Исследуя историко-культурные основы отношений Российского государства и сформировавшейся на его территории мусульманской уммы, автор прослеживает их развитие с X по конец XX вв., анализирует особенности их институализации и подробно обсуждает оформление и эволюцию идеи межконфессионального единства в системе отношений государства и ислама (в том числе реформаторское направление в последнем), а также характер и формы участия мусульман в общественногосударственной жизни России. Особое внимание уделено проблеме отражения отношений государства и ислама в политических, социально-философских и религиозно-этических концепциях XIX — начала XX вв., что исследуется на примере творчества как представителей миссионерского направления русской религиозно-философской мысли (А. Заборовского, А. Светлакова и др. выпускников Казанской Духовной академии 1870-х—1900-х гг.), так и Л.Н. Толстого и Вл. Соловьева. ; This publication continues a cycle of articles devoted to the social and philosophical analysis of the relationship between the state (as a leading political institution) on the one hand, and the Muslim Ummah on the other. Researching the historical and cultural basis for the relationship between the Russian state and Muslim Ummah formed on territory of Russia, we trace development of this relationship from the X to the end of XX century. We analyze the features of the institutionalization of state-islamic relations and discusse in detail the genesis and evolution of the idea of interfaith unity in the system of relations between the state and Islam (including its reformist trend), and the nature and forms of Muslim participation in social and public life of Russia. Thus, we show that Islam in its "pure", "Arab" version was not accepted anywhere in North Eurasia, it existed in the Volga Bulgar and Khazar Kaganate, and in the Khanate of Kazan and Astrakhan in the form of so-called "liberal" Islam, with an admixture of national and ethnic element (we mean Hanafi Islam, that confesses 90% of the contemporary post-Soviet Muslims). Muslim enclaves for a long time exist on these areas in an environment of non-Muslims and historically developed traditions of peaceful coexistence with these ones. Considerable attention we pay to the history of the spread of Islam in the Volga area and the North Caucasus and to the culture in these regions. As for the Golden Horde, it not only did not try to Islamize Russia, but in both the pre-Islamic and Islamic periods of its history, its rulers are not prevented Orthodox missionary activity on its own territory. As a result of this activity, some families of Khans began to turn to Christianity. This process, as well as the strengthening of Russia and its conquest of territories that formerly belonged to the Horde (then Persia and the Ottoman Empire), contributed to the relationship between the Russian state and people belonging to different ethnic groups and different religions. This process was of great importance in a cultural as well as the sociological aspects: this process began to changing the perception of the ontology of "pagans" — the perception of array, in which substantial differences (from the Russian ethnos) of linguistic, moral, ethical, religious, and, finally, anthropological phenomena was focused. Stabilization and strengthening of relations between the state and Islam were connected, first, to the general trend of strengthening national public values in the leadership of the Russian state, and secondly, with the accession of new southern and eastern areas to Russia. These were precisely XVI—XVII centuries, when the foundations of the approach of the state to Islam and Muslims, whose traditions in one form or another are stored in our days, were laid. We discussed in detail the legal and political and cultural aspects of the inclusion of the Muslim population of the Crimea, the Volga region and the North Caucasus in Russian society during the XVIII—XIX centuries, the political and psychological and governance aspects of the Caucasian War, as well as the ideas of reforming of Islam belonging Ismail Bey Gasprinskiy and his adherents and followers (Jadidism). Particular attention we pay to the problem of reflection of relations between the state and Islam in the political, social, philosophical, religious, and ethical concepts of XIX — early XX centuries. This one we examine on the examples of both creativity of the representatives of missionary orientation Russian religious and philosophical thought (A. Zaborovsky, A. Svetlakova and other graduates of the Kazan Theological Academy of the 1870—1900's), and ethic concepts of L.N. Tolstoy and Vladimir Solovyov. Finally, we discussed the political and cultural atmosphere of the Islamic Ummah in Russia before the October Revolution, and after it and the challenges of the administrative-territorial division of the North Caucasus in 1917—1940, and related matters of political relations between the Ummah and the Soviet state.
Glavni cilj disertacije je analizirati ideologiju glavnih predstavnika radikalne desnice u Poljskoj. Ova doktorska disertacija dizajnirana je kao studija slučaja unutar okvira kulturalnog pristupa u političkim znanostima. Kao metoda istraživanja odabrana je kombinacija kvalitativne analize sadržaja i konceptualne analize ideologije Michaela Freedena. Iako je najveći fokus istraživanja na dvjema političkim strankama (Zakon i pravda i Liga poljskih obitelji) kao glavnim predstavnicima radikalno desne političke scene u Poljskoj, istraživanje se bavi i drugim akterima, prije svega organizacijama civilnog društva, društvenim pokretima i medijima, koji sudjeluju u konstruiranju i promoviranju ideologije radikalne desnice. Pritom istraživanje nije ograničeno na sadržaj ideologije i aktere koji tu ideologiju promoviraju, već ono uključuje i analizu procesa putem kojih se ideologija radikalne desnice eksplicira i formulira, kao i analizu dinamičnih odnosa među akterima procesa proizvodnje ideologije doprinoseći istraživanju ideologije radikalne desnice kao i istraživanju procesa konstruiranja političkih ideologija općenito. Kao polazište za navedenu analizu u disertaciji se koristi ponešto modificirana definicija radikalne desnice poznatog politologa Casa Muddea prema kojoj su konstitutivna obilježja radikalne desnice integralni nacionalizam, autoritarnost i populizam. Analizom je utvrđeno kako su sve tri ideološke karakteristike tipične za radikalnu desnicu prisutne kod glavnih aktera istraživanih u ovoj disertaciji. Na tragu konceptualne analize, ova disertacija je pokazala kako središnji konstitutivni koncept radikalno desne ideologije u Poljskoj predstavlja nacija, i kako svi ostali okolni koncepti detektirani analizom, poput solidarnosti, jednakosti šansi, pravde, demokracije, slobode, zadobivaju svoje značenje na temelju svog odnosa prema središnjem konstitutivnom obilježju ideologije. ; In the last thirty years or so, the influence of the radical right has been constantly growing throughout Europe. This political success has been accompanied by an increasingly intensive scientific research on the phenomenon of the radical right, which has resulted in several studies that address various aspects of the radical right phenomenon in Europe. Paradoxically, despite such an abundance of research papers, their review suggests that there are relatively few papers that have a systematic and in-depth approach to the political ideology of the radical right. This doctoral dissertation fills this research gap and focuses on the political ideology of the radical right, taking into account the thesis of the well-known researcher of political ideologies Michael Freeden, that political ideologies are the center of political analysis because the study of ideologies can provide relevant insights necessary for understanding politics and political processes. In the context of the debate on the wave of radicalism in Europe, Poland is a particularly interesting case. Firstly, it is the largest and most populous post-communist country that became a member of the EU and a country in which the radical right won three parliamentary and three presidential elections between 2005 and 2020. Secondly, in academic papers and media Poland is often portrayed as an example of a country that has successfully gone through the process of transformation to liberal democracy and as an example of the most successful transition economy in Europe. The Polish case is also interesting because it is a a country with more than 90% of declared Catholics and where, primarily due to historical development, Catholicism plays a