Based on the first-person narratives of young born-again Muslims in mid-2000s' Pakistan, this article points to several ways in which a renewed sociology of self-reform and faith-based activism could usefully draw more systematic attention to emotions. This empirical and inductive study first explores the role of emotions in the micro-foundations of re-Islamisation. It stresses the need to locate the emotive experiences that trigger this process, and sustain it through times and in opposition to others, in the body and the senses. It also discloses specific sensibilities, which, when linked to individual biographies, elucidate why potential followers are receptive, or not, to the various 'sensitising devices' deployed by Islamic organisations. In the second section, the expression of emotions is addressed in regard to its collective implications. Indeed, re-Islamisation often translates into rigid emotional boundaries separating the born-again from other communities, the 'Muslims by birth' and members of other sects. Reshaping togetherness is nevertheless not devoid of ambivalence: The young born-again Muslims I met in Pakistan were clearly torn between their contemptuous pleasure of occupying the moral high ground and the equally compelling aspiration to be tolerant and abide by the 'feeling rules' valued in Islamic ethics. They were also fully aware of the dangerous political implications of their feelings in a country disfigured by sectarian violence.
In 2011, a number of trends in Indonesian politics became clearer. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) has not become a more reformist and risk-taking president in his second term, contrary to the hopes of many, but has rather become more cautious, aloof and regal in style. He is irked by criticism and dislikes any disturbance to the authority of his rule. The political elite, often in concert with the SBY government, pushed through a range of democratically regressive measures, including allowing politicians to be appointed to the Elections Commission. The malaise within the party system deepened, with less than a quarter of the electorate professing any party affiliation. Most Islamic parties slid closer to the political periphery, and the largest one, PKS, was beset by controversy. Government and community responses to a brutal attack on the Ahmadiyah sect in early 2011 showed the limits of Indonesia's much lauded religious tolerance.
In 2011, a number of trends in Indonesian politics became clearer. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) has not become a more reformist and risk-taking president in his second term, contrary to the hopes of many, but has rather become more cautious, aloof and regal in style. He is irked by criticism and dislikes any disturbance to the authority of his rule. The political elite, often in concert with the SBY government, pushed through a range of democratically regressive measures, including allowing politicians to be appointed to the Elections Commission. The malaise within the party system deepened, with less than a quarter of the electorate professing any party affiliation. Most Islamic parties slid closer to the political periphery, and the largest one, PKS, was beset by controversy. Government and community responses to a brutal attack on the Ahmadiyah sect in early 2011 showed the limits of Indonesia's much lauded religious tolerance.
It is difficult to appreciate and understand Sufism fully without an informed exposure to the expressive cultural forms that help define and enhance it. It is this dimension of Islamic mysticism that transports the seeker on the path of spiritual attainment into higher states of consciousness that promise spiritual intoxication (Wajd) and a unique and intimate union, even annihilation (fanā), in the supreme being. This emotional expression of faith is intensified and externalized in elaborate forms of meditation and esoteric techniques that are part of ritual ceremonies.Through ritual, many Sufi orders and Sufi-related sects throughout the world of Islam have been able to articulate doctrines and beliefs through artistic traditions such as sung poetry, instrumental music and dance-like movements (samā' or spiritual concerts) and have utilized meditation patterns that combine corporeal techniques and controlled breathing (dhikr, Turkish, zikr) to induce or conduct trance and ecstatic states.
Given to several intellectual, social, economic, or political factors, religious sectarianism has been an ancient and ongoing phenomenon of human history. Sectarian "Islamic" groups also have a long history and some enjoyed substantial following and power. Recent resurgence of the classical sectarian "Islamic" groups and growth of the new ones, however, took place under the Western colonisation project. The discovery of Americas provided a haven to all sorts of religious sects. Individuals identifying with various sectarian "Islamic" groups have also been immigrating to the US for more than a century, and found in American environment a context for freedom of religious expression and potential to propagate and flourish. This paper skimming through these issues seeks to focus on the foundational stage of a unique American-born small modernist sectarian group, United Submitters International. Its founder, Rashad Khalifa, going through several stages finally claimed to be "God's messenger to the new world" and "God's messenger of the covenant." This claim, according to him, is validated by his discovery, through a rigorous computer-assisted analysis of the Quranic text, that the ultimate proof of the Quran's truth and its being ultimate miracle is based on and revolves around number 19. This paper studies issues related to Khalifa's birth, education, professional life, activism, and initial claims and culminates with the study of his computer-assisted discovery that the ultimate miracle of the Quran is based on number 19. The study of his further and final claims and the group's activities will be the focus of another paper.
