International audience ; [The specifics of the Lebanese state to officially hold multireligious character of this country, with a system of representative democracy taking it into account. Examination of geodemographic context then raises questions about possible unit features justifying the national character of this Mediterranean country. Although the analysis led to advocate a true Lebanese sovereignty, the latter is in an international and domestic context marked by constant and trends which impact on the Lebanese political balance.] ; Les spécificités de l'État libanais tiennent au caractère officiellement pluriconfessionnel de ce pays, avec un système de démocratie représentative le prenant en compte. L'examen du contexte géodémographique permet ensuite de s'interroger sur les éventuels traits unitaires justifiant le caractère national de cet État méditerranéen. Même si l'analyse conduit à plaider en faveur d'une véritable souveraineté libanaise, cette dernière se situe dans un contexte international et interne marqué par des constantes et des évolutions exerçant des effets sur les équilibres politiques libanais.
International audience ; [The specifics of the Lebanese state to officially hold multireligious character of this country, with a system of representative democracy taking it into account. Examination of geodemographic context then raises questions about possible unit features justifying the national character of this Mediterranean country. Although the analysis led to advocate a true Lebanese sovereignty, the latter is in an international and domestic context marked by constant and trends which impact on the Lebanese political balance.] ; Les spécificités de l'État libanais tiennent au caractère officiellement pluriconfessionnel de ce pays, avec un système de démocratie représentative le prenant en compte. L'examen du contexte géodémographique permet ensuite de s'interroger sur les éventuels traits unitaires justifiant le caractère national de cet État méditerranéen. Même si l'analyse conduit à plaider en faveur d'une véritable souveraineté libanaise, cette dernière se situe dans un contexte international et interne marqué par des constantes et des évolutions exerçant des effets sur les équilibres politiques libanais.
International audience ; [The specifics of the Lebanese state to officially hold multireligious character of this country, with a system of representative democracy taking it into account. Examination of geodemographic context then raises questions about possible unit features justifying the national character of this Mediterranean country. Although the analysis led to advocate a true Lebanese sovereignty, the latter is in an international and domestic context marked by constant and trends which impact on the Lebanese political balance.] ; Les spécificités de l'État libanais tiennent au caractère officiellement pluriconfessionnel de ce pays, avec un système de démocratie représentative le prenant en compte. L'examen du contexte géodémographique permet ensuite de s'interroger sur les éventuels traits unitaires justifiant le caractère national de cet État méditerranéen. Même si l'analyse conduit à plaider en faveur d'une véritable souveraineté libanaise, cette dernière se situe dans un contexte international et interne marqué par des constantes et des évolutions exerçant des effets sur les équilibres politiques libanais.
International audience ; [The specifics of the Lebanese state to officially hold multireligious character of this country, with a system of representative democracy taking it into account. Examination of geodemographic context then raises questions about possible unit features justifying the national character of this Mediterranean country. Although the analysis led to advocate a true Lebanese sovereignty, the latter is in an international and domestic context marked by constant and trends which impact on the Lebanese political balance.] ; Les spécificités de l'État libanais tiennent au caractère officiellement pluriconfessionnel de ce pays, avec un système de démocratie représentative le prenant en compte. L'examen du contexte géodémographique permet ensuite de s'interroger sur les éventuels traits unitaires justifiant le caractère national de cet État méditerranéen. Même si l'analyse conduit à plaider en faveur d'une véritable souveraineté libanaise, cette dernière se situe dans un contexte international et interne marqué par des constantes et des évolutions exerçant des effets sur les équilibres politiques libanais.
