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Strengthening local humanitarian engagement demands not only rethinking dominant understandings of religion, but also revisiting the principles and practices of humanitarianism. This book articulates key aspects of the 'transborder discourse' necessary for humanitarian dialogue in the 21st century.

Strengthening local humanitarian engagement demands not only rethinking dominant understandings of religion, but also revisiting the principles and practices of humanitarianism. This book articulates key aspects of the 'transborder discourse' necessary for humanitarian dialogue in the 21st century.

The education system in Quebec has found itself at the center of the debates about secularism since the 1960s. Embedded in broader academic debates about processes of secularization and deconfessionalization of state institutions, religious diversification of society, and reconfiguration of Catholicism, this article aims to analyze how private Catholic schools in post-Catholic Quebec respond to the challenges posed by the secularizing pressures of the state, and the religious diversification of their target populations. Based on a qualitative case study conducted in two private-partially-publicly-funded Catholic or Catholic-oriented high schools (one Anglophone, one Francophone) in Quebec, we argue that the different approaches observed result from the different processes of internal secularization that these two schools have gone through. We draw on Steve Bruce's notion of "cultural defense" and David Martin's conceptualization of different trajectories of secularization to interpret these results.

Abstract
This essay discusses in how far we can understand the evolution of secularism in South and Southeast Asia between the end of the First World War and decolonisation after 1945 as a result of transimperial and transnational patterns. In the context of the growing comparative literature on the history of secularisms around the globe, I argue for more attention for the mobility of ideas and people across borders. Conceptually, I suggest to capture the diversity of 20th century secularisms in terms of family resemblance and to understand this resemblance less as colonial inheritance but as the result of translocal networks and their circuits of ideas and practices since 1918. I approach these networks through a combination of global intellectual history, the history of transnational social networks, and the global history of non-state institutions. Empirically, I illustrate my argument with three case studies: the reception of Atatürk's reforms across Asia and the Middle East to illustrate transnational discourses around secularism; the role of social networks in the form of translocal women's circles in the interwar period; and private US foundations as global circuits of expertise. Together, these illustrations are an attempt to sustain a certain degree of coherence within globalising secularism studies while at the same time avoiding conceptual overstretch.

The French secularism from 1958 to 1969: however, the meaning of the word "secularism" is less obvious than it seems. That noun became established only belatedly, under the third Republic, with the policy of secularisation conducted by the republican. Since then, secularism has remained a subject of debate and controversy between citizens and between savers 1, and its very definition remains problematic. As Jean-Pierre Rioux points out, secularism is 'neither a concept, a substance, a concept, nor a principle of positive law', and its 'definition is not given in any code, law or constitution 2'. However, it is necessary to agree on a provisional meaning, if only in order to be able to define its contours: secularism is not a spiritual option (unlike Catholicism, atheism, etc.), but a game rule designed to enable citizens to live together with different beliefs. More specifically, it is a set of rules (legal and case-law) and practices (political, administrative, symbolic) designed to administer the place of religion in the State and in society, while respecting freedom of conscience and the freedom to exercise religion. I propose to examine here how this complex set of rules and practices evolved between 1 June 1958 and 28 April 1969, when General de Gaulle exercised power as head of the last government of the fourth Republic and then as President of the Fifth Republic. This is not the topic that attracted most attention from the historians of the period. Many works place this aspect of history in a secondary place, traditionally favouring the strengthening of executive power, the Gaullian theme of France's 'size', and decolonisation. At present, historiography is very attentive to political staff and Gaullist networks, particularly in the context of the GAULHORE research programme (Gaullists: men and Networks) launched in 2008 under the leadership of Bernard Lachaise ; International audience ; The French secularism from 1958 to 1969: however, the meaning of the word "secularism" is less obvious than it seems. ...

