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Responds to Alain Lipietz's "Political Ecology and the Future of Marxism" (2000). It is contended that Lipietz has clearly elucidated similarities between Marxism & political ecology; nevertheless, the need to expand political ecological theory is articulated. Four aspects of political ecology that require novel theoretical departures are identified: the understanding of value; the theory of crises; the assessment of social movements & political change; & the creation of an ideal society. Concerning the establishment of a new theory of value, it is asserted that there are three disparate sources of value in political ecological theory: the Marxist conception of value; the biological growth of renewable resource; & the scarcity of renewable resources. Although Lipietz perceives the ultimate objectives of Marxism & political ecology as different, it is concluded that the future integration of the two theoretical approaches is contingent upon determining the standards of equitability & sustainability. J. W. Parker

The social cost of carbon - or marginal damage caused by an additional ton of carbon dioxide emissions - has been estimated by a U.S. government working group at $21/tCO2 in 2010. That calculation, however, omits many of the biggest risks associated with climate change, and downplays the impact of current emissions on future generations. Our reanalysis explores the effects of uncertainty about climate sensitivity, the shape of the damage function, and the discount rate. We show that the social cost of carbon is uncertain across a broad range, and could be much higher than $21/tCO2. In our case combining high climate sensitivity, high damages, and a low discount rate, the social cost of carbon could be almost $900/tCO2 in 2010, rising to $1,500/tCO2 in 2050. The most ambitious scenarios for eliminating carbon dioxide emissions as rapidly as technologically feasible (reaching zero or negative net global emissions by the end of this century) require spending up to $150 to $500 per ton of reductions of carbon dioxide emissions by 2050. Using a reasonable set of alternative assumptions, therefore, the damages from a ton of carbon dioxide emissions in 2050 could exceed the cost of reducing emissions at the maximum technically feasible rate. Once this is the case, the exact value of the social cost of carbon loses importance: the clear policy prescription is to reduce emissions as rapidly as possible, and cost-effectiveness analysis offers better insights for climate policy than cost-benefit analysis.

The social cost of carbon - or marginal damage caused by an additional ton of carbon dioxide emissions - has been estimated by a U.S. government working group at $21 in 2010. That calculation, however, omits many of the biggest risks associated with climate change, and downplays the impact of our current emissions on future generations. Our reanalysis explores the effects of uncertainty about climate sensitivity, the shape of the damage function, and the discount rate. We show that the social cost of carbon is uncertain across a broad range, and could be much higher than $21. In our worst case, it could be almost $900 in 2010, rising to $1,500 in 2050. The most ambitious scenarios for eliminating carbon dioxide emissions as rapidly as technologically feasible (reaching zero or negative net global emissions by the end of this century) require spending up to $150 to $500 per ton of reductions in carbon dioxide emissions by 2050. Using a reasonable set of alternative assumptions, therefore, the damages from a ton of carbon dioxide emissions in 2050 could exceed the cost of reducing emissions at the maximum technically feasible rate. Once this is the case, the exact value of the social cost of carbon loses importance: the clear policy prescription is to reduce emissions a rapidly as possible, and cost-effectiveness analysis offers better insights for climate policy than cost-benefit analysis.

The proposed new chemicals policy of the European Community, REACH, is an important new development in environmental protection. Rather than waiting for government or independent researchers to determine that chemicals are hazardous, it will make manufacturers, importers, and professional users of chemicals responsible for the safe use. There is little doubt that REACH will give health and environmental benefits, but there has been little agreement about the resulting costs: -Will European manufacturers be crushed by the economic burden of chemicals regulation, as some industry sources have suggested? -Or, as projected in some public sector studies, will there be a minor cost impact, well within the ability of industry and worth the price? This report offers a new look at these costs. Frank Ackerman and Rachel Massey compare the current EC legislation on chemicals, the European Commission's proposal and an alternative proposal addressing previous versions of REACH. The authors make a bottom-up calculation of the expected registration and testing costs under REACH and provide a new analysis of the indirect economic impacts. Ultimately they evaluate some prominent arguments about the costs of REACH and discuss the expected benefits. In the appendices there is the derivation of their economic impacts analysis and a critique of the best-known industry-oriented study.