The situation along the Lebanese-Israeli front continues to escalate as Hezbollah and the Israeli military intensify cross-border operations. Despite the escalation, the Lebanese Shiite movement's strategy appears unchanged — to force Israel to divert substantial military forces from its Gaza offensive against Hamas without provoking a full-blown war with the Jewish state. Against this backdrop, Hezbollah's stance ironically appears to align with the Biden administration's goal of preventing a wider conflict as Israel continues its campaign against the Palestinian movement in Gaza.A new phase of escalation on the Lebanese-Israeli frontTensions between Hezbollah and Israel have peaked following an Israeli airstrike that targeted a civilian car in south Lebanon. The November 5 attack, which Human Rights Watch denounced as "an apparent war crime," led to the death of a woman and her three grandchildren, prompting retaliation from Hezbollah that led to the death of one Israeli civilian near the northern town of Kiryat Shmona. That incident marked the first time the Lebanese movement appeared to deliberately target Israeli civilians in this latest round of cross-border fighting.The situation has sharply escalated since then, with Israel bombing a hospital in the southern Lebanese town of Mays Aljabal, leaving one person wounded. Hezbollah meanwhile carried out a -border missile attack that left over 20 people wounded, including at least seven Israeli soldiers.The Lebanese Shiite movement's leader Hasan Nasrallah meanwhile announced that Hezbollah has upped the tempo and tactics of its cross-border operations. In his second address since the beginning of the war in Gaza, Nasrallah declared last Saturday that the Shiite movement has raised the level of its military action "in terms of the number of operations, targets and the type of weapons." This, he explained, included the use for the first time of "Burkan" missiles which have a higher explosive impact, in addition to suicide drones.Nasrallah stops short of declaring warImportantly Hezbollah's leader, while announcing the escalation at the tactical and tempo levels, did not declare a change to the movement's overall strategy since the beginning of the conflict in Gaza. This strategy, as explained by Nasrallah himself in his previous speech, aims to overstretch the Israeli army by forcing it to divert military resources towards the Lebanese front, thereby preventing Israel from using its full military power to destroy Hamas. Discussing the overall situation on the Lebanese-Israeli front, he stated that "this front would remain active."Nasrallah's apparent reluctance to open a major new front with Israel is consistent with his general strategy of not initiating conflict. Following the July 2006 war, he famously stated that he would not have authorized the capture of two Israeli soldiers, which initiated the conflict, had he known it would lead to war on Lebanon itself.Sources close to the Lebanese movement emphasize that preventing a new Israeli war on Lebanon is a major factor in its approach to the current conflict in Gaza."Hezbollah will not drag Lebanon into a destructive war unless Israel imposes such a war," explained one source close to Hezbollah who spoke on condition of anonymity. According to a second source who also enjoys close ties to Hezbollah's leadership, the movement's posture proves it places a high priority on Lebanon's national interests. "Hezbollah is behaving as a Lebanese rational actor that attaches great importance to Lebanese national interests," he stressed.This argument serves to counter the image of Hezbollah as a proxy of Iran. Both Lebanese and foreign critics of the movement depict it in such a manner, but the movement itself rejects this characterization, insisting instead that Tehran plays a mere supportive role.While Hezbollah has previously hinted that a Hamas defeat would be a red line that would provoke a more aggressive approach against Israel, Nasrallah appeared to pin his hopes on growing international pressures to prevent such a scenario. "We see thousands of people in Washington, New York, London and Paris protesting against Israel" he stated, adding that support by Western governments for Israel's ongoing war in Gaza was declining.The Lebanese Shiite movement also appears aware of the danger of Israel dragging the United States into a broader regional conflict. According to the first source, Hezbollah, as things stand, will not engage in any actions that would be understood as a declaration of war that would permit Israel to fulfill its longstanding dream of forcing the United States into a larger war against Israel's regional enemies. "There are American military assets and aircraft carriers deployed in the region" he emphasized, warning that this "increases the danger of Israel dragging the U.S. into a regional war."Israel escalates its threats against LebanonSenior Israeli officials meanwhile have threatened Lebanon with a Gaza-like scenario. Following Nasrallah's latest speech, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant warned that Hezbollah was playing a dangerous game that could elicit a devastating response."What we can do in Gaza, we can also do in Beirut," he asserted during a tour of the Israeli northern front.Such statements, in addition to Israeli military action on the Lebanese front, appear to have sparked new fears in Washington. According to media reports released immediately following Gallant's remarks, U.S. Secretary of Défense Lloyd Austin expressed his concerns regarding Israeli escalation against Lebanon during a phone conversation with his Israeli counterpart.Concerns over broader escalation reflect the Biden administration's policy of preventing a widening of the conflict in Gaza to Lebanon and elsewhere in the region. Biden's senior adviser for energy and infrastructure Amos Hochstein recently visited Beirut where he held talks with high-ranking officials that focused on preventing a spillover of the conflict into Lebanon.Austin is better placed than most in the current American administration in understanding the potentially catastrophic repercussions of full-scale war on the Lebanese-Israeli front. Having served as both head of U.S. forces in Iraq and the region more broadly as head of U.S. Central Command, the Pentagon chief is no doubt well acquainted with the significant clout Hezbollah enjoys with regional players like the Houthis in Yemen and Shiite armed groups in Iraq.Nasrallah himself alluded to this, stating that operations targeting U.S. military assets and personnel launched from Iraq and Yemen would stop if Washington pressured Israel into halting its offensive in Gaza. "If you Americans want to stop these operations, you must stop the war in Gaza," he declared.Viewed against this backdrop, Hezbollah's leader was effectively sending a message to Washington offering to rein in his allies in Yemen and Iraq if the Biden administration would do the same with its Israeli ally.The U.S. administration also appears to fear being dragged by Israel into a broader regional war. According to Joshua Landis, the head of Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma and a non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute, concerns regarding escalation on the Lebanese front stem from fears that Israel may seek to ignite the situation there as international pressures increase for a cease-fire."Biden has compromised the U.S. position through his outright support for Israel's objectives," he said in an interview with RS, adding that "Austin and other senior officials may be concerned that Israel will take this as a green light to widen the conflict which would endanger U.S. troops." Some U.S. bases in Syria and Iraq have come under increased rocket and missile fire from pro-Iranian Iraqi Shi'a militias since the launch of Israel's offensive in Gaza and elsewhere in the region.