Abstract Any attempt to resolve political violence in religious or ethnic terms is bound to fail at the outset, for it settles for addressing a representation of the symptoms and manifestations of violence rather than disclosing its constitutive moments and the political terrain of its lived relevance. My argument runs counter to such a phenomenological presentation of violence, asserting that the contemporary violent conflicts within Iraq are not a war of sect against sect, but rather one among powerful political contenders and their regional and/or international backers. To generalize and present war in the first sense is to apologetically cover up what essentially is a class conflict, above all among fractions of the ruling class and their political representatives, an explanatory that creates an image of senseless violence. This class scenario cries for a security state, order and the monopolization of violence, i.e., the making of a hierarchical class-based state. The constitution, coherence and homogeneity of any ruling class is not pre-given, rather it necessitates a project of political hegemony within the power block in which it is established, reproduced and guaranteed by the state. The absence of such a hegemony witnesses conflicts among fractions of the ruling class that permeate all societal levels to the extent that the state apparatus itself becomes an instrument, mean and object of the conflicts rather than its purveyors and means of pacification. The intersection of imperialist occupation, violent claims for hegemony among regional contenders and domestic struggle over political power assumes inevitably fractured and particularist forms: religion, confession and ethnicity. In this way, religion, confession and ethnicity are not the cause of violence; rather the contest for hegemony violently manufacture and set them in motion. The destructive occupation regime and the lack of political will to make a unified national field empower sects and ethnicities to be recast as ideological centrifuges. In this article I will reconstruct the developments up to the emergence of ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) in December 2013/January 2014, in order to decipher the present and to warn that such catastrophes are to be expected in the future unless radical changes and reforms are made to the whole state edifice imposed on Iraqis from 2003.
ÖZETİran İslam Cumhuriyeti, Ortadoğu'nun önemli ülkelerinden biri olmasının yanında özellikle 1979 yılında ülkede gerçekleşen İslam devriminden sonra uluslararası politik gündemi de sürekli meşgul etmektedir. Bundan dolayı İran dış politikasının doğru anlaşılması büyük önem taşımaktadır. Bunun yolu da İran dış politikasının günlük olaylar karşısında tutunduğu tavırların yanında bu politikanın arka planının ne olduğunun anlaşılmasından geçmektedir. Ülkenin resmi adı İran İslam Cumhuriyeti'ndeki "İran", "İslam" ve "Cumhuriyet" kavramları İran dış politikasının meşruiyet kaynakları konusunda önemli fikirler barındırmaktadır. Buna göre İranilik, İslâmîlik ve yönetim biçiminin cumhuriyet olması ülkenin dış politikasının şekillenmesinde temel paradigmaları ortaya koymaktadır. Elbette bu üç kavramın İranlı karar alıcılar tarafından nasıl algılandığının bilinmesi konunun anlaşılması açısından önem taşımaktadır. İran denince salt coğrafi sınırlar değil zihinsel, tarihî ve kültürel bir harita kastedilmektedir. Yine İslam deyince daha çok İslam'ın Şii yorumunun merkeze alındığı dikkatlerden kaçmamalıdır. Cumhuriyet kavramı da İranlı karar alıcılar nezdinde farklı anlamlar taşımaktadır. Zira ülkede tüm kurumların üzerinde olan ve halkın doğrudan seçimine sunulmayan dinî liderlik makamı İran'ın uyguladığı politikaların temel belirleyicisidir. Bu çalışmada yukarıda bahsedilen hususlar dikkate alınarak İran dış politikasının meşruiyet kaynaklarının neler olduğu ve bu kaynaklardan hangi bakış açısıyla çıkarımlarda bulunulduğu incelendi. Öte taraftan bu özgün ve karmaşık politik sistemin dışarıdan bakanlar için anlaşılabilmesi önem taşımaktadır. Bu amaçla İran dış politikası uluslararası ilişkiler teorileri merkez alınarak değerlendirildi. Bu şekilde İran devletinin uluslararası ve bölgesel ölçekte attığı adımların doğru anlaşılmasının sağlanması hedeflendi. İran dış politikasını belirleyen kaynak ve etkenlerin bilinmesi aynı zamanda İran'ın gelecekte atacağı adımların öngörülmesi açısından da önem taşımaktadır. Bu çalışma bu konuda da perspektif sunmayı hedefledi.ABSTRACTIslamic Republic of Iran, besides being one of the highly prominent states of the Middle East, has started to influence the international political agenda and occupy an important place in it after the Islamic