The topics of urban insecurity have advanced as a central part of the local electoral strategies in the recent years. The objective of this paper is to analyze the political strategies in dispute based on the problem of urban crime. The approach is qualitatively based on the technique of political discourse analysis. The fragments referring to the issue of urban security are analyzed within a corpus of campaign material (graphic, audiovisual and journalistic) in the election for Head of Government of the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 2007. The results show how most political spaces incorporated urban security and defined their electoral positions based on this topic. The speeches of each political space focus on the modalities that differentiate the way of intervening on the criminal issue. Thus, it was verified that the speech of the PRO used descriptive components with diagnostic and proactive elements (the city is risky and with the measures that will be taken the situation could be resolved), the FPV highlighted the evasive key of the security issue to focus on the social topics, and +BA reinforced the prescriptive component (it should continue like this). The components used by each candidate form a recipient that defines a differential us in each case: the victim citizen; the rational citizen and the protected citizen ; Los tópicos sobre la inseguridad urbana pasaron a ser una parte central de las estrategias electorales locales en los últimos años. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar las estrategias electorales en disputa a partir de los discursos acerca del crimen urbano en la ciudad de Buenos Aires. El abordaje es cualitativo a partir de la técnica análisis del discurso político. Se analizan los fragmentos referidos a la cuestión de la seguridad urbana al interior de un corpus de material de campaña (gráfico, audiovisual y periodístico) de la elección de jefe de gobierno de Buenos Aires, Argentina, del 2007. Los resultados muestran cómo los espacios políticos mayoritarios incorporaron la seguridad urbana y definieron sus posicionamientos electorales a partir de este tópico. Los discursos de cada espacio político se centran en tres modalidades que diferencian el modo de intervenir sobre la cuestión criminal. Así, se verificó que el discurso del pro utilizó componentes descriptivos con elementos diagnósticos y propositivos (la ciudad es riesgosa y con las medidas que se tomarán se podrá resolver la situación), el fpv subrayó la clave evasiva del tema securitariopara centrarse en la cuestión social, y +BAreforzó el orden prescriptivo (debemos seguir así). Los componentes utilizados por cada candidato configuran un destinatario que define un 'nosotros' diferencial en cada caso: el ciudadano víctima; el ciudadano racional; y un ciudadano protegido ; Os tópicos sobre a insegurança urbana passaram a ser uma parte central das estratégias eleitorais locais nos últimos anos. O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar as estratégias eleitorais em disputa a partir dos discursos sobre o crime urbano na cidade de Buenos Aires. A abordagem é qualitativa a partir da técnica de análise do discurso político. Foram analisados os fragmentos referentes à questão da segurança urbana dentro de um corpus de material de campanha (gráfico, audiovisual e jornalístico) da eleição para Chefe de Governo da cidade de Buenos Aires (Argentina) no ano de 2007. Os resultados mostram como os espaços políticos majoritários incorporaram a segurança urbana e definiram seus posicionamentos eleitorais a partir desse tópico. Os discursos de cada espaço político se centram em três modalidades que diferenciam o modo de intervir sobre a questão criminal. Assim, verificou-se que o discurso do PRO utilizou componentes descritivos com elementos diagnósticos e propositivos (a cidade oferece riscos e com as medidas que serão tomadas poderemos resolver a situação). O FPV destacou a chave evasiva do tema da segurança para se concentrar na questão social e o +BA reforçou a ordem prescritiva (devemos continuar assim). Os componentes utilizados pelos candidatos configuram um destinatário que define um "nós" diferencial em cada caso: o cidadão vítima, o cidadão racional e o cidadão protegido
Gerardo L. Munck. University of Southern California (USC)@GerardoMunckSocial scientists have not discovered laws similar to those in the physical sciences. But they undersell what their disciplines have accomplished. That is why I like Josep Colomer's claim that 30 important propositions in political science should be treated as "things we know." Nov 25, 2022252. Retweets. 16. Quote Tweets. 1,043. LikesTo convey a sense of Colomer's claim, I copy verbatim the 30 propositions. Sources: Josep Colomer, The Science of Politics: An Introduction (2011), Oxford University Press, pp. xxi -xxv. - https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259760896_The_Science_of_Politics_An_IntroductionCiencia de la politica (2010, 2017), Editorial Ariel. - https://www.amazon.com/-/es/Josep-Maria-Colomer/dp/8434425289?asin=B06WD4Z1N7&revisionId=d87f6ef8&format=1&depth=1·1.PUBLIC GOODS. In contrast to private goods, public goods are indivisible & cannot be satisfactorily provided by the market or other private initiatives. The provision of public goods requires cooperation or coercion, whether by means of collective action or effective government2. GOVERNMENT SIZE. The demand for public goods and the relative levels of public expenditure by governments tend to increase with economic prosperity, institutional stability, and democracy.3. COLLECTIVE ACTION. Members of small, concentrated, and homogeneous communities or interest groups have more incentives to cooperate and participate in collective action than members of large, dispersed, and heterogeneous groups. /13. COLLECTIVE ACTION. In the public arena, small groups tend to have relatively more access to public resources at the expense of large groups. /24. VOICE VERSUS EXIT. Collective action for the advancement of collective interests, or "voice," weakens and may fail if the rival action of "exit," in search for an alternative provider, is less costly and more likely to give access to public goods.5. PRISONER'S DILEMMA. The "Prisoner's Dilemma," which is the most famous model in game theory, can represent the basic structure of collective action problems for the provision of public goods. /15. PRISONER'S DILEMMA. In this game, each actor has incentives not to cooperate, which may lead to an inefficient outcome in which all the participants are worse off than if all cooperated. /26. SUSTAINED COOPERATION. In interactions of the Prisoner's Dilemma type, sustained cooperation can emerge if actors apply the strategy of cooperating and doing unto others as they do unto yourself—also called "Tit for Tat." /16. SUSTAINED COOPERATION. Mutual cooperation is more likely the greater the uncertainty as to the length of the collective relationship and the higher the number of interactions you may be involved in. /27. LEADERSHIP. Collective action of communities and interest groups can develop thanks to leadership. Leaders distribute the costs of action among group members to provide public and private goods, /17. LEADERSHIP. while, in exchange, followers give the leaders votes or support and allow them to enjoy the benefits of power, fame, income, and a political career. /28. SMALL IS DEMOCRATIC. Small communities, which tend to be relatively harmonious in economic and ethnic terms, are comparatively advantageous for soft, democratic forms of government. /18. SMALL IS DEMOCRATIC. In recent times, small independent countries and self-governed communities have proliferated, thus making the average country size decrease. /29. MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE. Multiple levels of government, including local, state, and global, are necessary for an efficient provision of public goods at diverse territorial scales.10. FEDERATION NEEDS MANY UNITS. Local democratic self-government and large-scale provision of public goods can be compatible by means of federalism. Many-unit federations, in which no unit is sufficiently large to dominate, tend to survive and endure. /110. FEDERATION NEEDS MANY UNITS. In contrast, two-unit-only federations tend to fail, leading to either absorption of the smaller unit by the larger one or secession of the small, likely dominated unit. /211. DICTATORSHIPS FAIL AND FALL. Dictatorships have self-appointed rulers holding on to power by coercive and violent means. They can survive on the basis of repression and their "substantive" performance, whether economic or other. /111. DICTATORSHIPS FAIL AND FALL. But they also tend to fall as a consequence of their failures, including military defeats, economic crises, or the dictator's death. /212. DEVELOPMENT FAVORS DEMOCRACY. Democracy is based on freedom and regular elections of rulers. Economic development favors the viability of democratic regimes because it tends to reduce income