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ALMOST NO EFFORT HAS BEEN MADE BY POLITICAL SCIENTISTS TO INVESTIGATE THE INTERPARTY BARGAINING THAT IS DECISIVE FOR GOVERNMENT FORMATION AND GOVERNANCE IN MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACIES. THE QUESTIONS IN NEED OF ANSWERS ARE: 1. UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS AND WHY WILL SINGLE PARTY MINORITY, COALITION MINORITY, MINIMUM WINNING COALITION, AND OVERSIZED COALITION GOVERNMENTS BE FORMED? 2. WHAT WILL BE THE PARTY COMPOSITION OF THESE GOVERNMENTS? 3. WHAT KINDS OF POLICY PREFERENCES WILL BE DECISIVE IN THE CALCULI OF GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION THAT PARTY LEADERS MAKE? WHAT KINDS OF PREFERENCES WILL PARTIES BE WILLING TO SACRIFICE FOR THE SAKE OF PARTICIPATION IN A GOVERNMENT? AFTER FIRST SUMMARIZING THE EVOLUTION OF COALITION THEORY AND THE THEORETICAL THRUSTS OF DODD AND DE SWANN'S CONTRIBUTIONS, THIS PAPER PROPOSES A FUNDAMENTALLY NEW APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF GOVERNMENT FORMATION IN MULTIPARTY SYSTEMS.

CONFLICT BETWEEN CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN BRITAIN HAS REACHED HEIGHTS IN THE 1980S. EARLY ATTEMPTS IN THE LATE 1970S TO THEORIZE THE NATURE OF LOCAL POLITICS AND THE STATE HAVE BEEN OVERTAKEN BY THE RADICAL RESTRUCTURING OF THE GEORGRAPHY OF CENTRAL-LOCAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONS. THIS ARTICLE TAKES SLTOCK OF KEY ISSUES IN THE ANALYSIS OF LOCAL POLITICS AND THE STATE AT THE LEVEL OF THEORY AND PRACTICE. IT LOOKS IN TURN AT: DEVELOPMENTS IN RADICAL SOCIAL THEORY: CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION, HIGHLIGHTING THE EMERGING RADICAL CRITIQUE; THE INFORMAL POLITICS OF COMMUNITY ACTION AND BEYOND; THE POST-1979 CRISIS IN FORMAL CENTRAL-LOCAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONS; AND CONCLUDES BY DISCUSSING LOCAL POLITICAL RESPONSES TO THE SHIFTING GEOGRAPHY OF CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS.