In these pages I intend to connect the recent debates on secularism and a certain anthropology of religion/spirituality involved in an exercise of radical participation, symmetry and ontological recognition of the objects it studies. Detranscendentalising religion is effective as far as the effects of this intellectual operation cancel out the agency and methodological reality of the beings, energies and forces with which subjects deal. To disguise or omit the most exceptional or incommunicable aspects of ethnographic experience and field notes, diluting them in a scientifically-acceptable discourse —a common procedure according to Favret-Saada— is all the more disturbing when one does not share the premise according to which epistemes, religious narratives and practices belong to the universe of the irrational, the imaginary, the unobservable, when they arise from an error of perception or an intellectual delusion, which turns truth into a knowledge independent of the statements of the natives. This article, which deals with all of this and is eminently theoretical, would be inconceivable without years of fieldwork dedicated to the methodological, epistemological and ontological issues involved in the understanding of religions/spiritualities, understood as politics, but also as an exceptional form of perceptual and sensory alterity. ; En estas páginas me propongo conectar los debates recientes sobre el laicismo y cierta antropología de la religión/espiritualidad involucrada en un ejercicio de participación radical, simetrización y reconocimiento ontológico de los objetos que estudia. Destrascendentalizar la religión resulta eficaz hasta donde los efectos de esa operación intelectual cancelan la agencia y realidad metodológica de los seres, energías y fuerzas con los que tratan los sujetos. Maquillar u omitir lo más excepcional o incomunicable de la experiencia etnográfica y las notas de campo para diluirlo en un discurso científicamente aceptable, un proceder tan común según Favret-Saada, resulta tanto más inquietante cuando no se comparte la premisa según la cual las epistemes, relatos y prácticas religiosas pertenecen/remiten al universo de lo irracional, lo imaginario, lo inobservable, se levantan sobre un error de percepción o un desvarío intelectual, lo que convierte la verdad en un saber independiente de los enunciados de los nativos. Este artículo, que trata de todo ello y es eminentemente teórico, sería inconcebible sin los años de trabajo de campo dedicados a las cuestiones metodológicas, epistemológicas y ontológicas implicadas en la comprensión de las religiones/espiritualidades, entendidas como política, pero también como una forma excepcional de alteridad perceptiva y sensorial.

In these pages I intend to connect the recent debates on secularism and a certain anthropology of religion/spirituality involved in an exercise of radical participation, symmetry and ontological recognition of the objects it studies. Detranscendentalising religion is effective as far as the effects of this intellectual operation cancel out the agency and methodological reality of the beings, energies and forces with which subjects deal. To disguise or omit the most exceptional or incommunicable aspects of ethnographic experience and field notes, diluting them in a scientifically-acceptable discourse —a common procedure according to Favret-Saada— is all the more disturbing when one does not share the premise according to which epistemes, religious narratives and practices belong to the universe of the irrational, the imaginary, the unobservable, when they arise from an error of perception or an intellectual delusion, which turns truth into a knowledge independent of the statements of the natives. This article, which deals with all of this and is eminently theoretical, would be inconceivable without years of fieldwork dedicated to the methodological, epistemological and ontological issues involved in the understanding of religions/spiritualities, understood as politics, but also as an exceptional form of perceptual and sensory alterity. ; En estas páginas me propongo conectar los debates recientes sobre el laicismo y cierta antropología de la religión/espiritualidad involucrada en un ejercicio de participación radical, simetrización y reconocimiento ontológico de los objetos que estudia. Destrascendentalizar la religión resulta eficaz hasta donde los efectos de esa operación intelectual cancelan la agencia y realidad metodológica de los seres, energías y fuerzas con los que tratan los sujetos. Maquillar u omitir lo más excepcional o incomunicable de la experiencia etnográfica y las notas de campo para diluirlo en un discurso científicamente aceptable, un proceder tan común según Favret-Saada, resulta tanto más inquietante cuando no se comparte la premisa según la cual las epistemes, relatos y prácticas religiosas pertenecen/remiten al universo de lo irracional, lo imaginario, lo inobservable, se levantan sobre un error de percepción o un desvarío intelectual, lo que convierte la verdad en un saber independiente de los enunciados de los nativos. Este artículo, que trata de todo ello y es eminentemente teórico, sería inconcebible sin los años de trabajo de campo dedicados a las cuestiones metodológicas, epistemológicas y ontológicas implicadas en la comprensión de las religiones/espiritualidades, entendidas como política, pero también como una forma excepcional de alteridad perceptiva y sensorial.

To what extent was the evolution of secularism in South and Southeast Asia between the end of the First World War and decolonisation after 1945 a result of transimperial and transnational patterns? To capture the diversity of twentieth-century secularisms, Clemens Six explores similarities resulting from translocal networks of ideas and practices since 1918. Six approaches these networks via a framework of global intellectual history, the history of transnational social networks, and the global history of non-state institutions. Empirically, he illustrates his argument with three case studies: the reception of Atatürk's reforms across Asia and the Middle East; translocal women's circles in the interwar period; and private US foundations after 1945

To put it into perspective, the principal of secularism in France must be positioned at the intersection of three cardinal pillars: freedom, citizenship and what has founded them historically and what embodies them: the Republic. These three closely intertwined pillars where each supports the other, allows individuals and the national community to flourish, move forward, build, and develop. If one of them breaks down, the whole edifice is destabilized and with it freedoms, including the freedom of worship.