and social polarization and lower the intensity of redistributive conflicts.13. DEMOCRACY FAVORS DEVELOPMENT. Democracy can favor economic development because it is strongly associated with the rule of law and is more competent in the provision of public goods.14. DEMOCRATIC PEACE. Democratic states are less likely to fight one another and engage in wars than dictatorships.15. PARTY OLIGARCHY. Political parties are organizations that present policy proposals and compete for political power. A political organization tends to become an "oligarchy," ie, it tends to be dominated by political leaders or professional politicians seeking votes & offices.16. EXTREME ACTIVISTS. Voluntary political activists hold more "extreme" policy or ideological positions than party voters and even party leadership.17.MEDIAN VOTER. In elections in which only 2 major parties compete, they may have incentives to approach each other and converge in their policy positions. Once they converge around the median voter's preference, neither party has electoral incentives to move away from the other party18. INCUMBENT ADVANTAGE. Electoral competition is asymmetric between the government and the opposition. The incumbent party in government can gain advantage in electoral competition by providing or hiding information on its record to obtain credibility.19. ISSUE OWNERSHIP. In spite of parties' convergence in their policy positions on some issues, a party can keep advantage and "own" an issue if its past record in government has given it credit for policy making on that issue.20. NON-DEBATE CAMPAIGNS. In electoral campaigns, rival parties and candidates tend to choose or emphasize different policy issues according to different issue ownership and the parties' or candidates' expected relative advantage.21. POLICY CONSENSUS. In the long term, broad policy consensus can be accumulated on an increasing number of issues. But in the short term, mediocre policies and incumbent parties with no good performance in government may survive for lack of a sufficiently popular alternative.22. CONSENSUAL PLURALISM. There is an inverse correlation between the number of political parties in a system and the degree of party polarization in electoral competition. /122. CONSENSUAL PLURALISM. High fragmentation of the party system is associated with a high number of issues on the policy agenda, which generates low polarization of political competition and more opportunities for consensus. /2123. MAJORITY BIPARTISM. Presidential and other one-office elections by plurality rule tend to be associated with single-party dominance or a balance between two parties.24. MORE SEATS, MORE PARTIES. In assembly and parliamentary elections, large size of the assembly and a high number of seats in each district and proportional representation are associated with a high number of political parties.25. MICRO-MEGA RULE. When choosing electoral rules, large parties prefer small assemblies and small districts by plurality rule, while small parties prefer large assemblies and large districts with proportional representation.26. SMALL ASSEMBLIES, LARGE DISTRICTS. The development of multiple parties favors the adoption of large multi-seat districts with proportional representation rules. In the long term, proportional representation rules have been increasingly adopted. /126. SMALL ASSEMBLIES, LARGE DISTRICTS. But in very large countries, a large federal assembly can be elected with different electoral rules, including small single-seat districts. /227.INSTITUTIONAL "DEADLOCK." Single-party government promotes a high concentration of power, which may foster effectiveness in decision-making. In contrast, separate elections for different offices & divisions of power may produce divided government, "deadlock," & policy stability.28.MINIMUMCOALITIONS.Parties in parliament tend to form minimum-size winning coalitions & prefer partners located in contiguous policy & ideology positions. The distribution of cabinet portfolios among coalition parties tends to be proportional to the N of seats controlled by each party.29. CABINET DURATION. Single-party majority cabinets tend to last longer than multiparty coalition or minority cabinets.30. TWO-PARTY STALEMATE. In a system with separation of powers between the presidency and the congress, policy change is relatively more viable if there are multiple parties or individual members of congress are not strongly tied to party votes.30. TWO-PARTY STALEMATE. In contrast, a two-party system with strong party discipline may prop up confrontation and inter-institutional stalemate. /2
Bad governance causes economic, social, developmental and environmental problems in many developing countries. Developing countries have adopted a number of reforms that have assisted in achieving good governance. The success of governance reform depends on the starting point of each country – what institutional arrangements exist at the out-set and who the people implementing reforms within the existing institutional framework are. This dissertation focuses on how formal institutions (laws and regulations) and informal institutions (culture, habit and conception) impact on good governance. Three characteristics central to good governance - transparency, participation and accountability are studied in the research. A number of key findings were: Good governance in Hanoi and Berlin represent the two extremes of the scale, while governance in Berlin is almost at the top of the scale, governance in Hanoi is at the bottom. Good governance in Hanoi is still far from achieved. In Berlin, information about public policies, administrative services and public finance is available, reliable and understandable. People do not encounter any problems accessing public information. In Hanoi, however, public information is not easy to access. There are big differences between Hanoi and Berlin in the three forms of participation. While voting in Hanoi to elect local deputies is formal and forced, elections in Berlin are fair and free. The candidates in local elections in Berlin come from different parties, whereas the candidacy of local deputies in Hanoi is thoroughly controlled by the Fatherland Front. Even though the turnout of voters in local deputy elections is close to 90 percent in Hanoi, the legitimacy of both the elections and the process of representation is non-existent because the local deputy candidates are decided by the Communist Party. The involvement of people in solving local problems is encouraged by the government in Berlin. The different initiatives include citizenry budget, citizen activity, citizen initiatives, etc. Individual citizens are free to participate either individually or through an association. Lacking transparency and participation, the quality of public service in Hanoi is poor. Citizens seldom get their services on time as required by the regulations. Citizens who want to receive public services can bribe officials directly, use the power of relationships, or pay a third person – the mediator ("Cò" - in Vietnamese). In contrast, public service delivery in Berlin follows the customer-orientated principle. The quality of service is high in relation to time and cost. Paying speed money, bribery and using relationships to gain preferential public service do not exist in Berlin. Using the examples of Berlin and Hanoi, it is clear to see how transparency, participation and accountability are interconnected and influence each other. Without a free and fair election as well as participation of non-governmental organisations, civil organisations, and the media in political decision-making and public actions, it is hard to hold the Hanoi local government accountable. The key differences in formal institutions (regulative and cognitive) between Berlin and Hanoi reflect the three main principles: rule of law vs. rule by law, pluralism vs. monopoly Party in politics and social market economy vs. market economy with socialist orientation. In Berlin the logic of appropriateness and codes of conduct are respect for laws, respect of individual freedom and ideas and awareness of community development. People in Berlin take for granted that public services are delivered to them fairly. Ideas such as using money or relationships to shorten public administrative procedures do not exist in the mind of either public officials or citizens. In Hanoi, under a weak formal framework of good governance, new values and norms (prosperity, achievement) generated in the economic transition interact with the habits of the centrally-planned economy (lying, dependence, passivity) and traditional values (hierarchy, harmony, family, collectivism) influence behaviours of those involved. In Hanoi "doing the right thing" such as compliance with law doesn't become "the way it is". The unintended consequence of the deliberate reform actions of the Party is the prevalence of corruption. The socialist orientation seems not to have been achieved as the gap between the rich and the poor has