significant role in political, social, and cultural life; it has become a key component of the Polish national identity. In contrast to Western European countries, in Poland Political Catholicism, did not spark the development of strong Christian- Democratic parties, it rather gave rise to radical right-wing parties instead. In addition to cultural factors, historical heritage is often considered a fertile ground for the emergence of this type of parties, especially its influence on political processes and on the processes of building a national identity. Namely, the Polish historical heritage, specifically the one related to the 20th century, was marked by a short period of democratic rule (1918-1925), and two long periods of authoritarian rule, that of Jozef Pilsudski (1925 to 1939), and that of the communist authoritarians (1945 to 1989). Thus, the main goal of the dissertation is to analyze the ideology of the main representatives of the radical right in Poland by exploring its discursive manifestations, as well as the way in which the radical right ideology is produced. This doctoral dissertation is designed as a case study within the framework of a cultural approach in political sciences. The cultural approach is characterized by the insistence on the importance of context, which, on the other hand, makes it difficult to define clear independent, dependent, and intervening variables. Therefore, in the cultural approach, a case is most often taken as the analytical unit taking into consideration all the complexity of its historical and socio-political distinctiveness. Qualitative content analysis was chosen as the research method, and conceptual analysis of Michael Freeden's ideology was added to it, since this approach allows us to better understand the morphology of ideologies and their operationalization in politics. The first chapter is about the theoretical and methodological framework. Since the concept of the radical right is one of the deeply contested concepts which there is no consensus about in political science, and since the aim of this doctoral dissertation is to explain this concept, the first part of the chapter consists of a review and analysis of recent literature. The notion of the radical right was analyzed through comparison with related terms such as the extreme right, right-wing populism, and the far right. As a starting point for analysis in the dissertation, a somewhat modified definition of the radical right by the well-known political scientist Cas Mudde is used. According to him, the constitutive features of the radical right are integral nationalism, authoritarianism, and populism. Like the concept of the radical right, the concept of ideology is also ambivalent and can be understood in different ways which result in multiple uses of the term ideology which are often contradictory. This doctoral dissertation is largely based on the morphological approach to the study of ideology developed by Michael Freeden. The second chapter deals with the history of Poland before 1989. The first part of the chapter explains the early context of the emergence of Polish nationalism, which has its roots in the 'noble democracy' of the 17th century, as well as in the national struggles for independence of the 19th century. However, the chapter focuses on two periods that significantly influenced the emergence and growth of Polish political nationalism in the early 2000s. The first is the interwar period (1918-1939) in which two traditions of Polish political thought, Sanacja and Endeca, crystallized, and from which two visions of the Polish nation, national identity, and the nation-state, emerged. The second period is after the Second World War, i.e., the period of the People's Republic of Poland in which the legitimization and institutionalization of the nationalist discourse take place. Equally, in this period there emerged and formed social groups with different visions of the Polish state after the fall of communism. The third chapter deals with the transformation of the People's Republic of Poland into the The third Republic and with an account of political and social events in the first decade after the fall of communism. This chapter sheds light on the political and social context within which the dominant social divisions in Polish society emerged, which in large part resulted in the evolution of radical right-wing parties in the early 2000s. In particular, the very nature of the transformation process emerged as the main subject of dispute. Namely, the Polish right believes that due to the contractual transformation of the system, the 'revolution' is not over and that the left-liberal groups have made an agreement with the former communist establishment. They believe that the Third Republic is a product of this agreement and that it serves the left-liberal and former communist elites to maintain positions of power and rule the The third Republic to the detriment of the oppressed people. This conspiratorial narrative represents the foundation around which the politics and ideology of the radical right have been built in Poland since 2000. The fourth chapter deals with the emergence and profiling of two radical right-wing parties, Law and Justice (Polish: Prawo I Sprawiedliwość – PiS) and the League of Polish Families (Polish: Liga Polskich Rodzin – LPR) . The chapter is structured in such a way as to first present the history of the formation of these parties, with an emphasis on the main actors who participated as the originators and implementers of these projects. In both cases, these are largely the 'family projects' of the Kaczynski brothers (Law and Justice) and father and son Giertych (League of Polish Families). From the Kaczynskis' biographies, it is obvious that they come from an environment dominated by the legacy of Sanacja, while father and son Giertych openly presents themselves as the heirs of the interwar Endecja. After presenting their political activities and the first successes in the elections, the ideology of these two parties is reconstructed, primarily from their programs and other party publications. The research showed that until 2005 both parties contained all the constitutive elements of the radical right according to Mudde's conceptualization. While these constitutive elements have been present in the League of Polish Families since its founding, the party Law and Justice gradually became radicalized. This period, at least from the perspectives of PiS and LPR, is dominated by the conflict between the post-communist elites (former communists and left-liberal intellectuals) gathered around the left Democratic Left Alliance (Polish: Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD) and the so-called "patriotic' camp that emerged from Solidarity. This chapter also covers the period between 2005 and 2007 when these two parties, together with the Self-Defense party, formed a government that lasted less than two years. This first, shorter coming to power of the radical right in Poland is not important because of the public policies they pursued during that period, but because of the experience and lessons gained by PiS during its rule in the liberal democratic system. Namely, after 2007, the LPR disappeared from the Polish political scene, leaving the PiS as the only relevant political actor of the radical right. The fifth chapter covers the period between 2007 and 2015. It is the period of rule by the Civic Platform (Polish: Platforma Obywatelska, PO), a center-right party with strong pro-EU views and liberal economic and social policies. Due to the disappearance of the left from the Polish political scene, the main social and political conflict underwent a radical change. PiS formulated a new conflict – the struggle between solidarity and liberal or corporate Poland – and built its ideology around this conflict. This period in Polish political and social life was marked by the immigration crisis that hit Europe and the debate on the acceptance of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women, the so-called Istanbul Convention. Both topics as well as the pro-European orientation of the PO government led to the mobilization of radical right-wing social groups and media that skillfully occupied public space by successfully imposing their topics on the public agenda. As this dissertation will show, PiS has adapted its discourse to that of radical right-wing organizations and has successfully presented itself as their political representative. On the one hand, this 'alliance' helped the PiS succeed in the 2015 