The starting question underlying this thesis is "What is so deep about deeply divided societies?2" The "deeply divided societies" paradigm emerged during the 20th century as a depiction of societies considered as fragmented and in need of a certain diagnostic for them to be able to live peacefully and with no constant fighting. For those societies to achieve peaceful coexistence, the diagnostic has been, until now, implementing a consociational model of governance, implying power-sharing among the segments of society and/or formerly belligerent factions. However, why are some societies depicted as deeply divided, while others are not, although they share – obviously each within its own context – the same factors and dynamics implying deep division as prescribed by the paradigm? Moreover, where does the scientific literature put the threshold for considering a group of people as deeply divided, knowing of course that conflicts exist in every part of society, from the family unit up to state institutions? Our focus for this thesis will be Lebanon. Our choice stems from two main reasons. The first being that Lebanon, in the political science literature, is depicted as an interesting case of deeply divided society, with, for some authors, a functioning consociational model that is successfully managing societal disruptions, and able to settle conflicts between sectarian groups in Lebanon, while for other authors consociationalism has failed to develop into a fully-fledged democratic model. The second reason is, as mentioned in the above paragraph, the blurry definition and conceptualization revolving around the "deeply divided societies" paradigm. Since no threshold seems to be able to set a clear definition of the paradigm, the idea remains very shallow. Arbitrarily categorizing a handful of countries and societies as deeply divided and not others, although they share very "similar" characteristics, seems quite a far-fetched problematic. Insights from Lebanon reveal some interesting dimensions as per the "deeply divided societies" paradigm: no one actually seems in bad terms with the other, or hates the other. To put it in a simple way: if a Christian is asked about Muslims in the country, the answer would be far from expressing hostility. On the contrary, the questioned person will clearly show indifference regarding the other's sect (Majed, 2021). If so, then what is really "deep" about the so-called division? What differentiates it from other normal divisions of any society? Another rationale behind this work is the latest uprising that started in 2019 in Iraq and Lebanon. In the societies depicted as "deeply divided", light is always shed on identity-based cleavages (sect-based identities, or sometimes in Iraq a mix of ethnic and sectarian related identities (Kurds - Sunni muslims - Shi'a muslims)), even at a time when social and economic demands are taken at the forefront of country-wide protests (Majed, 2019). In the Lebanese case, it is indeed the economic reality which constituted the main drive of the uprising. Firstly, most of the protesters belonged to a 16 to 25 years old age range. They belonged mostly to popular classes with relatively low monthly incomes and are vulnerable to any eventual shocks due to their precarious situation (Bou Khater and Majed, 2020: 11). In addition to that, the interview sample clearly pointed out the dire economic situation pushing them to be part of the uprising. Secondly, protesters belonged to different geographical areas, and protests were not only focused in the capital Beirut (unlike for example other contemporary uprisings as the "You Stink" movement in 2015 for instance). Naturally, major Cazas (districts) such as Tripoli or Beirut attracted more protesters due to their size, but the other regions were equally "represented" (Bou Khater and Majed, 2020: 10). This geographical representation in the whole country brings some doubts about what the "deeply divided society" paradigm implies. How is the Lebanese society so deeply divided then if all of its social components, and especially its youth, rallied around the same socio-economic demands, and to a certain extent, political demands? Although these are preliminary questions – and cannot lead to any conclusion whatsoever in this promptness – they invite us to re-question the aforementioned paradigm. As per the paradigm itself, does deeply divided societies imply as their core element pretending divisiveness, identities as they are? Or does it imply the polarization of identities? Imagining a causal chain leading to a deeply divided society is in fact quite a difficult task to achieve; for a society to achieve a great step towards divisiveness suggests a model of society where each group does not/cannot face the other directly. Here comes the role of the institutional arrangements where the consociational model of governance lies. Its role is appeasing these tensions and paving the way to a more peaceful and integrated society. As shown by many scholarly studies, diversity does not form an obstacle to democracy (Fearon, 2004; Fish and Brooks, 2004: 162). In addition to that, it is argued that all civil conflicts share more or less the same underlying economic reasons, while the ethnic/religious aspect becomes relevant in the war's aftermath. If so, why did only a certain sample of countries/societies receive the "deeply divided society" description, and others not? Put differently, why is the emphasis on certain cleavages focal for certain societies and not others? Is it truly because these societies do have particularities, or because the religious cleavage is maintained at the forefront of the analyses and descriptions? It is noteworthy to mention that many defenders and sympathizers of the consociational