widened. Good governance is not achievable if citizens and officials are concerned only with their self-interest. State and society depend on each other. Theoretically to achieve good governance in Hanoi, institutions (formal and informal) able to create good citizens, officials and deputies should be generated. Good citizens are good by habit rather than by nature. The rule of law principle is necessary for the professional performance of local administrations and People's Councils. When the rule of law is applied consistently, the room for informal institutions to function will be reduced. Promoting good governance in Hanoi is dependent on the need and desire to change the government and people themselves. Good governance in Berlin can be seen to be the result of the efforts of the local government and citizens after a long period of development and continuous adjustment. Institutional transformation is always a long and complicated process because the change in formal regulations as well as in the way they are implemented may meet strong resistance from the established practice. This study has attempted to point out the weaknesses of the institutions of Hanoi and has identified factors affecting future development towards good governance. But it is not easy to determine how long it will take to change the institutional setting of Hanoi in order to achieve good governance. ; Bad governance (schlechte Regierungsführung) verursacht neben wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Schäden auch Umwelt- und Entwicklungsprobleme in vielen Entwicklungsländern. Entwicklungsländer haben zahlreiche Reformen in Angriff genommen, welche sie in der Entwicklung von good governance (gute Regierungsführung) unterstützen sollen. Der Erfolg solcher Reformen staatlicher Steuerungs- und Regelsysteme hängt jedoch maßgeblich von der Ausgangssituation in den einzelnen Ländern ab. Einfluss auf den Erfolg haben Faktoren wie z. B. die existierende institutionelle Ordnung, auf die zu Beginn solcher Reformen zurückgegriffen werden kann. Auch der verantwortliche Personenkreis, der mit der Umsetzung der Reformen beauftragt wird, ist für deren Erfolg maßgeblich. Diese Dissertation befasst sich damit, wie sich formelle Institutionen (Gesetze und Regeln) sowie informelle Institutionen (Kultur, Gewohnheit und Wahrnehmung) auf good governance auswirken können. Im Rahmen dieser Forschungsarbeit werden drei Merkmale mit besonderem Bezug zu good governance untersucht: Transparenz, Partizipation und Rechenschaftspflicht. Folgende Untersuchungsergebnisse sind hervorzuheben: In Bezug auf good governance stellen Berlin und Hanoi zwei Extreme dar. Während Berlin auf einer "good-governance-Skala" im positiven oberen Bereich anzusiedeln wäre, müsste sich Hanoi eher im unteren Bereich wiederfinden. Good governance im Sinne von verantwortungsvoller Regierungsführung ist in Hanoi bei weitem noch nicht erreicht. So sind in Berlin Informationen sowohl über die Ziele und die Entscheidungen der am Politikprozess beteiligten Akteure und über Dienstleistungen der Verwaltung als auch über die öffentlichen Finanzen allgemein abrufbar, verlässlich und verständlich. Dies ist nicht der Fall in Hanoi. Während in Berlin die BürgerInnen keine Schwierigkeiten im Zugang zu öffentlichen Informationen haben, so sind diese Informationen in Hanoi nicht oder nur schwer erhältlich. Weiterhin gibt es zwischen Hanoi und Berlin erhebliche Unterschiede in den drei Arten der Partizipation. Während die Wahlen kommunaler Vertreter in Hanoi rein formell und erzwungen sind, so sind Wahlen in Berlin gleich, geheim und frei. Bei den Berliner Kommunalwahlen entstammen die VertreterInnen den unterschiedlichen Parteien und Wählervereinigungen, während die Kandidatur der KommunalvertreterInnen in Hanoi weitgehend durch die Volksfront bestimmt wird. Obwohl die Wahlbeteiligung bei den lokalen Wahlen in Hanoi bei fast 90% liegt, so ist die Legitimität sowohl der Wahlen selbst als auch des Vertretungsprozesses so gut wie nicht vorhanden. Die zu wählenden VolksvertreterInnen werden ausschließlich durch die Kommunistische Partei bestimmt. In Berlin wird die Teilhabe der BürgerInnen bei der Lösung kommunaler Probleme durch die Regierung gefördert. Hierzu werden unterschiedliche Methoden genutzt, u. a. der Bürgerhaushalt, Bürgerportale, Bürgerinitiativen etc. Einzelne BürgerInnen können entscheiden, ob sie sich individuell oder auch kollektiv einbringen. Durch das Fehlen von Transparenz und bürgerlicher Teilhabe ist die Qualität öffentlicher Dienstleistungen in Hanoi gering. So werden Dienstleistungen selten innerhalb der Fristerbracht, die gesetzlich vorgegeben ist. BürgerInnen, die dennoch öffentliche Dienstleistungen in Anspruch nehmen und zeitnah erhalten wollen, können die verantwortlichen Beamten direkt bestechen, ihre persönlichen Beziehungen nutzen oder eine dritte Person gegen Bezahlung beauftragen – einen "Mediator" (Vietnamesisch: "Cò"). Im Gegensatz hierzu werden Dienstleistungen in Berlin kundenorientiert erbracht. Die Qualität der Dienstleistungen ist in Bezug auf Zeit und Kosten hochwertig. Schmiergeldzahlungen, Bestechung sowie das Nutzen persönlicher Beziehungen im Austausch für "bessere" öffentliche Dienstleistungen sind in Berlin unüblich. Die Analyse der Fallstudien in Berlin und Hanoi verdeutlichen, wie Transparenz, bürgerliche Teilhabe sowie Rechenschaftspflicht miteinander verflochten sind und sich gegenseitig beeinflussen. Es ist schwierig die Kommunalverwaltung in Hanoi zur Rechenschaft zu ziehen. Hierzu fehlt es an geeigneten Instrumenten, wie z.B. freie und gleiche Wahlen. Es fehlt ebenfalls die Beteiligung von Akteuren wie freien Medien, Nichtregierungsorganisationen und zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen. Der wesentliche Unterschied formeller regulativer und kognitiver Institutionen zwischen Berlin und Hanoi wird anhand von drei Prinzipien dargestellt: Rechtsstaatlichkeit (Rule of Law) vs. Herrschaft durch Recht (rule by law), Pluralismus vs. Einheitspartei innerhalb der Politik sowie Marktwirtschaft vs. Marktwirtschaft sozialistischer Prägung. In Berlin gelten Verhaltensnormen, welche das Gesetz und die individuelle Freiheit respektieren. Ebenso herrscht das Bewusstsein vor, die Gemeinschaft zu fördern. EinwohnerInnen Berlins erachten es als selbstverständlich, dass sie öffentliche Dienstleistungen gerecht in Anspruch nehmen können. Die Vorstellung, Geld oder Beziehungen auf unrechtmäßige Art zu nutzen, um Verwaltungsvorgänge abzukürzen, herrschen weder bei Verwaltung noch bei den BürgerInnen vor. Innerhalb eines schwachen formellen Rahmens von good governance in Hanoi interagieren neue Werte und Normen einer Volkswirtschaft im Umbruch (Wohlstand, Erfolg) mit denen einer Planwirtschaft (Lügen, Abhängigkeit, Passivität) sowie mit denen traditioneller Gesellschaften (Hierarchie, Harmonie, Familie, Kollektivismus) und beeinflussen die Handlungen der Akteure. In Hanoi wird es nicht als selbstverständlich angesehen, das zu tun, was in Berlin als "das Richtige" angesehen würde, z. B. Gesetze einzuhalten. Unbeabsichtigte Konsequenzen willkürlicher Reformaktivitäten der Partei zeigen sich im Fortbestehen von Korruption. Die sozialistische Orientierung der Marktwirtschaft scheint nicht erreicht worden zu sein, da sich die Schere zwischen Reich und Arm geweitet hat. Good governance ist unerreichbar, wenn BürgerInnen, Verwaltung und PolitikerInnen hauptsächlich von Eigeninteressen gelenkt werden. Der Staat und die Gesellschaft hängen voneinander ab. Um theoretisch good governance in Hanoi zu erreichen, müssten (formelle und informelle) Institutionen geschaffen werden, die positiven Einfluss auf BürgerInnen, Verwaltung und VolksvertreterInnen haben. BürgerInnen sind "gut" aufgrund von Lernprozessen und Gewöhnung und nicht aufgrund ihrer Natur. Das Rechtstaatlichkeitsprinzip ist notwendig, um die Leistungsbereitschaft lokaler Verwaltungen sowie der Volksvertretungen zu stärken. Sobald Rechtstaatlichkeit konsequente Anwendung findet, verringert sich auch der Raum, in dem informelle Institutionen angewendet werden können. Die Förderung von good governance in Hanoi hängt im Wesentlichen vom Verlangen ab, die Regierung und die Menschen zu verändern. Good governance in Berlin sollte als Ergebnis eines andauernden Prozesses von Entwicklung und Änderung von Lokalregierung und BürgerInnen angesehen werden. Institutionelle Transformation ist ein langwieriger und komplizierter Prozess. Veränderungen formeller Regelungen sowie die Art der Implementierung solch neuer Regelungen trifft möglicherweise auf starken Widerstand seitens etablierter Akteure mit ihren Gewohnheiten. In dieser Studie wurde gezeigt, welches die Schwachpunkte der Institutionen in Hanoi sind. Ebenso wurden jene Faktoren identifiziert, welche die zukünftige Entwicklung in Richtung von good governance beeinflussen können. Es ist jedoch schwierig einzuschätzen, wie lange es dauern wird, das institutionelle Gefüge in Hanoi hin zu verantwortungsvoller Regierungsführung zu ändern.