presidential and parliamentary elections, while on the other it marked the further radicalization of the PiS, especially when it comes to issues of morals and values. The sixth chapter deals with the period between 2015 and 2020. During that period, the PiS won both the presidential and the parliamentary elections twice. This chapter emphasizes how PiS translates its ideology into public policies. Namely, during this period PiS focused its efforts on two projects: 'repairing the state' and rebuilding the community (nation). The first project was marked by the judicial reform and the crisis related to the Constitutional Court; it aimed to strengthen the executive branch to the detriment of other branches of government. The PiS community reconstruction project was conceived as a change in the material and spiritual dimension of the community. The first is mostly related to social policies, the emphasis being on family policies. Changes in the spiritual dimension imply changes in cultural policy, within which there has been a reform of public media and the announcement of the "recolonization" of private media. In changing the spiritual dimension, PiS placed special emphasis on the defense of the traditional way of life on the one hand, and on the politics of history on the other, in which the Institute of National Remembrance played an exceptional role. The seventh chapter takes the form of a final discussion in which the basic theses of the radical right ideology in Poland are reconstructed. The aim of this discussion is to position the topic of this dissertation within the framework of a broader theoretical discussion between liberals and their critics. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the main research results in this doctoral dissertation and points to the possible direction of future research, especially research of countries with a strong radical right and with a similar historical and cultural heritage. Equally, the conclusion points to the fact that this dissertation has not fully answered the research question related to finding out how ideology is constructed, and the actors involved in the process. Namely, the problem was the research design and selection of the analysis method. The conclusion is that a more complete answer to this research question would require some field research, preferably using the method of interview or survey. Finally, we believe that some future research on ideology should move in that direction.
A continuación, dos elementos estratégicos conexos asociados a la dimensión económica de la competitividad, que dado su alcance suprarregional requieren mayores niveles de gestión por parte de los actores sociales del territorio. Entre ellos: el Ferrocarril Cafetero como fórmula que permite implementar la multimodalidad al integrar el sistema de transporte de carga de la Región Andina de Colombia. Además, un anexo titulado "La red vial de Colombia se abrió paso en la UN" tomado de UN Periódico, que resalta entre otros aportes de nuestra sesquicentenaria institución, dicho proyecto
Актуальность и цели. В 2016 г. Россия отметит 25 лет своей новой истории, связанной с выходом из СССР и распадом последнего. Несмотря на четвертьвековую ретроспективу данного процесса, сегодня все чаще разворачиваются дискуссии о сроках завершения данной трансформации, отражения ее сущностного проявления в реальных практиках российского общества, а также о причинах сложностей модернизационного развития российского государства на современном этапе. По нашему мнению, изучение вышеуказанных аспектов невозможно без глубокого анализа эволюции советского менталитета в русле зависимости успеха экономических преобразований от социального восприятия реформы собственности (приватизации) 1990-х гг. и связанных с ним поведенческих реакций населения. Целью данной работы выступает изучение уровня восприятия российским социумом содержания и установок радикальных социально-экономических преобразований начала 1990-х гг. в сфере трансформации отношений собственности. Материалы и методы. Реализация научных задач строится на основе социально-репрезентативных исследований, результатах полевых опросов, отраженных в материалах периодической печати как центрального, так и местного происхождения. Отдельным блоком источников выступает комплекс архивных документов фондов Государственного архива Российской Федерации, Российского государственного архива новейшей истории и Государственного архива Пензенской области. Методологию проведения работы составляют базисные принципы научного познания (историзм и объективность) и специально-исторические методы исследования: историко-системный, статистический, проблемно-хронологический. С целью получения более эффективного результата комплексного анализа социальной рефлексии приватизационных процессов раскрытие ее внутренних связей строилось на основе междисциплинарного категориального и методологического аппарата, необходимость использования которого вытекает не только из тематики работы, но и из признаков проблематизации исторического знания. Результаты. В статье оценивается возможность эволюции социетальных практик советского человека в условиях социально-культурной трансформации, меняющейся институциональной среды и объективного воздействия рыночных стимулов на модернизацию гражданского общества новой России. Конкретно-исторический анализ переходности и уровня преемственности российского социума в работе основывается не только на общероссийских исследованиях и измерениях общественного мнения, но и на локальном уровне Пензенской области, являющейся по всем параметрам стабильно-типичным регионом с усредненными ценностными архетипами. Выводы. Перестройка массового сознания советского социума под воздействием рыночных институтов, введенных в рамках радикальных преобразований 1990-х гг., безусловно, поляризировала общественные устои социалистического уклада и имущественно-собственнические настроения. Вместе с тем темпы такой перестройки менталитета были крайне медленными, что тормозило ожидаемое реформаторами развитие механизмов саморегуляции рынка и естественное образование гражданского общества новой России. Умеренные ожидания от перехода к рынку сменились общественным разочарованием, утерей доверия к власти и партии (КПСС) со стороны населения. Кроме того, население стало прибегать к консервативной тактике внутреннего сопротивления и «безмолвствия», что было прямым следствием ранее господствующих настроений социального иждивенчества и государственного партийного патернализма. Анализ причин данных тенденций позволил заключить, что трансформация отношений собственности в России показала высокую устойчивость советского менталитета к восприятию рыночных институтов. ; Background. In 2016 Russia will celebrate 25th anniversary of its new history, associated with the release from the USSR and disintegration of the latter. Despite a quarter-century retrospective of this process, the society quite often debates about the time frame of completion of this transformation, the reflection of its essential existence in the real practices of the Russian society, as well as the reasons for difficulties of the modernization of the Russian state development at the modern stage. In our opinion, the study of the above-mentioned aspects is impossible without a deep analysis of the evolution of "Soviet mentality" in the context of dependence of the success of economic transformation on the social perception of the ownership reform (privatization) of 1990s and the related behavioral reactions of the population. The aim of this work is the study of the level of perception by the Russian society of the contents and installations of the radical socio-economic transformation of the early 1990s in the field of property relations transformation. Materials and methods. The research objectives were implemented on the basis of the socially-representative studies, the results of field surveys, reflected in the periodical press of both central and local origins. Individual unit sources is a complex of archival document collections of the State Archive of the Russian Federation, the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History and the State Archive of Penza Region. The methodology of the work included basic principles of scientific knowledge historicism and objectivity, and special historical methods of research: historical and systematic, statistical, problem-chronological. For the purpose of obtaining more efficient results of the complex analysis of the social reflection of the privatization process, the disclosure of its internal relations was based on the