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Since the early 1980s the concept of non-offensive defence has gained considerable support in peace movements as well as among peace researchers in Western Europe. The debate has, however, become a 'for' and 'against' argument, while fundamental analytical questions have been left aside. This article deals with the nature of the premises for the implementation of defence policy alternatives based on specific technologies with assumed political and strategic effects. The distinction between offensive and defensive appears, in a historical perspective, as far more complex than assumed in the current debate. The concept of non-offensive defence presupposes that these distinctions can be handled through conscious and rational choices. Research in the interaction between technological change and military strategy and in the determining factors for the development of military technology and weapons systems provides very little support for such a conclusion. The concept of non-offensive defence, as presently developed, therefore appears as an attempted short-cut past the basic problems involved in the control of the development of military technology, and the debate therefore runs the risk of ending as just another 'single-weapon concept', soon to be forgotten.

Agrell, W. Behind the Submarine Crisis: Evolution of the Swedish Defence Doctrine and Soviet War Planning. Cooperation and Conflict, XXI, 1986, 197-217. In the 1980s Sweden has experienced a number of serious incidents involving foreign submarines. This 'submarine crisis' has affected Swedish foreign policy and Swedish- Soviet relations, but also the relevance of the defence policy and the flexibility of long- term planning. The submarine crisis can thus be regarded as a test of vital elements in policy and planning. Historically, the Swedish defence doctrine in the post-war period has been characterized by considerable inertia, only giving way to strong pressure from the formal or informal power-groups controlling various aspects of defence policy. New planning procedures have not made the system more sensitive to changes in the external premisses. A close analysis of alien underwater activity in Swedish waters indicates a turning point in the latter half of the 1970s with large coordinated penetrations being carried out deep into the archipelagoes. This indicates a major shift in Soviet war planning concerning Scandinavia, especially concerning operations against Sweden, on the outbreak of a conflict. Thus, the submarine crisis reveals a gap between the strategic assumptions forming the intellectual basis of the Swedish defence doctrine and the pattern in Soviet military activity and military preparations. The reaction of the Swedish planning system, and the historical experi ences lead, however, to the conclusion that presently there are no internal conditions for a change in the doctrine.