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En este artículo se estudian y ordenan las diferentes formas con que la ciudadanía decide directamente en las urnas sobre temas de su incumbencia. La apelación directa a la ciudadanía parece cada día más de moda en la región, cuestión que muchos autores ven como la utilización de recursos institucionales por parte de las autoridades para avanzar en una determinada agenda política. Sin embargo, la democracia directa es más heterogénea de lo que estos autores conceden. Los mismos resultados de las votaciones populares son, en términos generales, más ajustados de lo que se presupondría. La evidencia muestra que cuando los movimientos de democracia directa son utilizados por los ejecutivos, en América Latina, la tasa de aprobación no supera el 55%, incluso menor a la tasa de aprobación de cuando los inicia la ciudadanía (56%). Esto no significa que, en algunas oportunidades, las autoridades no los usen como ejercicios de movilización popular o que sean una búsqueda de legitimización popular de los deseos de las elites políticas en turno.AbstractThis study examines the different ways in which citizens decide directly at the polls on topics of their concern. The direct appeal to the citizenry seems to be increasingly popular in the region and many authors do not see in it more than the use of institutional resources by the authorities to advance a particular political agenda. However, direct democracy is a much more heterogeneous phenomenon than these authors usually grant. In fact, the results of popular votes are generally much tighter than one might assume. Surprisingly, the evidence shows that when used by government agents in Latin America, the rate acceptance does not exceed 55%, even lower than the rate of approval when they are initiated by citizens (56%). This does not mean that, on occasions, authorities use them as exercises of popular mobilization or as tools seeking popular legitimization of the desires of political elites.

Uruguay is one of the most prodigious users of mechanism of direct democracy in the world and it provides a rich milieu to test many hypotheses advanced by a literature that principally comes from the "north," and very especially from Switzerland (the world champion of direct democracy) and from the United States, where direct democracy is frequently used at the state level. This literature tends to suggest that economic interests or social groups could easily utilize direct democracy for their own particular benefit, making it, in the end, harmful to representative democracy. Nonetheless, this study will show that, at least for the Uruguayan case, this argument does not hold equally and consistently for all cases. Mechanisms of direct democracy in Uruguay do not undermine representative democracy because their passage depends largely on the mobilization efforts of organized partisan groups operating outside the conventional legislative arena. In this small country, unlike other cases, the central actors working for the approval of mechanisms of direct democracy are political parties' fractions, the basic institutions of electoral, legislative, and political representation. Therefore, an overall normative evaluation of mechanisms of direct democracy as either inherently good or bad for representative democracy must take into account the very different institutional contexts in which these mechanisms are utilized, as well as the strength of the political actors involved.

Uruguay, defining itself as the "Switzerland of Latin America", took the Swiss model (collegial executives and direct democracy) as an example when building its own political institutions. Despite the similarities of these institutions, the results were quite different due to the different context. The comparison between the institutions in these two isolated countries highlights the ways in which the same institutions may produce different results and evolve in distinctive ways. This is important to recognize as foreign models and experiences continue to inspire policies. Contrary to common arguments presented in the literature, even in such a "most likely case", institutions cannot simply be copied. Institutional effects are context-dependent and we need to pay attention to this interaction. This article provides new evidence showing that universalist institutional arguments can be misleading. Adapted from the source document.

Uruguay, defining itself as the "Switzerland of Latin America", took the Swiss model (collegial executives and direct democracy) as an example when building its own political institutions. Despite the similarities of these institutions, the results were quite different due to the different context. The comparison between the institutions in these two isolated countries highlights the ways in which the same institutions may produce different results and evolve in distinctive ways. This is important to recognize as foreign models and experiences continue to inspire policies. Contrary to common arguments presented in the literature, even in such a "most likely case", institutions cannot simply be copied. Institutional effects are context‐dependent and we need to pay attention to this interaction. This article provides new evidence showing that universalist institutional arguments can be misleading.

This article helps fill the void in U.S. political science's approach
to Latin American political science and its institutionalization.
One example of that void is that PS: Political Science &
Politics has recently published several pieces on the
state of the discipline in diverse regions of the world but, despite
its relative importance, none on the state of the discipline in
Latin America (see, for example, Bogaç and Turan 2004; Rizayev 2004;
and Sharapova 2005). This omission is remarkable because this
continent has both nourished U.S. political science by providing
several outstanding colleagues, many of whom have generated
controversial and important arguments against the dominant paradigms
in the discipline, and because, for better or worse, Latin America
has been considered the "backyard" of the United States. Arguably,
because of its economic, social, and political ties with the U.S.,
any major change in Latin America would have greater and more
immediate implications for the U.S. than similar events elsewhere in
the world. These topics are particularly pertinent with the upcoming
conference of the International Political Science Association (IPSA)
being held in Santiago, Chile, in 2009, and the APSA's new efforts
to recruit members from overseas, especially from not-so privileged
countries.

This article analyzes whether mechanisms of direct democracy initiated by the executive branch of government in the Americas -- independently of the subject in question -- tend to systematically favor the government; or, if citizens take it as an opportunity to cast a vote of censorship on the government. Neither alternative is supported by the evidence. Available data suggest that the more democratic a regime is, the weaker is the support to the option backed by the government. In addition, executives obtain greater endorsement for their proposals if inflation is greater & if electoral participation is smaller. Nonetheless, if we consider only unquestionably democratic regimes, participation plays in favor of the government. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.