revolution in 1979. Hence, it is critical that foreign policies of Iran are understood accurately which is possible by looking through Iran's day to day reactions to the current events and seeing the means to these ends. The three different concepts in the official state name, Islamic Republic of Iran, reflects the mindset behind Iran's foreign policy and foundations of its legitimacy. Ergo, it is suggested that the concepts of being Iranian, Islamic and ran by a republic as a governing system are shaping the core paradigms of Iran's foreign policy. It is quite important to understand in what sense these three concepts are taken into consideration by Iran's policy makers. For instance, the term Iran doesn't only suggest a set of geographical borders, but it indicates a more cognitive, historically rooted, cultural mapping of Iran. Similarly, it must not escape the eye that the term Islamic reflects a Shiite interpretation of Islam. The concept of republic carries a different meaning in the eyes of Iranian policy makers regarding the fact that the overarching determinative power in the country is the post of the religious leader which is not directly filled by the public vote. In this study, I'm examining the following questions; what are the foundations of legitimacy for Iran's foreign policy and what kind of interpretations and effect these foundations create. The theories of international relations are used as the central methodological tool to make Iran's complex, one and only political system more understandable for the audience foreign to Iran. By doing this, it is aimed to reflect Iran's political game on international and regional scale, accurately and understandably. It is important to acknowledge that, knowing the motives and foundations of Iran's foreign policy would allow us to foreshadow Iran's future moves better, for which this study aims to offer a perspective.
This article explores the life and career of male singing star, instrumental talent, and Composer Farid al-Atrash, who created a prototype of the romantic male musical star from the 1930s until his death in 1974. An immigrant to Egypt and a member of a distinctive religious sect, the Druze, he arose from poverty and the invisibility of the previous generation of musicians thanks to his talent, ambition, and investment in his own film productions. A lifelong bachelor, he constructed a popular image with references to the authentic Arab Islamic poetic/historical past and an idealized version of modernity. Tales of his love affairs enhanced his popularity during his lifetime and were seemingly merged with the lyrics of his love songs. From Arabic sources, the author attempts to uncover the psychological rationale of a man whose life goals were shaped by his mother, who was overshadowed by his sister, and who consciously elevated music making to a professionalized art form.
With the advent of Soviet power, Islam and Christian Orthodoxy in Kyrgyzstan retreated into the background and lost much of their former influence to the extent that, when the Soviet Union collapsed, the Muslim clergy proved incapable of alleviating the contradictions inside the Muslim community and preventing ethnic clashes. In 1989, the Kyrgyz and Tajiks came to blows over land plots-there are still about 70 disputed plots in the village of Uch-Dobo. In 1990, the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks clashed in the Osh Region in the country's south. In both cases, the official Islamic clergy proved impotent in the face of the dramatic events and were unable to normalize the situation. The Kyrgyz, however, remained devoted to popular Islam and its everyday practices: throughout the Soviet period it was a tool of self-identity and an element of the locals' way of life. The local Muslims continued practicing it on an everyday basis, but on a national clan-dominated scale Islam lost some of its pre-revolutionary importance. State atheism, the policy consistently pursued across the Soviet Union, left a void in the post-Soviet world rapidly filled with all sorts of radical Islamic ideas and new sects and religious (including totalitarian) organizations. The Soviet Union's demise revived religious feelings in all social groups. It was in the early post-Soviet period that the country acquired scores of new mosques and Orthodox churches as well as new religious trends. The Koran was translated into the Kyrgyz and Uzbek languages, while the Bible appeared in Kyrgyz translation. Several bookstores in Bishkek sold Islamic and Christian books; the faithful received two periodicals, the national newspaper Islam madaniaty published in Bishkek and The Muslim, which appeared in Jalal-Abad.