The uprisings that led to regime change during the early period of the Arab Spring were initially inclusive and pluralistic in nature, with men and women from every political and religious orientation engaging actively in political activities on the street and in virtual spaces. While there was an opening of political space for women and the inclusion of demands of marginalized groups in the activists' agenda, the struggle to reimagine national identities that balance Islamic roots and secular yearnings is still ongoing in many countries in the region. This paper seeks to deepen understanding of the extent to which the pluralistic sentiments and openness to accepting the rights women have persisted following the uprising. We aim to examine changes in attitudes towards women's equality in countries that underwent regime change through popular uprisings during revolutionary upheavals of the Arab Spring and in countries where regimes have remained unchanged. Using available data from consecutive rounds of the Arab Barometer survey, we examine changes in attitudes in nine countries with two rounds of Arab Barometer during and post Arab Spring (Egypt, Yemen, Tunisia, Algeria, Lebanon, Sudan, Jordan, Iraq, Palestine). We find that support for "Muslim feminism" (an interpretation of gender equality grounded in Islam) has increased over the period and particularly in Arab Spring countries, while support for "secular feminism" has declined. In most countries examined, relatively high degrees of support for gender equality co-exist with a preference for Islamic interpretations of personal status codes pertaining to women. We discuss the implications of these findings for academics and activists concerned with women's rights in the Middle East North Africa (MENA).

The uprisings that led to regime change during the early period of the Arab Spring were initially inclusive and pluralistic in nature, with men and women from every political and religious orientation engaging actively in political activities on the street and in virtual spaces. While there was an opening of political space for women and the inclusion of demands of marginalized groups in the activists' agenda, the struggle to reimagine national identities that balance Islamic roots and secular yearnings is still ongoing in many countries in the region. This paper seeks to deepen understanding of the extent to which the pluralistic sentiments and openness to accepting the rights women have persisted following the uprising. We aim to examine changes in attitudes towards women's equality in countries that underwent regime change through popular uprisings during revolutionary upheavals of the Arab Spring and in countries where regimes have remained unchanged. Using available data from consecutive rounds of the Arab Barometer survey, we examine changes in attitudes in nine countries with two rounds of Arab Barometer during and post Arab Spring (Egypt, Yemen, Tunisia, Algeria, Lebanon, Sudan, Jordan, Iraq, Palestine). We find that support for "Muslim feminism" (an interpretation of gender equality grounded in Islam) has increased over the period and particularly in Arab Spring countries, while support for "secular feminism" has declined. In most countries examined, relatively high degrees of support for gender equality co-exist with a preference for Islamic interpretations of personal status codes pertaining to women. We discuss the implications of these findings for academics and activists concerned with women's rights in the Middle East North Africa (MENA).

AbstractThis article examines Jewish feminists in the British Columbia and Ontario women's movements, particularly among radical and socialist feminists. Feminists within these movements saw organised religion as patriarchal, hostile to the interests of women and thus to be rejected. Using archival and oral history sources, we argue that looking more closely at Jewish feminists within second‐wave feminism can help us to more clearly understand the nature of secularism in the women's movement, its implicit contradictions and unspoken Christian bias. Jewish feminists noted, for example, that Christian holidays such as Christmas or Easter could be seen as secular celebrations, while any celebration of Jewish heritage, even if it emerged from a very secular Jewish socialist culture, was suspect within secular feminist circles, and indeed could be denounced as an acceptance of patriarchy. We analyse the distinctive experiences of Jewish feminists as a minority community within an ostensibly secular women's movement. We argue that Jewish activist women, because of their liminal position within the movement, as both secular feminists and ethnic/religious other, could challenge and reveal the Christian roots of feminist secularism.

We used the three latest rounds of the religion module of International Social Survey Programme to study secularization in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, focusing on belief in God. We restricted our sample to the affiliated with the majority Protestant churches and the unaffiliated and analyzed the trends toward disaffiliation and disbelief in God. Then, we studied the association between confidence in churches, religious/secular upbringing, and demographic controls with belief in God using multinomial logistic regression models. Our treatment of belief in God as a nominal variable allowed the inclusion of both the element of doubt and different images of God in the analyses. The trends toward disbelief in God and disaffiliation suggest that secularization in Scandinavia accelerated in 2008–2018 relative to 1998-2008. In Norway, these trends were already significant in 1998–2008. Disaffiliation and disbelief in God are strongly associated, as both 'believing' and 'belonging' decayed in the three countries and seem to be strongly intertwined. We found that confidence in churches, and the frequency of attendance at church services (even if only about yearly) during the formative years are powerful predictors of belief in God. The strength of the association between confidence and attitude toward the church's power in society suggests that these two variables are fundamental to the conceptualization of belonging in the Scandinavian countries and very likely in a more general context.