Reapportionment shook up Caddo and Bossier Parish representation in the Louisiana Legislature, setting up for some new faces, refugees from other local offices, and intense clashes on this fall's ballot.
The area's overall declining population rearranged things considerably. Which boundaries are coming and going will create some interesting dynamics.
In the House of Representatives, District 1 won last time for his first term by Republican Danny McCormick, retreated from Bossier Parish to become a completely Caddo-based entity. He will again face Republican Randall Liles in a race that could be closer than last time. Although McCormick eked out a general election win without runoff, he ran six percentage points better in Bossier than Caddo. Still, the foothold he has established over the past four years and votes reflecting the district's ideological tilt should be enough to reelect him.
The Bossier precincts largely transfer into District 10, the Webster Parish-based district held by an unopposed Republican Wayne McMahen. The district him for currently has Bossier's most southern precinct as a footnote, but starting in 2024 his Bossier portion swings north and grows substantially.
The other district within Bossier that largely was an afterthought, the Caddo-based District 2 currently held by the leader of Democrats' House caucus Sam Jenkins, expanded somewhat around old Bossier City. Jenkins will try for the Senate District 39 seat of term-limited Democrat Greg Tarver, and in his place Democrat Caddo School Board Member Terence Vinson will make his second try for the seat in eight years. He is joined by Democrat Caddo Parish Commissioner Steven Jackson.
Vinson's familiarity with the district should help, but his main asset is the quite erratic and controversial tenure that Jackson has had in office. In Bossier, Jackson committed his most recent and biggest folly, convicted for impersonating a police officer, which should just add to fodder that ends Jackson's political career.
Joining Jenkins in pursuit of a Senate seat is District 4 Democrat Cedric Glover. That House territory open, school board member Democrat Jasmine Green, term-limited Democrat commissioner Lyndon Johnson, and former District 3 candidate Democrat Joy Walters, who in 2019 lost narrowly to Democrat Tammy Phelps, who didn't draw an opponent this year, when she lived in that district. This could go in any direction, likely to the candidate who most convincingly runs to the far left ideologically while conveying an ability to bring home the bacon.
District 5 shifted eastward, still containing southeastern Caddo but with much of it now outside the parish, the plurality of that in southern Bossier and the remainder scattered well south into Red River Parish. Former Bossier Parish School Board Member Republican Dennis Bamburg played his cards right to become only one of three rookies to enter the House next year without drawing any opposition.
While that district entered Bossier, District 6 exited it and will pick up a new representative as GOP state Rep. Thomas Pressly will gun for Senate District 38 that moved over to grab east Shreveport. Michael Melerine, present Board of Elementary and Secondary Education member, also will take part in musical chairs by running for this spot. He is a big favorite against no party public defender Evan McMichael and Democrat theater manager and activist Robert Darrow.
In recent years, the traditional afterthought House district in Caddo has been District 7, as most of it is in rural parishes to the south. GOP incumbent Larry Bagley is heavily favored to retain that seat for a final term. In Bossier, the boundaries shoved a bit north, District 8 Republican Raymond Crews faces no opposition for another term.
As previously noted, district boundary changes and Bossier political establishment annoyance will create a rugged reelection battle for Republican Dodie Horton to secure a final term. She squares off against businessman Chris Turner, the establishment's pick. Her solid conservative legislative record might be enough to hold him off.
The reconfigured Senate District 38, open as incumbent Barry Milligan declined to run for a second term, that drew in Pressly managed to retain former Democrat now Republican former seat holder John Milkovich. Voters after one term grew sour on his taste for big government in particular and Milligan handily defeated him last time. Pressly is favored over him and also banker but previously political operative Republican Chase Jennings.
Spanning both parishes with a little presence in Bossier, the District 39 race that attracted Glover and Jenkins also brought back Democrat former state Rep. Barbara Norton, who tried to contest Tarver last time but who ran afoul of the residency requirement. With all three having tasted success in running in parts of the district, this also will be a contest where the winning candidate most convincingly runs to the left and shows an ability to pile up the pork. Making things even more interesting, perennial GOP candidate Jim Slagle is back, with his impact uncertain on who will make the runoff, or even against him. However, Glover's track record also as Shreveport mayor perhaps gives him a slight edge.
Perhaps receiving the award for most far-flung district touching multiple parishes, the plurality of new District 31's residents lie in Bossier and Caddo, washing over the southern reaches of each. As in the case of House District 9 but for somewhat different reasons, this turned out as a battle of the Bossier political establishment, if not of the rump grouping of white northwest Louisiana Democrats whose power steadily has faded, against conservative insurgents. As previously noted, establishment forces back retired basketball coach Republican Mike McConathy while insurgents are behind one of the Legislature's most prominent disruptors of traditional liberal populism, term-limited Republican state Rep. Alan Seabaugh in a race sure to be close. Again, a long legislative conservative record may allow Seabaugh to move into the upper chamber.
Finally, as previously noted another contest in which the establishment has a vested interest occurs in District 36, which has migrated south and mostly out of Webster Parish. Republican incumbent Robert Mills, who beat an establishment incumbent last time that spent the most money on a legislative race in history, takes on another establishment favorite in the form of Republican Bossier Parish School Board Member Adam Bass. Mills has run into difficulty among area conservatives by not backing an effort to hold the line on spending hundreds of millions more dollars on capital outlay this past year, and this disgruntlement presented an opportunity for the establishment to jump on him. Mills will have to hope an otherwise solidly conservative voting record carries him to victory.
Mexico's current administration, in its final stretch, will leave behind a legacy of a highly controversial and ideological energy policy that in practice halted the progress of the ambitious 2013 energy reform. Now, the country is gearing up for its largest-ever elections in 2024, and Claudia Sheinbaum, the candidate currently leading the polls, has declared her intention to continue the main policies of the AMLO administration, including a vision of the energy sector premised on the notion that the current government did not achieve all its energy policy objectives due to an "inherited" legal framework—the energy reform of 2013—that hindered the advancement of energy sovereignty goals. Recently the president has proposed a constitutional reform that dismantles, in part, the legal framework of 2013, to which Sheinbaum has expressed absolute support. In this context, a review of Claudia Sheinbaum's academic and policy background on energy issues can help us understand the possible future scenarios that could be at play in the energy sector if she wins the presidency in June 2024. While these ideas may not necessarily materialize into public policy, they provide a scenario of how her perception of the sector has been shaped. What would be similar to and different from the current administration? From her writings and discourses, it is clear that Sheinbaum shares with AMLO the idea of having strong state-productive companies to promote energy supply security; that a national energy policy should encourage a low rate of energy imports, particularly emphasizing the dependence on foreign natural gas and fuel imports; and that private participation in the energy sector should be allowed but in second-order behind the state's role. On hydrocarbons, Sheinbaum has criticized in the past multiple-service contracts in Pemex, the "obsession" with deep-water exploration at the expense of exploration and production in shallow waters, and the need to involve foreign companies in these activities. When it comes to electricity, Sheinbaum publicly backed AMLO's electricity reform initiative, particularly the idea of CFE becoming the main electricity generator in Mexico. So where are the differences? Do they exist? One area where Sheinbaum seems to differentiate from AMLO's views have to do with climate change and renewables. There, she has been a longtime advocate of the need for a broader diversification of Mexico´s energy matrix, with a specific focus on increasing the share of renewable energy sources, as well as a deeper commitment to the country's climate change goals where she has expressed the need for the country to be more ambitious. For example, during her tenure as Head of Mexico City, several of her government projects had a personal imprint toward these goals, although she never suggested in any way discomfort with AMLO's pro-hydrocarbon policies. Hence, if one would want to foresee how a Sheinbaum energy policy would look if she becomes the next president of Mexico, the conclusion would have to be overall continuity with ideology continuing to shape many policy decisions, with some minor changes. However, despite any preconceived ideas about the energy sector that either Sheinbaum or Xóchitl Gálvez could have about it, the inherited challenges that the next administration will face are far more complex than the one AMLO inherited in 2018. In a nutshell, Mexico faces increasing energy demand due to pent-up demand and nearshoring, coupled with insufficient investment in energy infrastructure, mainly for electricity transmission. There is also a significant dependence on US natural gas, oil production that has fallen instead of increasing as the administration promised, a deteriorating financial situation in Pemex and, widespread business distrust primarily caused by abrupt legislative and regulatory changes that halted investments and the function of market mechanisms, such as the oil rounds and electricity auctions. Therefore, in the end, no matter the ideological views any of the candidates have about energy, reality will play a critical force in shaping the route Mexico will follow in its always highly politicized energy sector.
