Search results

A commentary on 'Critical Questions for Big Data' and the projection in the article of how 'limited access to big data creates new digital divides'. Pressing questions are indeed proliferating around not only what the actual relationship is between data and real world user behavior but also around defining what the very practices, knowledge sets, legal and technological infrastructures, and social norms are that guide the work of big data as a field itself. But how much of a difference does it make for academics and academic institutions to gain access to big data when the logics of commerce and commercial enclosure around data management, collection, and use are what increasingly get privileged?

This article takes a historical perspective about the possibility of democratic grassroots trade union representation in Chinese factories. It documents previous trade union elections at supplier factories of multinational corporations (MNCs), from the first election organised by Reebok in 2001 at a supplier factory in Shenzhen to a recent election instigated by workers. For a decade and a half, a number of high-profile union elections were variously organised by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on behalf of MNCs, or by the Chinese trade union, or by workers. The article examines the political and social contexts in which these elections took place, the problems encountered by the newly elected trade union branches, their successes and failures, and how these elections prompted China's trade union federation to hold similar elections at domestically owned Chinese factories. It concludes with an analysis of the current labour scene in China and the prospects of genuine collective bargaining. (China/GIGA)

At a scholarly level, Chinese exceptionalism pervades many of the disciplines relating to China - in Chinese culture, Chinese history, or Chinese political practices. To my mind the exceptionalism paradigm stultifies our search for a deeper understanding of China.

In 2001 and 2002, Reebok facilitated democratic trade union elections at two of its supplier factories in China. After initial successes in one factory in bargaining with management to improve conditions, in the end the experiment failed. This article describes in detail the election process, the elections aftermath, and the power dynamics of the actors involved (Reebok, the supplier companies management, the workers, their newly elected trade union committees, the district-level trade unions, and the Chinese trade union federation). The article analyzes the reasons behind this failed experiment and concludes by arguing that in a new changed climate today, both within China and within the international trade union movement, the Reebok experiment is worth reexamining.

At a scholarly level, Chinese exceptionalism pervades many of the disciplines relating to China - in Chinese culture, Chinese history, or Chinese political practices. To my mind the exceptionalism paradigm stultifies our search for a deeper understanding of China.

In 2001 and 2002, Reebok facilitated democratic trade union elections at two of its supplier factories in China. After initial successes in one factory in bargaining with management to improve conditions, in the end the experiment failed. This article describes in detail the election process, the elections aftermath, and the power dynamics of the actors involved (Reebok, the supplier companies management, the workers, their newly elected trade union committees, the district-level trade unions, and the Chinese trade union federation). The article analyzes the reasons behind this failed experiment and concludes by arguing that in a new changed climate today, both within China and within the international trade union movement, the Reebok experiment is worth reexamining.

China's export industries witness outbreaks of spontaneous work stoppages and strikes that are often suppressed by the local authorities, sometimes with violence. To gain a perspective on these disturbances, and on what they reveal about China's industrial relations system, it is instructive to compare China with Vietnam. Even though the two countries have emerged from similar histories of Communist Party rule, their regulation of strikes is a study in contrasts. Chinese law does not mention strike actions; Vietnam, in contrast, has legislated complex provisions intended to regulate labor discontent by providing workers with a collective bargaining platform and with strike procedures when bargaining breaks down, to reduce the occurrence of wildcat strikes. We might therefore expect fewer strikes in Vietnam, but the reverse is the case: China experiences less frequent strikes than Vietnam. Also unexpected is that, even though the strikes in Vietnam are illegal, they are unimpeded by the authorities. In China, strikes, though not categorized as illegal, are nonetheless usually suppressed vigorously. This article will compare the course of strikes in China and Vietnam and examine the underlying factors, in order to understand this contrast. (China J/GIGA)