The capitalist economic system is a system of economic organization that is characterized by private property rights to the tools of production and distribution and utilization to achieve a profit in a very comparative condition. This capitalism is the result of Adam Smith's thought, Adam Smith is a classical sect figure where the world's economic experts assess that the classical sect's thinking is the basis of a capitalist economic system. Doctrines taught by the theory of economic system capitalist, namely about the value of goods and services, the price structure, ie the price in the production area, the price in determining the consumption and price in the method of determining production. The rationale of Adam Smith's theory was able to endure until the economic depressi of 1929. At that time J. M Keyness performed and succeeded in expressing a theory that new and improved economic system can be built, Keynesian thought requires the presence of government intervention in determining economic policy, this is the beginning of the fall of the capitalist economic system. Because the economic crisis has always occurred throughout history, it is necessary an alternative economic theory. The Dicita-citakan economic theory is an economic system that is able to create justice and shared welfare, accompanied by the concept of the blessing of the world and the hereafter. This is the theory of Islamic economics that will bring justice and complete prosperity. Islamic economics is regarded as a way out to address contemporary economic issues. The source of the idea of Islamic economic system is aqidah and Islamic ideology which is the foundation of the Quranic massage and as-Sunnah. With this foundation the Islamic economy is distinctive, unique and distinct from the capitalist economic system or socialist/Communist economic system. In the capitalist economic system, economic activity is conducted solely because of the benefits and material factors, so as not to pay attention to the interests of the crowd. There is also no guarantee the perfection of this economic system even brings disaster that afflict the people. The Islamic economic system is an independent economic system and apart from other economic systems. As for the difference of Islamic economic system with other economic systems is as revealed by Suroso Imam Zadjuli in Achmad Ramzy Tadjoeddin, namely that the principle of Islamic economics is the application of basic efficiency dam benefits while preserving the natural environment. And the motive of Islamic economics is to seek good luck in the world and in the hereafter as the FIL with the path of worship in a broad sense. Islam recognizes the welfare of the individual and the social welfare of the community that complements one another instead of competing against each other, as applicable in the capitalist and socialist economic system.
Cover -- Contents -- Introduction David Thomas -- Map of Western Europe and the Middle East -- Muslim Arabic -- Muslims encountering Christians in the Islamic Empire David Thomas -- 1 Ibn al-Layth, The letter of Ibn al-Layth Clint R. Hackenburg -- 2 The Pact of ʿUmar Milka Levy-Rubin -- 3 Abū ʿUthmān al-Jāḥiẓ, In rebuttal of the Christians James E. Montgomery -- 4 ʿAlī l-Ṭabarī, The book of religion and empire David Thomas -- 5 Abū ʿĪsā l-Warrāq, The refutation of the three sects of the Christians David Thomas -- 6 Islamic Psalms of David David R. Vishanoff -- 7 Al-Shābushtī, Book of monasteries Hilary Kilpatrick -- 8 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Confirmation of the signs of prophethood Gabriel Said Reynolds -- 9 Al-Juwaynī, Assuaging thirst David Thomas -- 10 Abū l-Qāsim al-Anṣārī, The indispensable, on theology Richard Todd -- 11 Ibn Jubayr, Travels Alex Mallett -- 12 Usāma ibn Munqidh, The book of instructions Alex Mallett -- 13 Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī, Critical commentary on the four Gospels Lejla Demiri -- 14 Ghāzī ibn al-Wāsiṭī, Refutation of the dhimmīs and those who follow them Alex Mallett -- 15 Ibn Taymiyya, The correct answer Jon Hoover -- Christian Arabic -- Arabic-speaking Christians in the Islamic Empire David Thomas -- 16 Abū Rāʾiṭa l-Takrītī, On the Incarnation Sandra Toenies Keating -- 17 Theodore Abū Qurra, Some statements of Theodore, Bishop of Ḥarrān John Lamoreaux -- 18 ʿAbd al-Masīḥ al-Kindī, Apology Sandra Toenies Keating -- 19 ʿAmmār al-Baṣrī, Book of questions and answers Mark Beaumont -- 20 The Muqaṭṭam miracle, from the Copto-Arabic Synaxarion Mark Swanson -- 21 Elias of Nisibis and Abū l-Qāsim, An epistolary exchange Michael Kuhn -- 22 The Apocalypse of Samuel Jos van Lent -- 23 Yaḥyā of Antioch on the Caliph al-Ḥākim Paul Walker -- 24 Letter from the people of Cyprus David Thomas.