Mexico's current administration, in its final stretch, will leave behind a legacy of a highly controversial and ideological energy policy that in practice halted the progress of the ambitious 2013 energy reform. Now, the country is gearing up for its largest-ever elections in 2024, and Claudia Sheinbaum, the candidate currently leading the polls, has declared her intention to continue the main policies of the AMLO administration, including a vision of the energy sector premised on the notion that the current government did not achieve all its energy policy objectives due to an "inherited" legal framework—the energy reform of 2013—that hindered the advancement of energy sovereignty goals. Recently the president has proposed a constitutional reform that dismantles, in part, the legal framework of 2013, to which Sheinbaum has expressed absolute support. In this context, a review of Claudia Sheinbaum's academic and policy background on energy issues can help us understand the possible future scenarios that could be at play in the energy sector if she wins the presidency in June 2024. While these ideas may not necessarily materialize into public policy, they provide a scenario of how her perception of the sector has been shaped. What would be similar to and different from the current administration? From her writings and discourses, it is clear that Sheinbaum shares with AMLO the idea of having strong state-productive companies to promote energy supply security; that a national energy policy should encourage a low rate of energy imports, particularly emphasizing the dependence on foreign natural gas and fuel imports; and that private participation in the energy sector should be allowed but in second-order behind the state's role. On hydrocarbons, Sheinbaum has criticized in the past multiple-service contracts in Pemex, the "obsession" with deep-water exploration at the expense of exploration and production in shallow waters, and the need to involve foreign companies in these activities. When it comes to electricity, Sheinbaum publicly backed AMLO's electricity reform initiative, particularly the idea of CFE becoming the main electricity generator in Mexico. So where are the differences? Do they exist? One area where Sheinbaum seems to differentiate from AMLO's views have to do with climate change and renewables. There, she has been a longtime advocate of the need for a broader diversification of Mexico´s energy matrix, with a specific focus on increasing the share of renewable energy sources, as well as a deeper commitment to the country's climate change goals where she has expressed the need for the country to be more ambitious. For example, during her tenure as Head of Mexico City, several of her government projects had a personal imprint toward these goals, although she never suggested in any way discomfort with AMLO's pro-hydrocarbon policies. Hence, if one would want to foresee how a Sheinbaum energy policy would look if she becomes the next president of Mexico, the conclusion would have to be overall continuity with ideology continuing to shape many policy decisions, with some minor changes. However, despite any preconceived ideas about the energy sector that either Sheinbaum or Xóchitl Gálvez could have about it, the inherited challenges that the next administration will face are far more complex than the one AMLO inherited in 2018. In a nutshell, Mexico faces increasing energy demand due to pent-up demand and nearshoring, coupled with insufficient investment in energy infrastructure, mainly for electricity transmission. There is also a significant dependence on US natural gas, oil production that has fallen instead of increasing as the administration promised, a deteriorating financial situation in Pemex and, widespread business distrust primarily caused by abrupt legislative and regulatory changes that halted investments and the function of market mechanisms, such as the oil rounds and electricity auctions. Therefore, in the end, no matter the ideological views any of the candidates have about energy, reality will play a critical force in shaping the route Mexico will follow in its always highly politicized energy sector.
The last batch of campaign finance reports prior to this week's election reveal for candidates running in Bossier Parish that existing legislators may be pulling away from their opponents, all in contests that will be settled this weekend.
This last span of raising and spending importantly gives clues as to the direction of a candidacy at a crucial period. Unlike with the governor's race, where five to two weeks out most voters have made up their minds, other contests remain in flux as these typically have had little or no information delivered not only by media and sources independent of campaigns but also by the campaigns themselves. Ramping up efforts in this period produces the most impact. Further, donations in this period tend to display a front runner effect, where gifts go to candidates who donors believe will win so they can have access to whom they think eventually will win.
By that metric, Republicans state Sen. Robert Mills in District 36 and state Rep. Dodie Horton in District 9 took best advantage of their opportunities. Mills outraised his opponent GOP Bossier Parish School Board member Adam Bass by $50,000 and outspent him by $130,000. Both have about $100,000 left for the stretch run. Mills has leaned more towards using electronic means to entice voters, while Bass has taken a more hands-on approach without much indirect voter contact. A Senate district is of such size that either approach could work, but the latter takes much more campaigning effort.
Horton appeared to have even more momentum over her opponent GOP businessman Chris Turner. While he raised only around $10,000 and hardly spent anything, Horton pulled in $60,000 and spent most of that, leaving her with almost $100,000 for the home stretch or about $25,000 more than him. She spent on both instruments of direct voter contact and indirect means through electronic media.
Another sitting legislator but running for a different office, Senate District 31, Republican state Rep. Alan Seabaugh also seized an advantage over his opponent, GOP retired basketball coach Mike McConathy. Seabaugh raked in close to $60,000, beating McConathy by about $20,000, but drawing on a huge war chest shelled out over $170,000 or about $100,000 more than McConathy. Seabaugh has more than double McConathy's $120,000 available for the run home. He spent across all campaigning platforms while McConathy relied mostly on television advertising.
This contest, however, can't be judged entirely on the candidate's efforts because so much outside money is pouring into it. Here also Seabaugh seems to have a leg up, as particularly Americans for Prosperity Louisiana and the Louisiana Committee for a Conservative Majority have sent multiple mailers, with the Louisiana Republican Party chipping in. McConathy has had mailers on his behalf from Watchdog PAC, a dark money group recently taken over by Baton Rouge Republican maverick Scott Wilfong who through another organization has campaigned on McConathy's behalf, and Keep the Lights On PAC, a climate alarmist dark money group that spent heavily to elect far leftist Democrat Davante Lewis to the Public Service Commission.
Donor data reveal that Turner is drawing money disproportionately from unions and the Bossier political establishment. McConathy also is getting action from the Bossier good old boys and additionally much from trial lawyers.
Finally, in the one parish contest without a sitting legislator involved, recent reports show a continuing divergency trend in the House District 2 contest between Democrat Caddo Parish Commissioner Stevem Jackson and Democrat Caddo Parish School Board member Terence Vinson. Jackson leans heavily on a more traditional direct voter outreach approach, while Jackson spends more and heavily on electronic-based indirect contact.
The outcome of this one should be telling. At the House level, typically Vinson's approach is the most effective, and Jackson faces reputational problems. So, if Jackson's higher spending and more electronic-media based strategy works, it could signal changing dynamics in campaigning.
It's a bold bid, but one if even moderately successful could drag Louisiana governance (probably kicking and screaming) into the 21st century.
The Louisiana Freedom Caucus PAC, the campaign arm of a collection of Republican House of Representatives members plus supporters, last week released a list of endorsees for upcoming legislative elections. This entitles them to campaign assistance.
Endorsees are judged to adhere to conservative principles and include both current legislators and hopefuls in joining them. Regarding this decision for existing legislators, one criterion stood out: only the 19 representatives who voted against breaking the constitutional spending caps in this past regular legislative session were eligible for endorsement. No senators did.
Thus, among the senatorial endorsements, the only sitting legislators comprised House members running for the Senate. In one instance that meant tabbing a newcomer over an incumbent, and in another a legislative neophyte received the nod over a current House member. Besides four other representatives receiving this backing, a political rookie also won endorsement over the son of the incumbent state senator.