interdisciplinary categorical and methodological apparatus, the need for which is substantiated not only by the subject of the work, but also by signs of problematization of historical knowledge. Results. The article traces the evolutionary nature of social practices of Soviet people in terms of the socio-cultural transformation, changing the institutional environment and objective impact of market incentives for modernization of the civil society in new Russia. A concrete historical analysis of transitivity and continuity of the Russian society in the work is based not only on the nation-wide research and measurement of public opinion, but also on local-level researches Penza region, which by all parameters is a consistently-typical region with average value archetypes. Conclusions. The restructuring of the mass consciousness of the Soviet society under the influence of market institutions introduced with a framework of radical reforms of 1990s, without a doubt, polarized social foundations of the socialist system in the direction of property-proprietary sentiment. However, the pace of adjustment of mentality was very slow, which hindered the development of mechanisms of self-regulation of the market and the natural formation of civil society of new Russia, expected by the reformers. Reasonable expectations of transition to a market economy was replaced by disappointment, loss of confidence in the government and the party (CPSU) by the population. In addition, the population began to resort to conservative tactics of internal resistance and "silence" that was a direct consequence of the previously predominant tendencies of social parasitism and state party paternalism. As a result, the analysis of the causes of these trends allows to conclude that the transformation of ownership relations in Russia confirmed high resistance of the Soviet mentality to perception of market institutions.
This thesis provides an analysis of the discourses of nature conservation in South Africa and Driftsands provincial nature reserve from constructionist and environmental justice perspectives. At the outset I examine the theoretical framework on the social construction of nature and that of environmental justice. I then discuss the history of nature conservation in South Africa. Finally I analyse the discourse (nature conservation and local communities) surrounding the Driftsands Provincial Nature Reserve (DNR). This nature reserve is located one kilometre east of Cape Town International Airport, in the Western Cape, South Africa. My analysis of the first theoretical framework (the social construction of nature) confirms that a) the idea of nature is constructed over time; b) nature, as a concept and a phenomenon, is complex; c) nature discourses reveal, hide, and create 'truths' about nature which are accepted as being truthful yet are a question of social struggle and power politics; d) humans have amassed countless definitions of the word 'nature'. Those definitions are categorised by Castree and Braun (2001) into three groups: external, intrinsic, and universal. My analysis of the second theoretical framework (environmental justice) suggests that the idea of nature can be used constructively or negatively depending on who uses it and why. The link between both theoretical frameworks suggests that nature is bound up with agendas. Humans construct natures to pursue individual, social or political agendas. From this standpoint the focus of the thesis shifts from debating whether or not nature is socially constructed to examining what type of agendas were pursued to achieve those 'natural' constructions, and what their consequences were for local communities living in and around protected areas. In order to achieve this, I employed four interlinked analytical methods (stakeholder, discourse, critical and ideological analysis). My analysis of the case study of DNR and that of the history of nature conservation in South Africa suggests ideological similarities. First, in both cases nature conservation is inspired by external environmental views. In the colonial period of South Africa, nature conservation policies and practices were shaped by English and Afrikaner protectionist ideas and aimed also to address the demand of their naturalists, sportsmen, and explorers for hunting and exploiting wild animals. In post-apartheid South Africa, nature has been 12 constructed in protected areas according to universalised environmental views and to some extent has been proactive, meaning that it aimed to address some of the social challenges. Likewise, at DNR, nature conservation was adopted in the early 1980s by the white government to pursue political agendas. In the late 1980s nature conservation began to be influenced by universalised environmental views. Second, the ideological nexus of both discourses regarding nature and local communities suggests conformity with global environmental models. Under these models the normal course is: a) to fence local communities from protected areas or to fence protected areas from local communities, b) to maximise the boundaries of protected areas, or to minimise the settlements of local communities in protected areas, c) to regulate local communities' access to protected areas and natural resources, d) to promote persuasive concepts of ecotourism to achieve nature conservation goals through community participation, co-benefiting local communities from protected areas, co-managing protected areas with local communities, and local socio-economic development, e) to aim for the removal of the on-site communities from protected areas. The impoverishment of the DNR on-site communities has been effected by means of three ideological principles. Since 1990, DNR's on-site communities have been labouring under a state of emergency - the state of living below the flood line; the state of high level of house robbery and a worrying level of rape and child abuse. Their dispossession has led to the spaces of temporality - a state of informality and limited public services and hopelessness (there is no hope of sustaining settlements on the site). Currently, these communities are cornered between two choices. Either they voluntarily relocate their shacks into the surrounding townships or they live with the state of emergency, hopelessness and temporality. Local communities of other protected areas in South Africa have been similarly impoverished by these states of emergency, temporality and hopelessness. During the colonial period, South Africa's conservation discourses were predominantly white-based. Whites constructed the common sense among themselves that they own the land and wildlife. Constructing the idea that they are the people of the land meant also suppressing the non-white sovereignty over land and natural resources. For example, Until late in the twentieth century [South African children's literature in English] 13 usually endorsed the assumption held by whites that they had exclusive ownership of the land and wildlife' (Jenkins, 2004: 107). While whites were protecting South Africa's wildlife, they also alienated blacks from nature. It is just recently, after 1994 that, 'English-Language children's writers and translators of indigenous folktales for children have begun to explore traditional beliefs about and practices in conservation (Jenkins, 2004: 107). These statements do not state or imply that English literature on humannature discourse begun to explore the idea of harmony where indigenous people live and depend on wildlife. In South Africa, it is typical for non-white communities living in or around protected areas to be relocated voluntarily or by force from their land or their settlements, and to be denied resources they had traditionally used within protected areas. Finally, both contemporary discourses continue to be in line with various universalised conservation models. Although both discourses have evolved over time, the status quo of local communities has remained the same: impoverished by exclusion from protected areas, permitted participation in only insignificant co-management models and recipients of intangible benefits. Although the contemporary discourse on nature conservation appears to be more considerate of local communities, I suggest that it is early days for this young discourse to achieve harmony between people and nature. It is up to local and national governmental and non-governmental agencies to modify global environmental views rather than fully adopting them, in order to be more respectful and accommodating of local communities.