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This book discusses the theological views of Abū Isḥāq al-Ṣaffār d. 534/1139), within the framework of his comments on the meanings of Allah's names, provided in his work titled Talkhīṣ al-adilla. Abū Isḥāq al-Ṣaffār is one of the Ḥanafite-Māturīdite scholars in the 6th/12th century. In his work titled Talkhīṣ al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd on kalām, he spared extensive space for al-asmāʾ al-husnā. Approximately one third of this work, published in two volumes, is devoted to al-asmāʾ al-husnā. An examination of the related section reveals that al-Ṣaffār explains many issues, particularly those related to the existence, unity and attributes of Allah, based on 175 al-asmāʾ al-husnā. He mentions some of the names that he does not include in the al-asmāʾ al-husnā section under separate headings. For example, the name al-Mutakallim is addressed within the context of the attribute of kalām and in relation to subjects, such as the khalq al-Qurʾān and i'jaz al-Qurʾān. Upon the addition of these names to the list, the number names reaches 178. This means that half of the work deals with the subject of al-asmāʾ al-husnā. al-Ṣaffār lists the divine names in alphabetical order and explains them semantically in the chapter of al-asmāʾ al-husnā. Then he goes on to clarify each divine name through a theological lens with a specific reference to the subject of kalām. In the pre-Saffar Ḥanafite-Māturīdite theological literature, there is no other work that addresses al-asmāʾ al-husnā in such an extensive way. This book consists of three main sections. The first section titled "Methodological Framework", elaborates on the focus, significance, purpose and method of the study, along with the sources used. The first part describes the political, social and religious status of Transoxiana (Mā-warāʾ al-Nahr) region and the cities of Bukhara and Marw, the sociocultural environment in which Saffar lived. The second chapter addresses various concepts, which promote the understanding of al-asmāʾ al-husnā, such as name, tasmiya, musammā, attribute and qualification in addition to the theological debates such as the number and iḥṣāʾ of al-asmāʾ al-husnā. Then, it provides information about the al-asmāʾ al-husnā literature produced in the pre- Ṣaffār period. The end of each chapter comes with a detailed table with the 178 divine names mentioned by al-Ṣaffār. In the third chapter, the author initially discusses the theological principles that al-Ṣaffār considered while explaining the essence of al-asmāʾ al-husnā. This section also determines and systematically categorizes the theological views and evaluations put forward by al-Ṣaffār while explaining the divine names in Talkhīṣ al-adilla. The tables with the divine names and the related discussions can be seen at the end of the discussion for each subject. The last section presents the conclusions reached, regarding the kalām method based on al-Ṣaffār's understanding of the essence of al-asmāʾ al-husnā. The present study revealed that he made theological interpretations in 75% of the al-asmāʾ al-husnā and interpreted all theological issues ranging from the subjects of knowledge and existence to the Afterlife in connection with the al-asmāʾ al-husnā. These results