On the House side, 13 incumbents snagged the endorsement, although in four other cases incumbents were passed over for challengers, with another 13 going to contenders for open seats. As with Senate candidates, in almost every case an endorsee was chosen over at least one other Republican running.
LAFCPAC hopes to influence legislative affairs to create more conservative policy-making. Although Republicans held supermajorities in both legislative chambers this term, often bills similar to those in several other states that passed with ease there couldn't make it all the way in Louisiana because of key committee, floor, and veto session defections by a handful of Republicans, so the group hopes to put in place legislators less likely to go weak at the knees on these issues.
Nor did chamber leaders sufficiently back conservative causes. GOP Speaker Clay Schexnayder, now running for Secretary of State, assumed that role with well less than half of his party's votes, instead relying mostly on Democrats unified behind him. This led him and his team to slow-walk or actively try to obstruct a number of conservative measures eagerly embraced by the party's legislative leaders in many other states.
For some of these races, LAFCPAC likely will have little influence. House District 7 Republican state Rep. Larry Bagley at the end of last year had over $150,000 banked to run for a final term, while GOP challenger and LAFCPAC-endorsed Tim Pruitt has yet to report any fundraising at all, although he has started to campaign. It will be a tough road to hoe for him.
But in other instances, this endorsement could be crucial, especially as a signal to voters searching for reliably conservative candidates in fields without an incumbent but with multiple members of the GOP running. And where the group has endorsed a challenger, it creates a tool by which to hold more accountable any incumbent who survives, as well as alerting for the future that straying too much from voting by conservative principles could bring a challenger.
The real measure of the group's clout will come by assessing how many of its endorsees win open seats. From political unknowns to GOP state Rep. Alan Seabaugh, the group's chairman who is locked in a competitive race for an open Senate seat, a number of wins by endorsees will ensure its relevance and increase the sway it has over policy-making.
Groups like this don't often have lasting staying power. Already, one that isn't much older than the Caucus of which the Caucus essentially exists as a subset of it, the Louisiana Conservative Caucus, largely fizzled this spring in its attempts to sway Schexnayder, and it doesn't have an allied campaign apparatus designed to bolster the number of conservative lawmakers. If the Freedom Caucus can have a sufficient number of its endorsees win, it can last and in a way that pushes Louisiana towards following other states currently sprinting away from it in economic development and advancement of individual liberties.
Organized by the NGO Argentina Debate, the first Argentinian presidential debate was held on October the 4th, 2015. The incumbent, Daniel Scioli, had announced he would skip this debate the week before: an unexpected resolution. An empty chair was left where his place would have been. Exactly three years later, on October the 4th, 2018, the last debate prior to the first round of Brazil's presidential elections was held, part of an already well-established tradition. Using his heath as an excuse, candidate Jair Bolsonaro skipped this televised meeting. The object of this article consists of this two "missings". Its point of departure is that not going to a presidential debate is a costly decision for a presidential candidate. The article first explores hypothesis that can explain the decision to skip the debate in terms of its tactical implications. Second, the article turns to observe the absence as a cause, examining its discursive effects. The analysis is situated on two levels: strategic and discursive. The conclusions hang upon this twofold analysis, while taking advantage of a comparative approach. ; El 4 de octubre de 2015 se celebró el primer debate presidencial en la Argentina, organizado por Argentina Debate. El candidato del oficialismo, Daniel Scioli, decidió ausentarse una semana antes de la fecha pautada para la realización del duelo, elección inesperada que motivó la puesta en escena de un atril vacío durante la transmisión. Exactamente tres años más tarde, el 4 de octubre de 2018, excusándose con referencia a su salud, el entonces candidato Jair Bolsonaro no asistió al encuentro previo a la primera ronda de los comicios presidenciales en Brasil, parte de una tradición de debates ya consolidada en el país. Partiendo de la base de que faltar a un debate presidencial televisado es una decisión costosa para un candidato en carrera, el presente artículo toma por objeto ambas ausencias. En primer lugar, explora hipótesis que expliquen la falta en términos de una opción estratégica. En segundo lugar, procede al examen de los efectos discursivos que la ausencia produce durante el desarrollo de las emisiones de debate. El análisis se sitúa en dos niveles: estratégico y discursivo. Las conclusiones conectan estas dos miradas y los hallazgos que ofrece el abordaje comparativo. ; No dia 4 de outubro do 2015 ocorreu o primeiro debate presidencial na Argentina, organizado pela ONG Argentina Debate. O candidato oficialista, Daniel Scioli, decidiu se ausentar uma semana antes da data agendada para a realização do debate, uma escolha inesperada que teve como resultado a forte imagem de um lugar vazio durante a transmissão. Exatamente 3 anos depois, 4 de otubro de 2018 o então candidato Jair Bolsonaro não assistiu ao encontro prévio a primera ronda de comissões presidenciais no Brasil, parte de uma tradição de debates já consolidada no país. Partindo da base de que não assistir a um debate presidencial televisionado é uma decisão cara para um candidato na carreira presidencial, o presente artigo tem por objeto analisar ambas ausências. Em primeiro lugar, explora hipóteses que explicam a ausência em termos de uma opção estratégica. Ou seja, como conseqüência de um certo equilíbrio entre custos e benefícios dentro de uma série de condições. Isso está fundamentado em literatura pré-existente e em fontes secundárias. Em segundo lugar, examina os efeitos discursivos que a ausência produz durante o desenvolvimento das transmissões de debates. A análise está em dois níveis. Por um lado, se questiona brevemente como a falta apresentada pelos organizadores do debate, no nível da organização e no formato das trocas. Por outro, permite o exame do papel da ausência para a estruturação contraditória do campo político (Verón, 1987) nos argumentos dos debatedores. As conclusões conectam as duas perspectivas, estratégicas e discursivas, e os resultados oferecidos pela abordagem comparativa.
Mittels Process-Tracing werden in diesem Buch die komplexen Kausalmechanismen aufgedeckt, die die gelegentliche Demokratisierung der innerparteilichen Willensbildung der Parteien auf Landesebene erklären. Die Analyse baut dabei auf Daten aus Interviews, Partei- sowie Zeitungsdokumenten. Die Autorin zeigt, dass für gewöhnlich eine Kombination aus Wahlniederlage, dem Wunsch nach friedlicher Lösung eines internen Konflikts und taktischen Motiven ursächlich ist, damit Parteien ihrer Basis ein Mitspracherecht einräumen. In Bezug auf die Konsequenzen dieser neuen Selektionsmethode wird mittels statistischer Methoden gezeigt, dass erfahrene Bewerber in Urwahlen schlechtere Erfolgsaussichten haben; Frauen aber nicht benachteiligt werden.
