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The article considers legal principles of regulation for relations of guardianship, care and adoption in international family law, the regulation of these forms of arranging children in law and their interpretation in the legal doctrine of certain foreign states, the definition of features and peculiarities of these concepts, the definition of relations in this field, as well as formulation of conclusions and proposals aimed at harmonization of national legislation with the law of leading foreign states.

Legal grounds for the regulation of the relations of guardianship, care and adoption in the legislation of some foreign countries shows that there are different legislative approaches to the regulation of such forms of placement of children. Historical, religious, national factors, elements of tradition and culture – all these factors significantly affect the substantive content of the essential traits of care, and adoption in different countries.

At the same time, the basic provisions of such institutions are unchanged – both guardianship and adoption are intended to promote the upbringing and development of the child, to guarantee the exercise of their rights and legitimate interests, to ensure their care and custody.

Custody relations are regulated both on the basis of conflict law rules and in accordance with substantive rules of private international law. For example, in Ukraine the establishment and cancellation of custody of minors, disable persons are regulated by the personal law of the ward. The obligation of the guardian to accept guardianship is determined by the personal law of the person appointed by the guardian. The relationship between the guardian and the person under guardianship is determined by the law of the state the body of which appointed the guardian.

The regulation of relations for international adoption is subject to conflict of law rules. In Ukraine, adoption and its abolition are governed by the child's personal law and by the adopter's personal law. A person's ability to be an adopter is determined in accordance with his or her personal law. The legal consequences of adoption or termination are determined by the personal law of the adopter.
One of the areas of state activity regarding adoption should be effective monitoring and control over the processes of adoption including the participation of foreign entities as well as the further upbringing, care and observance of the rights and interests of children who have been adopted by foreigners.

This paper expands the micro-foundations of the traditional greed and grievance non-cooperative model of civil conflict between a government and a rebel group. First, the paper's model allows for greed and grievance to be orthogonal, so that they may affect each other. Second, the model allows for the reaction curves of both parties in non-cooperative games to be substitutes and not inevitably complementary. Third, the paper allows for Diaspora transfers to rebel groups. Fourth, the paper expands external aid in the form of fungible financing of government transfers 'buying' peace. These extensions provide a better understanding of conflict persistence, the consequences of competing international aid and why sub-optimal sanctions provision ('cheap talk') by the international community are frequent.

As global interdependence grows, states often use international organizations to achieve both domestic and foreign policy goals. One way states respond to demands for cooperation is to delegate to international organizations and private actors. In this article, we use new data spanning a century of international environmental law to understand when and why states delegate to international organizations to manage environmental problems. We find that delegation is a persistent phenomenon that facilitates the implementation of states' preferences. However, they make this decision with care: States tend to delegate functions with lower sovereignty costs, such as implementation and monitoring, but rarely delegate rule making and enforcement. We also find that heterogeneous preferences among states increases the likelihood of delegation. Overall, our results suggest that states seek to delegate out of a motivation both to reduce transaction costs and to establish credible commitments.

AbstractInternational 'naming and shaming' campaigns rely on domestic civil society organizations (CSOs) for information on local human rights conditions. To stop this flow of information, some governments restrict CSOs, for example by limiting their access to funding. Do such restrictions reduce international naming and shaming campaigns that rely on information from domestic CSOs? This article argues that on the one hand, restrictions may reduce CSOs' ability and motives to monitor local abuses. On the other hand, these organizations may mobilize against restrictions and find new ways of delivering information on human rights violations to international publics. Using a cross-national dataset and in-depth evidence from Egypt, the study finds that low numbers of restrictions trigger shaming by international non-governmental organizations. Yet once governments impose multiple types of restrictions, it becomes harder for CSOs to adapt, resulting in fewer international shaming campaigns.