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This paper investigates the dynamic effects of monetary and fiscal policy in a monetary union, which is characterized by asymmetric interest rate transmission. This asymmetry gives rise to intertemporal reversals in the relative effectiveness of policy on member country outputs. The direction and the number of these reversals depend on whether policies are unanticipated or anticipated. We also study the coordination between monetary and fiscal policy in a monetary union. Monetary policy may completely stabilize European output after unanticipated fiscal policy shocks. With anticipated fiscal policy shocks, complete stabilization throughout the overall adjustment process requires monetary policy to be time-inconsistent.

Using a DSGE model calibrated to the euro area, we analyze the international effects of afiscal devaluation (FD) implemented as a revenue-neutral shift from employer's socialcontributions to the Value Added Tax. We find that a FD in 'Southern European countries'has a strong positive effect on output, but mild effects on the trade balance and the realexchange rate. Since the benefits of a FD are small relative to the divergence incompetitiveness, it is best addressed through structural reforms

We use a two-country model with a central bank maximizing union-wide welfare and two fiscal authorities minimizing comparable, but slightly different country-wide losses. We analyze the rivalry between the three authorities in seven static games. Comparing a homogeneous with a heterogeneous monetary union, we find welfare losses to be significantly larger in the heterogeneous union. The best-performing scenarios are cooperation between all authorities and monetary leadership. Cooperation between the fiscal authorities is harmful to both the whole union's and the country-specific welfare.

KEY ISSUESContext. The region continued to experience a strong upswing in 2013 and the immediate outlook is for further vigorous growth and moderate inflation. Sustaining this performance over the medium term, however, will require ambitious growth-enhancing reforms, high quality public investment, and consolidation of the recent improvements in the regional political and security situation. The outlook is subject to moderate downside risks. In the short term, political stability could be tested with the upcoming elections in a number of member states, particularly in a context of high demand

We propose a continuous time model to investigate the impact of inflation credibility on sovereign debt dynamics. At every point in time, an impatient government decides fiscal surplus and inflation, without commitment. Inflation is costly, but reduces the real value of outstanding nominal debt. In equilibrium, debt dynamics is the result of two opposing forces: (i) impatience and (ii) the desire to conquer low inflation. A large increase in inflation credibility can trigger a process of debt accumulation. This rationalizes the sovereign debt booms that are often experienced by low inflation credibility countries upon joining a currency union.

We use a two-country model with a central bank maximizing union-wide welfare and two fiscal authorities minimizing comparable, but slightly different country-wide losses. We analyze the rivalry between the three authorities in seven static games. Comparing a homogeneous with a heterogeneous monetary union, we find welfare losses to be significantly larger in the heterogeneous union. The best-performing scenarios are cooperation between all authorities and monetary leadership. Cooperation between the fiscal authorities is harmful to both the whole union's and the country-specific welfare.