model of government have been advising policy-makers on many issues, be it at the United Nations, on Northern Ireland, Cyprus, South Africa or Iraq. We consider such recommendations as erroneous and inaccurate, since the description of the conflicts and of their aftermath is often – if not always – misleading, by putting forward the parameters and factors that are only relevant for the consociationalists. In this sense, policymakers, consultants and other "weighty" bodies are not remedying the source of the problem, but are rather enforcing and anchoring it (Majed, 2017). This Master's thesis presents itself as an alternative exploratory roadmap to the study of what is usually presented as "deeply divided societies". It will explore the Lebanese case – which is usually presented as a deeply divided society – and will try, through an attempt at clarifying definitions, and a qualitative-historical analysis, to put into question the rigid idea of the aforementioned paradigm. The study will do so by questioning the traditionally used paradigm, and by inverting the variables of study by defining sectarianism as the dependent variable, rather than the explanatory one, as usually done to describe Middle Eastern societies (Ghosn and Parkinson, 2019: 494). In order to set the frame of the work, it is worth noting what lies in the debate around "disciplinarians" and "area specialists" on the notion of sectarianism, since this thesis fits exactly in this middle ground: "While the former, lack "conceptual sophistication and methodological rigor", favor "description over explanation", and have "no interest in parsimony and generalizations", the latter are "engaging in sterile conceptual and abstract theoretical debates providing little real insight into complex behavioral patterns" (Valbjørn, 2021: 4).
This study aims to determine the effect of Zakah Infaq Shadaqah (ZIS) funds channeled by the National Amil Zakat Agency/Badan Amil Zakat Nasional (BAZNAS) on unemployment in Indonesia during 2002-2017. The study was conducted using a quantitative approach. The control variables used for this research are Gross Domestic Product (GDP), education level, investment, and government subsidies. The analysis technique used is Autoregressive Ditributed Lags (ARDL). The data in this study were obtained from the Central Statistics Agency page, BAZNAS, and Indonesian State Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara). The research results partially in short term shows that ZIS has a positive and significant effect on unemployment. While partially long-term research results, ZIS has a negative and significant effect on unemployment. Simultaneously, the variable ZIS, GDP, education level, investment, and government subsidies have significant effects in the short and long term on unemployment in Indonesia in 2002-2017.Keywords: Zakat, Infaq, Shadaqah, Unemployment, Gross Domestic Product, Education Level, Investment, Subsidies, BAZNASREFFERENCE Abdullah, M. dan Sapiei, N. S. (2018). Do religiosity, gender and educational background influence zakat compliance? The case of Malaysia. International Journal of Social Economics, 45(8), 1250-1264.Al-Arif, M. N. R. (2010). Efek pengganda zakat serta implikasinya terhadap program pengentasan kemiskinan. Jurnal Ekbisi Fakultas Syariah UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, 5(1), 42-49.Al-Qardhawi, Y. (2011). Fiqh Al-Zakah (Volume 1). Jeddah: King Abudulaziz University.______________. (2011). Fiqh Al-Zakah (Volume 2). Jeddah: King Abudulaziz University.An-Nabhani. (2004). An-Nizham Al-Iqtishadi fi al-Islam, Cetakan VI. Beirut: Darul Ummah.Anshori, M. dan Iswati, S. (2009). Metodologi penelitian kuantitatif. Surabaya: Airlangga University Press.Badan Pusat Statistik. (2018). Keadaan ketenagakerjaan Indonesia Agustus 2018. Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik.Handoko, R. dan Patriadi, P. (2005). Evaluasi Kebijakan Subsidi Non BBM. Kajian Ekonomi dan Keuangan, 9(4), 42-64.Jalaludin, H. (2017). Filsafat pendidikan Islam dari zaman ke zaman. Jakarta: Rajawali Pers.Karim, A. A. (2014). Ekonomi Makro Islami. Jakarta: Rajawali Pers.Kurniawan, A. B. (2014). Analisis pengaruh pertumbuhan ekonomi, upahminimum, dan investasi terhadap jumlah pengangguran di KabupatenGresik. Jurnal Ilmiah Mahasiswa FEB. Malang: Universitas Brawijaya.Kurniawati, L. (2017). Dampak penurunan subsidi bahan bakar minyak: analisis sistem neraca sosial ekonomi Indonesia. Jurnal Info Artha, 1(2), 91-110.Mariyanti, T. dan Mahfudz, A. A. (2016). Dynamic circular causation model in poverty alleviation: Empirical evidence from Indonesia. Humanomics, 32(3), 275-299.Nasrullah, M. (2016). Peran zakat sebagai pendorong multiplier ekonomi. Jurnal Hukum Islam, 8(1), 108-119. Nasution, dkk. (2015). Pengenalan eksklusif ekonomi Islam. Jakarta: Prenadamedia Group.Sukirno, S. (2000). Makro ekonomi modern. Jakarta: Penerbit PT Raja Grafindo Persada. ________. (2006). Makroekonomi teori pengantar. Jakarta: PT Raja Grafindo Persada.Sulaiman, A. S. J. (2015). An empirical study on the influence of Islamic values in poverty alleviation. Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business Research, 6(2), 222-243.Swaramarinda, D. R. (2014). Analisis dampak pengangguran terhadap kemiskinan di DKI Jakarta. Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis (JPEB), 2(2), 63-70.Tambunan, T. (2001). Perdagangan internasional dan neraca pembayaran. Cetakan Pertama. Jakarta: LPFE-UI.Weber, B. A. (2002). The link between unemployment and returns to education: evidence from 14 European countries. Education + Training, 44(4/5), 171-178.Zhang, H., A, R., dan Zhong, Q. (2019). Anti-corruption, government subsidies, and investment efficiency. China Journal of Accounting Research, 12(1), 113-133.
