Search results

AbstractPrevious evaluations of job creation schemes (JCS) reveal mostly negative employment effects, mainly due to inherent lock-in effects. In this paper, we assess the impact of an innovative JCS that employs a pre-selection mechanism to target programme participation on unemployed job seekers with very low integration chances, hereby reducing possible lock-in effects. Relying on high-quality administrative as well as survey data, we conduct regression-adjusted matching analyses to estimate the programme effect on integration into regular employment. Our results show that the programme did not succeed to foster labour market integration, but still entails remarkably negative employment effects in the first years after participation. We argue that this results from a principal-agent problem at the last step of the selection mechanism that may have led to cream-skimming rather than targeting on very hard to place workers. However, supplementary analyses reveal that negative effects can be avoided for subgroups with very poor employment chances in case of non-participation. These results are robust to the use of different matching estimators and definitions of non-participation. The inclusion of usually unobservable survey variables as well as placebo tests based on past employment outcomes refute concerns about endogenous selection. From a policy-perspective, these findings imply that targeting JCS on workers with very low integration chances is a key factor to avoid negative employment effects found in previous evaluations. At the methodological level, our analyses add to recent literature that assesses the credibility of non-experimental evaluations based on high-quality administrative data.

ZusammenfassungInwiefern erreichen Schülerinnen und Schüler, die über gleiche Kompetenzen verfügen, auch gleiche Abschlüsse und gleiche Abschlussnoten? Dieser Fragestellung gehen wir am Beispiel des Mittleren Schulabschlusses und des Abiturs der Hamburger Prüfungsjahrgänge der Schuljahre 2015/16 und 2016/17 nach. In diesem Kontext untersuchen wir ebenfalls, inwieweit Gruppenunterschiede in den Abschlussnoten und in der Abschlusswahrscheinlichkeit (nach Geschlecht, Migrationshintergrund und sozialem Status) bestehen und inwieweit sie auf Kompetenzunterschiede zurückzuführen sind. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass zwar keine Chancengerechtigkeit besteht, die Vergabe von Schulabschlüssen und Abschlussnoten aber weitgehend leistungsgerecht erfolgt. Auffällig ist dabei, dass sich der Leistungsvorteil der Mädchen unter Kontrolle der Kompetenzen vergrößert.

AbstractA large number of articles have analysed 'the one constant' in the economic effects of trade unions, namely that collective bargaining reduces employment growth by 2–4% points per year. Evidence is, however, mostly related to Anglo‐Saxon countries. We investigate whether a different institutional setting might lead to a different outcome, making the constant a variable entity. Using linked‐employer‐employee data for Germany, we find a negative correlation between being covered by a sector‐wide bargaining agreement or firm‐level contract and employment growth of about 1% point per annum. However, the correlation between employment growth and collective bargaining is not robust to the use of panel methods. We conclude that the results of the literature using cross‐section data might be driven by selection.

"In diesem Beitrag widmen wir uns der Frage nach der Relevanz der sozialen Herkunft bei der beruflichen Orientierung im Übergangssystem. Auf Basis der Panelstudie 'Wandel der Berufsorientierungen von Schülerinnen und Schülern im Übergangssystem' (Schuljahr 2011/ 12) wird aufgezeigt, dass Herkunftsfaktoren, wie der Schul- und Ausbildungsabschluss der Eltern sowie deren Erwerbsstatus den Berufswahlprozess von Jugendlichen beeinflussen. Insgesamt wird deutlich, dass der Zeitpunkt der Aufnahme der Ausbildungssuche mit der sozialen Herkunft variiert. Die Bewältigung der ersten Schwelle ist für Jugendliche aus statusniedrigen Familien, trotz eines erfolgreichen Besuchs des Übergangssystems, aufgrund der nach der sozialen Herkunft variierenden Kapitalausstattung, erschwert." (Autorenreferat)

Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of opening clauses in German collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) on job flows. Opening clauses should provide firms with more flexibility in economic crises. Therefore, firms operating under a CBA with opening clauses are expected to have lower job turnover, in particular lower job destruction under bad business conditions, and - if job creation is not adversely affected - higher job growth. We analyse this question empirically using data from the IAB Establishment Panel, a large and representative data set on German establishments. We supplement the data with additional information on the existence of opening clauses in CBAs in the West German manufacturing sector (using the IAW Data Set on Opening Clauses). By means of a matching approach, we address selection problems in flexible CBAs and reveal that the existence of opening clauses has a positive, albeit not always significant, effect on job growth. In contrast, there are no significant effects on job destruction and job creation per se, and, based on information given in the IAB Establishment Panel itself, explicit knowledge of opening clauses or their application have no additional effect on job flows.

Collective bargaining agreements have been said to decrease deployment since the work of Calmfors and Driffill (1988). We investigate empirically whether opening clauses, flexible elements that have been introduced to reduce the decline in coverage, can indeed minimise this effect and increase job growth in covered firms. Using representative data on German establishments, the IAB Establishment Panel, in combination with data on opening clauses from the IAW, and performing propensity score matching to control for selectivity bias, we find that the existence of opening clauses has significantly negative effects on job destruction rates and that it increases job growth by approximately 0.73% per year. However, it does not seem the case that firms with explicit knowledge of opening clauses anticipate their increased flexibility, since they do not have higher job creation rates. As regards the actual application of opening clauses, our results do not show additional effects.

A major goal of the reform of the German Temporary Employment Act (Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz, AÜG) on April 1, 2017, was to strengthen collective bargaining autonomy. This paper uses quantitative and qualitative methods to show whether and to what extent this goal has been achieved and how we can empirically assess why the goal has (not) been achieved. The reform of the AÜG enabled the bargaining partners to adopt collective bargaining exemptions, which was also done in large parts of the bargaining landscape. It can be seen that the reform of the AÜG had an impact on the collective bargaining coverage of temporary employment agencies. In contrast, neither the collective bargaining coverage of temporary agency workers nor of deployment firms has been significantly influenced by the reform of the AÜG. It becomes clear that this is due in particular to loopholes in the law as well as to the general complexity of collective bargaining regulations.