The term 'sustainable development' was coined to denote a political goal some 40 years ago; debates about sustainability date back considerably further. These debates reflect the growing awareness of the destructive effects of human activities on the natural foundations of life. Numerous initiatives have been launched to trigger a turnaround, with the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs being the latest attempt. However, substantial progress has been rather limited thus far. This discrepancy is the subject of the article. Starting from a historical overview of sustainability politics, the argument develops in three steps. First, it is shown that conventional conceptions to promote environmental change fall short in depicting the broader societal context. To provide a comprehensive picture of the challenges related to transformation processes, a theory of the functional differentiation of societies is presented in a second step. A systems theory perspective offers a convincing theoretical explication of the problem. Third, this approach is scrutinized with regard to the political system and the politics of sustainability. The key finding is that the specific functional logics of the different social subsystems must be taken into account when analysing sustainable development and the discrepancy between the aims and ambitions of (global) environmental policy and the visible consequences. On the one hand, the functional differentiation of modern society guarantees its high degree of effectiveness and flexibility. On the other hand, implementing fundamental change, such as a transition towards sustainability, is not simply a question of strategy or of political willingness and steering. Rather, there is a need for more elaborate explanatory instruments. As a result, we argue for a linking of theories of sustainable development and advanced social theory.
The article presents an analysis of the character of model Serbian political leadership with respect to its endurance over an extended period. The author traces the analogies between the leadership models of Serbian leaders active in diff erent periods and historical contexts: Prince Miloš Obrenović (1780–1860), Prime Minister Nikola Pašić (1845–1926) and President Slobodan Milošević (1941–2006). Over this extended period, the type of leadership remained relatively constant in response to a certain set of expectations that reflected the values regarded as fundamental by Serbian society, and in particular: stability of social relations, egalitarianism, collectivism, and conservatism. As this set of values changed little over the examined period, the archetype of Serbian leader as an advocate of egalitarianism, a warrior and a tribune of the people, that had emerged in response to Ottoman domination, remained relevant. ; Summary in English. ; p. 143-165 ; Text eng. ; The article presents an analysis of the character of model Serbian political leadership with respect to its endurance over an extended period. The author traces the analogies between the leadership models of Serbian leaders active in diff erent periods and historical contexts: Prince Miloš Obrenović (1780–1860), Prime Minister Nikola Pašić (1845–1926) and President Slobodan Milošević (1941–2006). Over this extended period, the type of leadership remained relatively constant in response to a certain set of expectations that reflected the values regarded as fundamental by Serbian society, and in particular: stability of social relations, egalitarianism, collectivism, and conservatism. As this set of values changed little over the examined period, the archetype of Serbian leader as an advocate of egalitarianism, a warrior and a tribune of the people, that had emerged in response to Ottoman domination, remained relevant. ; s. 143-165 ; Tekst ang. ; Streszcz. ang.
Varias décadas luego de la independencia, el desempeño de la mayoría de los países africanos en sus intentos por materializar los sueños y aspiraciones de sus ciudadanos ha sido desconsolador. En estos Estados africanos postcoloniales la desilusión post independentista se ha expresado de distintas formas. La música, junto a la literatura y el teatro, ha sido una de las formas culturales a través de las cuales los artistas en Kenia han logrado construir continuamente una realidad política y social alternativa, alejada de la ofi cialidad, a fi n de responder a los desafíos post coloniales. Este artículo es una disertación sobre el rol fundamental que ha tenido la música popular en la Kenia postcolonial, como uno de los lugares más connotados de la lucha entre gobernantes y gobernados. Este artículo toma como base las canciones de dos artistas: Joseph Kamaru y Eric Wainana. ; Several decades after independence, most African countries have continually performed dismally in actualising the dreams and aspirations of their citizenry. Th e post-independence disillusionment has been expressed in various forms in these postcolonial African states. Music is one of the cultural forms, like literature and theatre, which artists in Kenya have employed as a force that continually constructs an alternative political and social reality, away from offi cialdom, in a way to respond to the postcolonial challenges. Th is paper is an exposé on the fundamental role that popular music has played in postcolonial Kenya as one of the salient sites of the struggle between the rulers and the ruled. Th e paper draws on songs from two artists, Joseph Kamaru and Eric Wainaina. ; 47-66 ; mmutonya@colmex.mx ; semestral
The relatively extensive analysis of political values, attitudes and political participation of youth enables us to better explain the existing trends in the relationship of youth towards politics. Especially helpful in this regard is the comparison with adults, as well as the longitudinal tracking of changes within the young population. Here, we will reflect on the important tendencies and try to understand their wider and far-reaching implications. When we look at all the obtained results, it is evident that there are differences between youth and adults, but only a smaller part of them is significantly pronounced. Thus, the results indicate that the young express a higher level of trust in the media. Furthermore, they are more tolerant towards a number of social phenomena and groups causing debates in the Croatian and the European public, they are more sensitive to ethnic inequalities, they also perceive the war as the main cause of existing difficulties more, they have considerably more faith in their own generation as the social strength which can initiate positive trends, they express a greater readiness for joining different civil activities, and trust that television and youth associations might mobilize them to actively participate in social affairs. At the same time, the young less than the adults accept the values of a democratic order, but are less inclined towards the harmonious conception of politics, they are less socially sensitive, express less trust in the institutions of power, they more rarely express socio-economic goals and preservation of tradition among the political priorities, they choose immorality and crime in privatization as the causes of today's problems less, they perceive less corruption in all areas of social life (aside from the school system), they have less faith in the positive contribution of experts and entrepreneurs in overcoming the crisis trends, they are less interested in politics and participate in political parties less, and their trust in the mobilizing role of democratic education, volunteer work, political parties and nongovernmental organizations, as well as in the contribution of the family and educational system in the stimulation of the social engagement of youth, is much lower. The enumerated differences between the youth and adults can primarily be interpreted from the discourse of the life cycle theory. This means that the witnessed differences are mostly the product of a different total social status of youth and adults, which presumes that most of the young have yet to take over their permanent social roles, and that their immediate experience is limited to some social areas. It follows that with their maturing and their full social integration, most differences from the adults will be erased. The common experience of a time in history, that is, life in a specific socio-historic period with a tendency to equalize differences, contributes to the convergence of youth and adults. The potential generational differences – which, as a rule, occur with