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There are dangerous sparks and embers of national, ethnic, and cultural conflict throughout the continent, capable of causing new conflicts and reanimating old ones, but they are mostly subdued by historical standards.

AbstractIn 2005, after the making of the Constitution of Iraq and the making of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement, many analysts expected the imminent break-up of Iraq, and that the South Sudanese would eventually opt for federalism and power-sharing rather than secede from Sudan. Six remarkable parallels in the histories of Iraq and Sudan suggest that analysts should have predicted that the Kurds and the South Sudanese would have been equally ardent secessionists in the early twenty-first century. Yet Kurdish nationalist leaders chose federalization in and after 2005, whereas South Sudanese nationalists eventually chose secession after a brief federal power-sharing experiment. The different choices of the respective nationalist leaders were therefore critical, but some plausible explanations of their different choices do not withstand scrutiny. The differing outcomes, so far, are necessarily but not sufficiently explained by the different geopolitical neighbourhoods of Iraq and Sudan. The author suggests that secessions are also driven by political parties who are willing to downsize their state rather than modify the existing regime, and by nationalists who calculate that they are unlikely to have political pivotality in a federal democracy. One implication is that federal power-sharing bargains have a better chance of working in deeply divided places when potential secessionists believe that they may have political pivotality within a federation.

The political and military scene in Iraq is best described as a series of truces. All parties await America's exit, and all will try to steer it
in their favor. President Barack Obama's moment can be used either to guide Iraq toward a successful federation or to preside over a
failed transfer of power, one in which the United States, with bungled intentions, assists divided Arab centralists in Baghdad to go to
war with Kurdistan and with each other. Leaving Iraq with integrity requires the Obama administration to ensure a secure balance of power within Iraq. That is made feasible
by Iraq's Constitution, properly understood. It also requires the new administration to encourage clear internal territorial demarcations
within Iraq's federation, especially between Kurdistan and al-Iraq al-Arabi. It will have to inhibit fearful or aggrandizing interventions
by Iran or Turkey and the provisioning of insurgents by Sunni Arab-dominated states.

A consideration of what will be required for the US to successfully transfer power over to Iraq begins with a summation of the many grim legacies that define Iraq today. It is contended that the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 & the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) must be protected if there is to be an "honorable" US exit, & the transfer of power must be completed with the KRG & the federal government of Iraq. Outlined are provisions of the Constitution, which is seen as laying out a coherent vision of democracy centered on a quest for province-based federalism. Recentralizing Iraq is rejected, & the Obama administration is warned against going that route & called to consolidate a balance of power by rendering military & policing assistance to provinces & the Kurdistan region. Further, the Obama administration is admonished about supporting Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who, it is asserted, seeks to consolidate his power in Baghdad & is not the source of stability he claims to be. Success at that could lead to Arab-Kurdish war, & it is contended that the Obama administration must seek to resolve major Arab-Kurdish tensions before the US leaves Iraq; the means to do so are found in the Constitution's Article 140. Further, the Constitution also provides the means to reincorporate Sunni Arabs into the new Iraq. A responsible US exit will also require diplomatic attention be given to avoiding malign interventions into Iraq; thus, new US policies toward Iran & Turkey are advocated. It is argued as well that US soft power must be applied to support those Iraqi power centers most likely to ensure the development of an Iraqi pluralist federation. D. Edelman. Adapted from the source document.