly distributed, either in terms of geography or issue-area. While some policyareas are characterized by networked cooperation, others continue to be dominated by formal ITOs. How can we explain such variation? I draw on recent network studies in public policy, economics and sociology to theorize the conditions in which states may prefer cooperation through TGNs. I have two main findings: First, TGNs are designed to deal with cooperation problems of a different nature than those addressed by ITOs. ITOs aim to reduce transaction costs, enhance credibility of interstate agreements and solve problems of incomplete contracting. By contrast, the chief benefit of TGNs is to provide policy flexibility and untie the hands of national executives, allowing them to bypass domestic and international constraints on policy. Second, TGNs are not a panacea for international problemsolving. Rather, they are useful tools in situations where states are reluctant to embrace treaty-based cooperation due to sovereignty concerns or environmental uncertainty. The argument is applied against three cases drawn from the ordinarily hierarchical realm of international security cooperation.

An introduction to a special section on, "Transnational Networks & New Security Threats," points out the importance of addressing the impact on security of transnational political networks (those that attempt to directly or indirectly influence governmental policies/practices). Transnational networks are described as "a series of nodes that are connected through links of communication &/or exchange of resources." The advantages & disadvantages of networks for political actors are explored, along with their increasing use for criminal purposes; efforts of global government networks to combat the threat of criminal transnational networks; & various kinds of public-private networking. It is noted that new security threats from transnational networks include terrorism, cybercrime, political insurgency, & trafficking in both drugs/people. The three essays are part of a larger research project funded by the Airey Neave Foundation of London. They examine how networks affect the state as a locus of power/authority in the international system by showing how they both generate new security threats that challenge state authority & enhance the ability of states to improve security governance. 24 References. J. Lindroth