the different reception of the same events and processes – are not very visible, and will be unambiguously detected only when today's generation of youth is in its mature age and when their attitudes are then compared with the attitudes of new young generations. Then, it will be more clear how much the existing differences between the young and the adults are a consequence of the fact that most adults gained their experience in a different social order, which, to a degree, forms their existing system of political values, which in some elements, especially related to the social dimensions, are different from the system of political values of youth. The absence of deep inter-generational divides indicates that, in spite of the radical changes taking place in the dissolution of the old and the establishment of a new social and political order, the mechanism of transferring political values from the adult generations to the young functions considerably, along with the faults that exist in the constructed political awareness of adults. Here, we must notice that the adults are more resistant to the potentially unfavorable influences from the environment, which is especially evident in their better understanding of the democratic rules. This statement also suggests that Croatia is now in a more stable period of social development, which is expected when the early phase of transition is replaced by the democratic consolidation phase. Therefore, it was demonstrated that the young in Croatia accept traditional values somewhat less than the adults, but also that in some areas they are just as more conservative compared to their European peers. Pointing to this is the greater orientation of Croatia youth towards family and the lower level of tolerance for some phenomena and groups in the modern society. Also, the social participation of Croatian youth is at a lower level, which testifies less to their lack of interest, and more to the inability of the Croatian society to meet the needs of youth for realizing its social necessities. The third comparative level includes the tracking of changes occurring within the Croatian youth between 1999 and 2004. The recapitulation of the obtained results indicates that in the observed period of time there has been an increase in the already relatively high level of acceptance of all the constitutional principles, as well as in the harmonious perception of politics and institutional trust, while the lack of work, discipline and irresponsibility are now more perceived as a social problem than before. The recent data also indicate that the young today perceive the existence of educational, gender and age related differences more, as well as the worsening political representation of all marginal groups. On the other hand, the understanding of conflicts and democratic rules (especially the role of the opposition) is weaker, the emphasis of crime in transformation of ownership and privatization as problems is smaller, the young now perceive the existence of social and religious differences less, their social activism and political participation is reduced, and the perception of joining political party youths and establishing autonomous youth parties as forms of activities that might contribute to a more active participation of youth in society decreased. The mentioned changes tend to lead to a further social, especially political, (self)passivity and marginalization of youth, and it is especially intriguing that it does not sufficiently understand political competition and its importance. If this was understandable in the first phase of transition, considering the war, stimulating homogenization, and the absence of a democratic tradition and the monopolization of power by one political party – the obtained results are no longer as understandable after spending more than 15 years in a multiparty democratic system. Therefore, we can presume that some elements of a functional political system and behavior of political protagonists is such that they convince the young that democracy, immanently inclined toward a conflict between political interests, is simply a less important form without obligating rules and procedures. This certainly points to faults in the process of political socialization of youth, which especially raises the issue of the need for an institutionalized education for democracy. In other words, if the adult generations, socialized in a different social order, still cannot optimally transfer their values in new generations, and if the functioning of political institutions is still marked by numerous " child illnesses" , than education, which can develop civil competence, is necessary. Anyway, in the countries that do not lack a democratic tradition, education for civil rights and democracy is a permanent process which takes place through appropriate school programs. The data also show that there has been a certain decrease in the social sensitivity of youth, which must be a consequence of socialization in a society aiming at market competitiveness and maximizing profit. The accompanying consequences are – especially with the lack of developed instruments of a social state, and after the poorly implemented restructuring of economy – the deepening of social inequalities and the decrease of the living standards of a large portion of the population. Thus, maturing in a society that suppresses social sensitivity, the young also become insufficiently sensitive to the issue of social justice in the (re)distribution of significantly limited resources. The young are raised in an environment in which their immediate and indirect experience tells that personal success is important, and the responsibility for achieving or not achieving it, is also personal. The emphasized orientation on competition and individualization of achievements weakens the social sensitivity and solidarity with the losers of social transformation. However, during the past several years the acceptance of the Constitutionally outlined basic political values has increased. This is a very important finding because such a high, and increased validation of liberal-democratic principles, leads us to assume that the Croatian society is overcoming the anomy it was in since the transitional period began. Leaving aside many events from the social and political practice that are witnesses to the recurrent violation, disregard or reduction of the interpretation of constitutional principles, we are left with an extremely high convergence of the political value systems of youth (as well as adults) and the officially proclaimed political values. This, of course, is no guarantee of a harmonized and appropriate behavior of those in power and of citizens, but it certainly represents the necessary level of consensus about the principles a pluralistic society and a democratic political order should be built on. The continuity of the tendencies established in the previous research is confirmed by the findings that youth is not a monolithic group, regarding the acceptance of political values, expression of political attitudes and level of political participation. The systemized data indicate, however, that the young tend to be homogenous in their acceptance of constitutional values and democratic attitudes, the common perception of social and socio-cultural inequalities, the extreme perception of their political status as marginal, and their average readiness to join different civil actions. At the same time, the greatest level of differentiation occurs regarding the not especially present tolerance toward most of the observed social phenomena and groups, the perception of unemployment as the most important social problem and the cause of existing difficulties, the average perception of the existence of political inequalities, and the expression of a weak interest in politics as well as the perception of the role of the " Diaspora" in Croatian political life. Looking at these results generally, it turns out that the young are mostly different regarding the level of achieved education and socio-professional status. The education level usually has the position of the attribute that affects the participants' attitudes the most in every social research, and it is interesting here because this is true even in the young population, many of which are still in the process of obtaining an education. Certainly, the basic division occurs between those with the lowest and highest qualifications, where a part of youth with high school education tends to get the same results as the academically educated