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Despite major changes in the system of international relations andsecurity, states are still the main actor, and hence it seems that the essence ofinternational relations today is not much changed. As the main feature of the system ofinternational relations remains constant anarchy despite the significant scale of the use ofinternational law. In order t o d etermine w hether a narchy i s s till p resent a nd l iving i ninternational relations in this article analyzes the ruling of the International Court of Justicein the case of Macedonia against Greece, adopted on 05.12.2011, as a legal act of theinstitution established by the United Nations. By defining the concept of anarchy ininternational relations and presenting a brief history of the dispute and the positions of thetwo countries, this article presents the judgment and analysis of its essence and meaning.Noting the reactions of the States parties concerned in the dispute, as well as significantactors (NATO, EU) included in the dispute, this article essentially analyzes the importanceand impact of the judgment, as a response indicator and the main thesis of the presence ofanarchy in today's international system relations. Analyzing the meaning of the judgment inthis paper comes to the conclusion that anarchy and free will of the activity of states in thesystem of international relations are still present, clearing space to create different policiesand security challenges and uncertainties.

The lines between conventional and unconventional conflicts become blurred. Alongside non-international and international conflicts, a third category of armed conflict is emerging: hybrid, asymmetric, and transnational conflicts which involve state and non-state actors whose legal status and classification is disputed.[1] While it's a blend of traditional and irregular tactics, hybrid warfare makes use of a wide range of tools: military and civilian; conventional and unconventional. Hybrid warfare was linked almost exclusively with non-state actors. Afterwards the concept of hybrid warfare developed in a way that is now commonly accepted to describe the interplay between conventional and unconventional means used also by governments and regular armies. For such emerging conflicts/warfare there is no legal definition, therefore leaving room for interpretation and applicable law. International law (IL) and international humanitarian law (IHL) – in particular the law of war (Geneva and Hague law) – apply in case of armed conflict. The law of war, a branch of public international law, sets the acceptable justifications to engage in war (jus ad bellum) and the limits to acceptable wartime conduct (jus in bello). The law of war regulates inter alia: declaration of war; acceptance of surrender and the treatment of prisoners of war; military necessity, along with distinction and proportionality; and the prohibition of certain weapons that may cause unnecessary suffering. [1] For a definition of the term hybrid conflict, see: Gray, C.S. (2005). Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. ; This study was supported by the European Social Fund (FSE) and by the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT), Portugal, under research grant No. SFRH/BD/136170/2018. Abstract presented at the Unequal World Conference on Human Development in the context of Current Global Challenges, held virtually in New York on 28-29 September 2020, organized by the Unequal World Research Center in partnership with ...

This is the first time in its history, to the best of my knowledge, that the International Court of Justice has established violations of the two human rights treaties at issue, together, namely, at universal level, the 1966 UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and, at regional level, the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, both in the framework of the universality of human rights.This is the opening paragraph of Judge Cançado Trindade's Separate Opinion in the Diallo case. The ICJ's judgment is a remarkable decision contributing to the widening and deepening of international law and has consequences for several fundamental questions, including the role of the ICJ and international law in making human rights effective, erga omnes and jus cogens rules, customary law, evidence, and several substantive rules. In bringing the transformation of international law one step further, the Diallo judgment develops the ICJ as 'the principal judicial organ of the United Nations'1 at the top of an open international law system. To achieve this, the Court had to overcome a series of jurisdictional and procedural hurdles.2 All the permanent judges of the ICJ agreed that Congo had violated the prohibition on arbitrary detention and expulsion and that the violations gave rise to a right of compensation. The ICJ's use of sources from other international and regional bodies as sources of authority, indicates solutions to fragmentation problems.

On September 19, 1910, at The Hague, plenipotentiaries of the following nations: Germany, United States of America, Argentine Republic, Austria-Hungary, Chile, Denmark, Spain, France, Great Britain, Japan, Norway, Netherlands and Sweden, signed an instrument entitled Protocole Additionnel á la Convention XII de la Haye du 18 Octobre, 1907. The protocol is by its own provisions (Art. 8) to be considered as forming an integral part of the Convention creating the International Court of Prize; and the acceptance of the protocole additionnel is likewise made a sine qua non to the acceptance of the original convention.The protocole additionnel seeks to create a different remedy and a modified procedure par dérogation to Articles 28 (paragraph one), 29 and 45 (paragraph two) of the Prize Court Convention and by eliminating Article 8 of the convention entirely and substituting therefor a method preserving the appearance of an action de novo in the International Court and confining its judgment to the ascertainment of the damages to be allowed an injured claimant. It is the practical embodiment of the voeu adopted by the London Naval Conference in 1909 at the instance of the delegation of the United States (acting under instructions from their government); and is intended to offer a means whereby certain nations named as parties to the protocol may obviate constitutional difficulties in the way of their ratifying the original convention.

On November 17, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the following Resolution:"The General Assembly,Considering Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations,Considering the exchange of views which has taken place in the Security Council at its Two hundred and fourth, Two hundred and fifth and Two hundred and sixth Meetings, relating to the admission of certain States to membership in the United Nations,Considering Article 96 of the Charter,Requests the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on the following question:Is a Member of the United Nations which is called upon, in virtue of Article 4 of the Charter, to pronounce itself by its vote, either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, on the admission of a State to membership in the United Nations, juridically entitled to make its consent to the admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided by paragraph 1 of the said Article? In particular, can such a Member, while it recognizes the conditions set forth in that provision to be fulfilled by the State concerned, subject its affirmative vote to the additional condition that other States be admitted to membership in the United Nations together with that State?Instructs the Secretary-General to place at the disposal of the Court the records of the above-mentioned meetings of the Security Council."

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