In Not Done With Life Yet, Wafa Darwish muses on major stops along the road of her life in Palestine and abroad. At first impression, the book may seem to be an ordinary tale of an ordinary woman: A young child grows up in Jerusalem, spends her school years in Ramallah, moves to Beirut for college, and becomes a woman, mother, lecturer. On careful reading, however, Darwish's extraordinary persona shines through. Considering critical eras in the personal history of Darwish, the narrative also touches on a collective history of the region: Palestine, Lebanon, and Egypt are among the countries where Darwish strove to grow roots and find normalcy. Slowly, massive layers peel off to reveal the fight that Darwish had to lead against disability, oppression, and many strings of loss and longing. It traces a humane experience of life, spanning from ordinary childhood situations, infatuations, and merriment to major losses and injustices. There are many challenges to overcome in a journey of growth that takes place in a region that is never stable or peaceful. The opening chapters offer a window into the old city of Jerusalem and find a child born into a torn house to divorced parents. Walking through the book, the reader grows close to the author, feeling the first pangs of loss, realizing that Darwish is gradually losing not only her homes and homeland to occupation but also her eyesight, a main means by which we survive. But life carries on with more surprises for both protagonist and reader. The book sorts through chapters in the history of a family that is at war with belonging: Jerusalem is an occupied city in which the Darwish family fights not only for physical space but also for joy in long nights of hospitable summers. Readers lose and find themselves the same way the author does, gliding to a possibility of a brighter end as the fight for life continues and the author's thirst for a middle ground has not been fully realized. As the years pass, readers rest with Darwish as she contemplates the breeze blowing from the window by her daughter's bedside, an alternative middle ground. Within the journey, one can feel the strength of the woman Darwish has become within the whirlwind of political and personal turbulence. Even though Darwish is not a typical, traditional Palestinian woman, she radiates strength and nationalism, evident in the many sacrifices she's made to survive divorces, death, and the side effects of war. Far from the classic romanticization frequently associated with writings about Palestine, and far from political diction and jargon, the book is written in a simple manner, narrated as if spoken, and packed with action and movement. There's a whiff of every place: the reader can smell the jasmine of summer and taste the mujadara made for friends in Lebanon. Despite extensive losses, bitterness rarely exists, and the tone of the writing tends to be lighthearted, at times even funny. Wafa Darwish made me laugh and cry; and by the way she combs disasters with the back of her hand and walks on, not done with life yet, she makes me realize what a Palestinian woman is.
Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM) ; La tendance des Libanais à émigrer remonte à plusieurs siècles et les départs définitifs ou temporaires font partie du quotidien. Toutefois, certaines périodes ont connu une intensification de ces mouvements touchant l'ensemble des résidents, toutes régions et toutes catégories sociales confondues. Dans ce rapport, nous nous proposons d'étudier le phénomène d'émigration des jeunes Libanais au cours des dernières vagues d'émigration. A cette fin et en l'absence de statistiques officielles, nous nous baserons entièrement sur les deux enquêtes nationales réalisées par l'Observatoire universitaire de la réalité socio-économique (OURSE) de l'Université Saint-Joseph de Beyrouth. La première section compare les caractéristiques sociodémographiques et occupationnelles de la population jeune résidente et émigrée. Dans la seconde partie, les attitudes des jeunes Libanais face à l'émigration ainsi que leur dispersion dans le monde sont analysées dans le détail. Les résultats mettent en exergue l'importance de l'émigration des jeunes, leurs projets de mobilité, leur perception de l'émigration et l'attitude de la collectivité quant à ce phénomène. Il semble que l'émigration, présente depuis longtemps dans la société libanaise, a tendance à s'accentuer et s'étendre à l'ensemble des couches sociales. Par ailleurs, les opportunités du marché du travail local semblent constituer le principal régulateur de l'intensité de l'émigration. Toutefois, les stratégies de départ et les opportunités du marché international du travail ne sont pas pour autant envisagées dans une perspective de rupture avec le pays d'origine. La raison du départ serait financière, mais la période de l'exil est déterminée et non définitive. Par ailleurs, malgré l'impact économique des remises d'épargne, l'émigration des jeunes est vécue par les familles au Liban et par la société dans son ensemble comme un fléau et de nombreuses voix se sont élevées dans le débat public pour en dénoncer les conséquences, provenant aussi bien des responsables politiques que des communautés religieuses et des médias. Abstract Attitudes to emigration have ancient roots in Lebanon. Indeed, leaving the country permanently or temporarily has long been part of Lebanese life. However, emigration flows have been more intense during certain periods involving the whole population regardless of social class and place of residence. This research report looks at recent patterns of youth emigration from Lebanon. Given the lack of official statistics for this phenomenon, this study is based on two national surveys carried out by the Observatoire universitaire de la réalité socio-économique (OURSE) of the St. Joseph University (USJ) in Beirut. In the first part of the report, the socio-demographic characteristics as well as the employment conditions of the young resident population and their emigrant peers will be compared. The second part will deal, instead, with the attitudes of young Lebanese nationals towards migration. The results highlight the plans of the young and the attitude towards migration found in Lebanese society. Furthermore, it emerges that younger emigration flows have been growing in recent years, responding to a lack of employment opportunities at home. However, emigration has not been perceived as a definitive separation from Lebanon, since migratory projects have often been temporary. From the point of view of the families left behind and the whole of Lebanese society, the continuous emigration of younger Lebanese migrants is a big loss, which is only partly counter-balanced by remittances.
The myth that the Palestinian exodus of 1948 was triggered by orders from the Arab leaders——a cornerstone of the official Israeli version of the 1948 war and intended to absolve it of responsibility for the refugee problem——dies hard. Thus, it continues to be deployed by apologists for Israel as a means of blaming the Palestinians for their own fate. Even Benny Morris, one of whose major conclusions in his 1986 The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem was to discredit the Israeli claim, cannot seem to let go of it completely. Thus, the conclusion of the substantially revised update of the book, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (2004), states that although the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) and the local National Committees made efforts to block the exodus of army-aged males, ""at the same time, they actively promoted the depopulation of villages and towns. Many thousands of Arabs——women, children, and old people……left, well before battle was joined, as a result of advice and orders from local Arab commanders and officials……. Indeed, already months before the war the Arab states and the AHC had endorsed the removal of dependents from active and potential combat zones……. There can be no exaggerating the importance of these early, Arab-initiated evacuations in the demoralization, and eventual exodus, of the remaining rural and urban populations"" (pp. 589––90). Given the endurance of this central plank of the Israeli doctrine of 1948, JPS has decided to reprint for the first time a difficult-to-obtain article published in July 1959 by Walid Khalidi in a long-defunct periodical of the American University of Beirut (AUB), Middle East Forum. Entitled ""Why Did the Palestinians Leave? An Examination of the Zionist Version of the Exodus of '48,"" the article was based on a talk Professor Khalidi gave at AUB earlier that year. After tracing the origins and first appearance of the Zionist claim, the article, using AHC and Arab League archival material, Arab and Palestinian press releases and reports, Arab and Haganah radio broadcasts, and other Arab and Israeli sources exhaustively rebuts the claim through showing both what the broadcasts did not say and what they did say. JPS is reprinting the article as is. While the July 1959 article debunks the myth using documents at the national or Arab level, a second article by Professor Khalidi published in December 1959, ""The Fall of Haifa,"" touches on the Arab orders at the local level, an issue equally emphasized by Morris. The article, also published in the Middle East Forum, puts the exodus from the city after the Haganah offensive that led to its capture in April 1948 within the overall military context: Anglo-Zionist collusion, the balance of power, and so on. The article also deals directly with the orders and reproduces the texts of the eleven communiquéés issued by the Haifa National Committee between the UN General Assembly partition decision (November 1947) and the fall of Haifa in April, all of which have bearing on the subject. JPS is reproducing these pages as an appendix but intends to publish ""The Fall of Haifa"" in its entirety at a later date.