youth. These are primarily students, and the fact is that education is very linked to the socio-professional position of youth, which has the same scope of influence on their differentiation. The results have manifested that students are usually on the one side, and pupils and the unemployed youth on the other in most situations. While with pupils we can assume that there will be a change with their maturing, the issue of the unemployed participants remains, because they seem to be a subgroup of youth that is placed more permanently on the social and political margins. A significant influence on the differentiation of youth is played by party affiliation, gender, age, regional status and the father's level of education. This group of attributes points to the influence of different types of socialization, along with a degree of (im)maturity of youth. In other words, being raised in families with different social statuses and in regions with different levels of development and cultural traditions, results in the formation of different attitudes of youth. It is also obvious that in the area of relationships towards politics, the differentiated models of socialization of women and men are still at work, contributing to the survival of the commonly known gender differences. As is logical when the political sphere is involved, party affiliation is an important element of polarization because it consists both of different ideological orientations, and of differences in the social profile of party supporters. The least influential attributes are the residential status, provenience and religiousness. These trends indicate a certain weakening of the influence of rural-urban differences, which is to be expected in a modern society, where the media override the transportation, infrastructural, cultural and other differences. The poor influence of religiousness indirectly testifies to the weakening of the correlation between the adoption of religious beliefs and the manifestation of religious affiliation, resulting in the loss of certain differences between the religious and the non-religious youth. However, the share of religious believers is such that their attitudes predominantly determine the main direction of youth orientations, which then points to a strengthening of the influence of religious on a general level. It is therefore questionable if the weakest influence of religion on political attitudes of youth may be seen as an indicator of a weakening correlation between politics and religion, traditionally present in this area. All the mentioned differentiation of youth can be summarized by sketching out two large, relatively polarized groups. One group consists of youth with higher education and social origin (an above averagely educated father, urban environment, and developed regions), students, averagely older, mostly non-religious and supporters of HNS and SDP – that is, the socially more competent youth, inclined to the left center ideological-political options. The other group consists of averagely younger participants, especially pupils and the unemployed with a lower education and social background (a father with lower qualifications, rural milieu, less developed regions), declared believers and sympathizers of HDZ, as well as HSP and HSS. In this case, we are profiling a socially more inferior youth inclined toward parties positioned at the right-wing pole of the ideological-political spectrum. The socially more competent youth is more liberal, critical toward social reality and political protagonists, and it manifests a greater consideration for democratic procedures and institutions, which is an indicator of the importance of more favorable circumstances in the process of political socialization. Since some of these circumstances are impossible to change by focused actions and campaigns, education is again the most appropriate channel of adopting knowledge and information that can contribute to the making of aware citizens, who are more difficult to manipulate and objectify for certain dubious particular political goals. The changes in the polarization of youth indicate that the territorial-cultural and ideological-cultural cleavages deepened in the past several years, and there are indications that the socio-economic cleavage will grow stronger as well. The unequal access to existing social resources of today's youth will generate an unequal status in their mature age, that is, the advantages achieved at the start (youth), are a guarantee of achieving better social positions in the future. Therefore, we can expect a widening and deepening of the process of social differentiation, which, if it is not corrected through mechanisms aimed at ensuring equal access, at least in the process of enabling youth to take over the permanent social roles, in the approach to social resources (primarily education), can be disastrous for the optimal development of a relatively undeveloped nation with a small population. What we mean is that human capital is what such countries, including Croatia, need to treat with a lot of thought and responsibility and invest in maximally. Among other things, by stimulating as many citizens as possible, especially the young, to actively participate in the social processes and institutions. Finally, the results obtained in this research may be summarized into tendencies and statements of a wider nature. Firstly, the political culture of youth testifies in a number of aspects that we are approaching democratic standards – especially regarding the acceptance of basic liberal-democratic values and the principle readiness for social engagement – but also that its social power and social capital are low. Secondly, the young are aware of their social and political marginalization, and recognize an entire spectrum of measures which might contribute to them achieving a certain amount of power and become active citizens, which is desirable in a democratic society, but they insufficiently use the channels of social and political promotion at their disposal. And thirdly, the young are not that different from the adults to enable us to mention a generational gap, let alone a conflict. However, the young did turn out to be somewhat more liberal, flexible and tolerant, which is certainly an argument in favor of them gaining and/or winning adequate social space for expressing their attitudes and desires. Their similarity to the adults might appease those social structures which fear that youth activation might end up in the radicalization of political life, which is difficult to control. This same inter-generational resemblance could be disappointing to those social structures that have high hopes regarding the innovative potential of youth and its ability to carry out the necessary changes. Independent of the potential fears and desires of the adults, one should assume that there is enough latent potential in the young population, which, in a more favorable social environment, might be more pronounced. The establishment of such an environment might be helped by the knowledge that the Croatian society, on its way to the European Union, needs the activity of all social resources, as well as the potential of youth, as the most vital segment of the society, which is most open to changes.
This work has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 645763. ; Distinctive political compromises prevailed and explained various brands of capitalism observed from WWII to the early 1990s. Is this key finding by régulation research been still valid given the wide diffusion of common structural changes since the 2000s: slow productivity in the industrialized world, overwhelming impact of finance, rise of inequalities within many Nation-States in response to deregulation, social and political polarization, open conflict between capitalism and democracy, the trading place between mature and emerging economies? These stylized facts challenge most economic theories but they can be explained by an institutionalist and historical approach that also helps in redesigning a relevant macroeconomic approach. Each capitalism brand displays specific complementarities among institutional forms and their growing interactions imply more their complementarity than their frontal competition. Consequently, all capitalisms have been transformed but they do not converge towards a canonical configuration. The rise of nationalist movements may challenge the present international relations but they should not underestimate the economic and social costs of their protectionist strategy.