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The topics of urban insecurity have advanced as a central part of the local electoral strategies in the recent years. The objective of this paper is to analyze the political strategies in dispute based on the problem of urban crime. The approach is qualitatively based on the technique of political discourse analysis. The fragments referring to the issue of urban security are analyzed within a corpus of campaign material (graphic, audiovisual and journalistic) in the election for Head of Government of the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 2007. The results show how most political spaces incorporated urban security and defined their electoral positions based on this topic. The speeches of each political space focus on the modalities that differentiate the way of intervening on the criminal issue. Thus, it was verified that the speech of the PRO used descriptive components with diagnostic and proactive elements (the city is risky and with the measures that will be taken the situation could be resolved), the FPV highlighted the evasive key of the security issue to focus on the social topics, and +BA reinforced the prescriptive component (it should continue like this). The components used by each candidate form a recipient that defines a differential us in each case: the victim citizen; the rational citizen and the protected citizen. ; Os tópicos sobre a insegurança urbana passaram a ser uma parte central das estratégias eleitorais locais nos últimos anos. O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar as estratégias eleitorais em disputa a partir dos discursos sobre o crime urbano na cidade de Buenos Aires. A abordagem é qualitativa a partir da técnica de análise do discurso político. Foram analisados os fragmentos referentes à questão da segurança urbana dentro de um corpus de material de campanha (gráfico, audiovisual e jornalístico) da eleição para Chefe de Governo da cidade de Buenos Aires (Argentina) no ano de 2007. Os resultados mostram como os espaços políticos majoritários incorporaram a segurança urbana e definiram seus posicionamentos eleitorais a partir desse tópico. Os discursos de cada espaço político se centram em três modalidades que diferenciam o modo de intervir sobre a questão criminal. Assim, verificouse que o discurso do PRO utilizou componentes descritivos com elementos diagnósticos e propositivos (a cidade oferece riscos e com as medidas que serão tomadas poderemos resolver a situação). O FPV destacou a chave evasiva do tema da segurança para se concentrar na questão social e o +BA reforçou a ordem prescritiva (devemos continuar assim). Os componentes utilizados pelos candidatos configuram um destinatário que define um "nós" diferencial em cada caso: o cidadão vítima, o cidadão racional e o cidadão protegido. ; Los tópicos sobre la inseguridad urbana pasaron a ser una parte central de las estrategias electorales locales en los últimos años. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar las estrategias electorales en disputa a partir de los discursos acerca del crimen urbano en la ciudad de Buenos Aires. El abordaje es cualitativo a partir de la técnica análisis del discurso político. Se analizan los fragmentos referidos a la cuestión de la seguridad urbana al interior de un corpus de material de campaña (gráfico, audiovisual y periodístico) de la elección de jefe de gobierno de Buenos Aires, Argentina, del 2007. Los resultados muestran cómo los espacios políticos mayoritarios incorporaron la seguridad urbana y definieron sus posicionamientos electorales a partir de este tópico. Los discursos de cada espacio político se centran en tres modalidades que diferencian el modo de intervenir sobre la cuestión criminal. Así, se verificó que el discurso del pro utilizó componentes descriptivos con elementos diagnósticos y propositivos (la ciudad es riesgosa y con las medidas que se tomarán se podrá resolver la situación), el FPV subrayó la clave evasiva del tema securitario para centrarse en la cuestión social, y +BA reforzó el orden prescriptivo (debemos seguir así). Los componentes utilizados por cada candidato configuran un destinatario que define un 'nosotros' diferencial en cada caso: el ciudadano víctima; el ciudadano racional; y un ciudadano protegido.
On October 6, Tunisian president Kais Saied won a second term with the highest abstention rate since the fall of Ben Ali. The hopes born of the Revolution of Dignity of 2011 have vanished into the quick sands of history as the country reverts to its traditional autocratic norm. Tunisia has embarked in a risky journey to an economic and political cliff-edge.Fewer Tunisians turned out to vote in the presidential election which gave president Kais Saied a second mandate (27.7%) than at any election since the fall of Ben Ali in January 2011. The 89% of voters who endorsed him may well confirm the majority view of those Tunisians who cast a ballot but in the world of modern-day Tunisia, nothing is what it looks like: growing repression takes the form of preventing candidates to stand, sending them to jail under false pretences, denying them the "signatures" they are legally required to gather, etc. A recent Arab Barometer analysis suggested Saied retained broad popular support. It is born of quiet despair at a corporatist system where insiders hold true economic and political power; where powerful businessmen languish in prison awaiting trial for alleged corruption; where the once powerful UGTT has been emasculated and a relatively free media gagged. Tunisia's accelerating journey to economic cliff-edge has been well documented by Hachemi Alaya, the editor of the Ecoweek newsletter who points to two statistics in the 2025 budget, which has just been put to parliament. Domestic borrowing is set to jump from 11,7 bn Tunisian Dinars (TD) this year to TD21,9 bn in 2025 (in other words the Central Bank will print money) while recourse to foreign borrowing will be cut from TD16.5bn to TD6,1 bn. Foreign credit markets are closing because Kais Saied refuses to broker an agreement with the IMF. This high-risk strategy could tip the economy over the cliff-edge.The same could be said of the country's journey to political cliff-edge. Reverting to autocracy started well before Saied's first election to the presidency in 2019 and was characterised by several oversights: the failure to reform the security apparatus and hold it to democratic account; the unwillingness of successive government to reform a corporatist state which favoured insiders and rents; the failure to reform the judicial and tax systems; and a denial of the growing economic and social fracture between a relatively prosperous coast and a poor hinterland which exports its water, natural resources (phosphates and oil) and man power to the city hubs of the coast – Tunis, Sousse and Sfax.A recent internal report drafted by the European Union's diplomatic service (EEAS) details "a clear deterioration of the political climate" and a "shrinking civic space" under Kais Saied. The EU fears the credibility of its foreign policy is at stake as it seeks to weigh growing concerns about the crushing of dissent in Tunisia and the 2023 EU-Tunisia Integration Pact aimed at stopping people from reaching Europe's shores from that country. The EU faced comparable situations when it signed agreements, built upon similar lines, with Turkey and Egypt. Who might these countries be? Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UAE which provide over and under the counter financial aid to the north African country, China and Russia maybe.The dilemma in Brussels is the result of the EU's propensity to mix defending its own interests and promoting democracy, which it is considered part of its "chore values". That mixing has led to endless confusion about what EU foreign policy really is, not least in southern rim Mediterranean countries which are ever less inclined to be "dictated to" as they see it by a Western world which it no longer respects. The EU has long boasted of its Neighbourhood Policy and the benefits it is supposed to bring to countries on both shores of the Mediterranean. A minority of economists such as Alfred Tovias and Gilbert Achcar have pointed out, ever since the inception of the Barcelona Process in 1995 that the benefits of the Neighbourhood Policy to southern rim countries were much less than the inflated EU vocabulary used to promote them. But, until recently the ruling doxa took little notice of such criticism nor did it accept that free trade agreements which do not include a much freer movement of people than the EU ever allowed for which a country such as Tunisia was not simply hypocritical, but doomed to fail. However tired they feel about the constant posturing, as they see it, of the Tunisian president and his disregard for the rule of law, nobody expects any change after this recent presidential election. The hopes born of the Revolution of Dignity of 2011 have vanished into the quick sands of history as the country reverts to its traditional autocratic norm.Saied's fight against corruption is genuine but increasingly akin to Don Quijote tilting at windmills. Leading businessmen are under lock and key but never brought to trial. The fair trial of one of two prisoners such as Kamel El-Taief might show how leading private groups have built their wealth on privileged access to political power and crony capitalism, which the president claims to hate. But such trials look unlikely to ever occur. Fear stalks the board room of Tunis and Sfax – private investors be they domestic or foreign are on strike. A country which fails to invest in its economy eventually runs into the ground.The EU is paying the price of a misunderstanding that goes back to before 2011 when a violent revolt forced the ruling class to get rid of Ben Ali in order to save their privileges. The Tunisian security forces forced Ben Ali to flee. In 2021 they backed Kais Saied. Tunisia was never the model economic boy beloved of the IMF and Brussels before 2011 nor the only Arab democracy they pretended after that date. In Tunisia as elsewhere in the Muslim world, the mukhabarat – secret police - hold the reins of power. Tunisia has reverted to autocracy, assuming it ever really left it. Keywords: Tunisia, Saied, elections, autocracy, EU, neighbourhood policyAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB or its donors
