Es el voto nacionalista un voto de proximidad o un voto de compensacion? Una nueva aproximacion "especial" al voto en dos dimensiones

In: Revista española de ciencia política, Issue 16, p. 61-88

Abstract

This paper explores what makes dictators survive in power focusing on the strategies to buy-off loyalty. It is shown that dictators who are able to incorporate into the regime structure those he needs in order to stabilize his rule & some potential opposition members stay longer in power. To do so he resorts to the distribution of resources and, in case he need to incorporate larger sectors, to the creation of institutions. However, it is shown that the different actors that may oust the autocrat are conditioned by different considerations and, hence, variables. Deliver resources from commodity exports diminishes the probability of being deposed by the regime elite, while institutions prevent interventions both by the elite as well as the military. Society driven changes are avoided through the delivery of public goods such as economic growth. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.