This work has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 645763. ; Distinctive political compromises prevailed and explained various brands of capitalism observed from WWII to the early 1990s. Is this key finding by régulation research been still valid given the wide diffusion of common structural changes since the 2000s: slow productivity in the industrialized world, overwhelming impact of finance, rise of inequalities within many Nation-States in response to deregulation, social and political polarization, open conflict between capitalism and democracy, the trading place between mature and emerging economies? These stylized facts challenge most economic theories but they can be explained by an institutionalist and historical approach that also helps in redesigning a relevant macroeconomic approach. Each capitalism brand displays specific complementarities among institutional forms and their growing interactions imply more their complementarity than their frontal competition. Consequently, all capitalisms have been transformed but they do not converge towards a canonical configuration. The rise of nationalist movements may challenge the present international relations but they should not underestimate the economic and social costs of their protectionist strategy.
This work has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 645763. ; Distinctive political compromises prevailed and explained various brands of capitalism observed from WWII to the early 1990s. Is this key finding by régulation research been still valid given the wide diffusion of common structural changes since the 2000s: slow productivity in the industrialized world, overwhelming impact of finance, rise of inequalities within many Nation-States in response to deregulation, social and political polarization, open conflict between capitalism and democracy, the trading place between mature and emerging economies? These stylized facts challenge most economic theories but they can be explained by an institutionalist and historical approach that also helps in redesigning a relevant macroeconomic approach. Each capitalism brand displays specific complementarities among institutional forms and their growing interactions imply more their complementarity than their frontal competition. Consequently, all capitalisms have been transformed but they do not converge towards a canonical configuration. The rise of nationalist movements may challenge the present international relations but they should not underestimate the economic and social costs of their protectionist strategy.
In: Soziale Ungleichheit, kulturelle Unterschiede: Verhandlungen des 32. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie in München. Teilbd. 1 und 2, p. 2883-2894
"The paper rejects the notion of 'multiple modernities' as both conceptually flawed and empirically unfounded. In line with the sociological tradition, it will argue that we should speak of modernity only in the singular. Modernity, according to this view, denotesa peculiar epoch in the history of human kind, originating in Europe and spreading from there to the rest of the world. We may well be tempted to succumb too quickly to ill-conceived generalizations of what are in fact often only particular, locally based experiences. But we should also not lose sight of the truly revolutionary character of the historical 'breakthrough' to modernity. The protagonists of the multiple modernities paradigm appear to be doing precisely this: their very terminology impliesa trivialization of what is common to 'the' modern condition. At the same time, it suggests an overrating of which ever diversities (may) exist in different parts of the world. The paper will identify four main conceptual flaws in the pertinent literature: 1. The proclivity to equate modernity with its polity. The proposed conception of modernity is thus too thin for capturing the complex social structure of modern society as a whole. 2. To the extent that a theory of modernity is proposed at all, this theory is a self proclaimed cultural theory. Such a theory may shed light on some of the historical roots and self-perceptions of modernity, but it does so at the cost of excluding any thorough analysis of institutions. 3. The conceptualization of inter-societal difference in civilizational terms is misleading because it rules out, almost by definition, the possibility that countries belonging to different civilizations may in certain respects have more in common with ones from other civilizations than with some of the members of their 'own'. 4. The account's notion of diversity is exceedingly vague - the nature and profundity of the differences that are said to exist between different modernities are nowhere discussed at adequate length. But we need to know them to assess their social theoretic significance. In addition to these conceptual flaws, there are also various empirical phenomena and trends that challenge key premises of the multiple modernities approach. None of this is to say there are no differences between different regions, countries, civilizations. Nor is it to suggest their insignificance. It is, however, to suggest that we be more precise and that we extend our analyses beyond the confines of culture and politics - at least if we want to say something meaningful about modernity or modern society at large. Rather than speaking of multiple modernities, a better alternative to accommodate existing differences might be a yet to be developed concept of 'varieties of modernity' - akin to (but naturally pitched at a higher level of abstraction than) the notion of 'varieties of capitalism' which is beginning to crystallize in the new political economy literature." (author's abstract)
"The world has a lot of questions about the current state of affairs between the United States and Iran… How has the US undermined democracy in Iran? Is Iran really trying to develop nuclear weapons? How has US waged a terror campaign against Iran for years? How is it that the US and Israel, rather than Iran, are destabilizing the Middle East? How has Iran helped the US in the war on terror? In 'The Plot to Attack Iran', critically acclaimed author Dan Kovalik exposes what Americans have known about the Islamic Republic is largely based on propaganda. The 1953 coup that deposed the democratically-elected prime minister for a US-selected shah? Sold to average American citizens as a necessity to protect democracy and guard against communism. In truth, it was America's lust for Iranian oil and power that installed the tyrannical shah. The Iranian hostage crisis that miraculously ended with Ronald Reagan's inauguration as president? Evidence shows that Reagan negotiated with the hostage-takers to hold the hostages until his inauguration. Iran, once known as Persia, is one of the oldest nations on earth. It has a rich history and a unique culture, and is bordered by seven countries, the Caspian Sea, and the Persian Gulf. It is literally the intersection of many countries and many worlds. It has a population of eighty million people and occupies a space nearly the size of Alaska, the largest US state; it is the seventeenth largest country in the world. Over the past century, Iran's greatest resource, and at the same time its greatest curse, has been its oil. For it is oil that has caused the United States and other world powers to systematically attempt to destroy Iran. After a greedy Iranian monarch sold all of Iran's oil and natural gas reserves to a British financier in 1901, the West started just one of its many invasions and exploitations of the country. Using recently declassified documents and memos, as well as first-hand experience of the country, critically-acclaimed author Dan Kovalik will change the way you think about Iran, and especially what you think of US interference there. Learn how the United States vilifies its enemies, and accuses them of unspeakable horror to mask its own terrible crimes. Not only does the illuminating and important 'The Plot to Attack Iran' delve into the current incendiary situation, but it also predicts what could happen next, and what needs to be done before it is too late." (Publisher's description)