This is a follow-up to my post arguing that American political institutions, which were traditionally held to reduce polarization (and probably did), promote it given the conditions that prevail today (viz., parties that are distinguished by ideology). A new book by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt that makes the same general argument has been getting attention, so I thought I should say how my view differs from theirs. Levitsky and Ziblatt say that the main problem is institutions that work against majority rule, like the Senate, the Electoral College, and gerrymandered congressional districts. As Michelle Goldberg summarizes it "The Constitution's countermajoritarian provisions, combined with profound geographic polarization, have locked us into a crisis of minority rule." However, in recent years the institutions that are more majoritarian have been more of a problem. For example, most of the Republican members of the House of Representatives voted against "certifying" the 2020 election, but only a few of the Republican members of the Senate did. It's the House, not the Senate, that has tried to use the debt ceiling as a political weapon. Judges, including judges appointed by Trump, almost unanimously rejected Trump's attempts to overturn the results of the 2020 election. Since the election, Republican-controlled state legislatures have made efforts to change electoral rules to benefit Republicans. I think that the difference between the Senate and the House and state legislatures arises because Senators have a higher profile--someone who goes against the party may be able to survive, and even to benefit. But Representatives and members of the state legislature are unknown to many of their constituents. So the logic of trying to appeal to the "median voter" doesn't hold for them--the median voter probably won't even know what they've done, and will treat them like any other Democrat or Republican. But party activists will know, and may support a primary challenge or withhold financial support. I also want to elaborate on my point about the complexity of the American political system, especially the electoral system. That provides opportunities to take advantage of the system--figuring out some angle you can use to get your way. Of course, if you do that, the other party is likely to retaliate, and the possibility of retaliation can be an effective deterrent. But the complexity of the system also means that there's room for disagreement about whether an action is out of bounds, or how severe an infraction it is. So the other side commits some offense, you retaliate in what you regard as a reasonable and proportionate manner, and then they are indignant about what they regard as a grossly excessive reaction. It's even possible to take offense at things that haven't happened, but that you think might happen. For example, a Washington Post column by Jason Willick discussing the argument that Trump is ineligible to run for president: "What is sure to be a well-funded and well-coordinated campaign to disqualify Trump from office has begun.... Champions of 'automatic' disqualification have one pragmatic objective in mind: Eliminating Trump from U.S. politics. So what if they turn the 14th Amendment's Section 3 into a Red Scare instrument in the process? ... populists will someday have another chance in government. At that point, liberals might come to regret having legitimated the 14th Amendment as a quasi-authoritarian tool for purging political opposition." During the 2020 election campaign, the Claremont Review talked about how Democrats would try to overturn a Trump victory. And if the hypothetical action you became indignant about doesn't happen, you don't have to conclude that you were wrong--you can conclude that they surely would have done it if we hadn't called them out. And finally, some data. In 2016, a CNN/ORC poll asked people if they thought Trump would concede if he lost the election and then asked the same question about Hillary Clinton. About 65% said that Trump would not concede, and 25% said Clinton would not. Answers were strongly related to who you favored--Trump supporters were more likely to say that he would concede and less likely to say that Clinton would, and Clinton supporters were more likely to say that she would concede and Trump wouldn't. But that wasn't the only thing that made a difference: more educated people were more likely to say that both would concede. The percent expecting each to concede, by candidate preference and education:Not college grad Trump ClintonTrump supporter 52% 57%Clinton supporter 19% 92%Neither/DK 22% 63%College grad Trump ClintonTrump supporter 67% 70%Clinton supporter 26% 95%Neither/DK 30% 77%Similar questions were asked in 2020, with similar overall results, although I can't get the breakdowns. The point is that some Trump supporters could justify his refusal to concede by a belief that the Democrat wouldn't have conceded either. [Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]
Gerrymandering is the practice of deliberately drawing electoral districts in a way that provides unfair advantage to one group over another, typically with respect to political parties or particular social or ethnic groups (Bunge 1966; Horn 1999). The term itself was coined in 1812, after a Massachusetts Governor, Elbridge Gerry, signed into law a political reapportionment bill with long, sinuous districts that one political cartoonist aptly compared to a winged salamander (Morrill 1973). While this practice was by no means new, the particularly grievous instance had given it a name; because, of the profound impact that voting district boundaries can have on the outcome of single-candidate elections, the practice lives on some two centuries later. Since then, several important legislative and judicial standards have emerged at the level of US Federal Government that were intended to stymie this practice. These include the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which stipulated that US Congressional districts be comprised of contiguous territory in "as compact form as practicable" (Bunge 1966). And yet despite these laws and legal standards, the US Supreme Court has been "reluctant to overturn even fairly blatant partisan gerrymandering," (Horn 1999), in part due to the inherent complexity of ascribing arbitrary boundaries on complex social and geographic landscapes, but also due to the onerous (and sometimes conflicting) legal standards that have been established. As Bill Bunge (1966) put it, "the problem sounds geographically simple—merely construct regions of 'compact form'! But the grouping of locations into an antigerrymandered state touches on some of the deepest and most fundamental problems in regional geography." In the United States, the upcoming 2020 Census, and the resulting redistricting process, has brought gerrymandering back into focus. Specifically, algorithmically conducted geospatial analysis and the resulting cartographic visualizations produced have emerged as a central battleground on which various practices of redistricting are discussed. However, most spatial analysis and cartographic visualization of gerrymandering to date has relied almost exclusively on Euclidean, absolute representations of space (O'Sullivan et al . 2018). In this paper, we demonstrate how strictly Euclidean perspectives may fail to account for the quotidian experiences of space. Further, we argue towards a relational understanding of space that takes into account how individuals move through space in their day-to-day lives. To do so, we first return to a set of complex mathematical approaches first espoused during the quantitative revolution of the 1970s (Forer 1978; Morrill 1976; Morrill 1973; Tobler 1961; and others). Using new and improved computational tools, we improve upon these efforts, providing a process for generating new visualizations that explore relational spaces within congressional districts. Specifically, we use Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) within a graph network to bend and fold congressional districts in accordance with the travel-time it takes to move through them. We conclude by discussing the limitations of this approach and areas for further research. Though quantitative methods in the field of geography seem presently dominated by narrow views of absolute, Euclidean spaces, early efforts at defining quantitative geographic approaches were focused largely on finding new ways to define and visualize space (Janelle 2015; Kitchin 2006; O'Sullivan et al. 2018). Tobler (1961) proposed that much distortion of space by transportation can be understood through the transformation of coordinates. Bunge's transformation of the "real" travel time for commuters is one of the more famous visualization of this type of isochronic transformation (O'Sullivan et al. 2018). Forer (1978) expands upon this idea with a discussion of an all-points-to-all-points reorganization, rather than the bending of adjacent points of interest based on a singular, central anchor point. Such an approach is necessarily computationally intensive as points must be moved over many iterations as the relative location of adjacent points is also in flux, and there exists the possibility of complex inversions in cases where the interior of the geographic space is not navigable (O'Sullivan et al. 2018). Simply put, this type of computationally intensive visualization was extremely difficult in the 1970s and, additionally, newer techniques such as MDS and bidimensional regression not developed or relatively unknown at that time (Ahmed and Miller 2017). While the practical and mathematical execution of these approached failed to overcome the technical barriers of their time, deeper philosophical currents present in such were were carried on through discourse in both feminist and human geography. Much of this work has engaged with Marx's concept of the "annihilation of space by time" particularly as articulated through Harvey's (1990) explication of "time-space compression." Despite academic interest in the relational experiences of space in daily life and a recognition that distance alone is an insufficient means of characterizing the spaces and places in which human interaction takes place, there has been little engagement with these ideas with respect to the creation of representational voting districts where an emphasis on purportedly "neutral" algorithms and their resulting visualizations has dominated the public discourse. We present an approach for the visualization of congressional districts within the United States that is based upon the estimated travel time between points according to Bing Maps API. Such an approach is informed by the relational, lived experiences of individuals as they attempt to traverse space, but also requires significant computational complexity. The approach follows Forer's (1978) conceptual model of continuous spatial transformations between all points. To create a visualization that maintains some similarity to the types seen by traditional maps, points will be assigned as an evenly spaced grid at sufficient density to roughly approximate the full shape of traditional congressional district polygons. In our test case, we demonstrate significant distortion of districts when travel-time is taken into account that reveals otherwise cartographically hidden experiences of lived space. We select three districts in Washington state for this demonstration, although the open-source code can be readily applied to any district for which the user has information. In brief, the process involves the transformation of a congressional district to a set of coordinate points (Figure 1). A distance matrix of travel times between all-points-to-all-points is then constructed. MDS, a process for arranging points based on their dissimilarity (Bouts et al. 2016; Shimizu & Inoue 2009; VanderPlas 2016), allows for the rearranging of these points within a graph network such that the average travel time between all points in the graph is minimized. This follows Morrill's (1973; 1976) approach to the construction of congressional districts.