indicate that al-Ṣaffār's understanding of kalām is based on the interpretation of the divine names. ; Bu kitapta, Ebû İshâk es-Saffâr'ın (öl. 534/1139) kelâmî görüşleri, Telḫîṣü'l-edille li-ḳavâʿidi't-tevḥîd adlı eserinde Allah'ın isimlerinin anlamlarını açıklarken yaptığı yorumlar çerçevesinde ele alınmaktadır. Ebû İshâk es-Saffâr, 6./12. yüzyıl Hanefî-Mâtürîdî âlimlerinden biridir. Kelâma dair Telḫîṣü'l-edille eserinde esmâ-i hüsnâ konusuna ayrıntılı olarak yer vermektedir. İki cilt hâlinde yayımlanan bu eserin yaklaşık üçte birlik bir kısmını esmâ-i hüsnâ konusu oluşturmaktadır. Bu kısım incelendiğinde, Saffâr'ın Allah'ın varlığı, birliği ve sıfatları ile ilgili konular başta olmak üzere pek çok konuyu 175 esmâ-i hüsnâya dayanarak izah ettiği görülmektedir. O, esmâ-i hüsnâ bölümünde yer vermediği bazı isimlere ise müstakil başlıklar altında değinmektedir. Örneğin el-Mütekkelim ismi kelâm sıfatını bağlamında ve halku'l-Kur'ân ile icâz'ul-Kur'ân gibi konularla ilişkili bir şekilde ele almaktadır. Bu isimler de listeye dahil edildiğinde sayı 178'e ulaşmaktadır. Bu durumda eserin yarısını esmâ-i hüsnâ konusu teşkil etmektedir. Saffâr, esmâ-i hüsnâ bölümünde alfabetik bir sıra içerisinde ele aldığı ilâhî isimleri öncelikle lugavî (semantik) yönden izah etmektedir. Sonrasında ise değerlendirdiği ilahî ismi, bir kelâm konusu ile bağlantı kurarak kelâmî perspektifle açıklamaktadır Esmâ-i hüsnâ temelinde ele alınan konuların hilâfet meselesi hariç diğer kelâm bahislerini kapsadığı görülmektedir. Saffâr öncesi Hanefî-Mâtürîdî kelâm literatürü içinde esmâ-i hüsnânın bu kadar kapsamlı ele alındığı başka bir eser bilinmemektedir. Bu kitap; üç ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. "Metodolojik Çerçeve" başlıklı giriş bölümünde çalışmanın konusu, önemi, amacı, yöntemi ve kaynakları hakkında bilgi verilmiştir. Birinci bölümde Saffâr'ın yaşadığı sosyokültürel çevre olan Mâverâünnehir bölgesi ile Buhara ve Merv şehirlerinin siyasî, sosyal ve dinî durumu ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. İkinci bölümde esmâ-i hüsna konusunun anlaşılmasına temel oluşturan isim, tesmiye, müsemmâ, sıfat ve vasf gibi kavramlar ile esmâ-i hüsnânın sayısı ve ihsâsı gibi kelâmî tartışmalara değinilmiştir. Sonrasında Saffâr öncesi dönemde kaleme alınan esmâ-i hüsnâ litaratürü hakkında bilgi verilmiştir. Bölüm sonuna Saffâr'ın rivayet ettiği 178 ilahî isme dair ayrıntılı bir tablo eklenmiştir. Üçüncü bölümde öncelikle, Saffâr'ın esmâ-i hüsnâyı izah ederken dikkate aldığı kelâmî ilkeler tespit edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Sonrasında ise Saffâr'ın Telḫîṣü'l-edille'de ilâhî isimleri açıklarken ortaya koyduğu kelâmî görüş ve değerlendirmeler belirlenerek sistematik bir şekilde kategorize edilmiştir. Bu kapsamda ele alınan her konunun sonuna ilgili ilâhî isimleri ve bağlantılı olduğu tartışmaları içeren tablolar eklenmiştir. Sonuç bölümünde ise Saffâr'ın esmâ-i hüsnâ anlayışına dayanan kelâm yöntemine dair ulaştığımız sonuçlara yer verilmiştir. Bu kitapta onun, esmâ-i hüsnânın 'inde kelâmî yorumlarda bulunduğu ve bilgi-varlık bahsinden âhiret hayatına kadar bütün kelâm konularını esmâ-i hüsnâ ile bağlantılı yorumladığı tespit edilmiştir. Ulaşılan bu sonuçlar, Saffâr'ın kelâm anlayışının ilâhî isimlerin yorumuna dayandığını ortaya koymaktadır.