Formation of government is one of the most important issues in parliamentary democracies. The text elaborates propositions of the theory of coalitions. It enumerates the factors influencing the formation of coalitions. Formation of excessively large coalitions derives from potential unreliability of certain partners, in 'extraordinary' circumstances, when there are some external or internal threats, when the two-third majority rule is required, for some decisions: constitutional amendments, budget, for larger legitimacy and due to insecurity of certain partners and reduction of risk. Minority government can be a single-party minority government and a minority government composed of several partners. In negotiations on formation of government, care is taken of harmonization of policy and distribution of resources. Parties often set one eye on the government and another on the mood of their members and supporters. Ministerial posts are observed quantitatively and qualitatively. Successful negotiations about the formation of government result in coalition agreement. It can be formal and informal, for internal use or publicly announced. Coalition negotiations depend on institutional and behavioral factors. Coalition governments have their advantages: broader representation in executive power; increased level of agreement, negotiation and compromises in executive power; flexibility and adjustability. Critics of coalition governments are as follows: majority coalition governments are most often the result of post-electoral coalitions, frequent secret negotiations of party leaders unclear and non-transparent for citizens, as being led behind closed door, and therefore the connection between elections and formation of government is weak; it is thought that coalition governments take less care of pre-electoral promises due to the need for mutual adjustment and achievement of compromise, but also because one party is hiding behind another; small parties can have disproportional higher influence in executive power than is their electoral support; coalition government can be inefficient as it requires agreement of all coalition partners which is not always easy to achieve; coalition governments are potentially unstable. In fragmented multiparty systems, derivation of the will of voters from the electoral results it is not easy at all. Coalition negotiations decide about who will rule more than the elections. In formation of ruling coalitions, will of voters expressed at elections is often changed. Coalition is, above else, a compromise without losers and winners, with an aim to make everybody satisfied. ; Formiranje vlade je jedno od najvažnijih pitanja u parlamentarnim demokratijama. U tekstu su elaborirane propozicije teorije koalicija. Navedeni su faktori koji utiču na formiranje koalicija. Formiranje prevelikih koalicija proizlazi iz potencijalne nepouzdanosti pojedinih partnera, u 'vanrednim' okolnostima, kada postoje neke spoljašnje ili unutrašnje pretnje, kada se zahteva pravilo dvotrećinske većine, za neke odluke: ustavni amandmani, budžet, zbog većeg legitimiteta i zbog nesigurnosti pojedinih partnera i smanjenja rizika. Manjinska vlada može biti jednopartijska manjinska vlada i manjinska vlada sastavljena od više partnera. Kod pregovora o formiranju vlade vodi se računa o usaglašavanju politike i raspodeli resora. Partije su često jednim okom zagledane u vlast a drugim u raspoloženje svojih članova i simpatizera. Ministarska mesta se posmatraju kvalitativno i kvantitativno. Rezultat uspešnih pregovora o formiranju vlade jeste koalicioni sporazum. On može biti formalan i neformalan, za internu upotrebu ili javno saopšten. Koalicioni pregovori zavise od institucionalnih i bihejvioralnih faktora. Koalicione vlade imaju svoje prednosti: šira je zastupljenost i predstavljenost u izvršnoj vlasti; povećava stepen dogovaranja, pregovaranja i kompromisa u izvršnoj vlasti; fleksibilnost i prilagodljivost. Kritike koalicionih vlada su sledeće: većinske koalicione vlade su najčešće rezultat postizbornih koalicija, često tajnih pregovora partijskih lidera koji su građanima nejasni i neprozirni, jer se odvijaju iza zatvorenih vrata, otuda je veza između izbora i formiranja vlade slaba; smatra se da se koalicione vlade manje drže predizbornih obećanja usled potrebe međusobnog usaglašavanja i postizanja kompromisa, ali i zato što se jedna partija krije iza druge; male partije mogu imati nesrazmerno veći uticaj u izvršnoj vlasti nego što je njihova izborna podrška; koaliciona vlada može biti neefikasna jer se zahteva saglasnost svih koalicionih partnera, što nije uvek lako postići; koalicione vlade su potencijalno i nestabilne. U fragmentiranim višepartijskim sistemima nije nimalo jednostavno izvoditi volju birača iz rezultata izbora. Koalicioni pregovori odlučuju o tome ko će vladati više nego izbori. Kod formiranja vladajućih koalicija neretko se preinačuje volja birača iskazana na izborima. Koalicija je, pre svega, kompromis bez gubitnika i dobitnika, sa ciljem da svi budu zadovoljni.

Structural reform has been one of the most important and hotly contested features of modern local government. From North America to Europe to Australasia, local government boundaries have been redrawn over the last two decades. In many countries it seems that structural change has been the 'default' option to which successive generations of policy makers are irresistibly drawn time and time again. And yet the reasons for the extraordinary popularity of this particular policy instrument and, more importantly, its impacts are under-researched. There is a dearth of rigorous empirical analysis of the costs and benefits and the relative effectiveness of different kinds of structural change and different approaches to implementing them. The Theory and Practice of Local Government Reform, edited by Brian E. Dollery and Lorenzo Robotti, is then a very welcome attempt to address these issues in comprehensive and comparative fashion, which draws upon expert knowledge of recent developments from across an impressive range of different countries and contexts.

Structural reform has been one of the most important and hotly contested features of modern local government. From North America to Europe to Australasia, local government boundaries have been redrawn over the last two decades. In many countries it seems that structural change has been the 'default' option to which successive generations of policy makers are irresistibly drawn time and time again. And yet the reasons for the extraordinary popularity of this particular policy instrument and, more importantly, its impacts are under-researched. There is a dearth of rigorous empirical analysis of the costs and benefits and the relative effectiveness of different kinds of structural change and different approaches to implementing them. The Theory and Practice of Local Government Reform, edited by Brian E. Dollery and Lorenzo Robotti, is then a very welcome attempt to address these issues in comprehensive and comparative fashion, which draws upon expert knowledge of recent developments from across an impressive range of different countries and contexts.

Book review of Social Media for Government: Theory and Practice, by Staci M. Zavattaro and Thomas A. Bryer

Article about system essence of social contradictions between a society and the power inevitably arising at level of municipal management. On the basis of V. Pareto heritage and the theory of self-organizing of I. Prigozhin the author analyzes deep problems of formation of a civil society in Russia. Статья о системной сущности социальных противоречий между обществом и властью неизбежно возникающих на уровне муниципального управления. На основе наследия В. Парето и теории самоорганизации И. Пригожина автор анализирует глубинные проблемы формирования гражданского общества в России. ; In Russian: Калужский М.Л. Проблемы общественного самоуправления в свете теории самоорганизации // Городское управление. – 1998. – № 5. – С. 47-49.