" La guerre, la ville et l'économie " est un titre qui fait un " clin d'œil " au célèbre ouvrage de Jean-Louis Dufour : La guerre, la ville et le soldat. Questionner le lien entre guerre et économie au prisme du cas particulier des villes en guerre permet de procéder à un changement d'échelles : si de nombreux travaux analysent les liens entre guerre et économie à l'échelle de l'Etat qui finance la guerre (en particulier dans le cas des opérations extérieures menées par des Etats engagés au nom de leur Etat ou dans des coalitions, notamment onusiennes ou otaniennes), ou à l'échelle des entreprises impliquées dans l'effort de guerre ou à l'échelle mondiale (pour notamment mettre en exergue les rapports de pouvoir entre les différents Etats), cet article se propose de présenter les conséquences de la guerre sur l'économie urbaine à l'échelle locale. S'appuyer sur une approche géographique permet de compléter les approches économiques et juridiques, dans la mesure où elle met en exergue les impacts des destructions et d'une géographie de la peur qui se construit dans la ville et tend à faire disparaître l'urbanité, c'est-à-dire le vivre-la-ville, celle-ci étant alors conçue comme un lieu d'échanges, de rencontres et de proximités. On distinguera trois types d'interrelations entre guerre et économie dans la ville en guerre. Tout d'abord, les destructions dans la ville provoquent des dysfonctionnements urbains très lourds : il s'agit là de questionner l'économie urbaine dans la guerre, c'est-à-dire la manière dont l'économie urbaine est affectée par la géographie des combats, qui dessine des zones-refuges et des zones-cibles, produisant une injustice spatiale profondément ancrée dans la ville. De plus, il est nécessaire de questionner le financement de la guerre au prisme de ces spatialités : la violence produit des fragmentations urbaines, qui sont (ré)activées, créées, apaisées ou renforcées par les acteurs de l'économie urbaine de guerre. Ainsi, l'échelle de la ville ne peut suffire à comprendre tous les enjeux ...
The rise of urban studies in Lebanon: local critical engagements and globalisation of academic practices -- The emergence and the structuration of urban studies constitutes one of the most striking change in the social sciences in Lebanon since the end of the civil war. This relates to the social and political context, that of reconstruction and urban modernisation in the last 30 years. But it is also linked to the changes affecting the academia and in particular its international insertion. Therefore, it is interesting to examine urban studies in Lebanon in a comparative perspective. On the one side, I take stock of the acknowledged specificities of urban studies, in particular the tension between academic structuration and links with policies. On the other side, it is necessary to account for the global reshuffling of this field, with the rise of questions stemming from Southern cities. This text starts by proposing an analytical framework pour studying urban studies in a country of the South; then it develops three main findings. First, the emergence of urban studies in Lebanon directly accompanied the mobilisations of intellectuals and scholarsagainst the government's urban policies of reconstruction and planning. Second, the structuration of urbanstudies is occurring foremost in the academic sphere of urban planning, which is located inside the facultiesof architecture. These places have access to uneven resources to access the international debates and theAmerican University of Beirut stands out from this point of view. The state and local public actors played aminor role in the structuring of urban studies but there are various forms of coproduction of urban dataand knowledge that associates academics, consultants and administrations. The rise of urban studies alsostrongly results from the development urban activism, particularly in the recent years. This has led to theadoption of new practices of coproduction of knowledge with the residents, as well as of now forms ofdissemination to the public. The framework of "translational urban praxis" Susann Parnell and EdgarPieterse proposed for South Africa helps to understand these new practices of translation between differentsocial groups and publics. ; L'émergence et la structuration des études urbaines constituent des modifications parmi les plusfrappantes au sein des sciences sociales au Liban depuis la fin de la guerre civile. Cela renvoie à la fois à une actualité sociale et politique, celle de la reconstruction et de la modernisation des villes dans les trentedernières années. Mais cela est également lié à des mutations du milieu universitaire lui-même et enparticulier aux formes de son insertion internationale. En ce sens, la montée des études urbaines au Libanest intéressante à étudier dans une perspective comparée, prenant en compte les spécificités des étudesurbaines, notamment la tension entre structuration académique et lien avec l'action publique, et lesrenouvellements à l'échelle globale, liés à la montée des problématiques des villes du Sud. Ce texte posed'abord un cadre d'analyse des études urbaines pour un pays du Sud, avant de développer trois grandsrésultats : l'histoire de l'émergence des études urbaines au Liban accompagne des mobilisationsd'intellectuel.le.s et d'universitaires contre les politiques publiques de reconstruction et d'aménagementurbain. Les études urbaines se structurent dans un espace académique qui est celui de l'urbanisme,étroitement liée au Liban aux facultés d'architecture. Ces foyers des études urbaines sont inégalementdotés pour prendre place dans l'espace académique international. L'Université Américaine de Beyrouth sedistingue sur ce plan. L'État et les acteurs publics locaux jouent un rôle mineur dans la structuration desétudes urbaines mais des formes de co-production de données et de savoirs pratiques associantuniversitaires, consultants et administrations sont néanmoins observables. Enfin, le développement desétudes urbaines est indissociable du militantisme urbain qui conduit à l'adoption de nouvelles pratiques decoproduction de savoirs avec les habitants et de nouvelles formes de diffusion, qu'il est loisible decomprendre comme des pratiques de traduction entre différents publics, comme l'ont proposé à propos del'Afrique du Sud Susan Parnell et Edgar Pieterse.