Introduction --. - 1. IBN KHALDUN'S 'ASABIYYA AND THE CYCLE OF FEAR. A Definition of 'Asabiyya and its Sectarian Dimension; How a Group Develops High 'Asabiyya; The Nature and Influence of a Group with High 'Asabiyya; How a Dynasty Maintains 'Asabiyya; Variables for the Success of a Dynasty; How a Group's 'Asabiyya Declines --. - 2. ORIGINS. Foundations of the Sect; Golden Period; Becoming Ibna' al-Jabal (Sons of the Mountain); Fatwas and Officialdom; Ottoman Rule: Continued Alawite Marginalization --. - 3. INTEGRATION. Saving Alawite 'Souls'; New Horizons; Resistance and Receptivity; Artificial Integration; Genuine Integration?; Independent Syria and the 'Problem' of Pluralism; Suspicions of Sectarianism; Alawites Ascendant --. - 4. APOGEE & DECLINE. Early Asad Rule; The Muslim Brotherhood Rebellion; The Hama Tragedy; The Spoils of Power; Struggle for the Asad Dynasty; The Alawite-Iranian Axis; Preparing for Succession --. - 5. RAPID DESCENT. A Modernising Reformer?; New Challenges; Losing Lebanon; Regime Consolidation and Isolation; Alawite Socio-Economic Conditions under Bashar al-Asad; The 'Precarious' Security of the Lebanese Alawites --. - 6. RUMBLINGS OF REVOLUTION. Regime Restoration; Elite Infighting; A Confident Bashar al-Asad; Rising Internal Challenges; A Rising Islamic Tide?; Integration at Last? --. - Conclusion --
Islamists in civil wars often prioritize their factional conflicts above the collective goals of their movements. They end up fighting and killing each other despite having mutual state adversaries and shared normative commitments. This reality raises an intriguing puzzle. How can Islamists justify fratricidal practices given the ubiquity of Quranic scripture and prophetic traditions that prevail upon them to unite and refrain from infighting. This article explores two religious narratives that rationalize violent infighting between Islamist factions. The Victorious Sect narrative depicts rival Islamist factions as insufficiently Islamic by harboring political pluralism and nationalism in their ideological platforms. These deviations from orthodoxy are proof of their ineligibility to lead the Islamist movement. The other narrative depicts rival factions as modern day Kharijites or Muslim extremists that must be repelled and driven out of the Islamist movement because they undermine its legitimacy. Although these narratives do not necessarily drive factional struggles for power, they are important because they rationalize and publicly justify the highly controversial act of Islamists killing one another in their quest for movement supremacy.
It was the second 'Abbãsid Caliph Abû Ja'far al-Mansûr, who was the first to formulate a complete, integrative ideological system about the sacredness of the caliphal institution and of the caliph himself. Unlike his predecessors, whether Rãshidis or Umayyads, whose caliphate had never been considered as a heavenly divine affair, Abu Ja'far wanted his one to be pertaining to the realm of religion, and his person as a caliph to be surrounded by an aura of holiness. To this effect, he incorporated in his ideological system diverse elements that had never been put together before. Religion-like claims, concepts of a mythical nature and inherited ancient Arab traditions were combined together to incubate his theory about the caliphate. Although this was intended primarily to inhance his legitimacy in ruling and confronting his antagonists of the different colors and sects, this ideological system initiated by al-Mansûr found its way into some aspects of the political Islamic thought in which the caliphal institution has been by and large one of the religious terms and concepts that strongly echoes Abû Ja'far's opinions.