This dissertation examines how U.S. foreign policy shaped the origins and expansion of Middle East studies and expertise. For over sixty years the United States has considered the area called the "Middle East" to be vital to its national security interests, and governmental and academic institutions have been essential pillars in support of this policy. America's involvement in the Middle East has matched its rise as a global superpower and I argue that U.S. foreign policy significantly influenced the production and professionalization of knowledge about the region. I demonstrate that passage of the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958 ultimately led to the growth and diversification of the field. Moreover, my dissertation contends that an unintended consequence of this expansion was strained relations between academia and the government, which contributed to and was compounded by decreased federal funding for area studies. By the late and post-Cold War periods, I assert that these factors led to a perceived decline in the field while private think tanks garnered increased attention and influence.Drawing on research completed at national, university, and foundation archives, I explain how key governmental and non-governmental institutions collaborated to promote Middle East studies and expertise. I examine early American attempts to produce contemporary regional expertise through different wartime agencies and programs during the First and Second World Wars. In particular, I focus on the Inquiry, a group of scholars created to help President Woodrow Wilson prepare for the Versailles Peace Conference, as well as the Office of Strategic Services and the Army Specialized Training Program. I assert that the example of these initial efforts and their alumni helped establish the institutional precursors for the development of area studies. During and after the Cold War, I analyze how the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency coordinated with the Middle East studies programs at Princeton and Harvard and supported the American Universities of Beirut and Cairo. I also discuss the coordination of private foundations and academic societies with governmental agencies as well as their funding and support of area studies programs before and after the NDEA. This includes the activities of the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, the Social Science Research Council, and the American Council of Learned Societies. I conclude that different regimes of knowledge production and cultures of expertise related to the Middle East have emerged over the past century. While these regimes have often intersected and competed for supremacy, I contend that U.S. foreign policy interests and goals have had a predominant influence on the contested ways knowledge is produced, communicated, and consumed. I demonstrate that the terminology and associated geographical representations inherent in U.S. foreign policy discourse has been adopted and promulgated by academic scholarship on the Middle East. Thus, revealing that even when Washington's policies are contested by area experts its interests have already been subsumed into existing discourse on the region. While university-based Middle East studies were successful in expanding and enhancing the U.S.'s knowledge about the region and producing potential candidates for government service, I assert that the foreign policy and intelligence establishments developed their own processes for collecting and analyzing information and trends which benefited from but were independent of academic scholarship on the Middle East. Furthermore, I argue that think tanks emerged at the expense of university-based Middle East studies programs by actively pursuing research agendas in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region.
Woodlard (1998: 16) states: "The equation of language and nation is not a natural fact but rather a historical, ideological construct". Based on that, this study serves to point out how the change of political, social and cultural ideologies of the January generation led to a similar change in their language ideology and consequently a remarkable change in their use of written Arabic. The attempt is to answer the following questions: How do new language ideologies reflect on the practices of written Arabic, and how to map these to certain genres or social contexts? How can the power of changing language ideologies help in revitalizing Arabic and connecting it to the international community? To achieve this, the study depends on a qualitative approach of analyzing and discussing written practices introduced in the years following January 2011. The study falls in four sections: the first is an introduction to the concept of language ideology and its role in shaping the linguistic practices and features that get selected for cultural attention and social marking (Schieffelin & Doucet 1998). Section two presents the literature on the history of standardizing Arabic and a description of the crucial issue of diglossia (Ferguson 1959, 1996; Eisele 2002) in Egypt and the Arab world. Section three discusses the relationship between language and politics as well as language ideologies behind the different conflicting language varieties. Section four investigates the changes that took place in the language ideologies held by the Egyptian youth after the January 2011 by the means of analyzing and discussing data extracted from written practices of variable genres of media. Finally, the study suggests some approaches to revitalize the Arabic language by deploying different ideologies in the sense of using this diversity for the benefit of the language. ; Assiut University, Egypt ; Walaa Hassan is an Associate Professor of Linguistics at the English Department, Faculty of Arts, Assiut University, Egypt. She received her PhD in Linguistics from Assiut University, Egypt, and Michigan State University, USA (a collaborative program administered jointly by both Assiut University and Michigan State University). She has also been a researcher and a language consultant for 6 months at MSU, USA. Her research is in the area of comparative Arabic-English analysis, particularly the syntax-semantics interface, comparative syntax, and the lexicalization of loanwords into Arabic. 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